



MARCVS
Tullius Ciceroes

three bookes of dueties
to Marcus his sonne,
turned out of la-
tine into Eng-
lish, by Ni-
cholas Grim
alde.

wherunto the latine
is adioyned.

Cum priuilegio.

Anno Domini.

1574.



L.

27.

22



See 9b; 59b

To the right reuerend

father in god, and his singular good

Lord, Thomas, Bishop of Ely,

one of the king, and Queenes

Majestyes moste honou-

rable ppyue

Counsel.

(.:.)



Having recourse
of late (right re-
uered father to
the olde studies
þ I once applied
in the vniuersi-
ty: and getting
some fruite of
quicke life to the
perusing, & re-

cording of those things, wherw in tyme
past I felt my self gretly both delighted, &
furthered: I gaue my mind chiesly to such
kind of lerning, as wold serue both best to
þ order of my study, & also to þ governace
of my life, so þ cōparing my experience,
and reading together, I might make my
pyuate diligence in studyng do ser-

C. y.

uise

The Epistle

inse to the open vse of lininge. In folo-
wying of whiche intent, what by encrease
of iudgement for yeres, what by trauai-
ling abroad in þe world, I founde ever more
& more so new profits, & commodities: þe
wheras, me thought, I had scene but the
shadow of thinges, now I begin more to
see (as it were) þe whole body therof. And
most of al, this profe I haue, i þe greatestt
and most profitable part of philosophye,
which is cōcerning māners: & namely in
þe booke, þe of duties be writte, by Marcus
Tullius Cicero: a matter conteyning þe
whole trade how to liue among men dis-
creetely, & honestly: & so rightly pointing
out the pathwaye to all vertue: as none
can be righter, onely Scripture excepted
Insomuche, that when I had well consi-
dered altogether: I said with my selfe cō-
cerning this, as did a certayne learned
mā, not lōg ago, by Homer: This is the
first time, I haue red ouer this auto: & as
oft as I red him, so oft scōwhat I finde, þe
I marked not befoze: & þe hath nede to be
depeley pōdered, so þe I fastied at the firste,
he

To the reader

he was easie: but now me thinks, he requiers a very heedful, & a musing reader
Wherfoze notwithstanding maruelous great
pleasure, espying: y^e either in p^rivate life
to attaine quietnesse and contentation: or
in office bearing to winne fame, and ho-
nour: or in eucry estate, both to auoid dis-
order, & enoymity, & also to kepe a ryght
rule, and commendable behauour: thys
booke plainly is the mirrour of wisedom,
the foztres of iustice, the master of mali-
nes, y^e schoole of tēperāce, y^e iewel of com-
lines: I wished manye mo to be partners
of such sweetenes, as I had partlye felte
my self: & to declare, y^e I mēt nolesse then
I wished: I layde to, my helping hande:
endenouring, by translation, to doe lyke
wise foz my countrey men: as Italians,
Frenchemen, Spaniards, Duchemen, &
other fozeynes haue liberallye doone foz
theirs. So, chiefly foz our vnlained peo-
ple I haue made this latin writer, englysh
& haue now brought into light, y^e frō the
so lōg was hiddē: & haue caused an auncy-
ēt w^ritig to becōc in a maner, new agai:

C. iij.

and

The Epistle.

And aboue, vsed but of few, to war com-
mō to a great many, so y^e our mē, vnder-
standing, what a treasure is among thē,
for the fashioning of their life, and being
by nature most of al other nations genē
to ciuilltie, & humanitie, when they shall
be ayded, & directed by these perfite pre-
cepts, may in al poyntes of good demean-
our, become people perelasse. Yet iudge
I all this labour litle worthe, & small ye
or nothing able to preuail, without your
honorable lordship were patron hereof,
to whō I do dedicate both my good hert,
& my worke also, (I cal it mine, as Plau-
tus, and Terence called the comedyes
theirs, which they made oute of Greeke)
not as to teach your lordship ought, that
you haue not alredy, but by your autho-
ritie, to get it the moze estimacion wyth
other. For as Tullies treatise beeyng so
ful of lerning, asketh a lerned mās iudge-
ment, whiche who so refuse, they shewe
thēselues to be vnwise, enē so suche a no-
ble counseler of Englād semeth most mete
to receiue so noble a senator of rome ito a
straunge

To the reader

straunge region. Doubtlesse amonge so many honozable deedes of your lordships, it shal not be the least honozable, if ye do Marcus Tullius this honour, to welcome him hither, and to be the verye cause, that so famous a Romaine may become familiar with our Englishe men. So shall a worthy peere be worthely entertained as very curtesye requyrethe, so your lordships iudgement muste needes be wel liked, which is wot to alow onely knowledge, and goodnesse, so wil the comō people more hyghly esteeme y thing, as it is expediet for the to do, and the sooner also will they followe these holesome lessōs, which is ful necessary, in a wel ordered state, to be shoyt, your lordship, for a chose patron, my trāslatiō, for a welcōe worke, & Tullie shalbe taken for suche a Tullie as he is. And like as Marcus Cicero, w y authozitie of a father, commēded these bookes to his yong Cicero, so whē our English youth shall beholde the ōce autozised by so reuerēd a father i god no doubt, they wil be y rather in loue w
C.iii. them

The Epistle.

them, and will counte it pleasaunt payne
taking here to enriche themselues wyth
enfozmations of vertue, ensamples out of
stories, mozal doctrine, politike prudence
antiquitie, varietie of marueylous mat-
ters, so conningly, & oratorially treated,
and endyted, as he was able to declare &
expresse, who was the first, and the chief
y euer cladde lady Philosophy in romain
attire. Thus, very lothe to let your
lordship from your weigh-
tie affaires, I make an
end, & pray god, long
to preserve your ho-
norable lordship
in health, with
encrease of
honour.
(.)

Your humble oratour.
Nicholas Grimald.

N, G, To the Reader.



All thinges in the
worlde (good rea-
der) bee made for
some vse, and end,
which end is moze
wozth, than all, y
doth seruice there-
vnto, and where
both y end is good, & what so serues ther-
to: there y whole doyng is likewise good.
In vs the best wozk is, to vse oure selues
wel, & wozthely who in the ozder of na-
turall thinges are of the best, & wozthiest
kinde. For what is their, y can vse it self:
onles it be enfourmed w reason: & vnder-
stāding: Dumb creatures, & liuelesse of
other be vscd: but theselues can they ne-
uer vse. Beastes endewd w life, & sence
may seeme to haue some seblant hereof:
in y, they vse their feeding, lodginge, & o-
ther necessaries, yet therby they obtayne
neither praisse, noz dispzaise, seig they do
it not of any free choise, but oly by y mo-
tion of kind, & as their appetite draweth
them.

The pface,

them. But we, who haue the great gyfte of wit, & reason, must not most of al stick still in that appetite, to get nothyng els, but pleasure, & profite, but ensuing y^e heauenly guide of our nature, muste bee led to the desire of trouth, honour, & seemelynes, wherewith the moze that we be decked, adozned, & beautified, the farther we be from the byutifhnesse of beastes, & the nerer appoche we to the nature deuine. In asmuch then as euery thing is bozne to do that which to his kind is most agreeable, & vs it belemeth most to vse our selues, our part wout doubt, and our duety shall we do best, if we imploy the vsinge of our selues to deedes, y^e be honest, & commendable. Other things when wee vse, as landes, houses, armoz, hozses, holwides, money, clothes, oz stuffe, we can not yet vse them at all times, and with them wee muste enforce, and busie oure selues also, whereas the vsing of our selues is in euery place at hande, and at no season to seeke. For whether we be doing somwhat, oz at rest, whether we abide in the
country,

N.G. To the Reader.

countrie, or in the citie: whether wee be occupied in earnest, or in game: no pause there is at al, but night and day wee vse our selues continually. Which thing sith in euerye portion of a mans life it hathe place, if it be wel, & wisely, & conueniently done, we shalbe wealful, & in a blessed case, if vnglaciously, and fondly, & wickedly, wretched shal we be, and in a woollfull plight. This are we taught to much, by the common lyfe of men, who for default of skyl, how to behaue themselves be confounded in deepe darknes of error, & ignorance, & wanting the right rule, they take chalke for cheese, as the saying is, they can not frame their affections, nor kepe them in temper. But suche maner cloudes be clerely dissolued, by y^e beams of Philosophy, which set before our eyesight the very ends, & markes, y^e selfe nature hath appointed vs. For in this worlde here beneath are three kyndes of lyuing wights, whereof some haue no more, but life, as plantes, herbes, and trees growing out of the grounde, some haue not onely

The p̄face;

onely life, but senses also: as Sheepe, oxen
& other beastes: ȳ thirde comprehendeth
bothe these: & our life and senses, hath ȳ
louerain ruler Reason: as in the nature
of man we se them al conioyned. It re-
mains, therfore, and mete it is for him,
such doings to practise: as may both seue-
rally agree with eche of these parts, and
generally with them altogether. To the
parcel inferiour (by whiche wee receyue
our noysshment, our growing, & the state
of our body) welfare is appoynted the vt-
most end: wherein the thing consisteth ȳ
we call profitable: whiche concernes the
getting, mainteining, or recovering of
helth. Of the soule, or life endewd wyth
sciences, pleasures is the end, ȳ it woulde
enjoy. The thirde nature, which is parte-
ner of reason, hath this prick to shoothe at
(if you consider it by it selfe alone) sciēce
& knowledge of trouth: if you beholde it
with the other two accompanied, it hath
honesty, worship, and honour.

These be e the verye endes, where to
mannes lyfe, and nature muste ende-
nour

To the reader,

nour to attayn: hither dothe Philosophie
prouise to bring a man, by her informacion.
For when she hath tolde in a generall
tie, what is honest, comely, paylable,
praise worthy, and in euery point conue-
nient: then may men, by intelligēce per-
ceyuing the trouth, truly expresse y^e same
in euery particular deede.

Wherfore seing reason cōtains y^e whole
life of man: & to it, as to their captain, the
other partes be obedient, or at least wise
ought to be: first, marke we the particu-
lar p^{ro}pertie of reason: then, how with y^e
other powers it exerciseth mā, after ward
the comely behauiour, & dutifull dealing
in the open resort, and felowship of men.
Manne minde is contented, and satisfi-
ed with nothing so muche, as the cleere
vnderstāding, and the vndeceauable sci-
ence of soothe. Chyefelye standeth hys
minde in contemplacion of immortall,
and pardurable things: therto, in such as
fade, & fall, it teacheth, ordeineth, appoin-
teth, cōmādeeth. Wherupō y^e order, cour-
se, figure, light, influēce, of sūne, moone,
and

The p̄face

and strerers it obserueth:concelueth the intelligences,aungels,soules, & fourmes immaterial:procedeth from them,and so moūteth vp to the very aucthoꝝ,& p̄ince of this woꝝldes vniuersitie: whō it knoweth,& knowledgeth to be one, the best, the mightiest,the truest,& most righteous,& everlastinge. Yet is the selfesame minde by the felowship,and company of the sences,& desires,manye a time called away from that p̄ncipal office , to consider these vnstable,and mutable things & sometime to cast in cōceit fourmes disseuered frō h̄ matter, mathematically: and sometime to view things sensible, h̄ can in no wise be sondered frō the material substance:as elements,beasts,herbz,trees,metals,stones,& such like: al h̄ while must needes be f̄ced,& fortified with h̄ trade of debating doubts,& discerninge of trouth from vntrouth:which is h̄ arte of Logik.the very rule of reason,and instrument of al discourse.

Nowe to speake of the vsynge of the whole man, by the continuall tenoure,
and

To the reader.

and stedfast rate of bodies celestial, and natural, the mind of mā learneth order, obedience, & concord. For like as God gouerneth things manifolde, mouable, and falling alwaye, beeing himselſe but one, vnremouable and euer during: so reason within vs ought to rule ranging luste, & rash motions of the minde, and the other vnworthier, and weaker parts: beeing it self stedfast, sage, principal, and strongly established.

In case a mā loue any one part of hym selfe to much: or seiw after the end therof by a wrong way, and cleane oute of fashion: hee shall not leade a lyfe all euen and straight but hooked, and croked, noz easie, and quiet, but miserably dis tempered. For who so be ouermuch enclined to paupering, & pleasing of the vitall portion, they be al bent to gather good, and wholly geuen to gain. They, that al only serue their senses, & set theirs delite to feele the pleasures of y^e same, by excessive either in riotting, & bāketting, & in outrageous fleshesondinges, or in other suche passaunces

The preface.

pastauces, as be sensual. They, whiche hold them content to leade a life contemplatiue, hauing no regard, ne respect to the forenamed parcels: do prooue solwe lowzing, blockish, rustical, and farre from al ciuillnesse of life. He, in whom reason ioynes with the senses, for to do the seruice: wil enforce himselfe to win worldly glozy, and soueraintie.

He y can cōpyse in his thought no large compasse, nor depe consideration: but is faynt, feeble, waueringe, and full of infirmitie: wil shew forth himselfe chiefly with appareling, or with some outward bragge, to supply his want within.

To such sorts of annoyance, & disconuenience, light, & moderation is brought by moral docttine: y whiche Marcus Tullius Cicero in these booke of duties, professeth. This learning teacheth so much to grant y vitall part, and the netherest: as wil be sufficient to p̄serue the life in helth, and wellfare. It willeth also y seeing porciō so to take fruitiō of pleasures: y neyther it defraude the lower parte of the

to the reader

the profits thereto appropiat, nor with
importune egginge annoye the mynde
whiche aspireth vnto verurie of opini-
ons, and vprightnesse of maners.

Without mo wordes, it assignethe that
foz to raygne, which is bozne to raygne,
and that to bee obeyssaunt, whiche is fra-
med foz obeyssaunce.

Now, when a man is so instructed with
philosophy, that he can full conuiently
liue sole, & at point deuise by himselfe, he
must be brought fozth abrode into y^e face
of the worlde, to the intent hee may pro-
cure, not ouely that becomes himselfe to
doe, but also the welth of o^rher folke. Hee
must rymeber the three folde state, & dy-
uysitie, y^e hee hath espied. & practised in
him self. & must transferre the same to the
gouernance both of his household priuat-
ly, & of the whole comōd openly. So shall
y^e meaneſt fozt, lyke y^e vital parcel in man
be occupied about y^e most seruile, & nede-
full woorkes, men of middle degree, lyke
the sensine soule, shall attend to affaires,
& sciences moze liberall. The nobilitie in
y^e cōmon gouernement, like reason in the

CC.I. nature

The Preface.

nature of man,shal rule all the multitude. That thing also doth Cully touche in this treatise and sheweth men in authoritie their duties, both in warre and peace, whereby theye maye make themselves, & their subiectes happy & fortunat. And not onely them, but all sorts of men he admonisheth, what theye haue to doe, throughout their life, according to their age, trade, and estate, with respecte to the circumstances of times, places, & psones. In the first booke, he firste deuideth dutie into the perfit, and the meane, leauinge the one (whyche belongeth to the ende of good, and is in it selfe ryght) to men of perfection, and prosecuting the other in certeine rules, & precepts, so that thereby euerye man maye frame & order his life. When hee leades vs to the synding out of duties, by taking aduise about the choise of honest things, and refusall of the vnhonest. Afterwarde hee sets forth the original causes, & the chiefe partes of honestye, withe their dyuties and properties. At the last, hee warneth vs to discerne the more, or mooste honest thing

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thing from the lesse or leaste, and alwaies in the vse therof, to preferre the greater. In the second, reherling profitable, and vnprofitable thinges: he sheweth, howe to attaine, & to vse the profitable, & howe to eschewe the contrary, & in the ende makes a cōparison of profitēs, teachinge to preferre the greter befoze the smaller, or the mo befoze the fewer.

In the third, he compareth profit wth the honestie, & wth euery parte thereof, not as if there could in dede be contrary betwene them, but he meanes the profite, which seemeth not honest, & the honestie which seemeth not profitable, or of either of them the apparaunt shewe, & he tels vs, what is to be doone, when they seeme so to strue, one wth an other, that honestie allureth vs one way, and profite calleth vs another way.

Thus the whole matter is referred, & applied to honestie, and profite, twoe principal points of good, the third (which we call pleasure, & is placed by the Peripatetikes in the nōber of good thinges) I will like a Stoike, doth but briefely

CC.vj.

touch

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touch as a thinge impertinent. But of the other two places, containinge all the doinges of men, Cicero hathe tolde hys minde, & left it vs in this booke: euen as fully, as in his life time hee conceived it in his hed. For who euer saw in so fewe leaues so much moral doctrine, & polity, call, set out wth so manye conninge cases, and feats oratoricall: What a sort of stories be there so notable of themselves, so handsomely appllied, so elegantl^y tolde & you shal not lightly reade the like, within so little compasse, in anye historian, that of purpose doth nothinge els, How finely, & featel^y, bee y^e poets verses alledged: With what a discretion are some auncient w^{ri}tters reprov^{ed}: With what subtilty & finesse of wit be certeine contronersies debated: Either of y^e chief philosophie, or of all humanit^y whate pointe is there lackinge: Aristotle artificially hath w^{ri}ttten of manners: but what for the lightsonesse & eloquent handlinge of the treatise, what for the latine tong, which we do vse more then the Greekes: Tullye is a bove him, Panetius w^{ro}te of

to the reader.

of duetifull demeanour: but though bys
wozke in some pointes was Tullyes pa:
terne: yet in al points, by al theire iudge
ments, that euer saw them both: Tullye
is aboue him. Xeno the Stoike wzote of
duitye: but seeing diuers Greekes, who
are Tullyes inferiours, were as good as
hee: certesse Tullye is aboue him. Posi
doni⁹ a Rhodiā, medled wth the same mat
ter, but nothing to Tullyus. So did He
cato, but nothing to Tullius. And many
other mo of latter time; but lord, how far
be they frō Tulli⁹: Tulli⁹ in his graue
peres, after he had heard a nōber of ler
ned men: after he had redde the most ap
proued anthors: after hee had endyted so
manye volumes: and his style was war
en ripe, his witte sage, bys learninge full
his iudgemēt perfitt: enterprised to drau
this draughte, and made it of suche excel
lence, as wee maye well wonder at in
blewing, & yet not attaine in solowng.
Tullius, hauinge doone many glorious
acts, in a state of gouernement most try
ūphāt, learned y^e most part of these lessōs
by experience. Tullius out of the Greke
CC. iij. authors

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anthours, of whom also some had beene
gouernours in flozishing empires, trans-
lated a great deale. Tullius to Marcus,
his welbeloued sonne, abydinge euen at
Athens, amonge the best Philosophers,
was not afrayde to sende this parcell of
philosophy. No doubt as welcome it was
to the learned Athenians, as the Greekes
doinges were to the Romaines, or as
nowe adales, the French and Italyans,
well framed wittynge were to those
Englishmen, that vnderstande them,
yea and so muche the more welcome, as
it was a rare thinge then, to see that
kinde of knowledge expressed in pure la-
tine. But in Rome, in Italie, in Euro-
pa, in all quarters, where latyne speeche
hadde place, and so it was embraced at al
times, of all menne, in euerye degree,
order, and estate. Rulers haue here found
much wittye policie, appertaininge to
the gouernance of realmes. Houshol-
ders, and parentes haue pyked out of
these bookes vertuous instructyons for
theire childezen & their seruantes. Doctors
and diuines haue here mette w mozaill
sentence

to the reader.

sentence, and ensamples, verie excellent,
Ciuil lawyers haue espied, touching ius-
tice and equitie, both rules appointed &
cases discussed.

Scholemen haue taken herebence pro-
blemes, & questyons, to debate at large,
and haue fetched from hence philosophi-
cal conclusions, with reasons & argumētis
to proue, & to disproue. Oratoures haue
bene wel furnished herebye wth sundrye
graces and ornaments of spech, and in y^e
lyke maner of mater, haue marked, how
to bestow theire stile. Rhetoricians, who
for theire exercise, doe vse declamations
haue taken out of this common places,
like large fieldes, where men may walke
at libertie. Scholemasters neuer wyfte
of syner phrasēs, for to make their scho-
lers acquainted with the verie beyne of
the Latyne language. At selue wordes
al men, that of wisdomē bee studious,
may get somewhat herein to sharpe the
wit, to steepe the intelligence, to feede the
mynde, to quicken the sprite, to augment
the reason, to directe the appetyte, to
frame the tongue, to fashion the maners,

The pface,

moreouer to rule, to obeye, to dispute, to determine, to teache, to perswade, and to suery nedeful purpose in a mans life.

Unlesse the selfe thing witnesse as much as I say, let me not be credited: but i case both the booke speak for it selfe; and to my testimonial I am able to adioine pzynces, by peres, wel beknowne & wel approued then shall both the worthines of y^e worke & also the weight of the aucthoritie winn credite & assent. Tullies duxties whē Cesar Augustus had redde ouer, still standing on his fecte: as he againe deliuered them to his nephew, of whō he had them Eloquent (quoth he) was this man, eloquent he was in dede: & one y^e loued well his countrey. Tullies duities had Seuerus, the noble emperour, in so greate pzyce, and reputacion: that of all the Romaines bookes, to read them, he thought him best apaid. Tullies duities haue I knowne good clerkes, & wel learned men beare about in theire bosomes, laying it ful neare their hartes, y^e they would haue lodged in theire heades: and entirelye louynge Tullies heauenlye companye,
which

To the reader,

Which way so euer they went. Tullies
dutie did Erasmus, the Roferdame, so
greatly commend: y in makinge menc-
on of them, he could not choose but break
forth into these wordes. What: wryteth
an Ethnike all this to Ethnikes: a pro-
fane man, to the profane: Yet in his pre-
ceptes of conuersacion. O Lorde, what
an equity, what an holynesse, what syn-
ceritye, what veritye: How wel doth all
together accord with nature: howe is all
framed euen by good reason: What a
consciēce requireth he of such as gouerne
the State: How plainely setteth he before
our eyes the maruailous and the amiable
beutifulnes of vertue: How much, how
religiously, yea howe like a diuine dothe
he teache of helping, & relieving other mē:
of getting and mainteining of loue, and
frendship: of the contempt of those vany-
ties: for which the common sorte of Chri-
stien folke will either doe, or suffer, they
care not what: Finally he deemeth them
full worthy, & full meeete both for schoole
maisters in their schooles to reade vnto
the youth: and also for olde men agayne
and

The preface.

and againe to vse, and to peruse.

These riches, and treasures of witte,
& wisdom, as Cicero transported out
of Greece into Italy, so haue I fetched
from thence, & conueied them into Eng-
land, & haue caused also Marcus Tullius
(more then he could doe, when hee was
aliue) to speake Englishe. Marueylous
is the matter, flowing the eloquence, rich
the store of stuffe, & full artificiall the en-
diting, but how I, in our maner of speech
haue expressed the same, the more the
booke be perused, the better it may chace
to appere. None other translation in our
tongue haue I soene, but one, which is of
all men of anye learning so wel lyked, y
they repute it & count it as none, yet if ye
list to compare this somewhat wth that no-
thing, perauenture this somewhat wil seeme
somewhat the more. Howbeit loke, what
rule the Rethorician giues in precept, to
be obserued of an Oratour, in tellinge of
his tale, y it be short, & wthout ydle words,
y it be plaine & wthout darke sence, y it bee
prouable, & without any swaruinge from
the trouth, the same rule shoulde bee vsed

in

To the reader.

in examining, & iudging of translation.
For if it bee not as brieft as the verbe
authoꝝ text requireth, what so is added
to his perfect stile, shal appeare superfluous,
& to serue rather to the makinge of
some paraphrase, or cōmentarie. Ther-
to, if it be vttered with ynkehoꝝne terms
& not with vsual woꝝdes, or if it be phra-
sed wth wꝝasted or farrefetched fourmes
of speech, not fine, but harsh, not easie,
but hard, not natural but violent it shall
seeme to be. When also, in case it yeld not
the meaninge of the authoꝝ, but either
folowinge fansy, or misledde by erreure
foꝝakes the true paterne, it cannot bee
approued foꝝ a faythfull & sure enterpre-
tation, which oughte to bee taken foꝝ the
greatest pꝛaise of al. These pointes as I
haue studied to perfourme, so where I
haue not alwaies attayned vnto them,
I shall desyre you, gentle reader, gentlye
to consider both the excellency of the auc-
thoꝝ, who is a pꝛfect oratoꝝ, & also y^e gret-
nesse of the matter, whiche is pꝛofounde
philosophie. Neuerthelesse such as be ex-
quisite in both the lāguages alredy, mai-
(And

The preface.

(& that with some profite, & pleasure) trye
what I haue done, & what they can doe,
all vnder one: if, laying my translatyon
aparte, they will set the latine befoze the,
& so assay their owne vaine. Either they
shall like: themselues the better, when
they conferre it wth my poore woorkman-
ship, or els perchaunce conne me y^e more
thanke for attempting, folowing, & accō-
plishinge of this enterpryse. Bee it so, one
hath neither the latine, nor the englyshe
eloquence: yet by the benefite of nature,
syth a man may do muche: namely if hee
thereto adioine vse, & exercise, here is for
him occasyon both to whet his wit, & al-
so to fyle his tong. For although an en-
glisheman hath his mother tongue, and
can talke apace, as he learned of his dam
yet is it one thing to tittle tattle, I wote
not how, or to chatter like a iay: and an o-
ther to bestow his wordes wysely, order-
ly, pleasantly, & pithily. Such as haue en-
glish meatly well, & but a smatteringe or
small tast in the latine, which number is
gret amōg y^e scholers of this realme: may
hereby fal into such acquaintaunce, and
fa

To the reader,

familiaritie with this moste excellent latine manne: that neither shal hys deuyse seeme harde, nor his art obscure nor his stile strange. I dare wel say, if this worke happe into a good studientes hande, hee will not thinke it ynough to runne ouer it once, as wee sate with trifles & toyes: but aduisedly, & wth good leasure, syth or ityth or vth times, hee will reade it, & read it, & read it again: first, by y^e p^rincipall points, by y^e dⁱfinitions, & the dⁱuisions: to see, what is treated, howe farre foozthe, in what order, and withe what varietye, then, to marke the p^rceptes, reasones, conclusion, & common places. After, vnto the saide places to referre all the stories, withe the verses poetical. Finally, as wel in the englishe, as the latyne, to weigh well properties of wordes, fashyons of phzases, and the oznamentes of both. Moreover, manye clerkes haue I knowne, eare this, which could conceaue & vnderstand ful well, whose tongue neuerthelesse in vtterance & vse of speache was in a manner maimed. Yea & some, that coulde also speake latyne readelye, and

The pface.

and wel fauoredlye, who to haue doone
as muche in our language, and to haue
handled the same matter, woulde haue
bene halfe blank, what neede mo words
I desire, my trauayle none other wyse
to be taken in worth, then the diligent p-
nser shal in effect finde fruit therof.

Now therfore, good reader, farre you
well, and remembre, how vnfit (as Ary-
stotle saith) and vnprofitable hearers of
moral science yongmen bee, as longe as
either they follow their youthly affectiōs
or doe continue vnskilfull, & rude in the
deedes, y of duitie belonge to mans lyfe.
For, al the while, they yelde them selues
to be led away of their madde moodes,
if you talke to them of vertues, and of
maners, ye doe but synge the deasse a
song. And howe shal theye bee able to
iudge, what is discretly, rightfully, va-
liantlye, moderatly, & worthelye done,
who neither haue anye such qualitie, nor
vnderstand by experience anye poynte of
y same. Yet for asmuch as it must of ne-
cessitie be knowne, what is vertue & vice,
besoꝛe a man can wel & wiselye liue, em-
brasinge

To the reader,

bracing the one, & eschewing the other
either to make sounde the sicke mynde
(in case it be diseased, and hath a wyll
to be relieved) take this doctrine, as a
medicynē, or els to confirme the whole,
that is to meane. in case you haue beene
well and honestly trained vp, more per-
fectlye to perceiue the pathe of good ma-
ners, wherein you may walke wyth en-
tire delyte, and come to the honoure of a
laudable life. Thus haue I holden you,
good reader, wyth my homely tale: nowe
wil I not bozow your pacience any lon-
ger but for your gentlenes and studious
disposition, wil streight waye sende you
from the scholer to the maister: and

from mee to the speeche of
this diuine oratour &
worthy philo-
sopher.

(. .)

¶ MARCVS

Cullius Cicerones first
booke of duties, to
Marcus his
sonne.

¶ MARCI TVL-

lii Ciceronis de offi-
ciis ad Marcum fi-
lium. Lib. I.



Though you
sonne Marke,
haturge nowe a
pere harde Cra-

tipus, and y in Athens,
must needes flowe full of
rules and lessons of philo-
sophie: because of the pas-
sing great excellency bothe
of your teacher, and of the
citie: whereof the one may
stoe you with knowledge
the other with ensamples:
yet as we selfe, to myne
owne furdurance, haue e-
uermore ioynd the latyne
with the greeke: and haue
done that, not onely in phi-
losophye, but also in the
practise of oratory: I thinke
it meete for you to dde the
same, y a like you may bee
in the redines of bothe the
kundes of eloquence. And
the which purpose verely,
we (as we suppose) haue
brought great ayde to oure
countrimen: that not onely
the



Vanquá te Mar-
ce fili annum iam
audientem Cra-

tippū, idq; Athenis, abun-
dare oportet p̄ceptis in-
stitutisq; philosophiæ, pp-
ter summam & doctoris
authoritatē, & vrbis: quo-
rum alter te scientia auge-
re p̄test, altera exemplis:
tamen vt ipse ad meā uti-
litatem semper cum grecis
latina coniuxi, neque id in
philosophia solum. sed e-
tiam in dicendi exercitati-
one feci: idem tibi censeo
faciendum, vt par sis in
vtriusque orationis facul-
tate. Quam quidem ad
rem nos (vt videmur)
magnum attulimus adiu-
mentū hominibus nostris:
vt non modo grecarum
A.i. littera-

de Officijs.

litterarū rudes, sed etiam the ignorant of the grecke
docti aliquantū se arbitré- tongue, but also the lear-
tur adeptos et ad dicendū ned reckon theselues ther=
et ad iudicādum. Quāob- by to haue attained some=
rem disces tu quidem à what, both to speache elo=
principe huius ætatis phi- quent, and also to iudge mēt.
losophorū, et disces quā wherfoze you shal learn in
diu voles (tā diu autē vel deede of the prince of philo=
le debebis, quoad te quā sopers in this age: & you
tum proficias non pœnite shall learne so long as you
bit) Sed tamē nostra legēs will (so long perdye ought
non multum à Peripateti- you to bee swillinge, as it
cis disidentia, quoniam v- shall not repent yee howe
triq; & Scratichi & Plato- muche ye profite) But yet
nici esse volumus, de reb⁹ readinge my bookes, not
ipsis vtere tuo iudicio: ni- greatye variant from the
hil enim impedio, oratio- Peripatetiks, because wee
nem autem latinam effici- wil be both | Socratiās, &
es profecto legendis no- Platonians, of the verye
stris pleniorē. Nec vero matters vse your owne
arrogāter hoc dictum ex- iudgement: for I nothinge
istimari velim: nam philo- ler: you: but of trouthe, by
sophādi scientiam conce- readyng my workes you
dens multis, quod est ora- shall make youre latine
toris proprium, aptē, dis- tongue the fuller. For yet
stincte, ornatē que dicere I woulde haue this sup=
(quoniā in eo studio etatē posed of a vaunt to be spo=
cōsūpsi) si id mihi assumo- ken. For geeuing place to
many in the knowledge of
philosophye, yf I take
vpon me that, which is an
orators propriety, aptly,
orderly & finely to speake:
because I haue passed my
time in that study, I seeme
after

after a certaine sorte, as in mine own right, to challeg it. For which cause I earnestly exhort you, my Cicero that diligently you read not only my orations, but these bookes also of philosophy, which now welnye to those haue euened themselves in quantitie. For there is a greater force of eloquence in those: but this euene, and tempered kinde of stile is also to be regarded. And this truely I see, hath happened to none of the Grekes, as yet: that one man trauayled in both the kindes: and followed as wel that lawierly trade of pleding, as this quiet forme of reasonyng: except perchaunce Demetrius Phalerius maye be compted in this number, who was a subtile reasoner no behemt orator, pleaseth yet, so as you may knowe him for Theophrasti scholar. But howe muche wee haue profited in bothe, I referre it to other mennes iudgement: certes we haue followed both, I thinke verely

Plato

Plato

videor id meo iure quodā modo vendicare. Quāobrem magnopere te hortor mi Cicero: vt nō solū orationes meas, sed hos etiam de philosophia libros, qui se iam illis ferē æquarunt, studiosē legas. Vis enim dicēdi maior est in illis: sed hoc quoq; colendū est æquabile, et tēperatum orationis genus. Et id quidem nemini græcorū video adhuc contigisse, et idem vtroq; in genere laboraret, seq̄returq; et illud forense dicēdi, et hoc quietū disputandi genus. Nisi forte Demetrius Phalerius in hoc numero haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parū vehemens: dulcis tamē vt Theophrasti discipulū possis agnoscere. Nos autem quantū in vtroq; profecerimus, aliorum sit iudicium, vtrumq; certē secuti sumus. Quod idem et

A.ij.

Plato-

de Officijs.

Platonē existimo. si genus id forense dicendi tractare voluisset, grauissime, et copiosissime potuisset dicere. Et demosthenem, si illa quæ a Platone dedicerat, tenuisset, & pronunciare voluisset ornate, splendideq; facere potuisset. Eodemq; modo de Aristotele et Isocrate iudico: quorum vterq; suo studio delectatus cōtēpsit alterum.

2. Sed cū statuisssem aliquid hoc tēpore ad te scribere, et multa posthac, ab eo exordiri volui maximū, qd' et ætati tuæ esset aptissimum, & authoritati meæ grauissimum. Nam cum multa sint in philosophia et graui et vtilia accutare, copioseque a philosophis disputata: latissime patere videntur ea, quæ de officijs tradita ab illis precepta sunt. Nulla enim vitæ pars, neq; publicis, neq;

Plato coulde haue spoken verpe grauely, and plenti-fully if he woulde haue practised the lawlyke sorte of pleading, & also Demosthenes coulde haue donne full finely, & semely, if he hadde kept still, & woulde haue vntered those things, whiche hee learned of Plato. And after þe same sorte I iudge of Aristotle, & Isocrates: either of whiche delighted in his owne study, despised þe other. But when I had determined to write some-what vnto you at this season, & many things hereafter: I was most willing to beginne with that, whiche bothe for your age shoulde be fittest, & for my aucthority & grauest. For wheras many matters in philosophy, bothe weyghie and profitable, be diligentie, & plentyfullie dysputed by phylosophers, those seeme moste largelye to spreade, whiche of dueties by them haue beene taughte and prescribed. For no parte of mannes lyfe, neyther in comen, nor priuate affaires

affaires, neither in matters
abrode, nor at home, nei-
ther if ye doe ought alone,
nor if ye contracte with a-
nother, may be without dui-
tie: and in regarding there
of resteth al honesty of life,
e in disposing the same, dis-
honesty. And this no dout
is a common matter with
al the philosophers. For
who is he, which geueinge
no rules of duitie, dare
name himself a philosopher
But there be sundrye doc-
trines, which in settinge
foorth the endes of goode
and badde, doe misurne al
duitie. For who in such wi-
se appointeth the soueraign
good that it hath nothing
adjoined with vertue: and
measurcth the same by hye
commodities, and not by ho-
nesty: it cometh to passe
that this man, if in hym-
selfe he agree, and bee not
sometime ouercome wiche
the goodnesse of nature:
canne vse neither friendship
neither iustice, nor lybe-
ralitie: and in noe wyse
doubtlesse, canne hee vse a
manly man, who iudgeth
paine the vtterest euil: nor
he

priuatis neq; forē sibi, ne-
que domestic in rebus, ne-
que si tecū agas quid, neq;
si cum altero cōtrahas va-
care officio potest. In eoq;
colēdo sita vitę est honel-
tas omnis, & id negligēdo
turpitudine. Atque hec qui
dē questio communis est
ōniū philosophorū. Quis
enim est, qui nullis officij
pręceptis tradēdis philoso-
phū se audeat dicere? Sed
sunt nonnullę disciplinę
quę propositis bonorū et
malorū finibus, officiū om-
ne puerunt. Nā qui sum-
mum bonū sic instituit, vt
nihil habeat cum virtute
coniunctum: idque suis cō-
modis, non honestate me-
titur: hic si sibi ipse consē-
tiat, & non interdum na-
turę bonitate vincatur, ne-
que amicitiam colere pos-
sit, nec iusticiā, nec liberali-
tatē Fortis vero dolorem
sūmum malū iudicans, aut

de officijs.

temperans, voluntatē sū-
mū bonorum statuēs, esse
certe nullo modo potest
q; quamq; ita sunt in prōp-
tis, vt res disputatione nō
egeat: sunt tamen à nobis
alio loco disputata. Hē dis-
ciplinæ igitur, si sibi cōsen-
taneq; esse velint de officio
nihil q̄ant dicere: neq; vl-
la officij præcepta firma,
stabilia coniuncta naturæ
tradi possūt, nisi aut ab ijs
qui solā virtute aut ab ijs
qui maxime honestatē pp-
ter se dicāt expetendā. Ita
que ppria est ea præcep-
tū Stoicorū, et Academi-
corum et Peripateticorū,
quoniā Aristonis, Pyrho-
nis, & Herilli iā pridē explo-
sa sētentia est, qui tamē ha-
berēt ius suū disputādi de
officio, si rerū aliquē delec-
tū reliquissent, vt ad offi-
cij inuētiōē aditus esset.
Sequitur igitur hoc qui-
dem tēpore et in hac que-
stione potissimū Stoicos:

he a tēperat man, who cōsi-
der the pleasure the greatest
good, which poits though
they be so apparant that
thing needeth no disputati-
on: yet they bee debated by
vs in another place. These
doctrines then, if they wyll
in themselves accorde, can
say nothing of duitie: ney-
there of duitie can there be
geuen any precepts, sure,
stedfast, and withenature
agreable, but by thē, who
mainteine that neither one-
lye, oz chiefly, honestie for
it selfe is to bee embraced.
And therefore the teaching
thereof properly belongs
to the Stoikes, and Aca-
demikes, & Peripatetikes,
because Aristoes, Pirho-
es & Herillus opinion lōg-
sins hath bene hyst out of
scholes, who neuerthelesse
should haue their lawefull
libertye to reason of duitie,
yf they hadde losse anye
choyse of thinges, that to
the outfindinge of duitie
there mighte haue bene an-
entrie wee wyll followe
therefore at this season,
and in thys matter,
chiefely the Stoikes, not
as a

as a traſſatour, but as we are accuſtomed, we will draw out of their fountayn after our own mind, & iudgement as much & in ſuche ſort, as ſhal ſeeme good.

It liketh me then, ſithen al my diſcourſe muſt bee of duitie, to deſcibe beefore what is duitie, whiche I maruaile, was ouer ſcaped of Panetius. For euery teaching of any mater, & by an orderly trade is take in hand, muſt begin & pceſſe at a definition, that it maye be perceiued, what the thig is, whereof the treatinge goeth. Al the queſtion of duities is twooſolde. One kinde there is, that belongeth to the ende of good, another that ſtandeth in precepts, by the which & trade of life maye bee faſhioned in euery condicion. Of the former kynde ſuche exam- ples there bee whether all duities bee perſite, or no: whether one duitie be more than another? & ſuche as bee of the ſame ſorte. But thoſe duities, where- of preceptes bee geuen, though they appertaine to

non vt interpretes, ſed (vt ſolemus (e fontibus eorum iudicio, arbitrioque nostro quantum quoque modo videtur hauriemus. Placet igitur (quonia disputationis de officio futura est) ante definire quid sit officium quod a Panetio premissum esse miror. Omnis enim, quae a ratione suscipitur de aliqua re institutio, debet a definitione perfici: vt intelligatur quid sit de quo disputetur. Omnis de officio duplex est questio. vnum genus est, quod pertinet ad finem bonorum: alterum quod positum est in preceptis, quibus in omnes partes vitae confirmari possit. Superioris generis huiusmodi exempla sunt. Omnia ne officia perfecta sint? nunquid officium aliud alio maius sit: & quae sunt generis eiusdem. Quorum autem officiorum precepta traduntur: ea quamquam pertinent ad

de officijs,

finem bonorum tamen id
minus apparet, quia magis
ad institutionē vitę cōmu-
nis spectare videntur: de
quibus est nobis his libris
explicandū. Atq; etiam a-
lia diuiso est officiij. Nā et
medium quoddā officium
dicitur, & perfectum. Per-
fectum officium rectū (o-
pinor) vocemus, qd' gręci
κατόρθωμα Hoc autem
commune officiū καθήκον
vocant. Atque ea sic defi-
niunt: vt rectum quod sit,
id perfectum officium esse
definiant. Medium autem
officiū id esse dicunt quod
cur factum sit, ratio pba-
bilis reddi possit. Triplex
igitur est, vt Panętio vi-
detur, consilij capiendi
deliberatio. Nam honest-
umnē factu sit an turpe
dubitant, id quod in deli-
berationem cadit in quo
considerando, sepe animi
in contrarias sententias

the end of good, yet & same
both lesse appeare, because
they seme rather to belong
to the framing of life, of &
which in these bookes, we
haue to opē our mind. And
also there is another diuisi-
on of duitie. For there is
saide to bee both a certaine
meane duitie, and a perfit.
I suppose, we may call the
perfit, or the right duitie,
Rectum, which as & Gree-
kes do terme κατορθωμα
& this meane or cōmō dūty
Commune. whiche theye
call καθήκον
And those they do thus de-
fine, that & same. Which is
Rectum, they define to be &
perfit duitie: & that, they
say is the meane dūty, for
the which, a probable rea-
son may be rendered, why
it is done.
Auisement then in counsel
taking is threefolde, as se-
meth to Panęti⁹. For first
mē doubt, whether it, that
falleth in aduisemēt be ho-
nest to be dōe, or dishonest:
i swępīg wherof many tics
mens minds are diuerslye
drawen

drawen into contrary opinions. Nexte, they searche and cast whether it, where vpon they take aduise-ment, auails or noe, to commoditie, and pleasantnesse of lyfe to ryches, and plenty of goods, to power, and sway of rule, wherby they may helpe bothe them selues, and theirs, all whiche aduise-ment falleth into the nature of profit. The third kind of doubting is: when it, that appeareth to be profitable, seemeth to strue with honesty. For where as profite dothe seeme to drawe to her honesty contrarywise, to call backe to her: it cometh to passe, that the minde in aduising is haled to and fro, and it bringeth a perplexed study of ymagination. whereas in deuydinge, it is a foule fault to leaue out any thig. Two thinges be ouerslipped in this diuision. For uerily wheather the thing be honest, or dishonest, is vsed to be aduised vpon: but also two honest thinges layd before vs whether is y honest: and likewise twoo

distrahuntur: Tum autem aut inquirunt, aut consultant ad vite commoditatem iucunditatemque, ad facultates rerum, atque copias, ad opes, ad potentiam, quibus & se possint iuuare & suos, conducat; id necne, de quo deliberant, q̄ de liberatio omnis in ratione utilitas cadit. Tertium dubitandi genus est, cū pugnare videtur cum honesto id, quod videtur vtile. Cū enim utilitas ad se rapere, honestas contra reuocare ad se videtur, fit vt distrahatur in deliberando animus, afferatq; accipitem curam cogitandi. Hac diuisione (cum preterire aliquid maximum vitium in diuidendo sit) duo pretermissa sūt. Nec enim solum vtrum honestum an turpe sit, deliberari solet: sed etiam duobus propositis honestis vtrum honestius. Itemque duobus

de Officiis.

propositis vtilib⁹, vtrū vti
lius. Ita quā ille triplicem
putauit esse rationē: in qui
q; partes distribui debere
reperitur. Primū igitur est
de honesto, sed de honesto
to dupliciter, tū pari ratio
ne de vtili: post de cōpara
4. tiōe eorū differēdū. Prin
cipio generi animatū ōni
est à natura tributum, vt
se, vitā, corpusq; tueatur,
declinetq; ea, que ei nociti
tura videātur: ōniaq; que
sint ad viuēdū necessaria
inquirat, et paret, vt pastū
vt latibula, vt alia eiusdem
generis. Cōmune autē ani
matium ōnium est cōiunc
tionis appetitus, pcreandi
causa, et cura quædā eorū
que pcreata sunt. Sed in
ter hominē & beluam hoc
maxime interest, qd' hæc
tātum quātum sensu mo
uetur ad id solū qd' adest
quodq; præses est se accō
modat, paululū admodū
fētiens pteritū, aut futurū

profitable thinges set be
fore vs, whether is y more
profitable. So y way wh
che he to ke to be but thre
fold, is found meete to be di
uided into siue ptes. First
then wee haue to treate of
honestye but y in two so
tes, next, as many ways of
profit, lastly, of y cōparison
of the both. Fro the begu
ning, to euery kinde of li
uing creature, it is geuen
by nature, to defend himself
his life, & his body, and a
uoid those thinges, which
may seeme likely to be har
meful, & seeke, and get all
things that be necessary to
liue with all, as feeding, as
couerts, as other of the sa
me sort. The appetite also
of comminge together for
engendringe sake & a cer
taine tendernes ouer the y
bee engendzed, is a cōmon
thing to all liuinge creatu
res. But betwene mā and
beast, this chiefly is y dif
ference, y a beast, so farre
as he is moued by sece, be
deth, him selfe, to that only
which is presēt, & at hande,
verye smallye perceiuinge
ought past or to come .but

an who is partaker of
 alon, whereby hee seethe
 quels beholdeth grounds
 causes of thinges, is not
 nozant of their procedin-
 is, and as it were theyre
 goings, cōpareth sem-
 ances, & with things pre-
 at, ioineth and knittethe
 ings to come, dothe soone
 pie the course of his hole
 e, & to the leading thereof
 rneuieth thiuges necessa-
 e. And the saide nature,
 ough the power of rea-
 n, winneth man to man,
 a felowship both in talk
 also of life, & engendzethe
 certeine speciali fauoure
 iefelp to themward, that
 e of them begotten, and
 rreth by the companyes
 men, that they bee wyl-
 ge both to be assēbled to-
 ether, and also to bee ser-
 scable one to another, &
 e those causes that theye
 dy to puruey suche thin-
 is, as may furnishe them
 n their apparel, and for
 stenaunce, not onelye for
 eselues, but for their wiv-
 es, chyliden, & other who
 ey holde deare, and ought
 defende. whych care stir-
 reth

Homo autem quoniam rati-
 onis est particeps, cōsequē-
 tia cernit, principia et cau-
 sas rerū videt, earumque
 progressus: et quasi átecef-
 siones non ignorat: simili-
 tudines comparat: rebusq;
 presentibus adiungit, atq;
 annectit futuras: facile to-
 tius vitæ cursum videt, ad
 eamq; degendam preparat
 res necessarias. Eadēq; na-
 tura vi rationis hominem
 conciliat homini & ad ora-
 tionis, & ad uitæ socie-
 tatem. Ingeneratq; in pri-
 mis præcipuum quendam
 amorem in eos, qui pro-
 creati sunt: impellitq;, vt
 hominum cœtus & cele-
 brari inter se, et sibi obedi-
 re velit: ob easque causas
 studeat parare ea, qua sup-
 peditent et ad cultum et
 ad victū, nec sibi soli sed
 coniungi, liberis, ceterisq;
 quos charos habeat, tue-
 rique debeat. Que cura

de Officiis.

excuscat etiam animos, et maiores ad re gerenda facit. In primisq; hominum est ppria veri inquisitio, atque inuestigatio. Itaq; cum sumus necessarijs negotijs curisq; vacui, tum auemus aliquid videre, audire, ac discere, cognitionemq; rerum aut occultarum, aut admirabiliu ad bene, beateq; viuendum necessaria ducimus. Ex quo intelligit, quod verum, simplex, sincerumq; sit, id esse naturam hominis aptissimum. Huic veri videndi cupiditati adiuncta est appetitio quedam principatus: ut nemini parere animus bene a natura informatus velit, nisi precipienti, aut docenti, aut vtilitatis causa iuste et legitime imperati, ex quo animi magnitudo existit, humanarumq; rerum contemptio. Nec vero illa pua vis naturae est rationisq; quod vnum hoc aialletit quid sit ordo

reth by also mens spirit and makes them of more courage to do theire business. Also searchynge, and tracynge out of trouthe chiefe mans property. Therefore when wee be boyde of necessarpe cares and busines. then we come to see, to heare, & to learn somewhat, and we thynke the knowledge of thinges eether hydden, or wonderful, verpe necessarpe to good & blisseful life where of is gathered that what so is true, simple, & pure, fittest for the nature of man.

There is rayned to the loue of espyng the trouthe a certain desire of souerainty, so as a well framed mynde by nature is willing to obey noe man, but hym, that instructeth, and teacheth: or hym, that for cause of his weale, iustly and lawfully gouerneth wherein standeth the greatness of courage, & of worldly vanities. And that truly is no small power of nature & reason. this creature onely perceiues what is order: what it is, becom

cometh in debes, and
 pds: & what is measure
 d therfore, of those sã-
 ngs which be discerned
 sight, no other creature
 recueth the beautye. the
 ace, & ppoziciõ of par-
 , which nature & reason
 eying from the eyes to
 mind dothe moze iudge
 eauty, a stedfastnes, & an
 er in counsell. & debes
 to be obserued: and is
 orful, & it do nothing vn-
 nely, or womannyshly:
 herto both in al though
 & debes, & nothing wã-
 ly either it dõ, or ima-
 n. Of whiche thinges is
 ged, & made that honesti,
 & we seke: which thou-
 e it be not auanced, pet
 nestie it is, & we truelye
 y, though of no man it be
 umeded, is pet cõmen-
 ble by nature. you see,
 ne dark, & very four-
 e doubtlesse, and (as it
 ere (the face of honestie:
 hich in case it might bee
 holden with the eyes,
 ould stirre vp (as sayth
 lato) a maruelous loue
 wilsdome.

But

quid deceat in factis, dictis
 que qui sit mod⁹. Itaq; eo-
 rû iſorû, quę aspectu sētū
 tur, nullū aliud animal pul-
 critudinē, venustatē, cōue-
 nientiam partiū sētū. Quā
 similitudinē natura ratio-
 que ab oculis ad animum
 trāsferēs multo etiā magis
 pulchritudinē, constantiā,
 ordinē in consilijs, factisq;
 conseruandū putat: cauet-
 que ne quid indecore, effē-
 minatēue faciat: tū in ōni-
 bus et opinionibus et fac-
 tis ne quid libidinosē aut
 faciat, aut cogitet. Quibus
 ex rebus cōflatur, et effici-
 tur id qd' q̄rimus honestū,
 qd' etiā si nobilitatū nō sit
 tamē honestum sit: quod-
 que verē dicimus etiam si
 anullo laudetur, laudabile
 esse natura. Formā quidē
 ipā Mar̄ fili, et tāquā faciē
 honesti vides: quę si oculis
 c̄neres: 'mirabil' amor' (vt
 ait Plato) excitat' sapiētię.

de Officiis

Sed ōne qd' honestū est, id
quatuor partiū oritur ex
aliqua. Aut enim in pspici-
entia veri, solertiaq; versa-
tur: aut in hominū societa-
te tuēda, tribuēdoq; quod
suū est cuiq;, et rerū cōtrac-
tatū fide: aut in animi ex-
cellsi, atq; inuicti magnitu-
dine ac robore, aut in ōni-
ū, quę fiunt quęq; dicūtur
ordinē et modo, in quo in-
est modestia & tēperātia.
Quę quatuor quāquā iter
se colligata, atq; implicita
sūt: tamē ex singulis certa
officiorū genera nascūtur
velut ex ea pparte, quę pri-
mò descripta est (in qua
sapiētiā et prudētiā pponi-
m⁹) inest, indagatio atq; in-
uentio veri: eiusq; virtutis
hoc munus est propriū. vt
enim quisq; maxime pspi-
cit, quid in re quaq; veris-
simum sit, quiq; et acutissi-
me & clereme potest et
videre et explicare ra-
tionem, is prudentissi-
mus & sapientissimus rite

But all that is here
springeth out of some
of 4 fower braunches. f
it is occupied eyther in
insight of trouthe, and s
fulness, or in pzeferuing
felowship of men, and g
uing euery body his ow
& keping a fapthfulness
contracts, or in 4 great
& mightines of haur, & b
cōquerable courage: or
in the orde, & measure
all things, that are done
sayde, wherein resteth
cretion and temperaunt
which fower, though th
be linked, & tangled tog
ther: yet certayne seuer
kindes of duities do gre
out of euery one of the,
out of 4 braunche, & sin
was descriued (where
we place wisdom & p
dence) issues 4 searching
tryng out of trouthe: a
this is the verpe prop
wozke of that vertue. f
who so thozowseeth in
what in euery case is tr
est: and who moste wit
lye, and readilye is
ble bothe to see, and gee
the reason: hee woo
thelpe is wont to bee r
puted the swittest, and t
wille

myself. wherefoze to thys
 vertue trouth is apointed,
 as the mater wherupon to
 worke, and wherein to bee
 occupied. But to the other
 thre vertues are assigned
 necessities, to get, & keepe
 those things, whereby the
 trade of māns life is mayn-
 tained: to the intent the fe-
 dowshep, & nighbourhood
 of men bee preserved: & the
 worthines, and greatnesse
 of conrage mayc shine a-
 boade: not onely in aug-
 menting of substance, & pro-
 curing of comodities bothe
 to him and to his, but also
 muche moze in despyllinge
 of the same. But orde, and
 modestnesse, and measure
 keeping, and such like, haue
 to do in that kinde: where-
 unto must be toynd a cer-
 taine doing, and not onely
 in earnest occuppying of
 wit. For applying a cer-
 taine mean, & orde to such
 things as be medled with-
 in māns life, wee shall ob-
 serue bothe honestye, and
 comelinessse.
 Now of those four pla-
 ces, wherinto we haue di-
 uided y nature & strengthe
 of ho-

haberi solet. Quocirca
 huic quasi materia quam
 tractet, et in qua versetur,
 subiecta est veritas. Reli-
 quis autem tribus virtuti-
 bus necessitates propositę
 sunt ad eas res paradas, tu-
 endasq; quibus actio vitę
 continetur, vt et societas
 hominum, coniunctioq;ue
 seruetur, et animi excellē-
 tia magnitudoq;ue, cū in au-
 gēdis opibus, vtilitatibusq;
 et, sibi et suis comparandis
 tūm multo magis in his
 ipsis despiciendis eluceat.
 Ordo autem et cōstantia,
 et moderatio, et ea, q̄ sunt
 ijs similia versantur in eo
 genere, ad qd. adhibenda
 est quedā actio, nō solū mē-
 tis agitatio. His enim rebꝰ,
 quę tractātur in vitā mo-
 dum quendam adhibētes
 & ordinem, honestatem
 & decus conseruabimus.
 Ex quatuor autem locis
 in quos honesti naturam,

de Officiis

vimque diuissimus primus ille qui in veri cognitione consistit, maxime naturam attingit humanā. Omnes enim trahimur et ducimur ad cognitionis et sciētię cupiditatem: in qua excellere pulcrū putam⁹: labi autē et errare, nescire, et decepti, et malū, et turpe ducimus. In hoc genere et naturali, et honesto, duo vitia vitanda sunt: vnū ne incognita ꝑ cognitis habeamus, iisque temerē assētiāmur, qđ vitiū effugere qui velit (ōnes autem velle debēt) adhibebit ad cōsiderādas res, et tempus, et diligentiam. Alterum est vitium, quōd quidam minis magnū studium, multamque operam in res obscuras, atque difficiles conferūt, easdemque non necessarias. Quib⁹ vitijs declinatis, qđ in rebus honestis et cognitione dignis opere curęque ponetur, id iure laudabi-

of honestie. & same first, & consisteth in knowledge of trouth, toucheth māns kind neresst of all. For we be all drawne, and led to a desire of knowledge, and science: wherein to passe other, we thinke it a goodly matter: but to slide. to erre, to bee ignorant, to bee decepued, we compt it both euil, and dishonest. In this kinde of vertue, which is bothe naturall: & honest, two faults must be auoyded: one, that wee take not thinges we know not, as though we knewe them, & rashly assent to them, whiche faulte who so wil eschewe (& all though to be willig) must employ to the considering of matters both leasure, & diligence. In other faulte there is, that some bestow ouer gret study, & to much trauaile, in dark, and difficult thinges, and the same nothing necessary, whiche faultes auoided, whatsoeuer labour, and diligence shall bee spent in honest thinges, and woorthye of knowledge, the same of ryght shall be commended as

as in Astrologie, we haue
heard what Caius Sul-
pitius was, in Geometry,
wee knew what Sextus
Pompeius could do. many
in logik, mo in ciuill law,
which sciences be all occu-
pyed in tracinge out the
trouthe, w^{ch} the studie
wherof to be drawen from
trauayling in matter, it is
against duty. For vertues
whole prayse consisteth in
doing, from which yet of-
tentimes there is hadde a
resting while, and there be
graunted manye recourses
against vnto study, yea and
the musinge of the minde,
that neuer ceaseth, maye
continue vs in the studies
of contemplacion, euen wth
out our trauayle. But let
euery thought, and mouing
of the minde be occupied
either in takinge of aduise-
ment aboute honest mat-
ters, and pertainyng to the
good, and blisseful lyfe, or
els in studies of science,
and knowledg. And thus
haue we spoken of the fyrste
fountaine of duitie. But
of the other thre vertues
remainyng, that kinde

exten-

tur: vt in astrologia C. Sul-
pitium audiimus: in Geo-
metria Sextum Pompeiū
ipsi cognouimus: multos
in dialecticis plures in iu-
re ciuili, quę omnes artes
in veri inuestigatione ver-
santur: cuius studio a re-
bus agendie abduci cōtra
officiū est. Virtutis enim
laus omnis. in actione con-
sistit: a qua tamen sepe fit
intermissio, multiq; dantur
ad studia reditus: tum agi-
tatio mentis quę nunquā
acquiescit, potest nos in
studijs cogitationis, etiam
sine opera nostra continē-
re. Omnis autem cogita-
tio, motusq; animi, aut in
cōsilijs capiendis de rebus
honestis, et pertinentibus
ad bene, beateq; viuendū,
aut in studijs sciencię, co-
gnitionisq; versatur, Ac
de primo quidem officij
fonte diximus. De tribus
autem reliquis latissimē

B. j.

de Officiis.

patet ea ratio, qua societas hominum inter ipsos, & vite quasi communitas continetur. Cuius partes duae sunt. Iustitia, in qua virtutis splendor est maximus, ex qua boni viri nominantur: & huic coniuncta beneficentia, quam eandem vel benignitatem, vel liberalitatem appellare licet. Sed iustitiae primum munus est, vt ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria, deinde vt communibus per communibus vtatur, priuatis autem vt suis. Sunt autem priuata nulla natura, sed aut vetere occupatione, vt qui quondam in vacua venerunt: aut victoria, vt qui bello potiti sunt: aut lege, pactione, conditione, sorte.

Ex quo fit, vt ager Arpinas Arpinatum dicatur: Tusculanus Tus-

extendeth fardest, wherein is contained the fellowshipp of men among themselves and (as it were) the inter partning of mans lyfe.

Whereof there bee two partes: Justice is one, in the which is the greatest brightnes of vertue, wherof good men beare their name, and to this is ioyned bonntifulnesse, which same we may terme eyther gentlenesse, or liberality.

But the principall duty of iustice is, that no manne hurt another, vnlesse he be prouoked by wronge: the next, that he vse things common, as common, & things priuate, as his own. Howsoe be it by nature, things priuate bee none, but eyther by auncient possession, as of theirs who in olde tyme came into waste grounds, or by victoꝛye, as of theirs who got things in warre: or by lawe, couenauunt, condition, or lotte. Whereof it comes to passe, that the ground Arpinas is compyled the Arpinatians: the ground Tusculan & Tus-

culanians. And after thys
forte is the poyntinge oute
of pinate possessions.

Whereupon seying there is
made a mans owne of eue-
rye one of those thyniges
whlich by nature were com-
mon, let euerye one enioye
that to euery one is befaile
More than that, if any mā
will couet to him selfe, hee
shall breake the lawe of
mans felowship. But by
cause (as it is notablie wri-
ten of Plato) we be bozne
not for our selues alone,
but some deale of our birth
our countrey. some deale our
parēts, some deale our frēds
do claime, and (as liketh
Stoikes) whatsoeuer is
bredde vpon earth, all to
the vse of manne is crea-
ted, but man for mannes
owne cause is begotten,
that they among the selues
one maye helpe an other,
herein we be bounde to fo-
low nature our leader: and
to sette abroade that maye
serue for common commo-
dities, by enterchaunge of
duities in geuig & taking,
and also by artes, by tra-
uaille

culanorum. Similisque est
priuatorum possessionum
descriptio. Ex quo, quia
suum cuiusque sit eorum
que natura fuerant comu-
nia, quod cuique obtigit,
id quisque teneat. Eo si
quis sibi plus appetet, vio-
labit ius humane societa-
tis. Sed quoniam (vt pre-
clare scriptum est a Pla-
tone) non nobis solum na-
ti sumus: ortusque nostri
partem patria vendicat,
partem parentes, partem
amici, atque (vt placet
Stoicis) que in terris gign-
untur, ad vsum homi-
num omnia creari, homi-
nes autem hominum causa
esse generatos, vt ipsi in-
ter se alij alijs prodesse
possint: in hoc naturam
ducem debemus sequi &
communes vtilitates in
medium afferre mutatio-
ne officiorum, dando ac-
cipiendoque tum artibus,

de Officiis.

tum opera, tum facultati-
bus deuincire hominū in-
ter homines fortietatē. Fū-
damentum autem iusticię
est fides, id est dictorum,
conuentorumq; cōstantia
et veritas, ex quo, quāquā
hoc videbitur fortasse cui-
piam durius, tamen aude-
amus imitari Stoicos, qui
studiosē exquirunt vnde
verba sint dicta, creda-
musq; quia fiat quod dic-
tum est, appellatā Fidem.
Sed iniusticię duo genera
sūt: vnū, eorū qui inferūt:
alterum, eorum qui ab ijs,
quibus infertur, si possent,
non propulsant iniuriam.
Nam qui iniuste impetum
in quēpiā facit, aut ira, aut
aliqua perturbatione inci-
tatus, is quasi manus vio-
lenter videtur afferre so-
cio: qui autē non defēdit
nec obsistit, si potest iniu-
rię, tam est in vitio, quā
si parentes, aut amicos aut
patriam deserat.

uayle by riches, to knit the
fellowshippe of man wythe
man.

But faithfulness is the
foundatiō of iustice which
is in word, and couenaunt,
a trouthe, and stedfastnesse
where vppon though thys
shall seeme to some per-
chaunce ouerharde: yet let
vs be bolde to folow the
Stoiks whiche heedful-
ly serche out from whence
woordes bee fetchēd, and
let vs thinke, that it is cal-
led faithfulness, because it
is fulfilled, whiche was
faithed.

Contrarywise, there be
twoe kindes of iniustyce.
One, of such as offer it: an
other, of those who though
they be able do not defende
wzong from thē to whō it
is offered. For who so vn-
iustly doth make assault vpon
any man, either styrred
by choler, or any passion he
seemeth as with violence,
to kil hys fellow, & who so
defendeth not, nor stan-
deth iniurye if he be able, is
as farre in faulte: as if he
should forsake his parents
his frends, or his cōstreys

And

And in deede those iniur-
ries that are doone of pur-
pose to hurt, do often times
arise of feare, when hee
who intendeth to hurt an-
other, is afrayde that un-
lesse he doe it to the other
he may him selfe be touched
wythe some discommodity.

And for the moste parte
many menne take occasyon
to doe wronge, of intent to
compassse those thinges
they haue coueted: in whi-
che kynde of vice, con-
tynellie, most largely she-
weth her selfe. For wythe-
standing riches be coueted
bothe for necessary vles of
the life, and also to enioye
pleasure.

But in those in who there
is a greater courage, coue-
ting of money hath an eye
to power, and ablenesse of
pleasuring, as of late Mar-
cus Crassus denyed anye
substance to be gret ynough
for him, that in a common
weale would bee a prince:
while hee were not able to
his reuenuē to maintein an
army. Sumptuous fur-
nitures do also delite, and
countenaunce of life, wyth

25. 19.

syne

Atq; ille quidem iniuria,
que nocendi causa de in-
dustria inferuntur, sepe a
metu proficiscuntur: cum
is qui alteri nocere cogi-
tat, timet, ne nisi id alteri
fecerit, ipse aliquo afficia-
tur in commodo. Maximā
autem partem ad iniuriam
faciendam aggrediuntur
nonnulli, vt adipiscantur
ea que concupierunt: in
quo vicio latissimē patet a-
uaritia. Expetuntur autē
diuitie, tum ad vsus vitæ
necessarios, tum ad perfru-
endas voluptates. In qui-
bus autem maior est ani-
mus, in his pecuniæ cupi-
ditas spectat ad opes, et
ad gratificandi facultatum
vt nuper M. Crassus nega-
bat vllam satis magnam
pecuniam esse ei, qui in re
pub. princeps vellet esse,
cuius fructibus, exercitum
alere non posset. Delectat
etiam magnifici appara-
tus, vitæq; cultus, cum

de Officiis.

elegātia & copia. Quibus
rebus effectū est, vt infinita
pecuniæ cupiditas esset

Nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocēs vituperanda est, sed fugienda
sēp iniuria. Maxime autē adducūtur pleriq; , vt eos
iusticiæ capiat obliuio, cū
in impiorū, honorū, gloriæ
cupiditatē inciderit qd' enim apud Ennium,

NVLA SANCTA
SOCIETAS, NEC
FIDES REGNI EST.

Id latius patet, nā quicquid
cuiusmodi est in quo non
possint plures excellere, in
eo plerūq; fit tāta cōtētio,
vt difficillimū sit factā seruare
societate. Declarauit
id modo temeritas C. Cæsaris
qui oīa iura diuina &
humanā puerit, ppter eū
quē sibi ipse opinionis errore
finxerat principatū.
Est autem in hoc genere
molestum, quod in maximis
animis, splēdidissimisque
ingenijs plerūq; existūt

synenelle and plenty. By
whiche meanes it is come
to passe that endlesse is the
desire of riches.

And truly the enlargement of a mannes priuate
goodes, hurtful to no body,
is not to bee dispraised
but euermoze iniurie is to
be shonned. But the moste
parte of menne chiesely be
brought to forgette iustice
when they fall into the desire
of rule, honour, or glorye,
for that whiche is in
Ennius,

In Empyre is no godly
fellowship, nor no faith,
reacheth furder. For what
soeuer is of suche sorte,
wherein many cannot bee
chiese, therein comunoniy
happene the so greate contention,
that verpe harde it is to
kepe a godly societie.
The stoyme of Caius Cæsar
declared that of late
who turned topsytoturye
at the lawes of God, and
manne, for that soueraynties
sake, which hee to himselfe,
by the error of his owne
conceite, had imagined.
And in this kynd, it is a
griefful case, that desires
of ho-

of honoz, rule, power, & glo-
ry be cōmonly in y greatest
cozages, & goodliest witts.
Wherfoze the moze heede
muſt be taken, & we offēde
nothing in that behalfe.

But there is a greate di-
uerſitie in al iniuſtice, whe-
ther the wrong be done of
any ſturte of y mind, whi-
che cōmonly is but ſhort, &
foz a ſeaſon, oꝛ els of pur-
poſe & aduiſedly. Foz the
harmes be eaſier, that bee
fall of ſome ſodein moode,
thā ſuch as bee done beig
deniſed and pꝛepared foꝛ.
And thus wee haue ſaide
enough of doing iniury.

But there are wonte to
bee many cauſes why wee
refuſe to defende an other,
& doe leaue our duitie. Foz
men bee vnwillinge to take
vpon thē either diſpleaſure
oꝛ trauaile oꝛ charges, oꝛ
els they be ſo geuē to negli-
gence, ſlothfulneſſe, ydle-
neſſe, pꝛiuate ſtudies, oꝛ cer-
taine buſineſſe, that theye
ſuffer them to be helpeleſſe,
whom theye ought to ſaue
harmeleſſe. Wherfoze we
muſt looke leaſt it bee not
ſufficient, that is ſpoken of

Plato

honoris: imperij, potentie
glorie cupiditates. Quo
magis cauēdū eſt, ne quid
ī eo genere peccetur. Sed
in omni iniuſticia pꝛmultū
interēſt vtrū pꝛeturbatiōe
aliqua animi, que plerūq;
breuis eſt, & ad tēpus, an
conſultō & cogitatō fiat
iniuria. Leuiora enim ſūt
ea, quæ repentino aliquo
motu accidūt, quā ea, quæ
meditata & pꝛeparata in-
ferūtur. Ac de inferenda
quidē iniuria ſatis eſt dic-
tū. Pꝛetermittēde autē de

9
fēſionis, deſerēdiq; officiij
plures ſolēt eſſe cauſa. Nā
aut inimicitias, aut laborē
aut ſūpt⁹ ſuſcipere nolūt,
aut etiā negligētia, pigri-
tia, inercia, aut ſuis ſtudijs
quibꝫdamuē occupatio-
nibus ſic impediuntur,
vt eos quos tutari debe-
ant, deſertos eſſe patian-
tur. Itaque videndū eſt, ne
non ſatis ſit id, quod apud

B. iij.

Pla.

de Officiis,

Platonem est in Philosophus dictum: quod in veri inuestigatione versentur, quodque ea, quę plerique vehementer expetunt, de quibus inter se digladiari soleant, contemnant, & pro nihilo ducāt, propterea iustos esse Nam dum alterum iustitię genus assequuntur, in inferenda. ne cui noceant, iniuria, in alterum incidunt. Discēdi enim studio impediti, quos tueri debent, deserunt. Itaque eos ad Rempublicam ne accessuros quidem putat, nisi coactos. Aequius autem erat id voluntate fieri, nam hoc ipsum ita iustum est, quod recte fit: si est voluntarium. Sunt etiam qui aut studio rei familiaris tuendę, aut odio quodam hominum suum se negotium agere dicant ne facere cuiquam

Plato touching the Philosophers, that therefore they be iust, because they be occupied in tracynge oute trouthe: and because they despyse, and set at noughte suche thinges as the moste part of men gredelye desire & among them selues are wont to be at daggers drawig for the same. For while they attaine one kinde of iustice, that they hurte no man with doing of iniury, they fall into the other. For beyng letted with the study of lerning, they forsake them, whom they ought to defende. And therefore hee thinke they woulde not enter into the commō weale, were they not compelled. But it were more reason, that voluntarily it shoulde be doone. For what so is rightly doone, the same thereby is iust, if it be voluntarye. There bee also who epyther for loue of sauinge their substance, or a certaine hatred to men, do say, that they meddle onely with their owne matters, lest they may seeme to doe any

anye bodye wronge, who
while theye bee void of one
kinde of iniustice, do runne
into the other. For they
forsake the felowshippe of
life, because they bestowe
no study, no labour, no sub
stance vpon it.

Seeing then after the de
claring of the two kyndes
of iniustice, wee haue there
to ioined the causes of ey
ther kinde & haue sette out
those thinges afoze, where
in iustice is contened, wee
may easelye iudge, what ys
the duytie of euery sealon.
excepte wee sauoure oure
selues to farre. For it ys
harde to haue a carefulnesse
ouer other mens matters,
although that same Chre
mes in Terence countethe
nothinge straunge to hym.
of ought that pertaines to
manne.

¶ Neuerthelesse, because
we perceiue and seele those
thinges moze, that do hap
pen to oure selues, eyther
luckely, or vnfortunatelye,
than such as befall to other
which (as ye would saye)
wee behold a great way of
wee iudge otherwise of the
then

videantur iniuriā, qui dū
altero iniusticię genere va
cant, in alterum incurrūt.
Deserūt enim vitę socie
tatem : quia nichil confe
runt in eam studij, nihil o
perę, nihil facultatū. Quo
niam igitur duobus gene
ribus iniusticię propositis
adiunxim⁹ causas vtriusq;
generis, easque res ante cō
stituimus, quibus iusticia
cōtinetur: facile quod cu
iusq; temporis officium sit
poterimus (nisi nosmet ip
sos valde amabimus) iudi
care. Est enim difficilis cu
ra rerum alienarum, quā
quā Terētianus ille Chre
mes humani nihil a se ali
enum putat. Sed tamen
quia magis ea precipimus
atque sentimus, quę nobis
ipsis aut prospera, aut ad
uersa eueniunt, quā illa
quę ceteris, quę quasi lon
go interuallo interiecto
videmus, aliter de illis,

de officiis.

ac de nobis iudicamus.

Quo circa bene precipiunt
qui vetant quicquā agere,
quod dubites æquū sit, an
iniquū. Aequitas enim lu-
cet ipsa p se, dubitatio au-
tem cogitationē significat
10 iniuriæ. Sed incidūt sæpe
tēpora, cū ea quæ maxi-
me vidētur digna esse iu-
sto homine, eoq, quē virū
bonū decim⁹, cōmutātur.
fiuntq; contraria: vt non
reddere depositum, etiam
ne furioso promissū face-
re, quæq; pertinent ad ve-
ritatem, et ad fidem ea ne-
gare interdum, & non ser-
uare sit iustū. Referri enim
decet ad ea, que posui in
principio fundamēta iusti-
ciæ: primum, vt ne cui no-
ceatur: deinde vt cōmuni
vtilitati seruiatur. Ea cū
tēpore cōmutātur cōmu-
tatur officiū: vt nō sēp sit
idē. Potest enim accidere
promissū aliquod, & cōuē-
tū, vt id effici sit in vtile,

then of our selues. There
foze they teache well, that
forbidde to doe any thing
whiche ye doubt, whether
it be right or wrong. For
very right sheweth of it self
but doubtinge declares an
imagination of wrong.
But often there befall sea-
sons, that those duties,
which seeme to bee moste
meete for a iust man, and
him whom wee call a good
manne bee chaunged and
become cōtrarious, so that
some time it is iuste not to
restore that is layd to kepe
also not to persourne pro-
mise wiche a mad manne,
and to denye those thinges
which cōcerne ones trothe
and honestye. For it ys
meete they bee referred to
those foundations of iustice
whiche I laide in the be-
ginninge: firste, that no
manne be hurte, nexte, that
common profite be serued.
When these bee chaunged
by time, chaunged is dū-
tie, that it remaines not al-
wayes a lyke. For there
may chaunce some promise
and couenant, that may bee
vnprofitable to bee perfoz-
med

med either to him, to whō
it is promised: or els to him
that promised it. For (as it
is in the fables) if Neptune
had not doone that to
Theseus hee promised.
Theseus had not bene be-
rest of his sōne Hippolitus
For of the three bonds (as
is written) that was the
thirde. whiche in hys surp
hee asked for the deathe of
Hippolitus: and when he
had obtained it, he fell in
to heauy wailings. There-
fore neither thole promyses
are to be fulfilled, whiche
are vnprofitable to them,
to whom you made them:
nor if they hurte you more
then they profit him, whō
you promised.

It is against dutie, the
greater harne to be rather
admitted, then the lesse: as
if you haue appointed your
self, with any man to come
as his counsellor in his mat-
ter, that is in hand: & in
meane season, your sōne be-
gins to fall soze sicke, let yt
not be rekened against du-
tie, not to pfourme & ye p-
mised: yea & he more shold
swaue frō dutie, to whō &
promis

vel ei cui promissum sit;
vel ei qui promiserit. Nam
si (vt in fabulis est.) Nep-
tunus quod Theseo pro-
miserat, non fecisset: The-
seus filio Hippolito non
esset orbatus: ex tribus e-
nim optatis, (vti scribi-
tur) hoc erat tertium,
quod de Hippoliti inte-
ritu iratus optauit, quo
impetrato in maximos
luctus incidit. Nec pro-
missa igitur seruanda sūt
ea, que sint ijs, quibus p-
miseris in vtilia, nec si
plustibi noceant, quàm
illi prosint, cui promiseris
Contra officium est, ma-
ius dānum anteponi mi-
nori, vt si constitueris te
cuipiam aduocatum in
rem præsentem esse ven-
turum, atque interim gra-
uiter ægrotare filius cœ-
perit, non sit contra offi-
cium, non facere quod
dixeris, magisque ille, cui

de officiis.

promissum sit, ab officio
discedat, si se destitutum
queratur. Iam illis pro-
missis non standum esse
quis non videt, quæ coac-
tus quis metu, aut decep-
tus dolo promiserit. Quæ
quidem pleraque iure pre-
torio liberantur, nonnul-
la legibus. Existunt etiam
sepe iniuriæ calumnia qua-
dam, et nimis calida, et
malitiosa iuris interpreta-
tione. Ex quo illud, sum-
mum ius, summa iniuria,
factum est iam tritum ser-
mone prouerbium. Quo
in genere etiā in Repub.
multa peccantur: vt ille
qui, cum centum trigenta
dierum essent, cum hoste
pactæ induciæ, noctu po-
pulabatur agros, quod di-
erum essent pactæ nō noc-
tium induciæ: Nec noster
quidem probandus est:
si verum est. Quintum
Fabium Labeonē, seu quē

promisse was made, if hee
woulde complaine him self
to be disapointed.

Now who seeth not that
it is not meete, to stand to
those promisses, whiche a
man hath promised beeing
constrained with feare, or
deluded with guyle. Which
thinges, for the moste part
bee discharged by the Iudice
toys court, & many of them
by statute.

Wronges also oftē tymes
do rise vppon a certeine ca-
uillation, and ouer craftye,
and subtle misconstruyng
of the lawe where vppon
that saying, Extreme law,
extreme wronge, is nowe
made a well woꝛne pro-
uerbe in communication.
In whiche kynde manye
thinges bee done amisse e-
uen in the common weales
matters, as he. who when
the truce was taken wpyth
the enemye, for 130. dayes
ouer ranne his lande in the
night because y^e truce was
taken for daies and not for
nighetes. No noꝝ yet oure
coustremā is to be allowed
(if it be true) y^e Quintus
Fabius Labeo, or any other
man

man (for I haue nothing but by hear say) beinge by the Senate appointed daifman to the Polones, and Neapolitanes, aboute the boundes of their land, did commune with the either of them apart, when he came to the place & theye should not do. nor coust any thing gredelye, and that rather they would sette backe, then encroche bypon eche other. which when eyther of them hadde so don. there was a parcell of grounde sette in the middes. And so hee caused their boundes to bee staked out, euen as they had tolde him the residue. that was in the middes hee adiudged to the people of Rome. This plainely is to disceane, & not to iudge. wherefore suche swynnesse in euery case is to bee auoieded,
There be certeine duties also to be obserued euē towards them of whom you haue receiued wrong. For in reuenge, & chastisement, there is a measure to be v. sed. And I wrote not, whether it be sufficient for him that

alium (nichil enim preter auditum habeo) arbitrum Nolanis et Neapolitanis de finibus agri a Senatu datum: cum ad locum venisset, cum vtriusque separatim locutum, ne cupidum quid agerent, nec appetere, atque ut regredi, quam progredi malent. Id cum vtrique fecisset, aliquantum agri in medio relictum est. Itaque illorum fines, sicut ipsi dixerant, terminauit, in medio relictum quod erat, populo Roma. adiudicauit. Decipere hoc quidem, non iudicare est.

Quo circa in omni re fugienda est talis solertia.

Sunt autem quedam officia etiam aduersus eos seruanda, a quibus iniuriam acceperis. Est enim vlciscendi & puniendi modus. Atque haud scio, an satis sit cum qui

de Officiis.

laccessierit, iniurię sue peni-
tere, vt et ipse ne quid tale
posthac committat, et cæ-
teri sint ad iniuriam tardi-
ores. Atque in Repub.
maxime conseruanda sūt
iura belli. Nam cum sint
duo genera decertandi:
vnū per disceptationē, al-
terū per vim, cūmq; illud
propriū sit hominis, hoc
beluarum, cōfugiendū est
ad posterius, si vti nō licet
superiore. Quare suspici-
enda quidem bella sūt ob
eam causam, vt sine iniu-
ria in pace viuatur, parta
autem victoria, cōseruan-
di sunt ij qui non crudeles
in bello, nec immanes fue-
rūt: vt maiores nostri Tus-
culanos, Auquos, Volscos,
Sabinos, Hernicos in ciui-
tatē etiā acceper: at Char-
thaginē & Numātiā fūdi-
tas sustulerūt. Nollem Co-
rinthū: sed credo illos se-
cutor opportunitatē loci,

that began to repent hym
of & wꝛong: but that he bee
punished, that he cōmit not
the like offense again: and
that other also may be the
slower to do wꝛong.

And the lawe of armes
must in any wise bee kept.
in & cōmō weal. For wher
as there be two kindes of
contētiō, one by reasoning
an other by violence: & the
first is the property of mā,
& second. of beast: we must
fly to the latter, if we may
not vse the former.

Wherefore to this end, &
purpose we must enter in
warre: & about iniury we
may liue in peace: & when
the victorie is gotten, they
must be saued, who haue
not been cruel, nor vnmer-
ciful in fight: as our ances-
ters euen into & citie recei-
ued the, Tusculanes, & E-
quianes, the Volscianes, &
Sabines, & the Hernikes:
but they bitterly razed Car-
thage, and Numance. Co-
rinth I woulde they had
not, but I beleue, they
chiefly respected the situ-
ation: least the very place
might

might encourage them , at any time to moue warre.

After my minde certesse, it is meteſwaies to geue counſel to peace, that ſhall haue in it no fraude, nor guyle. wherein if men had agreed to mee, we ſhoulde haue hadde, althoughe not the beſt, yet ſome common ſweale, which now is none. And not onely for them ye muſte prouyde, whom by force you haue ſubdued, but they alſo, who come in with yeldded weapon, bypon affiaunce in the Captaine (although ſ Hamme hath bated the wall) are to bee receiued. In whiche point, iuſtice hath bene ſo greatly regarded with our men, that they, who had taken cities, to mercy, or nations conquered in warre, ſhould be thire patrones, by the cuſtome of our aunceſters. And the Juſtice of warre is moſte ſincerely deſcryued, in the ſeciall lawes of the people of Rome. whereby it may be perceined, that no warr is juſt, but whiche eyther for

maxime ne poſſet aliquādo ad bellum faciendum locus ipſe adhortari. Mea quidem ſentētia, paci, quæ nihil habitura ſit inſidiarū ſemper eſt conſulendum. In quo ſi mihi obtemperatum eſſet: eſſi non optimam, at aliquam Remp. (quæ nunc nulla eſt) haberemus. At cū ijs, quos vi deuiceris, conſulendum eſt: tū ij, qui armis poſitis ad imperatorum fidē conſugiunt (quamuis murum aries percuffit) recipiendi ſunt. In quo tanto pere apud noſtros iuſtitia culta eſt, vt ij, qui ciuitates aut nationes deuictas bello in fidem recipiſſent, earum patroni eſſent more maiorum. Ac belli quidem æquitas ſanctiſſime ſeciali Populi Romani iure perſcripta eſt. Ex quo intelligi poteſt, nullum bellum eſſe iuſtum, niſi quod aut

de Officiis.

rebus répetitis geratur,
aut denunciatum ante sit,
et indictum. Pompilius
imperator tenebat prouin-
ciam, in cuius exercitu Ca-
tonis filius Tiro militabat.
Cum autem Pompilio vi-
deretur vnam dimittere
legionem: Catonis quo-
que filium, qui in eadem
legione militabat, dimisit.
Sed cum amore pugnan-
di in exercitu remansisset:
Cato ad Pópilium scrip-
sit, vt si eum pateretur in
exercitu remanere, secun-
do eum obligaret militię
sacramento: quia priore
amisso, iure pugnare cum
hostibus non poterat. A-
deo summa erat observa-
tio in bello mouēdo. Mar-
ci quidem Catonis senis
est epistola ad M. filium:
in qua scripsit se audisse eū
missum factum esse a Cō-
sule, cum in Macedonia
bello Persico miles esset.
monet igitur, vt caueat ne

things inclaine is moued
or is proclaimed before, &
bidden by defiance. Pōp-
ilius & Romans generall
kepte a prouince, in whose
army, Catoes sonne went
for a yong soldior a war-
farre. And when it liked
Pōpilius to discharge one
legion, he discharged Ca-
toes sōne also, who serued
in that legion as a soldior
But when hee, for loue of
the warres, remained in
campe still. Cato did write
to Pōmpilius, that if hee
would suffer him to remai-
n in & army, he should swere
him souldioner againe, be-
cause he might not lawfully
fight with the enemy, &
former othe beinge dischar-
ged. So passing gret regard
they had in makinge their
warres. There is a letter
abrode, of Marcus Cato,
& old man, to Marcus his
sonne, wherein hee wrote
that he heard, he was dis-
charged by the Consul, be-
inge a souldior in Mace-
donie, at & Persia warres.
Hee warnes him therefore
to beware, & hee enter not
tho

the battell: for hee deniethe
 that it is lawfull for hym,
 that is no souldier, to fight
 with the enemye. And thus
 also I note, that he which
 by his proper name was
 Perduellis, that is to meane
 an open enemy, was called
 Hostis, the mildnes of the
 worde allwagging the hap-
 nousnesse of the thing. For
 hee was called Hostis, with
 our aucters, whom now
 wee name Peregrinus &
 stranger. That the twelue
 tables declare, Aut status
 dies cum hoste, and agayne,
 Aduersus hostem æterna
 ritas. What may ther be ad-
 ded to this kind of gentle-
 nes: to call him by so faire
 a name & who you make
 warre. Not standing pro-
 cesse of time maketh & nã
 now more odious: for it is
 gone frõ the significatiõ of
 Peregrinus, that is to saie,
 a stranger, and properly it
 stãds for him & bereth ar-
 mour agais̃t one, but whẽ
 ther is fighting for pure, &
 glorie

prelium ineat. Negat enim
 ius esse, qui miles non sit,
 pugnare cū hoste. Equidẽ
 illud etiam animaduerto,
 quod qui pprio nomine
 pduellis esset, is hostis vo-
 caretur, lenitate verbi trif-
 titiã rei mitigãte. Hostis e-
 nim apud maiores nostros
 is dicebat, quẽ nũc pere-
 grinũ dicim⁹ Indicãt. XII.
 tabule. AVT STATUS
 DIES CVM HOSTE
 Itemque ADVERSVS
 HOSTEM ÆTERNA
 AVTHORITAS. Quid
 ad hãc mãsuetudinẽ addi
 potest! eum quicũ bellum
 geras, tã molli nomine ap-
 pellare! quãquã id nomen
 duri⁹ iam effecit vetustas:
 a peregrino enim recessit:
 & proprie in eo, qui con-
 tra ferret arma, remansit.
 Cũ vero de imperio de-
 certatur, belloq; queritur
 C. j. gloria

de Officijs.

gloria causas omnino sub-
esse, tamen oportet easdē,
quas dixi paulo ante iustas
causas esse bellorum. Sed
ea bella, quib⁹ imperij plo-
ria proposita est minus a-
cerbē gerenda sunt. Vt e-
nim cum ciuilit^r contē-
dimus, aliter si est inimicus
aliter si competitor: cum
altero certamen honoris,
et dignitatis est: cum alte-
ro capitis, & famæ. Sic
cum Celtiberis, cum Cim-
bris bellum, vt cum inimi-
cis gerebatur, vter esset,
non vter impararet. Cum
Latinis, Sabinis, Samniti-
bus Pœnis, Pyrrho, de im-
perio dimicabatur. Pœni
sedifragi, crudelis Annibal
reliqui iustitiores, Pyrrhi
quidem de captiuis red-
dendis illa præclara, sen-
tentia est.

glory is sought by warre:
yet it behoueth alwayes, &
y very same causes be ther
in, which I declared a lit-
tle before to bee y iust cau-
ses of warre. But these
warres are not so cruellie
to be made, which bee pur-
posed for y glory of empire.
For as, when wee strue
in y city, we do otherwise,
if one be our enemy, other-
wise if hee bee but suter a-
gainst vs: for & the one y
strife is for honoz, & digni-
tie, & the other for lyfe, &
honesty: euen so war was
holden & the Celtibers, &
& the Timbers, as & our
enemies, whether shoulde
liue, & not whether shoulde
rule, but & the Latines, y
Sabines, the Samnites,
the Pœnes, & y Pyrrhus
the fight was about empire,
& dominion. The Pœnes
were leag breakers. Anni-
bal was cruel, y rest were
iuster men. That is a no-
ble saying doubtles of Pir-
rhys, about the restorynge
of prisoners.

No golde do I craue, Nec mī aurum posco:
 no price offer me: nec mī pretiū dederitis,
 No hucsters of warre, Nec cauponantes bellum,
 warremen as we bee: sed belligerantes.
 With dint for our lyfe, Ferro non auro vitam
 fight we not with gold cernamus vtriusq; (hera
 Whether you to raigne vosne velit, an meregnare
 or me the lady would. quidue ferat fors.
 Chāce trie we by force Virtute experiamur,
 this answer eke bare: & hoc simul accipe dictū
 whose māhod the hap, Quorum virtuti belli
 of batel will spare: fortuna pepercit,
 Their freedome I put- Eorūdem me libertati
 pose to fauour also, parcere certum est.
 Them geue I, thē take: Dono ducit, doq; volētib;
 the Goddes wil it so. cum magnis dijs.

A princely saying, forsooth, Regalis sanè & digna
 and well beseming the ly= Aeacidarum genere sen-
 nage of the Aeacidans. tentia.

Likewise if priuate men Atque etiam si quid sin-
 dyuen by occasions, shall guli temporibus adducti
 promise oughte to the ene- hosti promiserint, est in eo
 my, they must keepe theire primo pūico bello Regu
 promise therein. As Regu- lus did, that was taken of
 the Carthaginens in the primo pūico bello Regu
 first Pūnik warres: who, lus captus à Pœnis:
 when C. ij. cum

de Officijs,

cum de captiuis cōmutan-
dis Romā missus esset, iu-
rassetq; se redditurū : pri-
mū, vt venit, captiuos red-
dendos in senatu non cē-
suit. Deinde cū retineretur
a propinquis & ab amicis:
ad supplicium redire ma-
luit, quā suā fidē hosti datā
fallere. Secundo autē: Pu-
nico bello, post Cānensem
pugnam, quos decem An-
niball Romam adstrictos
misit iureiurando se reddi-
tuos esse, nisi de redimē-
dis ijs, qui capti erant, im-
petrassent: eos omnes, Cē-
sores (quoad quisque eo-
rum vixit) qui peierassent,
in ærarijs reliquerunt. nec
minus illū, qui iurisiuran-
di fraude culpam inue-
nerat.

Cum enim Annibalis per-
missu exisset castris, redijt

whē he was sēt to Rome,
aboute the enterchaunging
of prisoners, & had sworne
̄ he would return first as
soone as he came, his ad-
uise was i ̄ Senate house
̄ the prisoners should not
be restored, after ward whē
he should haue ben stopped
of his kinsfolke, & frendes:
he was more willing to re-
turne to punishment, than
to break his promises geuen
to the enemye. And in ̄ se-
cond Punik warres, after
Cānas field ̄ Cēsores sel-
led at a perety fine all those
ten (as long as any of the
liued, ̄ taried still, & were
forsworne) which Annibal
sent to Rome, vppon their
othe. ̄ they should returne
except they obtained ̄ rai-
soming of those ̄ were pri-
soners there, & no lesse thei
sessed hī, which for ̄ decei-
uig of his oth had deuised
an excuse. For whē by An-
nibals licence, vpo his oth
to returne, hee was gonne
hout the campe, he retur-
ned

med Bin a little while after making his excuse, that he had forgotten. I wote not what. Afterward, beinge gonnes out of the campe, hee thought himself discharged of his othe, & in wordes he was, but not in dede. For alwaies in promise must be considered what ye meane not what ye say.

But the greatest example of iustice towarde the enemye was shewed by oure aunceters. When a runawaye traitour from Pirrh^o had promised the Senate, that he would geene the king poison, and kill him, the Senate, and Caius Fabritius did deliuer the runawaye traitour to Pirrh^{us}. In such sort, & trecherie, they allowed not the death of their enemye, and such a one, as was bothe mightye, & moued warre vnprooked.

Thus of warfaringe duties there is ynough spoke. Let vs remember also, the enen towarde the baseste sorte there is a iustice to be kepte. The baseste degree,

and

paulo post, quod se oblitum nescio quid diceret. Deinde egressus est castris, iure iurando se solutum putabat: et erat verbis, re non erat. Sæper autem in fide, quid senseris, non quid dixeris, cogitandum. Maximum autem exemplum est iusti-
tiæ in hostem à maioribus nostris constitutum. Cum a Pirrho perfuga Senatui est pollicitus, se venenum Regi daturum, et eum necaturum, Senatus, et C. Fabricius perfugam Pirrho dedit. Ita, ne hostis quidem, et potentis, et bellum vltro inferentis, cum scelere interitum approbauit.

Ac de bellicis quidem officijs satis dictum est. Meminerimus autem etiam aduersus infimos iustitiam esse seruandam. Est autem infima conditio et

C. iij.

for-

de officijs.

fortuna seruorum: quibus non male præcipiunt, qui ita iubent vti, vt mercenarijs. ad operam exigendâ, & iusta præbêda. Cum autem duobus modis, id est aut vi, aut fraude fiat iniuria: fraus quasi vulpeculæ, vis leonis videtur: vtrûq; ab homine alienissimum: sed fraus odio digna maiore. Totius autem iniustitiæ, nulla capitalior est, quàm eorum, qui tum cum maxime fallunt id tamen agunt vt viri boni esse videantur. De iustitia satis dictum est.

Deinceps, vt erat propositum, de beneficentia ac liberalitate dicatur: quod quidē nihil est naturæ hominis accommodatus. Sed habet multas causiones. Videndum est enim primum, ne obsit benignitas & his ipsis: quibus benignè videbitur fieri

and state is of slaues: who they, that wil ye so to vse, as hyed men, in requiring their worke, and geuinge them their due, doe teache you not amisse. But wher as iniuries maye bee doone two waies: & is to saye, either by force or by gyle: gyle seemes as of a fox: force as of a lion: bothe in trouth are verpe vsute for man, yet gyle deserueth the greater hatred. But of al iniustice none is moze pestilent then theirs: whiche when theye begyle a man moste, yet so handle the matter, & they will seeme to bee well meaning men. Of iustyce here is saide ynough. Let vs now speak as wee purposed, of bountifulnes, and liberalitie: for nothinge without doubt is to the nature of manne moze agreable. Notwithstanding it hath diuerz exceptions. For first we must see & our bountifulnes hurt not both those to whom bountifull ye shall seeme to bee doone.

any

& also other moe, next that
our liberalitie be not moze
than our abilitie, thirdlye
to euery man bee giuen,
accozdinge to his woorthi-
nesse. For that is the foun-
dacion of iustice, whereto
al these must bee applyed.
For bothe they, & pleasure
any body with that which
may hurt him, whom they
woulde seeme willinge to
pposit, ought to be deemed
not bounteous, nor liberal
but pestilent flatterers, &
they likewise who do hurt
some, that they may bee li-
berall to other, do fal into
the same iniustice, as if they
should turne other mennes
goods into their owne.

But there bee manye, and
namely the desirous of ho-
nour and glorie, who doe
catche from some, that they
maye lauish to an other, &
these suppose, & they shall
seeme bountifull too theyr
frendes, if they may enrich
them any maner way.

But that is so farre of frō
duitie that nothing may be
moze contrarious to duity
wee must see therefore that

et ceteris: deinde ne maior
benignitas sit, quam facul-
tates tum vt pro dignitate
cuius tribuatur. Id enim est
iustitię fundamentum, ad
quam hec omnia sunt refe-
renda. Nam & qui gratifi-
catur cuiuspiam, quod obsit
illi, cui prodesse velle vide-
antur, non benefici, neque
liberales, sed perniciosi as-
setatores iudicandi sunt. Et
qui alijs nocet: vt in alios
liberales sint, in eadem sūt
iniustitia, vt si in suā rem
alienā conuertāt. Sunt au-
tem multi, equidem cupi-
di splendoris & glorię, qui
eripiūt alijs, quod alijs lar-
giantur. Hiq; arbitrantur
se beneficios i suos amicos
visum iri, si locupletēt eos
quacunq; ratione. Id au-
tem tantum abest ab offi-
cio, vt nihil magis offi-
cio possit esse contrarium
Videndum est igitur, vt

we

C. iiii.

ea

de officijs.

ea liberalitate vtamur, quæ
 profit amicis. noceat nemi-
 ni, Quare L. Scyllæ, et C.
 Cæsaris pecuniarum trās-
 latio a iustis dominis ad
 alienos, non debet libera-
 lis videri. Nihil est enim li-
 berale, quod nō idē sit ius-
 tū. Alter locus erat causio-
 nis, ne benignitas maior es-
 set quam facultates: quōd
 qui benigniores esse volūt
 quam res patitur, primū in
 eo peccāt, qd' iniuriosi sūt
 in proximos. Quas enim
 copias his & suppeditari
 qui est, & reliqui, eas trās-
 ferūt ad alienos. Inest au-
 tē in tale liberalitate cupi-
 ditas rapiēdi plerūq; et au-
 ferendi p iniuriā, vt ad lar-
 giendum suppetāt copię,
 videre etiam licet plerōsq;
 non tam natura liberales,
 quā quadam gloria in-
 ductos, vt benefici vi-
 deantur, facere multa:

wee vse such liberalitie, as
 may profit our frendes, and
 hinder no body. wherefore
 Lucius Sillaes, & Catus
 Cæsars coueying of goodz
 from the iuste owners to
 strāgers must not be thou-
 ght liberality. For nothing
 is liberall, whiche same is
 not iust. The second pointe
 of exception was, & our li-
 beralitie should not be mo-
 re then our abilltie, because
 whoso will bee lauyther
 thā their goodz will beare
 they chiefly offend in this
 that they bee inuiolous di-
 to thaire nexte kynne. For
 they conuey & same riches
 to frende folke. whiche yt
 were moze reason bothe to
 bee dalt, and lest to theyre
 kinnsfolke. And there is in
 such liberalitie a gredynes
 oftentimes of catchynge, &
 pullynge aswaye withe in-
 myce, that there maye bee
 stroze to lashe out. A man
 maye see some also do mu-
 che, not by nature so lybe-
 rall, as ledde with a cer-
 taine gloze, that theye
 maye seeme bountifull,
 which

Whiche thinges maye bee
thought to come rather of
a bragge thā of a free hart.

Suche a false fainyng is a
nearer neighboꝝ to vauity,
thā either to liberalitie, or
to honesty. The thirde res-
traint, wee spake of, is that
in liberality there be a choi-
ce of woꝛthynesse, wherein
are to bee considered bothe
his maners, by whom the
benefit shal bee bestowed,
and also his good will to-
ward vs, & the eterperie-
ning & felowship of lyfe, &
frendly turnes done befoze
to oure commodities, all
which be wishefull to me-
te together, if not, & moze
causes, and & greatest shall
haue in them the moze
weight.

Howbeit because wee lead
not oure life with perfyte
men, and thozowly wyse.
but with such as in whom
it is a goodlye matter, yf
there be resemblaunces of
vertue, I recken thys also
meete to bee considered,
that wee despise no maner
man, in whom anye sygne
of

que proficisci ab ostentati-
one magis quā a volūtate
videtur. Talis autē simula-
tio vanitati est cōiunctior
quām aut liberalitati, aut
honestati. Tercium est, p-
positum, vt in beneficētia
delectus esset dignitatis in
quo et mores ei⁹ erūt spec-
tādi in quē beneficiū con-
feretur: & anim⁹ erga nos
& cōmunitas, & societas
vitæ, & ad nostras vtilita-
tes officia ante collata.

Quæ vt concurrāt omnia
optabile est: sin min⁹ plu-
res causæ maioresq; pōde-
ris plus habebūt. Quoniā
autem viuatur non cum p-
fectis hominibus, plenēq;
sapientibus, sed cum ijs, in
quibus peæclare agitur si
sint simulachra virtutis:
etiam hoc intelligendum
puto, neminem omnino
esse negligendum, in
quo aliqua significatio

de Officiis.

virtutis appareat. Colédū autē esse ita quenquā maxime, vt quisq; maximē his virtutib⁹ leniorib⁹ erit ornatus, modestia, tēperantia ac ipsa de qua iam multa dicta sūt iustitia. Nam fortis animus & magnus in homine nō pfecto, nec sapiēte, seruētiōr plerūq; est illę vero virtutes bonū virum videntur potius attigere. Atque hęc in moribus cōsiderētur. De beneuolētia autē, quā quisque habeat erga nos primū illud est in officio. vt eī plurimū tribuam⁹ à quo plurimū diligimur. Sed beneuolētiā non adolescētulorū more, ardore quodā amoris, sed stabilitate potius & constantia iudicemus. Sin erunt merita, vt non ineunda, sed referenda sit gratia, maior quēdā

of vertue doth appere: and specially, that euery man so be regarded, as eche man chiefly shall be garnished wth these gentler kyndes of vertues, sober, moode, temperāce, & this same iustyce, whereof alreedy much hath bene spoken. For a manly courage, & a great is commonly somewhat to seruēt in a man, & wants of perfection, and wisdom, but those other vertues seeme rather to pertain to a good man. Thus much in manners may be considered. But concerning loue, that any man beareth towarde vs, this is the chiefe pointe of duty, that we giue most to him, of whom wee are moste beeloued. But wee must measure good wyll, not after y^e gife of yōg mē, by a certaine heate of loue but rather by assurednesse, and stedfastnesse. But in case a mannes deseruing be suche, that wee haue not to seeke to crepe in fauour, but to requyte his kindnesse: a certaine greater

greater care is then to be
 vled. For there is no duty
 moze necessary thā requi-
 ringe of kindnesse: And if
 Hesiodus wils ye. & lar-
 ger measure (if ye may) to
 restore suche thinges as ye
 haue borrowed to occupie:
 what the ought wee to do,
 prouoked by benefites?
 Must wee not doe like the
 fruteful feedes, that yelde
 muche moze thā they recey-
 ued? For if we stick not to
 bestowe pleasures vpon the
 who wee hope, will profit
 vs hereafter: what maner
 men ought wee to be to-
 swarde them, that haue don
 vs good al ready? For
 wheras ther be two kindz
 of liberalitie: one of doing
 a benefite, an other of re-
 quiting: whether wee will
 do it or no, is in our owne
 choise: but to leaue oughte
 vnrequited, is not lawfull
 for a good man: so he maye
 doe it without inturpe.
 But there be respectes to
 be had of benefites recey-
 ued: and there is no doubt,
 but most is due to the gre-
 test.

Wherein

cura adhibenda est Nullū
 enim officium referenda
 gratia magis necessarium
 est. Quod si ea q̄ acceperis
 vtenda, maior mensura
 (si modo possit) iubet red-
 dere Hesiodus: quidnam
 beneficio prouocati face-
 re debem? An nō imitari
 agros fertiles, quia multo
 plus afferunt, quā accepe-
 rūt? Etenim si in eos, quos
 speramus nobis pfuturos
 non dubitamus officia cō-
 ferre: quales in eos esse de-
 bem, qui iam profuerūt?
 Nam cum duo genera li-
 beralitatis sint, vnum dan-
 di beneficij, alterum red-
 dendi, demus necne in no-
 stra potestate est: non red-
 dere, bono viro non licet,
 modo id facere possit sine
 iniuria. Acceptorū autem
 beneficiorum sunt delec-
 tus habendi. Nec dubium
 quin maximo cuiq; pluri-
 mum debeatur.

de Officiis.

In quo tamen imprimis quo quisque animo, studio, bene uolentia fecerit, ponderandum est. Multi enim multa faciunt ut temeritate quadam sine iudicio, vel modo in omnes vel repentino quodam quasi vento, impetu animi incitati: quae beneficia aequae magna non sunt habenda, atque ea, quae iudicio, considerate, constanterque delata sunt, sed in collocando beneficio, et in referenda gratia, si cetera paria sint, hoc maxime officij est, ut quisque maxime opis indigeat, ita ei potissimum opitulari. Quod contra fit a plerisque. A quo enim plurimum sperant, etiam si ille ipsis non eget, tamen ei potissimum inseruiunt. Optime autem societas hominum, coniunctioque seruatur, si ut quisque erit coniunctissimus, ita in eum benignitatis plurimum

wherin specially yet it is to be weied of what mynde, affection & good will, a mā hath done it. For many mē do many thingz of a certai nedynesse, wout discretion, or measure toward euerye man or els. As a certain souden braide of minde caried as with the winde, whiche benefites are not to be considered a like greate, as those, & bee offered wpythe indgement aduisedly, and constantly. But in placing of benefis, and requiting kynndnes (if all other thinges be correspondent) this is a principal pointe of duitie, & as euery mā most nedeth help so him most of al wee abyde which contrariwise is due of a gret many. For of whō they hope moste, although hee hath no neede of them, yet to him theye are moste seruifable.

But the felowshippe, and neighebourhoode of menne shall best be maynteyned, if as euerye man shall bee nearest vs, so on hym wee bestowe moste libe:

liberalitie. But what be
 natures p̄cipals of neigh-
 borhood, & the felowship of
 mā. I thinke good to fetch
 somewhat farder of. For
 the first is that, whiche is
 to see in the felowship of al
 mankind. The bond wher
 of is reaso, & speche, which
 by teaching, learning, con-
 ferring reasoning & iudge-
 ging, wynneth one man to
 an other, & ioineth the in a
 certain natural felowship.
 For by anye thinge farder
 we differ frō the nature of
 sauage beasts, in whō wee
 say oftentimes there is an
 hardinesse, as in horses, &
 lions, but wee neuer saye,
 they haue iustice, equitie, &
 goodnes, for they be voide
 of reason, & of speache. And
 surely this is y^e felowship
 y^e spreadeth the most largely
 amonge theselues.
 And with all among all, in
 y^e which they must be kept
 a cōmonnes of all thinges,
 that nature hath bredde to
 the common vse of man, so
 as the things, whiche bee
 appointed

conferetur. Sed quę natu-
 re principia sūt cōmunita-
 tis & societatis humane, re-
 petēdum alti⁹ videtur. Est
 enim primū qd' cernitur ī
 vniuersi generis humani
 societate. Eius autē vincu-
 lū est ratio & oratio, q̄ do-
 cēdo, discendo, cōmunicā-
 do, disceptādo, iudicando,
 consiliat inter se homines,
 cōiungitq; naturali quadā
 societate. Neq; vllare lōgi⁹
 absumus a natura ferarū,
 in quibus īesse fortitudinē
 sepe dicim⁹, vt in equis, in
 leonibus: iustitiā, equitatē,
 bonitatē, nō dicimus, sunt
 enim rationis, & orationis
 expertes. Ac latissime qui-
 dē patens hominibus in-
 ter ipsos, omnibus inter o-
 nes societas hec est: in qua
 ōnium rerum, quas ad cō-
 munem vsū hominū natu-
 ra genuit, est seruanda cō-
 munitas, vt q̄ descripta sūt

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legibus, & iure ciuili, hæc ita teneantur, vt sit constitutum, equibus ipsis cetera sic obseruetur, vt in grecorum pro verbio est. Amicorum esse communia omnia. Omnia autem communia hominum videntur ea, quæ sunt generis eiusdem, quod ab Ennio positum in vna re, transferri in multas potest, vt homo, qui errati cõiter monstrat viam:

Quis lumen de suo lumine accendat, facit.

Vt nihilominus ipsi luceat cum illi accenderit.

Vna enim ex re satis precipitur, vt quicquid sine detrimento possit commodari, id tribuatur cuique, vel ignoto. Ex quo sunt illa communia, non prohibere aquam profluentem pati ab igne ignem capere

appointed by statutes, and the ciuil lawe, bee obserued in such sort, as it is ordeyned, beside which, al other things are so to bee obserued as is in the Greeke: p. uerb: Emonge frendes all things bee comon. But all those things seme common to al men which be of that kind, as, being put for example by Ennius in one thing, maye bee applyed to many, The mā, that getty shewes the waye vnto the wādyng wight, dothe, as if he a candle should at his own cādle, light. That notwithstanding it light himself whē lighted is the other.

For ynowghe is taught vs by one ensample: that whatsoeuer we may lende without hinderance, it be graunted to euery bodye, yea to the vnknown. Whereuppon these thinges bee common: Not to foule bidde one the running water: To suffer one & wyl, to take fire at our fire:

To geue faithfull counsell
to him that asketh aduise:
which thinges bee profita-
ble to those, that receyue
them, and nothyng burde-
nous to the geuer, where-
fore we must both vse these
thinges, a somewhat alwaies
must we do to furder the
common profit. But syth
eche primate mans substāce
is small, and the multitude
is endlesse, that neede it:
common liberality must be
referred to that ende of
Ennius: That nathelesse it
light himselfe: So as there
may be an abilitie, where-
with we maye bee lyberall
to our owne. There bee
no degrees yet of the fe-
lowship of menne. For, to
leauie that endles number,
there is a nether degree, to
bee of one countrey, of one
nation, of one language,
by the which men be chief-
ly knit together. A neerer
also it is, to bee of one cy-
tye. For there bee manye
thinges common to citizes
amonge

si quis velit, cōsiliū fide.
Ie deliberāti dare: quę sūt
ijs vtilia, qui accipiunt, dā-
tū non molesta. Quare &
ijs vtendum est, & semper
aliquid ad communem v-
tilitatem afferendum. Sed
quoniam copię parū sin-
gulorum sunt: eorum au-
tem, qui his egeant, infini-
ta est multitudo, vulgaris
liberalitas referenda est
ad illum Ennij finem, ni-
hilominus vt ipsi luceat,
vt facultas sit, qua in nos-
tros simus liberales.

Gradus autem plures sunt
societatis hominum. Vt
enim ab illa discedatur in-
finitate, propior est eiusdē
gentis, nationis, linguę
qua maximē homines cō-
iunguntur. Interius etiam
est eiusdem esse ciuitatis.
Multa enim sunt ciuibz

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de Officiis

inter se cōmunia, forū, fa-
na, porticus, vię, leges, iura
iudicia, suffragia, cōsuetu-
dines, pręterea, & familia-
ritates, multęq; cū multis
res rationesq; cōtracte. Arc-
tior vero colligatio est so-
cietatis propinquorū. Ab
illa enim immēsa societate
humani generis, in exiguū
angustūque concluditur.
Nā cū sit hoc natura com-
mune omnium animatiū,
vt habeāt libidinem pro-
creandi: primo societas in
ipso est coniugio: proxima
in liberis: deinde vna do-
mus, communia omnia. Id
autem est principium vr-
bis, & quasi seminariū Re-
ip. Sequuntur fratrum con-
iunctiones, post consobri-
norum, sobrinorūque: qui
cū vna domo iam capi
non possunt; in alias do-
mos tanquam in colonias
execunt.

among thēselues: as lawes,
courts, churches, galleries
walkes, hie waies, statutes
lawes, iudgemēts, voyces,
custome: & besides these,
familiarities, & haupng to
do in sundry matters, and
bargaines & sundry folke.

But a faster knitting of
men together, is the felow-
ship of kinfolk. For out of
this innumerable felowship
of mankind it is diuēd to
a little, & narrowe compasse
For where as by nature
this is cōmon to al liuyng
creatures, to haue a lust to
engēdering, the first felow-
ship is in verpe wedlocke:
the nexte in children, and
after that, one house, and
all thinges common. And
this is the original of a cy-
tie and as it were the seede-
plotte of a common weale.
Then followe the kyn-
reds of brytherne, after of
brothers and sisters chil-
dern, who, whē they no more
cannot be contained in one
house get them abroade to
other houses, as into newe
townes.

Then

Then folow entermarriages, & alliances, of whiche also mo kinsfolke do arise. which multiplication, and succession of the roote of common weales. Surely the matchinge of bloodes, and good willes that riseth thereof, knitteth menne in loue together. For it is a great matter to haue the lyke monumentes of acceters, to vse all one religion, and to haue the same buriall places.

But of all felowshippes there is none better, none more assured, than whan good men alpe in conjunctions be enfelowshipt in familiarite together. For that honeste (whiche wee haue often mencioned) although we see it in another yet it moueth vs & maketh vs frends to him in whom the same seemeth to dwell And thoughe al vertue allureth vs to her, and causeth vs to loue the, in whō shee seemeth to harbor: yet iustice and liberalite woorketh that most of all. But there is nothing that winneth

Sequuntur connubia, et affinitates: ex quibus etiam plures propinqui. Quæ per rogatio & soboles, origo est rerum publicarum, sanguinis autem coniunctio, & beneuolentia deuincit charitate homines. Magnum est enim eadem habere monumenta maiorum, eisdem ut sacris sepulchra habere communia. Sed omnium societatum nulla præstantior est, nulla firmitior, quam cum viri boni moribus similes familiaritate coniuncti sunt. Illud enim honestum (quod sæpe diximus) etiam si in alio cernimus, tamen nos mouet, atque illi, in quo id inesse videtur, amicos facit. Et quanquam omnis virtus nos ad se allicit, facitque ut eos diligamus, in quibus ipsa inesse videatur: tamen iustitia. & liberalitas id maximè efficit. Nihil autem

de Officiis.

amabilius, nec copulati-
quàm morum similitudo
bonorum. In quibus enim
eadem studia sunt, eedēq;
voluntatis in his sit, vt æ-
que quisq; altero delecte-
tur, ac se ipso : efficiturq;
id quod Pithagoras vult
in amicitia, vt vnus fiat ex
pluribus. Magna etiam
illa communitas est socie-
tatum, quæ conficitur ex
beneficijs vltro citroq; da-
tis, acceptisq;. Quæ mutua
et, grata dum sunt, inter
quos ea sunt, firma deuin-
ciuntur societate. Sed
cùm omnia ratione, ani-
moq; lustraueris, omnium
societatum nulla est gra-
tior, nulla charior, quam
ea, quæ cum republica est
vnicuique nostrum.

Chari sunt parentes, cha-
ri liberi, propinqui, fami-
liares : sed omnes omni-
um charitates patria vna

neth moze loue. noz suerly-
er knitteth men together,
then a likenesse in good co-
ditions. For in whom be
like desires & like mindes:
it happeneth among them,
that eyther with orher is
as much delighted, as with
him selfe: & it is broughte
to passe, that Pithagoras
requires in amity, that ma-
ny become one.

That commō felowshyp
also is great, which grow-
eth of benefits to and fro,
geuen and taken. whych
while they be comen from
one to an other, and plea-
surefull: they amonge whō
those happen bee tyed in a
fast felowship.

But when ye haue peru-
sed al these things in your
reason, and mind: of all fe-
lowshippes there is none
moze acceptable, noz dea-
rer, then the same, whych
euery one of vs hath with
the common weale.

Deere be our parēts, deere
be our childzen, deere bee
our kinsfolke, and famili-
ers: but our countrey con-
teynes in it alone all the
deere

deere lone of them all: for the which, what good mā doubteth to take his death, if hee may profite & same: whereby their beastly cruelty is the more to bee abhorred: who haue rent a sunder their countrey & all maner of mischief, and both bee and haue been occupied in the vtter ouerthrowing thereof.

But if question or comparison bee made, to whom the greatest duty ought to be yeldeo: oure countrey, & Parents bee the chiefe, by whose benefites wee are most bound, our children, & all our whole family bee & next: which hang all vpon vs alone, & can haue none other refuge, then bee oure himselke, that agree well with vs. which commonly stand in the like estate.

Wherefore the necessary aydes of life bee due to the chiefe, whom I spake of before, but conuersation and commonnesse of table, counseylings, communicacions, exhortacions, comfortynges, yea
and

cōplexa est: pro qua quis bonus dubitet mortē optetere, si ei sit profuturū? Quo est detestabilior isto rum immanitas, qui lacerarūt omni scelere patriā, et in ea funditus delenda occupati & sūt, et fuerūt. Sed si contentio quēdam, & cōparatio fiat, quibus plurimū tribuendū sit officij, principes sint, patria, & parentes, quorū beneficijs maximis obligati sumus: p̄ximi, liberi, totaq; domus quę spectat in nos solos, neq; aliud vllū potest habere pfugiū. Deinceps bene conueniētes, p̄p̄inqui quibuscum cōmunis etiā fortuna plerumq; est. Quāmobrē necessaria vitę p̄sidia debentur ijs maximē, quos ante dixi, vita autē victusq; cōmunis cōsilia, sermones, cohortationes, cōsolaē iterdū etiā

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obiurgationis, in amicitijs
vigent maximè, estq; ea iu-
cundissima amicitia, quam
similitudo morum cōiuga-
uit. Sed in his omnibus of-
ficijs tribuēdis, videndum
erit quid cuiq; maximè ne-
cesse sit & quid quisq; no-
biscum, vel sine nobis, aut
possit consequi, aut non
possit. Itaq; non ijdē erūt
necessitudinū gradus, qui
& tēporū. Sūt quædā offi-
cia, quæ alijs magis, quam
alijs debeantur: vt vicinū
citius adiuueris in fructib;
percipiēdis quam aut fra-
trem, aut familiarem. At si
lis in iudicio sit, propin-
quum potius et amicum,
quàm vicinum defende-
ris. Hęc igitur et talia cir-
cumspicienda sunt in om-
ni officio, et consuetudo,
exercitatioq; capienda, vt
boni ratiocinatores offici-
orum esse possimus & ad-
dēdo, deducēdoq; videre

and chidinges otherwhyle
among frindes be most vs-
sed: and that is the plesan-
test friendshippe, whych
likenes of condicions hath
yoked in one.

But in doing al these du-
ties, we must marke what
is most needefull for euery
man: and what euery body
is able, or vnable by vs,
or without vs, to attayne.
So the degrees of friend-
shippes shall not bee alpe
with the degrees of times:
and there be duties which
are due to some: more then
to other some: as you shall
sooner helpe your neygh-
bour in innung hys coine,
then either youre brother,
or your familiar friend: but
if there bee a trauers in
lawe: you shall rather de-
fende youre kinsman, and
fende, than youre neygh-
bour. These therefore
and suche lyke must be tho-
rowly considered in euery
dutie: and we must so vse,
and practise oure selues,
that we may be good compte
makers of duties, and see
by addyng and deductyng,
what

What summe riseth of the
rest: whereupon we maye
vnderstand howe much is
due to euery manne. But
as neither phisicians, nor
capteines, nor oratours, al-
though they haue concey-
ued the rules of their scy-
ence, can attaine any thing
woorthy great praise, with-
out vse, and practise: so
those rules of keeping duety
are in deede taught vs,
that wee our selues should
putte them in vse: but the
hardnesse of the matter
also requireth vse and ex-
ercise.

And how honesty, from
which duety springeth, is
fetcht out of those things
that be within the lawe of
mans fellowship: we haue
in a maner said ynough.

But we must note, that
where as there bee fower
general kindes of vertues
pointed out, from y^e whiche
honesty, and duety should
flowe: that seemes to shine
brightest: whiche is wro-
ught in a great, & lofty co-
rage, dispising worldly va-
nities. And therefore in re-
proche

que reliqui summa fiat: ex
quo quantum cuiq; debe-
atur, intelligas. Sed vt nec
medici, nec imperatores,
nec oratores, quamuis ar-
tis præcepta perceperint
quicquam magne laude
dignum sine vsu, & exerci-
tatione consequi possunt:
sic officij conseruandi præ-
cepta traduntur, illa qui-
dem vt faciamus ipsi: sed
rei magnitudo vsu quoq;
exercitacionemq; deside-
rat. Atq; ab ijs rebus, quæ
sunt in iure societatis, hu-
manæ, quemadmodum du-
catur honestum, ex quo
ortum est officiū, satis ferè
diximus. Intelligendum
est autem cum proposita
sint genera quatuor, è qui-
bus honestas, officiumq;
manaret, splendidissimum
videri, quod animo mag-
no, elatoq; humanasq; res
dispitiēte factū sit, Itaq; in

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probris maximè i pmpu proch it is comonly ready
est, si quid tale dici potest if any such thing inaye bee
Vos etenim iuuenies said, as this.
animos geritis muliebres: you yongmen ywis
Illaq; virgo viri. cary womens hartes.
& si quid est eiusmodi. That virgin, a manns.
Salmacida spolia. Likewise if ought bee like
sine sudore & sanguine. to this.
Contraq; in laudibus, quæ A goodly great spoyle,
magno animo & fortiter at Salmacis wonne:
excellenterq; gesta sunt, VVithout any bloode,
ea nescio quo modo quasi or sweate was it donne.
pleniore ore laudamus. And on the other side, in
Hinc rhetorum campus praying, those deeds, that
de Marathone, Salamine, be done manfully, notably,
Plateis, Thermopilis, Leuf and with great courage, I
tris, Stratocle: hinc noster wot not how as with opẽ
Cocles, hinc Decij, hinc mouth wee comende. Here
Cn. & P. Scipiones, hinc of came the Rhetoricyans
M. Marcellus, & innum- large field byõ Marathon
rabiles alij: maximeq; ipse Salamis, Plateias. Ther
popul⁹ Romę animi mag mopplanes, Leuerrians, &
nitud' excellit. Declaratur Stratocles, hereof our Co
autẽ studiũ bellicę gloria cles, hereof the Dectans,
hereof Encus, & Publius
the Scipioes, hereof Mar
cus Marcellus, & other in
numerable, and speciallpe
the people of Rome did ex
ceede in greatnesse of cou-
rage. And their desyre of
martiall glozpe is declared

In that we see their images
of honour be set vp. for the
most pte, in warlike aray.

But if that hautynesse of
courag which is sene in pe
rels, and traualles be void
of iustice, and dothe not
fight for a common safety
but for a priuate profite, yt
is to be reckened faultye.
For that not onely ys not
the property of vertue, but
rather of brutishnesse, set-
tinge al humanity asyde.

Wherefore manlynesse is
wel defined of the Stoicks
where theye say. it is a ver-
tue. that fighteth in defence
of equitie. Wherefore noe
man that hath attained the
glozpe of manlynesse, euer
got praise by wily traines
and craftynes. For nothig
may be honest, & is voyde
of iustice. A worthy sayig
therefore is that of Pla-
toes who sayeth.

That not only the kno-
leg which is seuered fro
iustice, is rather to be ca-
led subteltye then wise-
dōe but also the courag

quod statuas quoque vi-
demus ornatu fere mili-
tari. Sed ea animi elatio, 10
quæ cernitur in periculis
& laboribus si iustitia va-
cat, pugnatq; non pro salu-
te communi, sed pro suis
commodis in vitio est. Nō
modo enim id virtutis nō
est: sed potius immanita-
tis omnem humanitatem
repellentis. Itaq; probè de-
finitur a Stoicis fortitudo
cū eam virtutem esse di-
cunt propugnantem pro
equitate. Quocirca nemo
qui fortitudinis gloriā cō-
secutus est, insidijs et ma-
litia laudem est adeptus,
Nihil enim honestum esse
potest, qd' iustitia vacat.
Preclarū igitur Platonis
illud. Nō solū, inquit scien-
tia, quæ est remota ab iu-
sticia, calliditas potius.
quàm sapientia est appel-
landa: verū etiā animus

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paratus ad periculū, si sua which is forward to dī.
 cupiditate, non vtilitate ger, if it bee sett on, for
 communi impellitur, au- ones owne greedinesse. &
 dacie potius nomen ha- not for a comon profit
 beat, quā fortitudinis. maye rather beare the
 Itaque viros fortes & ma- name of lewde hardines
 gnanimos, eosdem bonos then of manlynes.
 & simplices veritatis ami- wherefoze who be manlye
 cos, minimeque fallaces men, & stoute harted: those
 esse volumus: que sunt ex same wee would haue also
 media laude iustitiæ. Sed be good, & plaine iouers of
 illud odiosum est, quod in trouth, & nothing at al de-
 hac elatione & magnitu- ceitful: whiche come out of
 dine animi facillime per- the middelt of all y praisas
 tinatia, & nimia cupiditas of iustice. But this is odi-
 principatus innascitur. Vt ous. y in such hautinesse, &
 enim apud Platonem est, greatenesse of courage, ther
 omnem morem Lacede- groweth a wilfulnes very
 moniorum inflammatū esse soone, & an ouerseekinge of
 cupiditate vincendi, sic vt rule. For as it is in Plato
 quisque animi magnitudi- that it was al the maner
 ne maximè excellit, ita of the Lacedemoniās to
 maximè vult princeps om- be enflamed with desire
 nium, vel potius solus esse of conquering: so as eu-
 Difficile autem est cum ry man doth most excell o-
 præstare omnibus concupi- ther in greatnes of courage
 eris, seruare equitatē que he will likewise be y very
 highest ouer al, or rather
 without perc. And whē you
 conet to bee abone all, it is
 harde to keepe an equitye,
 which,

which is moſte proper to iuſtice. whereof comes to paſſe, that they cannot abyde to be bzyled neyther & reaſoninge, nor & anye cōmon & rightfull order of law: & theſe become in the cōmon weale for the moſte part guiſt geeners & part-makers, that they may attain to the greateſt rowe, and be rather by might ſuperiour, than by iuſtice equall. But the harder it is to maſter the affection, the worſthier is & maſtery. For there is no ſeaſon that ought to be without iniſtice. They therfore be compted manly, & of great courage not who do any wōg, but who withſtand it. But a true, and wiſe ſtout hearte iudgeth that honeſty, which nature chiefly followeth to ſtand in deedes, and not in glozy; and had rather bee, than ſeeme the chiefe. For who ſo hangeth hypon the ſwauering of the unſkilful multitude, hee is not to be counted amonge the nōber of manly menne. But as euery man is of & higheſte courage

est iuſtitia maximè propria. Ex quo fit, vt neque diſceptatione vici ſe, nec villo publico ac legitimo iure patiantur. Exiſtuntq; in Repub. plerumq; largitores & factioſi vt opes quàm maximas conſequantur, & ſint vi potius ſuperiores quàm iuſtitia pares. Sed quo id eſt difficilius, hoc preclarius.

Nullum enim eſt tempus quod iuſtitia vacare debeat. Fortis igitur et magna nimi ſunt habendi, non qui faciunt, ſed qui propulſant iniuriam, vera autem & ſapiens animi magnitudo honeſtum illud, quod maximè natura ſequitur, in factis poſitum, non in gloria iudicat, principemque ſe eſſe muult, quàm videri. Et enim qui exerrore imperitæ multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non eſt habendus,

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Facillimè autem ad res in
iustas impellitur, vt quisq;
altissimo est animo & glo-
riæ cupido. Qui locus est
sine lubricus: quòd vix in-
uenitur, qui laboribus sus-
ceptis, periculisq; aditis, nò
quasi mercedè rerù gesta-
rù desideret gloriã. 20Omni
no fortis animus & mag-
nus duabus rebus maximè
cernitur: quarù vna in re-
rum externarù despitiètia
ponitur, cū psuasū sit nihil
hominè nisi qd' honestū,
decorūq; sit aut admirari
aut optare, aut expetere o-
portere: nulliq; neq; homi-
ni, neq; pturbationi animi
nec fortunæ succūbere.
Altera est res, vt cū ita sis
animo affect⁹, vt sup̄ dixi
res geras magnas illas, qdè
& maximè vtilis, sed ve-
hemèter arduas, plenāq;
laborū et piculorū. tū vi-
tæ causā, tum multarū re-
rum, quæ ad vitam perti-
nent. Harū rerum duarū

courage, & desirous of glo-
rye, so is hee soonest egged
to vniust doinges. whiche
is in deede a very slipper
place, because scarce there
is anye manne found, who
when hee hathe sustayned
trauayles, and auentured
dangers, dothe not desyre
glozy, as rewarde of his do-
inges.

A manly courage, and a
greate is alwayes by towse
things chiefly dyscerned,
whereof the one standes in
the contempt of outwarde
things. when it is per-
swaded, that a manne
ought not eyther to esteeme
eyther wythe. or desyre a-
nye thinge, but that is ho-
nest and seemelye, to yelde
to none, neyther manne,
noz affection, noz chaunce
of fortune. The other
thinge is, that when you
bee so dysposed in courage
as I sayde befoze, ye doe
greate enterprises, & those
same right profitable, but
yet very harde, and full of
trauaille, and danuger boch
for life & for manye things
that to life do belonge. All
the glozy & honour of these
two

two things (I add therto the profite) standes in the latter, but the cause, and meane, that makes many men, is in the former. For in it is that which maketh excellent courages, & suche as despise the worldes vanities. But this same resteth in two things, if both you iudge that onely to be good, which is honest & also to be free from all moodiness of mind. For it is to be contented the part of a great, and manly courage, both to set light by those thingz, which do seeme precious, and good, geous to the greater number, and also to despise the same, with a stedfast, and grounded iudgement: and likewise it is a sygne of mightye courage, & greate stedfastnesse, so to beare those thinges, which seeme bitter & be much & sundrye wayes tosse in mans lyfe, & fortune, as nothinge you swarue from the order of nature, nor the worthines of a wise manne. And it is not meete, that he bee subdued wythe desyre, who is
 not

splendor omnis & amplitudo (addo etiā vtilitatē) in posteriore est: causa autē & ratio efficiēs magnos viros, est in priore. In eo enim est illud, quod excellentes animos, & humana contēnentes facit. Id autē ipsum cernitur in duobus si & solū id, quod honestū sit, bonū iudices & ab omni animi perturbatione liber sis. Nam & ea quę eximia plerisq; & præclara videntur. parua ducere eaq; ratione stabili, firmaq; cōtemnere, fortis animi, magniq; ducendum sit. Et ea quę videntur acerba, quę multa & varia in hominū vita, fortunaq; versantur, ita ferre, vt nichil a statu naturæ discedas, nichil a dignitate sapientis, hoc robusti animi est. magnęque constantiæ. Non est autem consentaneum, qui metu non frangatur

de officiis.

eum frāgi cupiditate : nec qui inuictum se a labore præstiterit, vinci a voluptate. Quamobrem hæc vitanda sunt: & pecuniæ fugienda cupiditas. Nihil enim est tam angusti animi tamq; parui, quàm amare diuitias. Nihil honestius, magnificētiusq; quam pecuniam contemnere, si nō habeas: si habeas, ad beneficētiā liberalitatamque conferre. Cauenda est etiam gloriæ cupiditas, vt supra dixi. Eripit enim libertatē: pro qua magnanimis viris omnis debet esse contentio. Nec verō imperia expetenda ac potius aut non accipienda interdum aut deponenda nonnumquā. Vacandum autem est omni animi perturbatione, tum cupiditate et metu, tum etiam ægritudine, & voluptate animi, & iracundia, vt tranquillitas adsit

not subdued wth feare, nor that hee be ouercome wth pleasure, who hath shewed himselſe vnable to be ouercome wth trauaile, wherefore both these faultes are to be auoyded, and also couetousnesse of money is to bee eschewed, For nothing is so muche a sygne of a small and tender courage, as to loue riches: nothing there is honeste, and nobler, then to dispise money if you haue it not: & if you haue it, to bestowe it in bounteousnesse and liberallitie. We must also beware of desire of glozy, as I said before. For it pulles away the freedom of the mynde: for the which, al the endeavour of stoute harted men should be. And verily wee ought not to seeke for rule but rather not to receiue it sometime, or other whyle to geue it ouer. And wee must be free frō al troubles: some sturre of mynde: from desyre and feare, from hart sickenesse, and voluptuousnesse. and angrynesse: that we may haue quietnesse of mynde

wilnde, and hoſednes of care
the whiche may bring both
ſedfaſtneſſe, & alſo a ſwooz=
thy eſtimacion.

But diuers there bee, &
haue beene: who deſpringe
that ſame quietneſſe, that
I ſpeake of, haue wpyth=
drawen them ſelues from
common affaires, and haue
gotte them to quietneſſe.
Among theſe both the no=
bleſt Philoſophers, and ſ
very chiefe, and alſo cer=
tayne vpright, and graue
menne neither could abyde
the maners of the people,
nor of the rulers: and ma=
ny of them haue liued in de=
ſert places, as delighted o=
ly & their home matters.

Theſe ſhoote at the ſame
marke, that kyngeſ doo,
that is, to haue neede of no=
thing, to obey no man, and
to vſe their owne libertie,
whoſe property is, to lyue
aſſeſt. wherefore ſyth
this is common both to ſ
deſprouis of power, & thoſe
whom I ſpake of) & leade
the quiet life: the one ſorte
do thinke them ſelues able
to compaſſe it, if they haue
great

& ſecuritas, quæ afferat
tum conſtantiam, tum e=
tiam dignitatem. Multi
autem et ſunt, & fuerunt,
qui eam, quam dico, tran=
quillitatem expetentes, a
negocijs publicis ſe remo=
uerunt, ad otiumq; profu=
gerunt. In his et nobiliſſi=
mi Philoſophi, longeq;
principes: & quidem ho=
mines ſeueriet graues, nec
populi, nec principū mo=
res ferre potuerunt, vixe=
runtq; nonnulli in agris
delectati re ſua familiari.
His idē propoſitū fuit, qd'
& regibus: vt ne qua re e=
gerent, ne cui parerent, li=
bertate vterentur: cuius
propriū eſt, ſic viuere vt
velis. Quare cum hoc cō=
mune ſit potentie cupi=
dorum, cum ijs, quos
dixi otioſos: alteri ſe ad=
ipſiſci id poſſe arbitran=
tur, ſi opes magnas ha=

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beant : alteri , si contenti
sint suo & paruo. In quo
quidem neutrorū omnino
contemnonda est sentētia
Sed & facilior , & tutior,
& minus alijs grauis , aut
molesta vita est otiosorū.
Fructuotior autem homi-
num generi , et ad clarita-
tem amplitudinemq; ap-
tior eorū , qui se ad Rem-
pub. & ad res magnas ge-
rendas accommodauerunt.

Qua propter & ijs for-
sitan concedendū sit, Rē-
pub. non capeſſētibus, qui
excellēti ingenio, otio, doc-
trineq; sese dediderunt.
Et ijs qui aut valitudinis
imbecillitate , aut aliqua
grauiore causa impediti,
& Repub. recesserunt, cum
eius administrande potes-
tatem alijs , laudemque
concederent. Quibus au-
tem talis nulla sit causa,

great wealth the other, yf
they be contented & their
owne, and a lyttle. where-
in verely the opinion of no
ther of them is vtterlye to
be despised: but the life of
quiet lyuers is both easier
and safer and lesse greuous
or troublesome to other: &
theirs is the profitabler for
man kynde. and fytter for
fame, & honour: who haue
applied them selues to the
common weale, and going
thorough with great mat-
ters. wherefoze perauēturs
bothe they are to bee bozne
withall, that take not in
hande the common weale,
who of an excellent wytt
haue applyed themselves
to learnynge : and also
they, who being letted ey-
ther by sicklynesse, or some
other moze weyghty
cause, haue conueyed them
selues away from the com-
mon weale: when theye
were well content to leaue
to other the aucthoritie, &
praysle of rulinge the same.
But to whome there is
no suche occasion : yf
they

they say they set nought by
those thinges, that moſte
menne haue in admiration
as rule, and office bearing,
to theſe I thinke it woꝝ
the to bee compted not
onely no prayſe, but alſo a
faulte. whose iudgement it
were verpe harde to diſa-
loue, in that theye diſpyſe
gloꝝp. and eſteeme it as no
thyng, but they ſeeme too
feare the troubles and
griues both of greuing of
ſce, & hauing repulſes as a
certein reproche & deſame,
foꝝ there bee, who do lit-
tle agree with them ſelues
in thinges that be contra-
rye, as ſomme moſte ear-
neſtly contempne pleaſure
and in paine bee ſomewhat
tenderer, ſomme regarde
not gloꝝpe and be broken
wyth ſlaunder: and theſe
thynges they do not wyth
ſufficient ſtedfaſtneſſe. But
all lingeinge ſet aſide, of-
ſices are to bee taken, and
the common ſweale to bee
ſerued of thoſe, who haue
by nature the helpes of diſ-
patch of materz. foꝝ other
wiſe can neither the ſtate
bee

ſi deſpicere ſe dicant ea-
que plerique admirētur, im-
peria, & magiſtratus: ijs
non modo nō laudi, verū
etiam vitio dādum puto:
quorū iudiciū in eo, quōd
gloriā contempnant, & p
nihilō putent, difficile fac-
tu eſt non probare. Sed
videntur, labores, et mole-
ſtias. tum offenſionū, tum
repulſarū, quaſi quandam
ignominiam timere & in-
famiam. Sunt enim qui in
rebus contrarijs parū ſibi
conſtent. voluptatē ſeu-
riſſimē cōtempnant in do-
lore ſint molliores: gloriā
negligant frangantur in-
famia: atq; ea quidem non
ſatis conſtanter. Sed ijs,
qui habent a natura adiu-
menta rerū gerendarū, ab-
iecta omni cunctatione
adipiſcendi magiſtratus
ſunt, & gerenda Reſp. eſt
Nec enim aliter aut regi

de Officiis.

ciuitas, aut declarari animi magnitudo potest Capessentibus autem Rempub. nihil min⁹ quam Philosophis, haud scio an magis etiam & magnificentia & dispicientia adhibenda sit rerū humanarū (quam sepe dico!) & tranquillitas animi, atq; securitas. Si quidem nec anxij futuri sunt & cum grauitate, constantiaq; victuri. Quæ eō faciliora sūt Philosophis, quō minus patent multa in eorum vita, quæ fortuna feriat: & quo minus multis rebus egēt: & quia si quid aduersi eueniat, tam grauius cadere non possunt. Quocirca non sine causa maiores motus animorū concitantur, maioraq; efficienda Rempub. gerentibus, quā quietis: quo magis his & magnitud' animi est adhibenda, & vacuitas ab

be gouerned, nor the greatness of courage be declared And of suche as take vpon them the comon weale, no lesse then of Philosophers yea and I wote not whether moze. must be vsed both a maiestye, and a contempt of worldye thinges (whiche I often repeat) & also a quietnesse of mynde, and boydnes of care: for so they shal not bee thoughtfull, and with grauity, and stedfastnesse they shal leade theire lyfe, whiche thinges be so much & easyer to Philosophers, as & fewer thinges lye open in theire lyfe, & fortune may strike: & as the fewer thinges they stand in neede of & because they cannot take so soze a fall, if any aduersity betide. wherfore not without cause. greater mocions of mindes bee stirred by in the: and greater enterpyses are meete to be compassed, by the gouernoures of the common weale, than by the quiet liuers, and therefore & moze greatnesse of courage, and boydnesse of griefes oughte they

they to vse. But who so doth come to the doinge of matters, let him take heede that not onely this he consider, how honest the matter is, but also if hee haue an ablenesse to discharge of same. In the whiche point muste bee considered: that neither ouer sone hee despair for dastardynes, nor ouer muche haue affiaunce for greedinesse. And in all matters, before ye go about the, ther must be vsed a diligent preparation.

But whereas most men suppose martiall feates to be greater, than cytic causes: this opinion is to bee abated. For manye haue sought warre ostentymes, vppon desire of gloze, and it commonly becaule the in great wittes, and courages, and so much the more if they bee men fit for chynalrye, and desirous of warfare. But if we minde to iudge truly: there haue bene manye cite matters greater, and nobler than martial. For though Themistocles be rightfully commended, and his name is more

angoribus. Ad re gerenda autē qui accedit, caueat ne id modo cōsideret, quā illa res honesta sit: sed etiā vt habeat efficiēdi facultatē.

In quo ipso cōsiderādū est ne aut temerē desperet ppter ignauia: aut nimis cōfidat ppter cupiditatē. In ōnib⁹ autē negotijs priusquā aggrediare, adhibēda est preparatio diligens.

Sed cū pleriq; arbitrentur res bellicas maiores esse quā vrbanas, minuēda est hęc opinio. Multienī bella sepe quēsiuerunt propter glorię cupiditatem, atq; id in magnis animis, ingenijsq; plerūq; cōtingit eorū: magis si sint ad re militarē apti, & cupidi bellorū gerendorū. Verē autē si volum⁹ iudicare, multę res extiterunt vrbane maiores clariore; quā bellice. Quāuis enim Themistocles iure laudetur et sit ei⁹ nomē

22

E. i. quā

de Officijs.

quàm Solonis illustrius: ci-
teturq; Salamis clarissimæ
testis victorię, que antepo-
natur consilio Solonis, ei,
quo primũ cõstituit Areo-
pagitas: nõ min⁹ præclarũ
hoc, quàm illud iudicadũ
est. Illud enim semel, p̃fu-
it, hoc semper p̃derit ciui-
tati. hoc cõsilio leges Athe-
nienũ, hoc maiorum in-
stituta seruantur. Et The-
mistocles quidem nihil dix-
it in quo ipse Areopagum
adiuuerit: at ille vere adiu-
uit Themistoclem. Est e-
nim bellũ gestũ consilio se-
natus eius, qui à Solone e-
rat constitutus. Licet eadẽ
de Pausania, Lyfandroq;
dicere quorum reb⁹ gestis
quanquam imperium La-
cedæmonijs dilitatũ puta-
tur: tamen ne minima
quidem ex parte Lycur-
gi legibus & disciplinæ
conferendi sunt, quin e-
tiam ob has ipsas causas,

more famous. thā Solōs:
& Salamis is cited a wit-
nes of his moste gloriouse
victorye, and this preferde
aboue & Counsel of Solō,
wher he first ordeined &
Areopagites, yet no lesse
praysle worthy is this, thā
that to be adiudged. For
that but once auailed, this
shal for euer auaille the city
By this counsell. the lawes
of the Athenians, by this,
the orders of their elders
be p̃serued. And Themis-
tocles can aledge nothing,
wherwith hee fundered the
Areopage, but Solon fur-
dered Themistocles. For
the warre was mayntay-
ned by the aduise of that
Senate, whych by So-
lon was established. We
may say as much of Pau-
sanias, and Lyfander: by
whose deedes of armes
though the Empire of the
Lacedæmoniās is thought
to haue been enlarged, yet
verely they are not to be
compared in the least part
wryth Lycurgus lawes,
and order, yea more o-
uer by these occasyons,
they

they had their armes both et paratiores habuerūt ex
 forwarde, and valiaūter, exercit⁹ et fortiores. Mihi q̃
 neyther when I was a dō neque pueris nobis M.
 child me thought Marcus Scaurus C. Mario, neq; cū
 Scaurus gaue place to Caius Marius: nor when
 I had a do in the common versaremur in Republica
 weale Quintus Catulus Q. Catulus Cn. Pompeio
 to Cneus Pompeius. For cedere videbatur. Parua e-
 of small force is the warre nim sūt foris arma, nisi est
 abroad, vnles ther be good consilium domi. Nec plus
 abuse at home. Africanus singularis &
 For African⁹, both a sin- vir & imperator in excide
 gular man, & captayne also da Numantia Reipub. pro
 did moze profit & common fuit, quā eodem tempo-
 wele in razing of Numās re P. Nasica priuatus, cū
 thā at that time. Publius Tiberiū Gracchū in inter
 Nasica, a priuate man did emit. Quanquam hec qui-
 furder it whē he slew Ti- dem res nō solū ex dome-
 beri⁹ Gracchus. Howbeit stica est ratione, attingit
 this case in dede is not on- enim & bellicā, quoniam
 ly a city matter, For it be- vi, manuq̃ue confecta est:
 longeth also to the nature sed tamē id ipsū gestū est
 of martiall feats sich it was cōsilio vrbano sine exerci-
 wroughte by force, and by tu. Illud autem optimum
 strong hand. But yet that est, in quo inuadi solere ab
 same was done by city cō- inuidis & improbis me au-
 sel, without an army. And dio.
 that is a goodly sayinge, To
 wherewith I here, that I
 am wont to bee touched of
 enuyous, and lewde per-
 sons.

To

E.ij.

Cedāt

de Officijs.

Cedant armatoz; To the robe aboue ar.
 concedat laurea linguę. let glory belong. (mes
 Vt enim alios omittā, no And the lawrell yeue
 bis Remp. gubernantibus; place to the orators tōg
 nonne toge arma cessere? For, & I maye passe ouer
 neque enim in Repub. pe other, did not armes yelde
 riculū fuit grauius vnquā, vnto the robe, when I go
 nec maius odium. Ita con uerned the common weale
 filijs, diligentiaq; nōstra For neyther in the cōmon
 celeriter de manibus au weale was euer a forer pe
 dacissimorum ciuium de rel nor yet a greater hatred
 lapsa arma ipsa ceciderūt. So by our counsel, and di
 Quæ res igitur gesta est ligence, the very weapons
 vnquam in bello tanta? full soone sliding out of the
 quis triumphus conferen boldest ciizens hands, dyd
 dus? Licet enim mihi M fall to the grounde. what
 fili. apud te gloriari ad quē enterpryse I pray you, in
 & hereditas huius gloriæ, warren was euer doone so
 & factorum imitatio per great: what triumphe is
 tinet. Mihi quidem certe there, with it to be compa
 vir abundant bellicis lau red? For I maye, sonne
 dibus Cn. Pompeius Dharke, glory befoze you,
 tis audientibus hoc tri to whom bothe the inheri
 buit. Vt diceret frus tance of this glory and the
 tra se tertium trium imitatio of my deedes doth
 phum deportaturum fu pertain. Cneus Pompeus
 isse, nisi meo in Rempub. a man flowing ful of mar
 tiall praises, gaue mee this
 cōmēdacio in & hearing of
 many, & he said, he shoulde
 in vaine haue bozne awaye
 the thirde triūph, except, by
 my furderāce in the cōmō
 weale

Weale, hee should haue had
a place, where hee myghte
haue triumphed. Whome ma-
hod then is not inferiour to
martial, in which also wee
must bestowe more labour
and study, thā in this. For
always y honestye whych
wee seeke in a haughty and a
pryncely courage, is wrought
by y strength of y mind,
& not of the bodye. Yet the
body must be exercised, &
brought in such plight, as
it maye be able to followe
counsel and reason, in execu-
tinge matters, & sustaining
travaille. But that honestye
wherafter we seck at home
consisteth in the care, & ca-
stinge of the mind, wherin
they bringe no lesse como-
ditie, who roabed doo go-
uerne y comon weale, than
they do, who armed do ma-
ke y warres. And therfore
by theire aduise oft tymes
warres be either, not bego-
zen, ended, and manye times
attempted, as by Marcus
Catoes counsel, was the
third Punic warre wher-
in y aucthoritie of the dead
man auayled wherfore ra-

C. iii.

ther

beneficio ubi triumpharet
esse habiturus. Sunt ergo
domesticę fortitudines nō
inferiores militaribus, in
quibus plus etiā quā in his
operę, studiijq; ponēdū est.
Quinimo enim illud hone-
stū, quod ex animo excel-
so, magnificęq; quærimus,
animi efficitur, non corpo-
ris viribus. Exercēdū tamē
corpus, et ita afficiēdū est
ut obedire consilio, ratio-
niq; possit in exequēdis ne-
gotijs, et in labore tollerā-
do. Honestū autē id, quod
exquirim⁹, totū est positū
in animi cura et cogitatio-
ne. In quo nō minorē uti-
litatem afferūt, qui togati
Reip. præsunt, quā qui
bella gerunt. Itaq; eorum
consilio sepe aut non sus-
cepta, aut confecta bella
sunt, nonnunquam etiam
illata, ut M. Catonis cōsi-
lio bellum tertium Puni-
cum, in quo etiam mortui
valuit authoritas. Quare

de officijs.

expetēda quidē magis est theire wisdomē in determi-
 decernēdi ratio; quam de ninge. thā mālines in sigh-
 certādi fortitudo. Sed ca- ting is to be desired: but we
 uēdū ne id bellādi magis must beware that we take
 fuga, quā vtilitatis ratio not by the matter by ad-
 nē faciāmus. Bellū autem uise. more to a boide warre
 ita suscipiatur, vt nihil thā for cause of pfit. And
 ud nisi pax quā sita videā so let wāre be takē in hād
 tur. Fortis vero animi et as nō other thig may seme
 cōstātis est: nō pturbari but pray. to haue bē fought.
 reb⁹ asperis: nēctumultu And it is verilye a tokē of
 atē de gradu dōicēi, vt di a māly courage, & a cōstāt
 citur: sed presētis animi: v not to be disquieted in rough
 ti cōsilio: nec a rationē dis stormes, noz in makynge a
 cedere. Quanquā hoc ani churic to be thurst frō his
 mi, illud etiā ingenij mag place, as they saye but so, so
 ni est pōipere cōgitationē low the cōsēl of a presēt
 futura: & aliquāto atē cō courage, noz yet to swarue
 stituere quid accidere pos frō reason. Not standing
 sit in vtrāq; partē: & quid the one cōme of courage, &
 agendū sit, cū quid euene other pōceedes of a great
 rit: nec committere ali wit, to fore cōcētue i minde
 quid: vō aliquando dicō. things to come, & sō what
 dum sit. Non putaram, befoze to appoynt vppon
 Hæc sunt opera magni what maye befall on bothe
 animi & excelli & pru sides, & what is to be don,
 dentia, cōsilioq; fidentis, whē any thing shal happen
 noz to cōmit ought, & at a
 npe time one shoulde haue
 cause to saye, had I wylle.
 These be & workz of a gret
 a lofty courage, & leanninge
 vppon prudenē, & cōnsēl.

But

But for a man to vse him
selfe rashly in fiede, & so to
bucke with y enemy hand
to hand, it is a certain by
tithe, and beastly thing. but
when time is, & necessitie
requires, a man must fight
hand to hād, & pfer death
befoze flauerpe, & shame.

But touching the razinge
& sackinge of cities. thys
greatly is to be considered
that nothing rashlye, no-
thing cruelly be done. And
it is the condico of a stout
hearted man, in the ende of
broyles, to punishe the offē-
ders, to saue the multitude
in euery estate to maintein
right & honestye. For like
as there be (as I saide to-
foze) who doe pfer martial
feates befoze citty causes:
so many ye finde manye to
whō dangerous, and hot-
brained deuises seme glori-
ous, & greater, than quiet
cōsels. We must neuer by
seeking to escape peril, de-
serue too s eeme cowardes
and dastardes, but thys
wee muste take heede of,
that we put not our selues
in daunger without cause:

C. liii.

for

Temere autē ī acie versa-
ri & manu cū hoste cōfli-
gere īmane quiddā, & bel-
luarū simile est. Sed cū tē-
pus, necessitasq; postulat.
decertandū manu est, &
mors seruituti, turpitudi-
neq; āteponēda. De euer-
tēdis autē, diripiēdisq; vr-
bib⁹ valde illud cōsiderā-
dū est: ne quid temerē, ne
quid crudeliter fiat. Idq;
est viri magnanimi rebus
agitatis punire sōtes mul-
titudinē cōseruare, in ōni
fortuna, recta atq; honesta
retinere. vt enī sūt (quē
admodū supra dixi) q; vr-
banis rebus bellicas ātepo-
nunt: sic reperies multos
quibus periculosa et calli-
da consilia quietis cogita-
tionib⁹ splēdidiora et tima-
iora videantur. Nūquā ō-
nino periculi fuga cōmit-
tendū est, vt imbelles, ti-
midiq; videamur sed fugi
ēdū etiā illud ne offeram⁹
nōs periculis sine causa

de officijs.

quo nihil potest esse stulti⁹ for there can be nothing fo
 Qua ppter in adeūdis pe- lisher, then so to do. wher=
 riculis cōsuetudo imitāda foze in aduēturing dāgers,
 medicorū est, qui leuiter & the gife of the phisiciās ys
 grotātes leuiter curāt: gra to bee solowed, who do ly=
 uioribus autē morbis peri- ghtly cure the lightly disea=
 culosas curationes et ācipi sed. but to foze sicknes they
 tes adhibere cogūtur. Qua be dzuen to minister dān=
 re in trāquillo tēpestatē ad gerous, & doubtful medeci=
 uersā optare dementis est, nes. Therefore in calme to
 subuenire autē tempestati swithe a foze tēpest, it is a
 quauis ratione sapiētis: eo- mad mans part, but to ma=
 q; magis, si plus adispiscare ke shift in a tempeste, by all
 re explicata boni, quā ad- maner meanes, it is a wise
 dubitata mali. Periculosa mans property, & so muche
 autē rerū attiones partim the moze, if ye attaine mo=
 ijs sūt, qui eas suscipiūt, p- re good when the thinge is
 tim Reipub. Itēquē alij de paste, thā harme, when yt
 vita, alij de gloria, & bene was in boubt. But the do=
 uolētia ciuiū in discrim- ing of matterz be dāgerous
 vocantur, Promptiores partly to those, which take
 gitur debemus esse ad no- thē in hand & partly to the
 stra pericula quā ad cō. cōmō weale. And also some
 munia: dimicareque pa- bee broughte in vāsarde of
 ratius de honore et glo- theyze life, some of their
 ria, quā de cāteris proplez glorie, some of the proplez
 commodis. Inuenti autem fauour, we aught therfoze
 multi sunt, qui non modo to bee redier to aduerture
 our owne, than cōmon pe=
 rels, & to fight soner for ho=
 nour, and glozy, than for o=
 ther comodities.
 But there haue bene foude
 many, who for their cōtry
 were

were redy to spend not on-
ly there substance, but also
their life, & those same yet
would not bee contente to
lose one tot of their gloz
no not thoughe the comon
weale would require it, as
Callicratides, who when
he was captaine of the La-
cedemonians, in the Pelo-
ponnesian warre, and had
done many things worthe
ly, in the ende, ouerturned
al, when he did not followe
their aduise who thought
good to transport & naue
from Arginusus & not to
fight w the Athenians. To
whom he made aunswere,
how the Lacedemonians,
& naue beinge lost, might
make forthe another: hee
coude not seee houte hys
dishonour. And this was
no doubt, to the Lacedemo-
nians a meetely soze plage
but that was a pestilente
plage whereby the Lace-
demonians power fel flatte
to the grounde, whē Cle-
ombrotus, fearinge enuie
had rashely encountred w
Epaminondas.

pecuniam sed vitā etiā pro
fundere pro patria parati
essēt: ijdē glorię iacturam
ne minimā qdē facere vel-
lent, ne Republi: quidē po-
stulante. vt Callicratidas.
qui cū Lacedemoniorum,
dux esset Peloponnesiaco
bello, multaque fecisset
egregiē, vertit ad extremū
ōnia, cū cōsilio non paruit
eorum qui classem ab Ar-
ginus sis remouendam, nec
cū Atheniensibus dimi-
candum putabant: quibus
ille respondit: Lacedæmo-
nios classe illa amissa aliam
parere posse: se fugere sine
suo dedecore non posse.
Atq; hæc quidem Lacede-
monijs plaga mediocris fu-
it: illā pestifera, qua cū
Cleombrotus inuidiam ti-
mens, temere cum Epami-
nūda cōfluxisset, Lacede-
moniorū opes corruerūt.

Now

quanto

de Officiis.

Quanto Q. Maxim⁹ melius; de quo Ennius.

Vn' homo nobis cūctādo restituit rem,

Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem.

Ergo postq; magisq; viri nunc gloria claret.

Quod genus peccandi vitandum est etiam in-

rebus vrbānis. Sunt enim qui consentiunt, etiam

si optimum sit, tamen inuidiē metu nō audent di-

cere. Omnino qui Reipub. prāfuturi sunt, duo

Platonis prācepta teneant. Vnum vt vtilitatem

ciuiū sic tueantur, vt quicquid agunt, ad eā referāt,

obliti commodorum suorum. Alterum vt totū corpus Reipub. curent: ne

dum partem aliquam tueantur reliquas deferant.

Vt enim tutela

How much better did Quintus Fabius Maximus: of whom quoth Ennius:

One wight there is, that hath our welth restored by delayes.

For he befor al rumors did our safty set alwais: wherfore in léger course of time, the greater is his praise.

which kinde of misdoing must be also auoided i city matters. For there be men who behit neuer so good & they thinke, yet for feare of euy they dare not utter hit, who so shall be gouernors of & cōmon weale, let the obserue two preceptes of Platoes, one is & theye so maintein the profit of & cōmōs, & what so euer they do, they referre it therto, alwais forgettig their owne cōmodities. they other is, & they haue carē ouer & hōle body of the cōmō weale lest while they vphold sōe one pt & rest they leue destitute. For like as gardeship

euen

enen so governemēt of the
cōmon weale ought to bee
vſed to the proſite of them
who are committed. & not
of them to who it is com-
mitted. But who ſo pvide
for parte of the people, & of
part bee richles, they bzing
in ſedition & diſcorde & thiſ
moſt hurtfull to the cōmō
weale: wherby it befallerh
& ſoe doe ſceme people plea-
ſers, ſome affectionate to
nobiltie, but ſewe to the
whole. Hereof ſpꝛāg great
diſcention amōg the Athe-
nians: and in opre common
weale, not only ſediciō, but
alſo ſoze ciuile warre: the
which a graue & ſtout city-
zen & woꝝthy of rule in the
common weale, wil ſlype
and hate: and geue himſelfe
whole to the cōmon weale
and nother hunte after ry-
ches, noꝝ poſwer: but wyl
ſo defende the whole ſtate
as, he maye prouyde for
al men, noꝝ by falſe accu-
ſacyōn wyl hee bzyng
anye manne into hatred
or enuye: but allwayes
wyl ſo cleaue too iuſtice,
and

ſic pcreatio Reip. ad vti-
litate eorū qui cōmiſſi ſūt
non ad eorū quib⁹ cōmiſ-
ſa eſt gerēda eſt. Qui autē
parti ciuiū conſulūt, partē
negligūt, rē pernicioſiſ-
mā in ciuitatē inducūt, ſe-
ditionem atq; diſcordiam
Ex quo euenit vt alij po-
pulares, alij ſtudioſi opti-
mi cuiuſq; videātur, pauci
vniuerſorū, Hic apud A-
theniēſes magne diſcordi-
æ Orte & in noſtra Reip.
nō ſolū ſeditiones, ſed peſ-
tifera etiā bella ciuilia. q̄
grauis & fortis ciuis i Re-
pub. dignus principatu ſu-
giet atq; oderit tradetq;
ſe totū Reip. neque opes
aut potētiā cōſectabitur
totāq; eā ſic tuebitur vt ō-
nibus cōſulat. Nec vero,
criminibus falſis in odiū,
aut inuidiā quēquā voca-
bit: omninoq; ita iuſtitie,
honeſtatiquē adhereſcet,

de Officijs.

vt dum eā conseruet, quē-
uis grauit̃r offendat: mor-
temquē oppetat potius,
quā̃m deferat illa, quē dixi
Miserima est omnio amb-
itio, bonorumq; conten-
tia. De qua preclarē a-
pud eūdem est Platonem
similiter facere eos, qui in
ter se contenderent, vter
potius Rempu. admini-
stret, vt si nautæ certarent
quis eorum potissimum
gubernaret. Idemque prę-
cepit, vt eos aduersarios
existimemus; qui arma
contraferant, non eos, qui
suo iudicio tueri Rempu.
velint: qualis fuit inter P.
Africanum, & Q. Mes-
sellum sine acerbitate dis-
fencio.

Nec vero audiendi sunt,
qui grauit̃r irascendum
inimicis putabunt,

& honestly & while he may
maintein it, although he so-
re offend other, he would de-
fire death rather then for-
sake those things & I haue
spoken of: Ambicion no
doubt, a struig for prouisi-
on is a very miserable thig
whereof it is notably sayd
in & same Plato, & sembla-
bly saie they, who would
strue together, whether of
thē should rather rule the
cōmō weale, as if the ma-
riners should be at variās
which of thē should chiefe-
ly gouerne & helme. And &
same man hath taught vs,
& those we take as enimies;
which would beare armoz
agaist vs, & not those who
by theire discretion meane
to preferue the cōmō weale
as the discention betwene
Publius Africanus, and
Quintius Metellus was
hout all bitterness of ma-
lice. Neither are they wor-
thy to be herd, which hold
opinion & wee should be
thoroughly angry with our
enemies, and doo thinke,
it is

it is the property of a stout harted, and manly man.

For there is nothing more comendable, nothing more seemely for a great and noble man, than pleasableness and mercy. But in free cities, and where there is an equalitie of law, they must be bled also a myldenesse & noble courage, as they call it: least if wee bee angrye either with commers out of tyme, or crauers wythout shame, wee fall into a testifnesse of mind, both vnprofitable, & hatefull. And yet meekenesse, and mercy is so to be allowed: that for the common weales sake, a seueritie be vsed: wythoute which, a citie can not be goarned. But all punishment, and chastysment must bee voyde of malice, and not be applied to serue his turne, who punishethe or rebuketh anye man, but to a common weales behofe. Wee must also beware, that punishment be not greater than the fault, & least al for one matter, some be corrected, some not bee spokē vnto

idq; magnimini et fortis viri esse censent. Nihil enim laudabilius, nihil magno et preclaro viro dignius placabilitate atq; clemētia. In liberis vero populis, et in iuris equabilitate, exercēda etiā est facilitas, et altitudo animique dicitur: ne si irascamur, aut itē pestiūe accedētib⁹, aut imprudēter rogātib⁹, in morositatē inutilē et odiosā incidamus. Et tamē ita pbāda est māsuetudo atq; clementia, vt adhibeatur Reipublicæ causa seueritas, sine qua administrari ciuitas nō potest. Omnis autē et animaduersio, et castigatio cōtumelia vacare debet: neq; ad ei⁹, qui punit aliquē, aut verbis castigat, sed ad Reipub. vtilitātē referri. Cauendum etiam ne maior pœna quē culpa sit, & ne eisdem de causis alij plectantur, alij ne appellentur quidem.

Prohi-

de Officiis

Prohibenda autem maxime est ira in puniendo. Nunquā enim iratus qui accedet ad pœnam, mediocritate illam tenebit, quæ est inter nimium & parum: quæ placet Peripateticis, et recte placet, modo ne laudent iracūdiam, et dicerent vtiliter à natura datam. Illa vero omnibus in rebus repudianda est, optandum quæ ut ij, qui præsumunt Reipublicæ legum similes sint: quæ ad puniendum non iracundia, sed equitate ducuntur. Atque etiā in rebus prosperis, & ad voluntatem nostram fluentibus superbiā, fastidium, arrogātiā, quæ magnopere fugiamus. Nam ut aduersas res, sic secundas immoderate ferre leuitatis est, præclarum est æquabilitas in omni vita, & idem semper vultus, eademque frons

into. And in punishinge we must chiefly refrain fro anger. For the angry man that goeth about punishinge shal neuer keepe that measure, that is betweene too much, & too little: & whiche measure liketh the Peripatetikes: & of good cause it liketh the. were it so, they would not commend angrynes: & say, & it is profitably geuen of nature. But in al cases, & affection is to be refused: and it is to be wished, & such as gouerne the common weale be lyke the lawes: which be moued to punish offenders not vpon any wrath, but vpon equitie.

Moze ouer in prosperitie, & when thinges flow euen at our will, let vs earnestly flee pride, disdainfulness, and arrogancye. For as it is a point of lightnesse, vnto measurably to beare aduersitie: so it is no lesse, vnto measurably to vse prosperitie: & a continual euennesse in al a mannes lyfe. & one chere euermore, and one manner of face is commendable,

as we haue hard of Socrate, & also of Caius Lelios. Certes I see, how Phillip kinge of the Macedonians was excelled of his sone in prowesse, & glorye, yet in mildenesse, & gentlenesse, he was farre above him. wherefoze if one was alwayes noble, the other oftentimes ful beastly, so if they seme rightly to teach, which warne vs, if howe much the hier we be in degrees, so much the lower we beare our selues.

Panetiū reporteth, how Africanus his scolar, and familiar frende, was wont to say, like as horses by reason of many duels fightes of warres waxing ouerhote, & couragious men vse to put to riders if theye maye haue the if redier, euen so men vnbridled by prosperitie & ouertrusting to themselves should bee broughte as it were within the compasse of reason, & learninge, that they might thorowsee the frailenesse of the worlde, and the waueringe of fortune.

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vt de Socrate, inteq de C. Lelio accepim⁹. Phillippū quidē Macedonū regē, reb⁹ gestis & gloria superat⁹ a filio: facilitate et humanitate video superiorē fuisse Itaq; alter sēper magnus, alter sēpe turpissimus fuit. Vt recte p̄cipere videatur qui monēt, vt quātō superiores simus, tantō nos sumissius geramus. Panetiū quidem Africanū auditorem, & familiarem suum solitū ait dicere: vt equos propter crebras contentiones p̄riorum ferocitate exultantes domitorib⁹ tradere soleāt, vt his facilius possint vti: sic homines secundis rebus effrenatos, sibiq; p̄sidentes, tanquam in girum rationis, & doctrinē duci oportere, vt perspicerent rerum humanarum imbecillitatem, varietatemq; Fortunę.

Atq;

de Officiis

Atq; etiā in secundissimis rebus maxime est vtēdum consilio amicorū: ijsq; maior etiā quā antē tribuēda est authoritas: ijsdemq; tēporibus cauendū est, ne assētoribus patefaciam⁹ aures, nec adulari nos sinamus: in quo falli facilē est. Tales enim nos tūc esse putamus, vt iure laudemur, ex quo nascūtur innumera peccata: cū homines inflati opiniōib⁹ turpiter irridentur, et in maximis versantur erroribus. Sed hec quidem hactenus. Illud autē sic est iudicandum: maximas geri res, & maximi animi ab ijs, qui Rempub. regant, quōd eorum administratio latissime pateat, ad plurimosq; pertineat. Esse autem magni animi, & fuisse multos etiam in vita otiosa, qui aut inuestigarent, aut conarentur magna

More ouer in our best p-
perne, we must most of all
take & aduise of our frēdes
& wee must geue the also
a greater auctoritie, than
we did befoze, & i thuse sea-
sons, we must take hede, &
wee open not our eares to
flatterers, nor suffer oure
selues to be claued w̄ flat-
tery, wherē it is an easye
thinge to bee begiled. For
we thinke our selues such,
& of right we may be pray-
sed. whereof do springe in-
numerable faults, whē mē
pust bp w̄ opiniō be sham-
fully scorned, & be wapt in
folish errors. But of these
matters th⁹ far we treat.
This then is to bee taken
thus, & y greatest deedes &
of y greatest courage, bee
done by them, whiche go-
uerne the cōmon weale, be-
cause their ministratiō rea-
cheth fardest, & to most mē
apperteineth. And y there
be, and haue bene manye,
euer in the quyet lyfe, of
great courage. whiche ey-
ther woulde tpe oute, or
take in hand certeyn great
enterpr

enterprizes: & would keepe
themselves in y^e boundes
of their owne matters: or
els, placed betwene Philo-
sophers, and those that rule
the common weale, would
be delighted in their home
goods: not heapinge vp the
same, by all maner of mea-
nes, nor barring theirs fro
the vse thereof: but rather
empartinge them bothe to
their frinde, & to the comō
weale, if at any time there
shoulde bee neede. whiche
good, first, let it be wel got-
ten, and with no dishonest
or hateful game: next, let it
be readye to doe good, to
manye, so they be worthy:
lastlye, let it be increased
with discrecion, diligence,
& thurst: and not lye open
rather to lust and riot, thā
to liberalitie, and bounty-
fulness.

These fore sayde lessons
who so obserueth: may liue
both honozablye, grauely,
and stoutly, and also plaine-
ly, saythfullty, and frendly
for the trade of mans lyfe.
It folowes, & we speak of
the other parte of honestye,
whiche

quedam seseq; suarum re-
rum finibus continerent:
aut interiecti inter philo-
sophos & eos qui Rēpub.
administrarent, delectarē-
tur re sua familiari non e-
am quidem omni ratione
exaggerantes, neq; exclu-
dētes ab eius vsu suos, po-
tiusq; & amicis impartiē-
tes, & Reipub. si quando
vsus esset. Quę primū be-
ne parta sit, nullo neq;u-
turpi questu neq; odiofo,
tū quam plurimis (mo-
dodignis) se vtilē prębeat,
deinde augeatur ratione,
diligentia, parsimonia: nec
libidini potius, luxurięq;
quā liberalitati, & bene-
ficiētię pateat. Hęc pre-
scripta seruanti licet mag-
nificē, grauitē, animoseq;
viuere: atq; etiam sim-
pliciter, fideliter, viteq;uē
hominum amicē. Sequi-
tur vt de illa reliqua parte
honestatis dicendum sit:

de Officiis.

in qua verecūdia, & quasi quidem ornatus vite, temperantia et modestia, omnis quē sedatio perturbati-
onum animi, et rerum mo-
dus cernitur. Hoc loco cō-
tinetur id quod dici latine
decorem potest: grece e-
nim *πρεπον* dicitur huius
vis est, vt ab honesto non
queat seperari. Nam et
quod decet honestum est
et quod honestum est, de-
cet. Qualis autem diffe-
rentia sit honesti, et deco-
ri, facilius intelligi, quā
explanari potest. Quic-
quid enim est quod dece-
at, id tum apparet, cum an-
tegressa est honestas.
Itaque non solum in hac
parte honestatis, de qua
hoc loco differendum est,
sed etiam in tribus supe-
rioribus, quid deceat ap-
paret. Nam et ratione vti
atque oratione prudēter,

whiche remaineth, wherin
shamefastnesse, and tempe-
rance, as it were & certaine
ornament of mans life, &
sober moode, and all ap-
peasement of passions of &
minde, and the measure of
thyngs is scene. In this
place also comeliness is cō-
teyner, the whiche may bee
named Decorum in laten,
for in Greeke it is called
πρεπον The nature here
of is such, that from hone-
sty it cannot bee sundred.
For bothe what becometh
is honest and also what is
honest, becommeth. But
what difference there is
betwene honesty & comely-
nesse, it may sooner be con-
ceiued then expressed. For
whatsoeuer it is, that be-
commeth, it thē appeareth,
when honestye is gone be-
foze. And therfoze not on-
ly in this part of honestye,
whereof in this place we
haue to dispute, but also in
& thre former ptes it doth
apere what becometh. For
as it becometh the one to vls
realū, & speache discretelye.

to doe, that hee shoulde do, & agere quod agas consi-
derate: onique in re quid
advisedly: to espye & main-
tain whatsoeuer is in eue-
ry thing the trouth: so con-
sist veri videre & tueri de-
trary wyle to bee beguyled
cet contraq falli, errare,
to erre, to fall, to be decey-
labi, decipi, tam dedecet,
ued, as much it misbecom-
quam delirare, & mente
meth: as to dote, and bee
captum esse. Et iusta om-
distraight in minde.

Thereto al iust thynges be
comely: all vniust thynges
again: as they be dishonest
so are they vncomely.

Like is the nature of man
lines For what so is done
manfully, and with a great
courage, that dooth seeme
meete for a man, & comely:
what so goethe contrarpe:
that as it is dishonest, euē
so it is vncomely.

Wherefore this comelynes
whereof I speake, doth p-
taine to al honesty in dede:
and so pertames, that not
after a certeine hidden sort
it is scene. but shōdes in ope
sight. For a certein thinge
there is & becommeth: & &
same is perceiued in euerie
vertue: which more by ima-
ginatiō, than in dede, may
be seuered from vertue.

For

nia decora sunt iniusta cō-
trā, vt turpia, sic indecora.
Similis est ratio fortitu-
dinis.

Quod enim viriliter ani-
moq magno fit, id dignū
viro & decorum videtur
quod contra, id vt turpe,
sic in decorum. Quare
pertinet quidem ad om-
nem honestatein hoc, qd
dico dicorum, & ita per-
tinet, vt non recondita
quadam ratione cernatur
sed sit in promptis. Est e-
nim quiddā (idque intel-
ligitur in omni virtute)
quod deceat: quod cogi-
tatione magis a virtute
potest: quam re seperari.

F.ij.

de Officiis.

& vt venustas, & pulchritudo corporis secerni nō potest a validudinē: sic hoc, de quo loquimur decorū, totum illud est quidē cum virtute confusum, sed mēte & cogitatione distinguitur. Est autem eius descriptio duplex, nā & generale quoddā decorū intelligimus, quod in omni honestate versatur, et aliud huic subiectum, quod pertinet ad singulas partes honestatis. Atq; illud superius sic fere definire solet. Decorum id esse quod cōsentaneū sit hominis excellētiæ in eo, in quo natura eius a reliquis animantibus differat. Quę autē pars subiecta generi est, eā sic definiūt vt id decorum esse velint, quod ita naturę cōsētaneū sit, vt in eo moderatio & tēperantia appareat cum specie quadā liberali. Hęc ita esse, itelligere possum?

For as goodlynesse & beauty of, body cannot bee parted from health, so this comeliness, wherof we treat, is altogether blynded. & vertue, but yet in ones mynde and thought it may be deuyded.

But the description thereof is on twoe sortes. For bothe we conceaue a general comeliness to be, which in all honestys hath to do, and an other speciall comeliness vnder this; whyche belōgeth to euery particular part of honestye. And y former thus in a maner is wont to be defined, that it is comely, whiche is agreeable to mans excellency, in that, wherein his nature is differēt from other liuing creatures. But they define the parte, whych is vnder the general, in suche wise, y yet they wil haue it to be comely cōely, which is so to nature agreeable, as it may appere both in measureableness, & temperāce, & a certeine honest shewe. That these be thus meane of y philosophers, we may gesse

gesse by that comynesse
whiche the Poets folowe
wherof, in an other place,
wee are wont to say moze
But then wee say, the Po
ets kepe that grace, which
becommeth: when it that
to eche personne is sitting
both is done, and said. as
if either Ecus, or Minos
should saye:

wel let them hate, while
they stand in feare: or this

this childrens graue the
parent selfe now is.

Uncomely it should seeme
because we haue hard, that
they were iust men. But
Atreus saying so, it is ly-
ked of the hearers, because
the speache is fiete for the
personne.

But Poets wil iudge by
the personne, what is co-
ly for euery body, how be it
nature her selfe hathe putt
vpon vs a psonage of great
excellency, & pzheminence
abdue al other liuing crea-
tures. wherefore Poets in
the greate diuerlitie of per-
sons will espy what is fyt
euen for the wicked sort, &
what becommeth them.

But

ex eo decore, quod Poete
sequuntur: de quo alio lo-
co plura dici solent. Sed
tum seruare illud poetarum
quod deceat dicimus, cum
id quod quaque persona
dignum est & fit & dicitur.
ut si Ecus aut Minos di-
ceret.

ODE RINT
DVM METVANT.

aut, NATIS SEPVL-
CRVM IPSE EST PA-

RENS: indecorum vide-
retur quod eos fuisse iu-

stos accepimus. At Atreo
dicente. plausus exitantur

est n. digna persona ora-
tio. Sed poete quid queq;

deceat, ex persona iudi-
cabunt. Nobis autem per-

sonam imposuit ipsa na-
tura magna, cum excellē-

tia, præstantiaq; animan-
tium reliquorum. Quo

circa poetarum in magna ve-
ritate personarum, etiam

vitiosis quid conueniat
& quid deceat, videbunt,

de Officiis.

Nobis autem cū a natura constantię, moderationis, temperantię, veritatis, partes datę sint cūq; eadē natura doceat non negligere, quē admodum nos aduersos homines geramus: efficitur, vt & illud quod ad omnem honestatē p̄tinet decorū quam latē fūsum sit, appareat: & hoc qd' spectatur in vno quoq; genere virtutis. Vt enim pulchritudo corporis apta cōpositiōe mēbrorū mouet oculos, & delectat hoc ipso qd' inter se ōnes ptes quodam lepore cōsentiūt: sic hoc decorū, quod elucet in vita, mouet approbationem eorū, quibus cum viuatur, ordine, & cōstātia & moderatione dictorum omnium atq; factorum Adhibenda est igitur quēdam reuerentia aduersus homines et optimi cuiusque, & reliquorum.

But seeing the parts of stedfastnesse, measurablenesse, temperance & shamefastnesse bee appointed vs by nature, & seeinge y same nature teacheih vs, not to bee rechelesse, after what sorte we behaue our selues to euery man, it comes to passe, that bothe it appeareth, how farre the comynesse which appertaines to al honesty, doth reach, and this also, which is marked in euerye kynde of vertue. For as the beautifulnesse, of the body with proportionable makynge of the limmes moueth a mannes eyes and deilyteth them euen so this y al the partes w a certeine grace agree together right so this comelines that shineth abrode in oure lyfe, winneth theire liking with whom we liue by an order, stedfastnesse, & measurablenesse in al our wordes & deeds. There muste be vsed therefore a certein reuerence towarde menne, both to euery one of y best, sorte, and also to the rest of meaner degree.

For

For it is not onely a signe
of an arrogant bodye, but
also of one altogether law-
lesse, to be richles, what e-
uery man thinketh of him.

But there is a differēce
betwēne iustice, & shame-
fastnes, in euery respecte,
that is to be had. It is
part of iustice, to offer men
no violence: of shamefast-
nesse to offende no bodye,
wherin the nature of come-
lynesse is moste througely
scene. These thinges then
declared: I thinke it suffi-
ciently conceiued, what
thinge that is, which wee
say, becommeth,

But the duptie, that proce-
deth of comelinesse, chiefly
taketh this way: which lea-
deth to the agreableness, &
pseruation of nature, whō
if wee wil folow as guide
we shal neuer go awisse, &
shal folow both that, whi-
che hath in it witnes, and
throug sight by nature, &
that which is agreable for
the felowship of men, and
that which is earnest, and
manly. But the greatest
effect of comelinesse standeth
in thys parte of vertue,

Nam negligere quid dese
quisq; sentiat, non solū ar-
rogātis est, sed etiā omni-
no dissoluti. Est autē qd'
differat in hominū ratioñ
habēda inter iustitiā & ve-
recundiā. Iustitię partes
sunt nō violare homines:
verecūdię nō offendere: ī
quo maxime pspicitur vis
decori, His igitur exposi-
tis quale sit id, qd' dicere
dicim⁹, intellectū puto, of-
ficiū autē qd' ab eo du-
cit, hāc primū habet viā, q̄
deducit ad conuenientiā,
conseruationēq̄ue naturę
quam si sequemur dūcem
nunquam aberrabimus, se-
quemurque & id. quod a-
cutum & perspicax natu-
ra est, & id quod ad homi-
num cōsotiationem ac-
commodatum est, & id
quod vehemens atq; for-
te. Sed maxima vis de-
cori in hac in est parte,

de Officiis.

de qua disputamus. Neq; ^{whereof wee nowe treat.}
 n. solū corporis qui ad na- ^{For not only the movingz}
 turā apti sunt, sed multo ^{of the bodye, which agre to}
 etiam magis animi motus ^{nature are to bee allowed:}
 probandi, qui item ad na- ^{but much more the motiōs}
 turam accommodati sūt, ^{of the minde, that likewise}
 Duplex est enim vis ani- ^{bee agreeable to nature, are}
 morum, atq; nature. Vna ^{to bee commended.}
 pars in appetitu posita est ^{For the power of y minde}
 que est, *ὀρεξις* grece, que ho- ^{& of nature standes in two}
 minem huc & illuc rapit ^{partes. The one is placed}
 Altera in ratione, que do- ^{in appetite: which in greke}
 cet & explanat, quid faci- ^{is *ὀρεξις* and this hither and}
 endū fugiendū sit. Ita fit ^{thither haleth a man: that}
 vt ratio presit, appetitus ^{other hath place in reason:}
 obtēperet. Omnis autē ac- ^{which teacheth and shew-}
 tio vacare debet temerita- ^{eth plaine lyce, what ys to}
 te & negligētia. Nec vērō ^{be done, and what to be re-}
 agere quicquā cuius nō ^{fused. So falleth it that re-}
 possit causam probabilem ^{ason ruleth, and appetit o-}
 reddere. Hec est enim fe- ^{bepeith. But al our doings}
 re descriptio officij. Effici- ^{must bee without rashnes}
 endū autē est, vt appetit⁹ ^{and negligence: neyther}
 rationi obediāt: eamquē ^{ought a manne to doe anye}
 neq; precurrans, ppter te- ^{thinge wherof he is not a-}
 meritatem, nec ppter pi- ^{ble to render a prouable}
 gritiam aut ignauiā dese- ^{cause. For this in a maner}
 rant: sintquē tranquilli ^{is the definition of ducty.}
^{But we must bzīg to passe}
^{that oure appetites obeye}
^{reason: and neyther runne}
^{befoze it, neither for slouth}
^{or dasterdlynesse, dragg be}
^{hinde it: & y they be quiet,}
 and

and boide of all sturre. and trouble of minde.

whereby al stedefastnes & measurablenesse shal appere in light. For appetitus which go ouer farre astray and (as it were) ouerhoort eyther in longinge after thinges, or sleepeinge from thinges. bee not stayed ynough by reason: these without doubt exceede theyre boundez and measure. For they forsake, and sette asid obedience: noz yet doe yeld to reason, whereunto they be made subiecte by y^e lawe of nature. But such motions not only mēs mindz be troubled, but also theire bodies. we may see it in y^e very faces of the angry: or of them, who either wth any luste, or with feare be sturred, or in ouermuche pleasure doe reioyce: for there with the countenance, voice mouing, & resting of them all is chaunged: Of which thinges this is gathered (to the entent we may retourne to the forme of dutie) that al appetites are to be pulled in, and asswaged and

atque omni animi perturbatione careant, ex quo elucebit omnis constantia, omnisq; moderatio. Nam qui appetitus longius euagantur, & tanquam exultantes siue cupiendo, siue fugiendo non satis a ratione retinentur, hi sine dubio finem & modū transeunt, Relinquūt enim et abijciūt obedientiam, nec rationi parent, cui sūt subiecti lege naturæ. A quib^{us} non modo animi perturbantur, sed etiā corpora. Licet ora ipsa cernere iratorū, aut eorū, qui aut libidine sunt, aut voluptate nimia aliqua aut metu cōmoti gestiunt: quorum omnium vultus, voces, motus, statusque mutantur. Ex quibus illud intelligitur (vt ad officij formam reuertamur) appetitus omnes contrahēdos, sedandosq; esse:

de officiis.

excitadāq; animaduersionē & diligētiā, vt ne quid temerē, ac fortuito, incōsideratē, negligentēq; agam⁹. Neq; n. ita generati a natura sum⁹, vt ad ludū & iocum facti esse videamur, sed ad ſeueritatē poti⁹. & ad qdā studia grauiora, atq; maiora. Ludo autē & ioco vti illis qd' licet ſed ſicut ſōno & quietib⁹ cēteris, tū cū grauib⁹ ſeriisq; reb⁹ ſatiſfecerimus. Ipſūq; genus iocādi nō pfuſū, nec imodeſtū ſed ingenuū, et facetū eſſe debet. Vt enim pueris non ōnē licētiā ludēdi dam⁹, ſed eā quē ab honeſtatis actionibus nō ſit aliena, ſic in ipſo ioco aliquod pbi ingenuij lumē eluceat Duplex ōnino eſt iocādi genus. Vnū illiberale, petulās, ſtelligioſū, obſcœnum, Alterū elegās, vrbanū, ingenioſū facetum, quo genere nō modo Plautus noſter

and ſ we muſt take good heede and diligence, ſ we do nothing raſhlye & ventuſouſly, nor vnaduifedly and negligentlye. For we be not to this ende engendred of nature, ſ we ſhold ſeeme to be created for play and ieſt, but we bee rather bozne to ſageneſſe, & to certeine grauer & greater ſtudies. Yet we maye lawfully vſe ieſtinge & paſtime, but euen as we doe ſleepe, & other reſtings at ſuche time as we haue ſufficientlye en deo graue & ernelt cauſes. And the very manner of our ieſtig muſt not be to large nor vnſober, but honeſt, & pleaſant. For as we ſee not children al maner liberty of playng, but ſuche as ſwarueth not from honeſt exerciſes, ſo in our very ieſting let there appere ſome light of honeſt witte. To be ſhort after ſwoe ſortes is the manner of ieſtyng: the one, vnhoneſte, rayling hurtfull, baſe, the other fine, ciuile, witty, pleaſant. Withe the whiche kynde, not onelye oure Plautus, and

and the olde comedy of the & Atticorum antiqua cō-
 Itikes, but also ʒ bookes mœdia, sed etiā philoso-
 of Socratical philosopherz phorū socraticorū libri re-
 be wel stoꝛed: & there be of ferti sunt, multaq; multo-
 many men many mery said rū facete dicta: vt ea q̄ a
 saues, as those: hat of old sene catone sūt collecta q̄
 Caro be gathered, whiche be called ἀποφθγγματα vocantur ἀποφθγγματα
 Easy therfore is the diffe- Facilis igitur est distinctio
 rence betwene honest, and ingenui & liberalis ioci-
 vn honest iesting. The one Alter est, (si tempore fit,
 is meete for a honest man, ac remisso animo) homi-
 if it be done in season, and ne libero dign⁹. Alter ne
 with a light hart: ʒ othet homine quidē. si rerū tur-
 meete for no man, if ʒ vn pitudini adhibetur verbo-
 clenlinesse of the matter be rū obscenitas. Ludēdi etiā
 encreased with filchynesse est quidā modus retinen-
 of wooꝛdes. dus, vt ne nimis omnia p-

Also in pastime, there is a certaine measure to bee kept: that we be not therin al together excessive, and fundamus, elatiq; volupta-
 puffed vp wythe pleasure, te in aliquā turpitudinem
 fall into some dishonestye. dilabamur. Suppeditāt au-
 But both oure Martiall tem & campus noster, &
 feelde, & also our exercises studia venandi, honesta
 of hunting do shew vs ho- exempla ludendi. Sed per
 nest examples of pastime. 20

But it belongs to the tinet ad omnē off. cij que-
 whole discourse of durtie, stionem sēper in promptu
 cuermore to haue in mind habere, quantum natura
 howe farre mannes na hominis pecudibus reli-
 ture exceedeth the nature quisque bestijs antecedit,

For

de officiis.

Ille enim nihil sentiāt nisi voluptatem, ad eamque feruntur omni impetu.

Hominis autem mens, discendo aliter, & cogitando semper aliquid aut inquirat, aut agit: videndiq; & audiendi delectatione ducitur. Quin etiā si quis est paulo ad voluptates propensior: modo ne sit ex peccatum genere (sunt enim quidam homines non re sed nomine) sed si quis est paulo erectior, quamuis voluptate capiatur, occultat & dissimulat appetitū voluptatis, propter verecundiam. Ex quo intelligitur corporis voluptas non satis esse dignam hominis præstantia, eamque contemni & recij oportere. Sin sit quispiam qui aliquid tribuat voluptati, diligenter ei tenendum esse eius fruendæ modum. Itaq; victus,

For theye feele nothinge but pleasure, and therebunto be caried & their whole sweighe: but mans witte is fedde with learninge. and by studyng either sercheth or doth alway somewhat: and is lead with the deylte of seeing and hearing. Yea moze ouer if there bee any somewhat with the most enclpneo to pleasure: so hee be not of the bestly kynde: (for some there be not men in deede, but in name) but if there be any man, that is some what moze greedely mynded: though with pleasure hee be caught, hee hedyeth and dissemble the hys appetite of pleasure, for very shamefastnesse: whereof it is soone perceiued, that pleasure of the body is not woorthye to bee matched with the excellency of man and that it ought to be despyssed, and reiected. But if there bee anye manne, who some deale ycldech vnto pleasure, hee must verely warelye kepe a measure in enioyng the same.

And therfore let the feeding
and

and apparailing of the bo-
dy be referred to health, &
strength, not to voluptu-
ousnesse. And therto if wee
suppl consider, what an ex-
cellency and a dignity ther
is in nature, wee shall vn-
derstand howe fowle it is
to fouerflowe in ryotte, and
liue delicioufly, and wan-
tonlye, and howe honest it
is, to leade our life sauing-
lye, chastyely, sagely, and so-
berlye.

Wee must vnderstand also
that we be cladd by nature
(as it were) with two par-
sons, whereof the one ys
comune, because we al bee
partakers of reason, & the
preheminnence, wherby wee
surmounte beastes, from
which reason, all honesty,
and comliness is derpyed,
and out of the whiche, the
waye of findinge duntye is
sought, the other is that
which properly to ech man
is assigned.

For as in bodyes there be
great differēces (for some
we see passe other in swift-
nesse to runne, some in
strength) to swastle, & like

cultusq; corporis ad vale-
tudinē referatur, & ad vi-
res, nō ad voluptatē. Atq;
etiā si cōsiderare volumus
quē sit in natura hominis
excellētia, & dignitas, in-
telligimus quam sit turpe
diffuere luxuria, et deli-
catē ac molliter viuere:
quāmq; honestum parce,
continenter, seuerē, sobri-
eq;. Intelligendū etiam est
duabus quasi nos a natura
indutos esse psonis. Qua-
rū vna est cōmunis ex eo-
quōd omnes participes su-
mus rationis, prestantiq;
eius, quē antecellimus be-
stijs: a qua omne honestū,
decorumq; trahitur: & ex
qua ratio inueniendi offi-
cij exquiritur. Altera au-
tem, quē ppriē singulis est
attributa. Vt n. i corporib;
magnē dissimilitudines sūt
(alios enim videmus velo-
citate ad cursum, alios vi-
ribus ad luctādum valere

swife

de Officiis.

itemq; in formis alijs dignitatē iēsse, i alijs venustatem) sic in animis axistūt etiam maiores varietates. Erat in L. Crasso, & in L. Philippo mult⁹ lepos: maior etiam, magisq; de industria in C. Cēsare Lucij fil'. At ijsdē temporibus in M. Scauro, & in M. Druso adoleſcente singularis seueritas: in C. Lēlio multa hilarita: in eius familiari. Scipione ābitio maior, vita tristior. De græcis autē dulcē & facetum, festiuq; sermonis atq; in omni oratione simulatorem, quem εἰρωνεία græci nominauerunt Socratē accepimus. Contra Pithagorā & Periclem summam auctoritatem consecutos sine vlla hilaritate. Calidū Hannibalē eu Pœnorum: ex nostris ducibus. Q. Maximum accepimus, facile cēlare, tacere, dissimulare,

wise in faces, some haue a portly looke, some an amiablenesse, so also in mindes there bee farre greater diuersities.

There was in Lucius Crassus & Lucius Philippus much pleasauntnesse: but greater & more of sette purpose, in Caius Cesar, Lucius sōne. And at those daies in Marcus Scaurus, & in Marcus Drusus the yonge man, there was a singuler grauitie: in Caius Lelius, muche mirth: in Scipio his familiar, bothe greater honour seeking, & a sadder life.

But of the Grecians, Socrates, we haue harde was pleasant, & feate conceted a merve talker, & in all his woozkes a mocker, whom the Grekes named εἰρωνεία cōtrarywise Pithagoras, & Pericles attained very high auctority, without any mirth at all. Of Penes, Anibal was crafty: of our captains Quintus Maximus, we haue heard say, he had a maruello⁹ cunning in cloking in keeping in, in dissemblinge, in masking

king a stale, in preventing insidiari, præcipere hosti-
the deuises of the enemy. um consilia. In quo gene-
In which kind, & Grekes re Græci Themistoclem
before al other do preferre Atheniensem, & Phære-
Themistocles the Atheni- um Iasonem ceteris ante-
an, & Iason the Pharaia. ponūt in primisq; versu-
And chiefly the subtle, and tum & calidum factum.
crafty dede of Solon, who Solonis: qui quo tutior
that both his life should be vita eius esset. & plus ali-
& safer, and somewhat the quanto Reip. prodesse fr-
moze hee might furder the rere se simulauit. Sunt his
common weale, fained him alij multum dispares, sim-
seife to bee madde. There plices et aperti, qui nichil
bee other farre vnlike to exocculto, nihil ex insidiis
these, plaine & open, which agendum putant, veritatis
doe thinke nothings in se- vltiores, fraudis inimici.
crete, nothing wpth guyle Itemq; alij, qui quiduis per
meete to bee wrought, and petiantur, cuius deseruiāt
bee louers of trouthe, and dum quod velint, conse-
enemys to discepte. And quantur: vt Syllam, & M.
again, there be other, who Crassum videbamus.
would any thing endure, & Quo in genere versutissi-
do seruice to anye manne, mum et patientissimū La-
so they might obtaine that cedemonium Lisandrum
they desire. as wee did see accepimus: contraquē
Silla, and Marcus Cras- Callicratidem, qui præ-
sus vse them seiues. Of fectus classis proximus
which sort, wee haue harde post Lysandrum fuit
Lysander the Lacedemo-
nion was the subtilest and
coude mozte abyde. And
contrarywise, of Callicra-
tides, who was Admirall
of the nauie, next after L-
sander.

And

de Officiis.

Itemq; in sermonibus aliū
quidem videmus, quāuis
prēpotens sit, efficere, vt
vnus de multis esse videatur
quod in Catulo & in
patre et in filio, itemq; & i
Q. Mutio Mancino vidimus.
Audiui ex maioribus
natu hoc quidem fuisse in
P. Spicione Nasica: cōtra-
q; patrē eius, illū qui Tiberij
Gracchi conatus perditos
vindicauit, nullam comitatē
habuisse sermonis, nec Xenocratē
quidē seuē rissimum philosophorum:
ob eamquē rem ipsam et
magnum & clarum fuisse.
Innumerabiles aliq; dissimilitudines
sunt naturę morumq;
minime tamen vituperātorū.
Admodū autem tuenda sunt
sua cuiq; non vitiosa, sed
tamen propria, quo facilius
decorum illud, quod quērimus
retineatur. Sic enim est
faciendum, vt contra

And likewise wee see an
other man in talke, though
he be of great auctority, so
order the matter, that hee
seemes one of the common
sorte. whiche in Catulus,
both the father & the sonne
and the same in Quintus
Mutius Mancinus, wee
haue scene. I haue heard
more ouer of myne elders,
the same to haue bene in
Publius Scipio Nasica.
And contrarywise, his father,
euen hym & auenged
Tiberius Gracchus wicked
ēterprises, to haue had
no gentle grace of speache.
So noz Xenocrates, who
was the sagest of the Philosophers,
and for the selfe
same thyng becoms great,
and famous.

Innumerable other diuersities
there be of nature & of manerz,
no deal yet dispraisable.
But euery mans own
guifts, not such as be faulty,
but naturall are earnestly
to bee maintayned, where
by & sooner maye & cōlineffe
be kept which we do seeke.
For in suche wise we must
wozke, as against all

al nature we neuer strue:
 which thing auoided, let vs
 follow our own proper na-
 ture. So that though ther
 be other studies grauer, &
 better, yet let vs measure
 our owne, by natures rule.
 For neyther it is to anye
 purpose to fighte agaynst
 nature nor to enſue anye
 thing y^e cannot attayne.
 wherupon it moze apperes
 what maner of thing thys
 cōlines is: becauſe nothig
 becommeth, *Mawger miner-*
ua, as they ſay, that is, na-
 ture withſtanding, & reſiſting
 it. In byeſe if oughte bee
 comely, of trouthe ther is no
 thing moze ſemely, than an
 euennesse in all mans lyfe,
 and euerpe of his doinges:
 which you can not kepe, if
 you counterſette anothers
 nature, and let paſſe your
 owne. For as we ought to
 uſe that ſpeache, whiche is
 known to vs, leſt as ſome
 men choppyng in Greeke
 wordes, we bee woozthelpe
 mockt at: ſo in our doings
 and al our life, wee oughte
 to ſhewe no contrarietie.

And

naturā vniuerſā nihil cōtē-
 damus: Ea tamē cōſeruata
 propriā naturā ſequamur,
 vt etiā ſi ſint alia grauiora,
 atq; meliora, tamē nos ſtu-
 dia noſtra naturæ regula
 metiamur. Neq; enī naturę
 attinet repugnare, nec quic
 quā ſequi, quod aſſequi ne
 queas. Ex quo magis emer-
 git quale ſit decorū illud,
 ideo quia nihil decet inui-
 ta (vt aiūt) *Minerua*, id eſt
 aduerſate & repugnāte na-
 tura Omnino ſi quicquam
 eſt decorū, nihil eſt pſec-
 to magis quā equabilitas
 vniuerſę vitę, tū ſingularū
 actionū, quā cōſeruare nō
 poſſis, ſi aliorū naturā imi-
 teris, omittas tuā. Vt enim
 ſermone eo debemus vti,
 qui notus eſt nobis, ne (vt
 quidam) græca verba in-
 culcantes, iure optimo irri-
 deamur, ſic in actiones ō-
 nemq; vitam nullā diſcre-
 pantia conferre debemus

G. j.

Atq;

de Officijs.

Atq; hec differentia naturarū tātā habet vim, vt nō nunquā mortē sibi ipse cōsciscere alius debeat, ilī⁹ in eadē causa nō debeat. Nō enim alia in causa M. Cato fuit, alia ceteri, qui se in Africa Cēsari tradiderūt. At qui ceteris forsitā, vitio daturū esse si se interemissent, propterea quōd lenior eorū vita, & mores fuerūt faciliores: Catoni autē, cū in credibilē tribuisset naturā grauitatē, eaq; ipse ppetuā cōstātia roborauisset, sēp; in proposito, susceptoq; cōsilio pmanisset, moriendū potius quā tirāni vultus aspiciendus fuit. Quā multa passus est Vlisses in illo errore diuturno, cū & mulieribus (si Cirse & Calipso mulieres appellandæ sunt) inseruiet, & in omni sermone ōnibus affabilē & iucūdum se esse vellet:

And this difference of nature hath so great a power that other whyle some one man ought to kil him selfe, some other in the same quarel ought not. For Marcus Cato was not in one quarel, and the rest in another, who yelded theselues vnto Cesar in Africa, yet to the reste perchaunce it should haue ben compted a reproche, if they had slaine theselues: because their life had been deintier, & theire maners milder: but when nature had geuen Cato an vncredible grauitie, and the same he had strengthened wth a continual stedfastnes: & alwaies had remayned in his intent, and determined purpose, it was mete for him rather to die than to looke vpon the tiraunts face. How many paines suffered Vlisses, in that longe wandering: when both to women he did serupce (yf Circe, and Calipso are to bee named women) and to al men in al his talke he woulde bee faire spoken: and

and also at home dyd beare the spight of the slaues, & mices, that hee might once attaine to the thing, which he desired. But Ajax, with courage, that he is repozed of, had rather dy a thousand deaths, than to suffer those things of a other mā: which diuersities whē wee behold, it shalbe necessarye to wepe, what eche manne hath of his owne, and to order those gistes, and not to haue a minde to trye, howe other mens graces woulde become him. For that becommeth eche man, whych is moste of al eche mannes owne. Let euery man therefore know his owne disposition, & let him make hym self a sharpe iudge bothe of his vices, and of his vertues, lest plaicrs may seme to haue moze discretio than we. For they do choose not the best enterludes, but the fittest for themselues. For who vpon their voices be bolde, they take Epigones and Medea, who vpon gesture, do take Menalippa

domi vero etiā contumeli as seruorum, ancillarumq; pertulit: vt ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, perueniret. At Ajax, quo animo traditur, millies oppetere mortem, quam illa perpeti ab alio maluisset. Quę contemplantes expendere oportebit, quid quisq; habeat fui, eaq; moderari, nec velle experiri quam se aliena deceant. Id enim quęq; decet, quod est cuiusque suum maximę. Suum igitur quisq; noscat ingeniū: ac remquę se & bonorum & vitiorum suorum iudicem præbeat: ne scenici plus, quam nos, videantur habere prudētię. Illi enim non optimas, sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt. Qui enim voce freti sūt, Epigonos, Medęaque Qui gestu, Menalippam.

G. ij. vel

de Officijs.

vel Clitēneſtrā. Séper Ruti
lius quē ego memini, Anti
opā: nō ſepe Aefopus A ia
cē. Ergo hiſtrio hoc vide
bit in ſcena quod nō vide
bit ſapiēs vir in vita? Ad
quas igitur res aptiſſimi e
rimus, in ijs potiſſimū cla
borabimus. Sin aliquando
neceſſitas nos ad ea detru
ſerit, q̄ noſtri ingenij non
erūt, ōnis adhibēda erit cu
ra, meditatio, diligentia, vt
ea, ſi nō decorē at quā mi
nime indecore facere poſſi
mus. Nec tā eſt intēdū vt
bona, quē nobis data non
ſunt, ſequamur, quā vt vi
tia fugiam⁹. Ac duab⁹ hiſ
pſonis, quas ſupra dixi, ter
tia adiūgitur, quā caſus ali
quis vel tempus imponit.
Quarta etiam, quā nobiſ
met ipſis iudicio noſtro ac
commodabimus. Nam reg
na, imperia, nobilita
tes, honores, diuitiē, o
pes, eaquē quē ſūt hiſ con

and Clytemneſtra. Euer
more Iupilius, whom I
remember, toke Antiopia,
not often Eſopus toke Ai
ax. Shal a plaier then ſee
this in the ſtage, & a wyſe
mā ſhall not ſee in his life?
we ſhal chieſly therfore la
bour in thoſe things, wher
vnto we ſhalbe moſt apte,
But in caſe neceſſitye ſhall
drtue vs ſometime to thoſe
things which ſhall not bee
for our diſpoſition, al care,
ſtudie, & diligence muſt bee
ēploied, & if we do thē not
comly, yet with as litle vn
comlines as may bee, ney
ther ought we ſo muche to
endeuour our ſelues to fo
low the vertues which be
not geuen vs, as to ſlee vi
ces. And vnto theſe twoo
pſons, which befoze I na
med, there is a thurd perſon
ioined, which ſome chance,
or time caſteth on vs. The
ſowerth alſo is &, whiche
we ſhal faſhion to our ſel
ues after our owne minde.
For kingdomes, Empires
nobility, honoz, riches, po
wer, & thoſe which be con
trarye

trary to these, being placed
in fortunes hande, be orde-
red according to the tymes
but what person wee oure
selues list to beare, proce-
deth of our owne free wil.
And therefore some to phy-
losophie, some to the ciuill
law, some to eloquence doe
applye them selues. & for
the vertues, some haue a
more mind to excelle in one
and some in another, and
whose fathers or aunceters
in anye commendation haue
bene notable, the most part
of theirs doe studie in the
same kinde of prayse to ex-
cel, as Quintus Mutius
Publius sonne, did in the
ciuill law: Africanus, Pau-
lus sonne: in feates of ar-
mes, but dyuers doe adde
some of their owne vnto
those praises, & they recey-
ued of their fathers, as
this same Africanus & elo-
quence encreased & heap of
his martial glory, whiche
selfsame Timotheus, Co-
noson, did also, who whē
in praises of warre, to his
father he was not inferiour,
did ioine to that commen-

dation

traria in casu sita, tempori
bus gubernantur. Ipse au-
tē quā personā gerere ve-
limus, à nostra volūrate p-
ficiscitur. Itaque se alij ad phi-
losophiam, alij ad ius ciui-
le, alij ad eloquentiam ap-
plicant: ipsarumq; virtutū
in alia alius mauult excel-
lere. Quorū vero patres
aut maiores in aliqua glo-
ria prebiterunt, student
eorum pleriq; eodē in ge-
nere laudis excellere, vt
Q. Mutius P. filius in iure
ciuili: Pauli filius Afri-
canus in re militari.

Quidā autem ad eas lau-
des, quas à patribus acce-
perunt, addunt aliquam
suam. Vt hic idem Africa-
nus eloquentiæ cumula-
uit bellicam gloriā. Quod
idem fecit Timotheus Co-
nonis filius: qui cū bel-
li laude non inferior fu-
isset quam pater, ad e-
am laudem doctrinæ &
ingenii

de officijs.

ingenij gloriam adiecit. Fit autem interdum, vt nōnuli omiffa imitatione maiorum, fuam quoddam institutum conſequantur: maximeq; in eo plerumq; elaborant ij, qui magna ſibi proponunt obſcuris orti maioribus. Hęc igitur omnia cū quærimus quid deceat, cōplecti animo & cogitatione debemus. In primis autē cōſtituēdū eſt, quos nos & quales eſſe velimus, & in quo genere vitæ: quę deliberatio eſt ōniū difficilima. Inuente enim adoleſcētia, cui ineſt maxima imbecillitas cōſilij tūc id ſibi quiſq; gen⁹ etatis degende cōſtituit, qd' maximē adamauit. Itaq; atē implicatur aliquo certo genere, curſuq; viuendi, quam potuit quod optimum eſſet iudicare. Nam quod Hercules Prodicus dicit, vt eſt apud Xenophontem,

dation the glōrye of wittē, & learninge. But it ſo falleth now & then, that ſome letting go the imitation of their aſſecuters, do folloꝝ a certaine trade of their owne & therein, for the moſt part they chiefly trauaile, who appoint them ſelues great enterprizes, being borne of ſcarce knowne parēts. In oure minde and thought, then we muſt caſt al theſe things, when we ſerche to knowe what becommethe. But firſt of al we muſt determine. Whō, & what manner mē we wold haue our ſelues, & of what kinde of life. which aduiſement is y hardest of al, for at the entering into y yerēs of diſcretion, whē there is moſt ſtēdernes of cōſel. euery mā doth appoint him ſelſe the trade of leadinge his lyfe, which he hath loued moſte of al. & ſo he is entāgled w ſouē certain kind, & courſe of life, befoze hee was able to iudge. what ſhoulde bee beſt. For whereas Prodicus ſaith, that Hercules (as is in Xenophon) as

as sone as he waxed whey
berded, which time is gra-
ted of nature, to those what
waye of lpyunge eche man
will enter, went forth into
deserte, and there syttinge
much, & a long while dou-
ted with him selfe. whē hee
beheld two waies, the one
of pleasure. the other of ver-
tue: whether of thē it were
better to enter: this mighte
peraventure happē to Her-
cules, that was bozne of
Jupiters seede, but not so
to vs, who do folloiw those
that euery one of vs list to
foloswe, and bee allured too
there studies, & fashions.
And for the most part, be-
inge traded with our parē-
tes precepts, we encline to
there gise, & maner. Other
be caried after the iudgmēt
of the multitude, and longe
after those thinges moste
which to the greater parte
seeme goodliest. Manye
neverthelesse, whether of a
certaine lucke, or of a good
nesse of nature, or by y in-
strucion of theire parents
haue folowed y right trade
of life.

cū primū pubesceret (qd'
tempus à natura ad diligē-
dū quā quisq; viā viuendi
sit ingressurus, datū est, ex
ille in solitudinem, atq; ibi
sedentem diu secum, mul-
tumq; dubitasse, cū du-
as cerneret vias, vnam vo-
luptatis, alteram virtutis,
vtram ingredi melius esset
Hoc Herculi Iouis satu æ-
dito potuit fortasse contin-
gere, nobis non idem, qui
imitamur quos cuique vi-
sum est, atq; ad eorum stu-
dia institutaq; impellimur,
Plerumque autem parētū
præceptis imbuti ad eorū
consuetudinem, moremq;
deducimur. Alij multitu-
dinis iuditio feruntur, que
q; maiori parti pulcherri-
ma videntur, ea maximē
exoptant. Nonnulli tamē
sive fœlicitate quadam, si-
ue bonitate naturæ sive
parentum disciplina rec-

But tam vitæ secuti sunt vici.

G. iij. Med

de officijs.

33

Illud autem maximè rarū gen⁹ est eorū, q̄ aut excellentes ingenij magnitudine, aut præclara eruditioe, atq; doctrina, aut vtraq; re ornati, spaciū etiā deliberādi habuerūt, quē potissimū vitę cursū sequi vellent, in qua deliberatione ad suam cuiusque naturā cōsiliū est ōne reuocandū. Nā cum ī ōnibus, quę agūtur, ex eo modo quoquēq; natus est (vt supradictum est) quid deceat exquirimus, tū ī tota vita cōstituenda, multo est eius rei cura maior adhibenda vt cōstāre in vitę ppetuitate possimus nobis met ipsis, nec in vllō officio claudicare. Ad hāc autē rationē quoniā maximā vim natura habet, fortuna proximam, vtriusq; omnino ratio habenda est in deligēdo genere vitę: sed nature magis. Multo enim et firmior est & constantior:

But that kinde of men is seldome found, who after they be either of excellēce profoundnesse of witte, or of a famous learninge, and knowledge, or withe bothe these adourned, haue got a tyme to take aduise: what race of life they wold the ratherest runne: in the which aduise, all a mannes counsell is to bee applied to eche mans proper nature. For lieth in all thinges that be done, out of the nature, wherewith euery mā is bozne (as before is said) we serch, what becōmeth: then in pointing out y^e hole life, much more regard therof must be had, that in y^e continuing of our life we may agree wth our selues, & neuer hault in any dutye.

But to this choise seying nature hath the greatest power, & fortune the nexte ther must consideration be had of thē both alwayes, in chousing y^e kind of ones lyfe, but of nature, more. For nature is muche the surer, and the stedfaster, so that

so þ forþtyme manye tymes, vt fortuna nō nūquam tā
 as moztal her leife, ſerueth quā ipſa mortalis cum im-
 ſb imoztal nature to fight mortali natura pugnare
 who ſo then will apply all videatur, qui igitur ad na-
 þ purpoſe of his life accoz- ture ſue, nō vitioſe genus,
 ding to the kind of his na- cōſilium viuēdi omne cō-
 ture not corrupted, let him tulerit: ijs conſtantiā tene-
 hepe a ſtedfaſtneſſe, for that at. Id enim maxime decet
 becōmeth moſte of all, ex- niſi forte ſe errāſſe itellex-
 cept perchance he ſhal per- erit in deligēdo genere vi-
 ceue. that hee hath gone a te. Quod ſi acciderit, (po-
 miſſe, in chouſing hys kind tū autē accidere) faciēda
 of life, whiche if it befall erit in deligēdo genere vi-
 (as it maye befall) there te. Quod ſi acciderit, (po-
 muſt bee made a change of tū autē accidere) faciēda
 maners, & purpoſes. That morū, inſtitutorūq; muta-
 chaunge then, if time ſhall tio eſt. Eā mutationem ſi
 further, we ſhal the ſooner tēpora adiuuabūt, facilius
 & moze conueniently bring cōmodiuſq; faciemus: ſin-
 to paſſe, if not faire & ſoftly minus, ſenſim erit, pedetē
 and by litle and litle it muſt timeq; faciēda: vt amicitia
 be done, like as frendſhipes as quę min⁹ delectent, &
 which do not deſpyte vs, & minus probētur, magis de-
 are not well liked, wiſemē cere cenſent ſapiētes, ſen-
 do iudge moze conueniēt, ſim diſſuere quā repente p-
 ſtitche after ſtitch to ryp. cidere. Commutato autē
 thā ſodenly to cut a ſūder. genere vitę omni ratione
 And when wee haue once curandum eſt, vt id bo.
 chaunged our kinde of lyfe no conſilio feciſſe videa-
 wee muſt by al meanes ta- mur. Sed quoniam paulo
 ke heede. & wee be thought ante
 to haue done it vpon good
 aduiſement
 But for aſmuch as a litle
 befoze

de Officiis.

ante dictū est imitādos esse maiores, primū illud excep-
tū sit, ne vitia sint imitāda:
deinde si nature nō feret,
vt quædā imitari possint vt
superioris Africani filius,
qui hūc Paulo Emilio na-
tum adoptauerat propter
infirmatē valetudinis, nō
tam potuit patri similis ef-
se, quā ille, qui fuerat sui. Si
igitur nō poterit siue causas
defensitare, siue popu-
lū cōcionibus tenere, siue
bella gerere: illa tamē prę-
stare debet, quę erunt in
ipsius potestate, iustitiā, fi-
dē, liberalitatē, modestiā, tē-
perātia: quo minus ab eo
id quod desit requiratur.
Optima autē hereditas à
patribus traditur liberis, ō-
niq; patrimonio præstanti-
or, gloria virtutis, rerumq;
gestarum: cui dedecori ef-
se, nefas & vitium iudican-
dum est. Et quoniam offi-
cia non eadem dispari-
bus ætatibus tribuuntur,

before it is laide, & we must
follow our aunceters: first
be this excepted: & their vi-
ces are not to be followed:
next & wee follow the not
in some things, that our na-
ture will not beare: as & el-
der Africanus sonne, who
adopted this our Datius
sonne, could not bee so like
his father. because of sick-
ly weakenesse, as the other
was like his. In case ther
fore one be not able epyther
to plede causes or to retain
the people & oracions, or
to follow the warres, those
things yet he ought to per-
forme, which shall bee in
his power, as iustice. faith-
fulness, liberalitie, sober,
mode, & tēperāce: to thitēt
the thing which hee lackes
may be the lesse missed in
him. Truly the best in-
heritance that fathers lea-
ue to their childrē, & more
worthie, than al liuelode is
the glōrye of vertue, and
worthye deds, whereunto to
be a staine, it is to be accōp-
ted both vice, and shame.
And because not alike dū-
ties are assigned to unlike
ages

ages, and some there be for
yongmen, & some for y^e el-
der sozt, somewhat also we
haue to saye of this diuersi-
tie. It is therefore a yong
mans part, to reuerēce his
elders, & of these to choosc
out the best & most cominē
ded, whose counsel, & auc-
thority he may leane vnto.
For the vnskilfulnesse of
tender yeres, must by olde
mens experiēce be ordered
and gouerned.

And this age specially frō
lust is to bee wayned, and
to be brought vp in labour
and paines takinge both of
minde and body, that both
in martial, & ciuill dupties,
theire diligence may appere
Also whē they wil refreshe
their wittes, & geue them-
selues to pastime, let them
beware of intemperance, &
remember shamesfastnesse,
which shal be done the ea-
sier, if at suche thinges also
their elders wil bee in pre-
sence.

But for olde mē, labors of
bodye are to bee diminui-
shed & exercises of y^e mynd
some mete to be encreased
and

alia que sunt iuuenū, alia
seniorū, aliquid etiam de
hac distinctione dicendū
est. est igitur adolescentis
maiores natu reuereri ex
ijsq; eligere optimos et p-
batissimos: quorū consilio
atq; authoritati nitatur. In
euntis enim ætatis inscitia
senum constituenda et re-
genda prudentia est. Maxi-

me autē hæc ætas à libidini
bus arcenda est, exercen-
dæ in labore, patientiaq;
& animi & corporis, vt eo-
rū & in bellicis & ciuilibus
officijs vigeat industria. At
que etiam cum relaxare
animos, & dare se iucundi-
tati volent, caueant intem-
perantiā, meminerint ve-
recundiæ, quod erit facili-
us, si in eiusmodi quoque
rebus maiores natu interes-

se velint: Senibus autem
labores corporis minuēdi:
exercitationes animi eti-
am augendæ videntur.

de Officiis.

Dada vero opera, vt et a & they must geue their diligence, that much they aide their friends, & youth, & specially the cōmon weale & counsell, & wisdom. But nothinge more of age ys to be taken hede of, than y it geue not it selfe to lecher-nes & idelnesse. As for reprochfull & for olde age moste shamefull. But if the in- perāce of lust bee ioined w it, there is adouble incō- nience, beecaue bothe age selfe taketh shame by it, & it causeth yōg mēs intē- perance to be moze shameles. And this trueip is not out of y matter, to speak some what touching the duties of magistrates, of priuate men of citizens, & of stran- gers. It is therefore the pper office of a magistrat, to consider, he representes the person of the citey, and that he ought to mainteine the honour, and reputation thereof, & to keepe the or- ders of y same, & to set out lawes fit therfore, & to re- mēber, theye be committed

Dada vero opera, vt et a
micos & iuuētutē & maxi
me Rēpu. consilio & pru
dencia quam plurimū ad-
iuuent. Nihil antē magis
cauēdū est senectuti quā
ne lāguori se, desidieq; de-
dat. Luxuria vero cū ōni
ētati turpis, tum senectuti
foedissima est. Sin autē li-
bidinū etiā intēperātia ac-
cesserit, duplex malū est :
quod & ipsa senectus con-
cipit dedecus : & facit ado-
lescētū impudentiorē in-
temperātiā. Ac ne illud
quidem alienū est, de ma-
gistratuum, de priuatorū,
de ciuium, de peregrino-
rū officijs dicere, est igitur
ppriū munus magistratū
intelligere se gerere per-
sonam ciuitatis, debere-
q; eius dignitatem & de-
cus sustinere : seruare
leges, iura describere, &
ea fidei suæ commissa

to his charge.

A priuate man it behoues
to liue in an equalitie, and
likenes of lawe & the city-
zens, neyther as an vnder-
ling, & abiect, for bearynge
himself to hye, & also in the
cōmon weale to seeke those
things, & be quiet & honest
for suche a one wee are
wont both to call & compt
a good citizen.

But it is the duitie of a
stranger, & alien inhabitāt
to medle & nothing besyde
his owne businesse, nor to
equyre any thing touchyng
an other man, and no whyt
in a straunge cōmon weale
to bee curious.

Thus for the most parte,
duities shalbe founde out,
when it shall bee soughte,
what becommeth, & what
is agreeable for personnes,
times, and ages. And ther-
is nothing that becomes a
man so muche, as in euery
doinge, & taking of aduise to
keepe a stedfastnes.

But because the same com-
mes appeareth in al dedes
& wordes, & in the mouing
and

meminisse. Priuatū autē
oportet æquo & pari cum
ciuibus iure viuere, nequē
summissum & abiectum,
nequē se efferentē, tum
in Repub. ea velle quæ
tranquilla et honesta sunt
Talem enim & sentire bo-
num ciuem & dicere sole-
mus. Peregrini autem &
incolę officium est, nihil
præter suum negotium a-
gere, nihil de alieno inqui-
rere, minimēq; in aliena es-
se Repub. curiosum. Ita
fere officia reperientur, cū
queritur quid deceat, &
quid aptum sit personis
temporibus, ætatibus. Ni-
hil est autem quod tam
deceat, quā in omni re
gerenda, consilioquē capi-
endō seruare constantiam
Sed quoniam decorum il-
lud in ōnibus factis et dic-
tis, ī corporis deniq; motu
& statu

de Officiis

& statu cernitur: idq; pos-
tū est in trib⁹ reb⁹, formo-
sitate, ordine, ornatu ad ac-
tionē apto difficilior ad e-
loquendū sed satis erit fa-
cile intelligi. In his autē tri-
bus continetur cura etiam
illa, vt probemur ijs, qui-
buscum, & apud quos vi-
uamus. His quoq; de rebus
pauca dicantur. Principio
corporis nostri magnā na-
tura ipsa videtur habuisse
rationē quē formā nostrā,
reliquāq; figuram, in qua
esset species honesta, eā po-
fuit in prōptu: quē autem
partes corporis ad naturæ
necessitatem datē aspectū
essent deformen habituræ
atq; turpē formam eas cō-
textit atq; abdidit. Hanc na-
turę tam diligētem fabricā
imitata est hominum vere-
cundia. Quæ enim natu-
ra occultauit, eadem
omnes, qui sanamente
sunt, remouent ab oculis

& staying of the bodye, and
the same consisteth in thre
thinges, wel fauourednes,
order, and furniture meete
for ones doing (some what
hard it is to expresse, but it
shal suffice, so it be concei-
ued) & in these thre cōtein-
ned is y care also. y we bee
allosed of those, & whom
& among whom wee lyue.
Of these matters likewise
a fewe wordes let vs say.

First, verie nature see-
meth to haue had a greate
respect of our body, whiche
hath set most in sight oure
physiomye, and the reste of
our shape, wherein there is
an honest shewe, but shes
hath couered, & kepte close
the parts of y body, geuen
for natures necessitie: whi-
che els should haue an euil
faouered and foule sight.

Whence shamefulesse
hath folowed this so cun-
ning a frame of nature.

For what so nature hath
hidden: the same all menne,
who be wel in their wits:
doe keepe from the eye,
and

& they do theire endenoure
 to serue very necessitie, as
 closely as they may: and of
 what partes of the body
 vble as seruile, neither those
 partes, nor theire seruice by
 their names they do call: &
 so, & which to do it is noe
 shame if it bee secretilp, to
 tel it is vnclently.

And therfore neither the
 open doing of those things
 is void of vnshamefastnes
 nor the talke without fyl-
 thines.

Neither truly are the Ci-
 nikes woorthp to be hearde
 nor any of y^e Stoicks which
 are almost Cynike, who do
 reprove vs, & mock at vs,
 because we cal those things
 in woordes shameful to be
 spoken vpon, which bee in
 deede not dishonest: & yet
 those thinges that bee vn-
 honest, we terme by theire
 names. As to go a thecuig
 to beguyle one, to commyt
 adoutrye, is a thing in deede
 dishonest, but it is tolde, &
 to get childzen in deede is
 honest, but to bee vttered
 in talke it were vnclently
 And

ipsique necessitati dant o-
 perâ, vt quâm occultissimè
 pareant quarumque parti-
 um corporis vs^{us} sūt neces-
 sarij eas neque partes, ne-
 que earum vsus suis nomi-
 nibus appellant: quodque
 facere turpe nō est, modo
 occultè, id dicere obscœ-
 num est. Itaque nec actio
 rerum illarum aperta pe-
 tulantia vacat, nec orati-
 onis obscœnitate: Nec
 vero audiendi sunt Cyni-
 ci, aut si qui fuerunt Stoi-
 ci penè Cinici, qui repre-
 hendunt & irrident, quòd
 ea quę re turpia non sint,
 verbis flagitiosa dicamus:
 illa autem quę turpia sūt.
 nominibus appellemus su-
 is. Latrocinari, fraudare,
 adulterari re turpe est, sed
 dicitur non obscœne: li-
 beris dare operam re ho-
 nestū est, nomine obscœnū
 Plurag

de Officiis

pluraq; in eā sentētiā ab
eisdem cōtra verecūdiā
disputantur: Nos autē na-
turā sequamur, et ab ōni,
quod abhorret ab ipsa o-
lorū auriūq; ap, pbatōne,
fugiamus. Status, incessus,
fessio, accubatio, vultus, o-
culi, manū motus taneāt
illud decorū. Quibus in re-
bus duo sunt maximē fugi-
enda, ne quideffeminatum
aut molle, & ne quid durū
aut rusticū sit. Nec vero hi-
strionibus, oratoribusq; cō-
cedēdū est, vt his hęc apta
sint, nobis dissoluta. Scēni
corū quidē mos tantā ha-
bet à vetere disciplina ve-
recundiam, vt in scenam
sine subligaculo prodeat
nemo: uerentur enim ne si
quo casu euenerit, vt cor-
poris partes quēdam ape-
riātur aspiciantur non de-
core, Nostro quidē more
cū parentibus puberes filij

And mo thinges, for that
purpose be reasoned by the
philosophers against shame-
fastnes. But let vs follow
nature & shon al thinges, &
adhorre & very pleasing of
oure eye, & eare. Let oure
standing, going, sitting ly-
in 3, there, eers, & mouinge
of hands kepe & same com-
lines. In whiche thinges,
two faultes we must specti-
ally take hede of. & nothig
womanishly, or dsintily, &
nothig blockishly, or car-
terly we do. Neither must
we agree, & these thynges
shoulde be seemelye in plai-
ers, & orators, & left loosely
in our selues. The custome
of & stage plaiers, even of
an old order, hath so great
regarde to shamefastnesse,
& no man commeth on the
stage without breeches. For
they are afearde, leste if it
chaunce by any mishappe,
ysome partes of the bodye
be discouered, they shoulde
be seene vncomlye. And as
the fashio is with vs, chil-
dren growyng to mannes
stat

state bee not bathed with
their parentes, nor sonnes
in lawe, with their fathers
in lawe. Therefore this
kinde of shamefastnesse ys
mete to be obserued, name-
lye when nature her selfe
is guide & maistrasse.

But wheras there be two
kindes of beuty: and in one
of them ther is a lowlines
in the other a maiesty: lowe-
linesse, we must thinke be-
longs to the woman, & ma-
iesty to the man. There-
fore al maner trimming, &
is vnfitting for man, muste
be kept from his outward
fourme, and the like faulte
to this must be takē heede
of in ones gestures, & mo-
nings. For bothe the stur-
ring like waslers is ofte
times misliked: and also
many gestures like play-
ers are not without foolish
toyes, and in bothe these
kinds, those thinges which
bee right and naturall, bee
commended. But the ma-
iesty of the fauour is pre-
serued by goodnesse of co-
lour, and colour by exercise
of body.

The

cum foceris quidem gene-
ri non lauantur. Refinen-
da est igitur huius gene-
ris verecundia, præsertim
natura ipsa magistra & du-
ce. Cum autem pulchritu-
dinis duo genera sint, quo-
rum in altero vetustas
sit, in altero dignitas: ve-
nustatem muliebre[m] du-
cere debemus, dignitatem
virilem. Ergo et a forma
remoueatur omnis viro
non dignus ornatus: &
huic simile vitium ingestu
motuque caueatur. Nam
et palestrici motus sæpe
sunt odiosiores & histrio-
num nonnulli gestus in-
eptijs non vacant: & in
vtroque genere, quæ sunt
recta & simplicia laudan-
tur.

Formæ autem dignitas co-
loris bonitate, tuenda est,
color exercitationib⁹ cor-
poris.

H.j.

de Officiis.

Adhibenda est præterea mūditiā nō odiosa nequē exquisita nimis: tamē quē fugiat agrestē & inhumā negligentiā. Eadē ratio est habenda vestitus: in quo sicut in plerisq; rebus mediocritas optima est.

Cauendū est autē, ne aut tarditatibus vtamur ī gressu mollioribus vt similes pomparū ferculis esse videamur: aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates: quē cū fiūt, anhelitus mouentur, vultus mutantur, ora torquētur: ex quibus magna significatio sit nō adesse cōstantiā. Sed multō etiā magis elaborandū est, ne animi motus a natura recedāt, quod assequemur, si cauebimus ne in perturbationes atq; ex animationes incidamus & si attētos animos ad decori cōseruationē tenebim⁹. Motus autē animorū duplices sunt, alteri cogitaē

There must a clemēnes be vsed besides: & is not obyrus nor curious, but onely escheueth carterly, and in naturall flouēry. The like regard we must haue of apparelle: wherin a meane, as in most partie of things is best, we must take heede also, we vse neither too nice a shewes in our pace lyke Pageaunts in triumphes: neyther too muche haste in speede making like wilde-braines. For when it happens, that men do so: there folowes shozte breaching, the cōutenance is changed, & the face disfigured wher of comes a great presumption that they haue no stay-cdness.

But we must muche more studie, that the effectiōs of our minde swarue not frō nature: which we shall attaine, if we will beware, & we fal not into moods, and mazes: and if we wil continue in hanīg hedeful minds to the keeping of cōmlynēs. But the motions of mindes be of two sortes some procede of intellygence, some

some of appetite. Intelligence is chieflie occupied in serching out of trouthe, appetite sterreth a man to bee doing. Wee muste provide therfore that wee vse intelligence aboute the best matters, and that wee make our appetite obedyent to reason.

And because the power of speach is great, & y^e same is in two sortes, the one of vehement speache, & other of comō talke: let the vehement speach, serue for pleadings in iudgements, orations, in assemblies, and debatinge in the Senate-house, let talke bee vsed in companies, in disputaciōs, in meetings of familiars, & let it also bee at feastinges. Of vehement speache the Rhetoritiās haue rules, of talk none at al: notwithstand-
ding I wrote not whether such also may be &c.

Howbeit for theire studies, that will learne, there be teachers found, but none there be, that study this, & the rout of Rhetoritiāns al places be replenished.

alteri appetitus, Cogitatio in vero exquirendo maxime versatur: appetitus impellit ad agendū. Curandum est igitur vt cogitatione ad res quā optimas vtamur: appetitū rationi obediētē prebeamus.

Et quoniam magna vis orationis est, eaq; duplex: altera contentionis, altera sermonis: contentio dilceptionibus tribuatur iudiciorum, concionum, senatur: sermo in circulis, disputationibus, cōgressionibus familiarium versatur: persequatur etiam conuiuia.

Contentionis, præcepta rhetorum sunt multa, nulla sermonis: quanquam haud scio an possint hæc quoq; esse. Sed discentium studijs inueniuntur magistri. Huic autem qui studeant, sunt nulli: rhetorum turba referta omnia

Re-

H.ij.

de Officiis.

quanquam quę verborū,
sententiarumque præcep-
ta sunt, eadem ad sermo-
nem pertinebunt. Sed cū
orationis indicem vocem
habeamus: in voce autem
duo sequamur, vt clara sit
vt. suavis: vtrumque om-
nino a natura petendum
est, verū alterū exercitatio
augebit, alterum imitatio
presse loquentium: & le-
niter: quid fuit aliud in
Catulis, vt eos exquisito
iudicio putares vti literarū
(quanquam erāt literati:
sed et alij) hi autē optime
vti lingua latina putaban-
tur: sonus erat dulcis: lite-
rę neque expresse, neq; op-
presse ne aut obscurū esset
aut pudicum, sine conten-
tione vox, nec languens,
nec canora. Vberior ora-
tio L. Crassi, nec minus fa-
ceta. Sed bene loquendi
de Catulis opinio non
minor.

Heuerthelesse & same præ-
cepts, which be of wordes
and sentences. shal apper-
taine to talke. But suchens
we haue our voice to vtter
speache: and in voyce we
seeke two thinges, that it
be clere, & swete: they both
are to bee fetched from na-
ture euermore: but exercise
wil encrease that one: imi-
tation of trefable, & soft
speakers wil helpe & other
what was in & Catulli. &
ye shoulde suppose them to
vse a perfite iudgement in
pronouncing of letters.
Howbeit they weare lear-
ned: but so were other too:
yet these weare thought to
vse the latin tongue best.
Their soundng was swete
thaire letters neyther too
muche mouthed, nor brow-
ned: lest eyther it should be
vnhearde, or ouer harsh.
Their voice was without
straining, neither faint nor
harsh. The speach of Luci-
us Crassus was more ple-
tisul. and no lesse feare con-
cepted, but for well spea-
kinge, the Catuli were in
as much estimacion.

Cesar

Cesar was sauced wth the
mirth, and mery conceits
Cattullus vnkle exceeded
all: so that in that lawierly
kinde of pleading, hee with
familiar speache passed the
vehemence of other. In al
these therefore we must la-
bour, if in al wee searche,
what becommeth.

Let then this familiar
talk (in which the Socra-
tians most excell) be gen-
tle, and nothing obstrinate
let there be therein a plea-
santnesse. No nor let a mā
keepe out other, as though
hee were entred into hys
owne possession: but as
in other matters, so in com-
mon talke, he must thinke
an interchaunged course
oftentymes meete to be
vsed. And let him see, first
of all, of what matters hee
speake: if they bee earnest,
lette him vse a sagenesse. if
they bee mery, a pleasant-
nes. Specially let him for-
see, that his talke be wape
not some vice i his maner;
whiche then chiefely is
swont to be fall: whē epyther
in mockage, or earnest, men

Sale vero conditus et fa-
cetius Cesar, Catulli patris
frater vicit omnes: vt in
illo ipso forensi genere di-
cendi contentiones aliorū
sermone vinceret. In om-
nibus igitur his laboran-
dum est, si in omnibus qd'
decent exquirimus. Sit igi-
tur hic sermo in quo So-
cratici maximè excellūt le-
nis, minimèq; p̄tinax; in sit
in vō lepos, nec vero tan-
quā in possessionē suā ve-
nerit, excludat alios: sed
cū reliquis in reb⁹, tū etiā
in sermone cōmuni, vicif-
itudine nōn ūquā vtendū
putet. Ac videat in primis
quibus de reb⁹ loquatur:
si serijs, seueritatem adhi-
beat; si iocosis, leporem. In
p̄cisijsque prouideat ne
sermo vitium aliquod in-
dicet: in effeminatis modis
quod maximè tum solet e-
uenire. cū studiosè de ab-
sentibus detrahendi causa

Do

de Officiis.

aut per ridiculum aut se- do busic the selues to speak
 uere, aut maledicere, contu- railingly and puttefullye of
 melioſeq; dicitur. Haben- & abſent, to their ſclaunder.
 tur autē plerūq; ſermones But this common talke
 aut de domesticis negotijs for the moſte parte, is had
 aut de Reipub. aut de arti- either of houſhold matterz
 um ſtudijs et doctrina. Dā oz of the comon weale oz of
 da igitur opera eſt, vt etiā learning, & teaching artes
 ſi aberrare ad alia cæperit, wee muſte ther:foze gyue
 ad hæc reuocetur oratio. good heede, that when the
 Sed utcūq; aderunt res communication begins to
 (neq; enim eiſdem rebus ſtraye to other thinges to
 nec omni tēpore, nec ſimi- theſe it bee retourned, pea
 liter delectamur) animad- how ſo euer the matter
 uertendum eſt etiam qua- failes out, that is in hand.
 tenus ſermo delectationē For neither all withe one
 habeat: & vt incipiendi ra- matter, nor at euery ſeaſon
 tio fuerit, ita ſit deſinendi noꝝ a like wee are deſpyed.
 35 modus. Sed quoniam in wee muſt marke alſo, how
 omni vita rectiſſimè preci- farre our talke hath in it a
 pitur, vt perturbationes likinge, and as there was
 fugiamus, id eſt motus a- a way to begynne it, ſo let
 nimi nimios rationi nō ob ther be a meſurable mean
 temperantes: ſic eiſmodi to ende it.
 motibus ſermo debet va- But becauſe it is verye
 care, ne aut ira exiſtat well taught: that in al our
 aut cupiditas aliqua: aut life wee ſee paſſions, that
 pigritia, aut ignauia, is to ſaye vmeaſurable
 moodes of minde not ru-
 led by reaſon, lyke wyſe
 oure talke muſte bee voide
 of ſuche moodes, leaſt ey-
 ther anger aryle oz ſomme
 greedynelle, oz ſlouth-
 fulneſſe, oz cowardynelle,

or some such thinge appere. And most of al, wee must haue regarde, that those to whom wee keepe talke, we seme both to reuerence and to loue.

Chiding also manye times comes in place as necessary: in which one must vse perauenture bothe a greater straining of voice, and a sharper grauitie of wordes. It must also be prouided that wee seme not to do those thinges, as ireful but as physicians do com to searing and cutting: so let vs selde, & vnwillingly fall to such maner of rebuking: & not at all vnlesse it be of necessity, where there wil be founde none other remedy.

But yet let it be clerely without anger, wherewith nothing rightly, nothing discretely can be done.

And for the most part, wee may vse a gentle maner of rebukinge, yet temperat with a grauitie, so as both a softnesse bee showed, & all spight refrained.

Yea & that same bitternesse which

aut aliquid tale appareat. Maximèq; curandū est vt eos quibuscum sermonem cōferimus, & vereri & diligere videamur. Obiurgationes etiā nonnūquā incidunt necessarię, in quibus vtendū est fortasse & vocis cōtentione maiore, & verborū grauitate acriore. Id agendū etiā est, vt ne ea facere videamur irati: sed vt ad vrēdū & secūdū medici veniūt, sic a d hoc genus castādi raro inuitiq; ve neamus, nec vnquam nisi necessario, si nulla reperiatur alia medicina.

Sed tamen ira procul absit, cū qua nihil rectè fieri nihil cōsideratè potest.

Magna autē ex parte clementi castigatione licet vti grauitate tamen adiuncta, vt et seueritas adhibeatur, & contumelia repellatur. Atque etiam illud ipsū, quod acerbitalis

de Officiis.

habet obiurgatio, signifi-
cādū est ipsi⁹ causa, qui ob-
iurgetur, susceptum esse.

Rectū est autē etiā in illis
cōtentionibus, quē cū ini-
micissimis fiunt, etiā si no-
bis indigna audiamus, ta-
mē grauitatē retinere, ira-
cundiā repellere. Que e-
nim cum aliqua perturba-
tione fiunt, ea nec constā-
ter fieri possunt, nec ijs qui
absunt approbari. Defor-
me etiam est de seipso præ-
dicare, falsa præsertim, &
cum irrisione audientium
imitari militem gloriosum

29 Et quoniam omnia perfe-
quimur (volumus quidē
certē) dicendum est etiam
qualem hominis honorati
& principis domum pla-
ceat esse cuius finis est v-
sus, ad quem accommo-
danda est edificandi des-
criptio: & itamen adhi-
benda dignitatis, com-
moditatisque diligentia.

which chidinge hath in it
must be declared to be vsed
for his sake, who is chyd-
den. It is good also, euen
in these braules, which bee
made withē our vtterest e-
nemies, although we bear
wozdes vnneete to be spo-
ken to vs: to keepe yet a
grauiſie, & to suppressē the
angry moode. For those
things that be wrought w-
any passion, neither can bee
consentily doone, nor allo-
wed of those that are pre-
sent. Cuiſecondured also it
is, to tal praſes of a mans
seife, specially if they be vn-
true and withē & makinge
of the hearers, to resemble
& glorious ſouldiour.

And because we go tho-
rough al matters, or at the
least be minded so to doe:
wee must tel also what ma-
ner of house, it likeh vs,
an honozable mā, & a prince
should haue. whose end is
& occupieng thereof accor-
ding to the which, & plat
of the buyldinge muste bee
made: & neuerthelesse there
must respect bee hadde to a
statelynesse & handſōnes.

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in the same. we haue harde
 sape. it was an honoure to
 Cneus Octavius, who &
 first of y family was made
 Consul: because in the pa
 laice, he had buylded a go
 geous house & ful of state
 lynesse: which when people
 resoꝝting thither had seene
 was thought to further y
 maister, a man newlye co
 men bp, to the attaining of
 the Consulship. Thys
 did Scaurus pul downe.
 and enlarge the rounge of
 his houses. And so Octa
 uius into his house fyrste
 brought y Consulship: this
 other a noble and famous
 mannes sonne, into his en
 larged house not onelye
 brought repulse, but also a
 stayne and miserye. For a
 mans honoure must be set
 out by hys house, and not
 al his honoure soughte by
 his house: noꝝ by the house
 the maister, but by y may
 ster the house must be ho
 nessed. And as in al things
 els, regarde is to bee had
 not of a mannes selfe only,
 but of other also: likewise
 in a noble mannes house,

Cn. Octauio, qui primus
 ex illa familia Consul fa
 ctus est, honori fuisse ac
 cepimus, quod præclarum
 ædificasset i palatio & ple
 nam dignitatis domū: quæ
 cum vulgo viseretur, suf
 fragata domino nouo ho
 mini ad consulatum pu
 tabatur.

Hanc Scaurus demoli
 tus accessionem adiunxit
 ædibus. Itaque ille in suam
 domum consulatum pri
 mus attulit: hic summi &
 clarissimi viri filius, in do
 mum multiplicatam non
 repulsam solum retulit,
 sed ignominiam etiam &
 calamitatem. Ornanda e
 nim est dignitas domo, nō
 ex domo dignitas tota
 querenda, nec domo do
 minus, sed domino domus
 honestanda est. Et vt in cæ
 teris habenda ratio nō sui
 solum sed etiam aliorum:
 sic in domo clari hominis,

de officiis.

in quam & hospites multi recipiendi sunt, & admit-
tenda hominum cuiusque generis multitudo, adhibenda est cura laxitatis,

Aliter ampla domus dedit cori domino saepe fit, si est in ea solitudo, & maxime si aliquando alio domino solita est frequentari.

Odiosum est enim cum a preteritibus dicitur: O domus antiqua, heu quam dispari dominare domino
Quod quidem his temporibus in multis licet dicere. Cauendum est autem praesertim si ipse aedifices, ne extra modum sumptu & magnificentia prodeas quo in genere multum malitiam exemplo est. Studiose enim plerique praesertim in hanc partem, facta principium imitantur.

into the which both many guests are to be receaued & a number of men of euery sorte is to be admitted, there must be made a provision for roomethimselfe.

Otherwise a large house proueth to the master oftentimes a shame: if there be in it a solitarinesse: and specially if once, with the othermaister it was wonte to be wel filled for an odious thing it is, when of hygoers it is saide.

An ancient house, alas, we may see.

How vnlike a lord hathe lordship on thee.

which a man may truelye say now a dayes of many. ye must beware also namely if your selfe be a builder that beyonde measure, in sumptuousnesse. and great costs, you doe not exceede: in the which kinde, euen of the ensample much harme aryseth.

For diligentie moste menne, specially in this point, doe followe the doings of princes: as of Augustus

cius Lucullus, a singular
man, who eniueeth the ver-
tue: How many yet haue
folowed the greates costly-
nesse of his manoure pla-
ces: In whiche thinges
there must doubtles bee
sed a measure, that to a
meankeping must be redu-
ced, and the same mean ke-
ping must be referred to
common vse, and counte-
naunce of the life. But of
these hitherto.

How in euery dede, we
take in hand, three pointes
are to be kept. First that
appetite obeie reason: for
nothing is meeter than
for the maintaining of due
ties. Next, that it be con-
sidered, how great a thinge
it is, whiche wee minde to
bring to passe, that ney-
ther lesse neither more care
and paine be taken, than
ease requireth. The thirde
pointe is, that we haue an
eye to vse a measure in
those thinges whiche per-
taine to an honest shewe,
scilicet grace.

The best measure is to
keepe the verie seemelinsse
whereof est optim^o dec^o ipsū tenere

Vt Lucij Luculli summi
viri virtutem quis? at quā
multi villarum magnifi-
centiam imitati sunt? qua-
rum quidem certe est ad-
hibendus modus, ad medi-
ocritatemq; reuocandus :
eademque mediocritas ad
omnem vsum cultumqūe
vitæ referenda est, Sed
hæc hæcenus.

In omni autē actione sus-
cipienda, tria sunt tenēda.
Primum vt appetitus rati-
oni pareat: quo nichil est
ad officia conseruanda
accommodatius. Deinde
vt animaduertatur quan-
ta illa res sit, quam efficere
velimus, vt neue maior,
neue minor, cura & opera
suscipiatur, quam causa
postulet.

Tercijū est, vt caueamus
vt ea quæ pertinent ad li-
beralitatis speciē dignitate
moderata sint. Mod^o autē
ipsū tenere

de officiis.

de quo ante diximus nec
 progredi longius. Horum
 autem triū præstantissimū
 est appetitū obtēperare ra
 40 tioni. Deinceps de ordine
 rerū, & tēporum oportu
 nitate dicendum est. Hac
 autem scientia continetur
 ea, quā grēci εὐταξίαν, no
 minant, non hęc, quā inter
 pretamur modestiam, quo
 in verbo modis inest: sed
 illa est εὐταξία in qua in
 telligitur ordinis conserva
 tio. Itaque vt eandem nos
 modestiam appellemus,
 sic definitur a Stoicis: Vt
 modestia sit scientia earū
 rerum, que aguntur aut
 dicuntur loco suo collo
 candarum, Itaque videtur
 eadem vis ordinis & collo
 cationis fore.

Nam & ordinem sic de
 finiunt: compositionē re
 rum aptis & accomodatis
 locis. Locū autē actionis,

whereof we speake before
 & not to passe those bonds
 But of these three the chie
 fest is that appetite obeys
 reason.

Hereafter touching order
 of things and opportunity
 of times. wee haue to say.
 And this knowledge con
 teineth that whiche the
 grekes do name εὐταξία

not this whiche wee enter
 prete modestia: is the whi
 che worde modus in com
 prehended. But that is
 εὐταξία wherein is ment

a keeping of order. And ther
 fore that wee maye cal the
 same modestia thus it is de
 fined of the Stoikes, that
 modestia (that is to saye)

discretion is y knowledge
 of settinge those thynges
 which are done, or sayde,
 in their pper places. And
 so of order & placinge there
 seemes to be al one propriety

For thus also they define
 order to bee a framinge of
 things in apt. & cōuenient
 places.

And place they say, cōcer
 neth

meth the doing, opportunitie & time. And time convenient for & doing, in Greeke *Ευκαιρία*, in latin is called *Occasio*. So saith it, that this discrecion, which wee interpret, even as I said, is the knowledge of opportunitie of fitte season to do a thynge,

But the same definition may be of prudence, wherupon we treated in the beginning. But in this place wee searche after measure keeping, and temperance, & other like vertues. Therefore, what were the properties of prudence, in their place we have spokē. But what properly belongs to these vertues, wherof here wee have begon to speake which pertain to shamefastnes, and to their lykinge, wth whome wee live we must now declare.

Such an order therefore in our doings is to be used that as in an oration well buylded, so in mans life all thinges be accordaunt, and agreeable together.

For

opportunitatē tēporis esse dicūt. Tēpus autē actionis oportunū grāce *Ευκαιρία* latinē appellatur occasio. Sic fit vt modestia. hec quā interpretamur (ita vt dixi) scientia sit oportunitatis idoneorum ad agendū tēporū. Sed potest eadē esse prudētiē definitio, de qua principio diximus. Hoc autē loco de moderatione, & tēporantia, & harū similibus virtutibus quęrimus. Itaq; quę erant prudentiē ppria, suo loco dicta sunt. Quę autē harum virtutum, de quibus am-dudum loquimur. quę continent ad verecundiam & ad eorū approbationem, quibus cum viuibus, nunc dicenda sunt. Talis est igitur ordo actionū adhibendus: vt quemadmodum in oratione constanti, sic in vita omnia sint apta inter se & convenientia.

de Officiis.

Turpe est, n. valdeq; vitio
 sū in re seuera, cōuiuio dig
 nū aut delicatū aliquem in
 ferre sermonē. Bene Peri
 cles cū haberet collegam
 in pretura Sophocle poe
 tam, iijq; de cōmuni officio
 cōuenissent & casu formo
 sus puer pręteriret, dixisset
 quē Sophocles: Opuerum
 pulchrū Pericle: Pericles
 ait. At enim prętorem So
 phocle decet nō solū ma
 nus sed etiā oculos abstine
 tes habere. Atq; hoc idem
 Sophocles si in Athletarū
 ap, pbatione dixisset, iusta
 reprehensione caruisset. Tā
 ta vis est & loci, & tēporis
 vt si quis cū causā sit actu
 rus, in itinere, aut in ambu
 latione secū ipse medite
 tur, aut si quid aliud attē
 tius cogitet, nō reprehēda
 tur, at hoc idem si in con
 uiuiū faciat, inhumanus
 videatur, inscitia tēporis.
 Sed ea quæ multum ab
 humanitate discrepant,

For a fowle hearing it is,
 and very faultye, in a sage
 matter to bring in anye ra
 ble talke or swation words.
 Pericles said well, when
 hee hadde Sophocles toy
 ned wth him, and
 they were communing a
 bout their office, and as by
 chaunce a well fauoured
 chylde passed by, Sopho
 cles sayde, Oh, there is
 a faire boye Pericles, hee
 answered, It becommes
 a wthtor, Sophocles, to
 haue not onely forbearyng
 handes, but eyes also. If
 Sophocles had sayde this
 same, where wthastlers bee
 allowed, hee had bene free
 frō iust reproof. So great
 a force there is bothe of
 place and tyme. As for ex
 ample, if a man, that shall
 pleade a cause. bee musing
 to himselfe in his tourneye,
 or in his walke, or anye
 other thig he mindeth hede
 tuiye, hee is not reproued,
 but if he do y^e like at a fealt
 he may be thought vnciuil
 for hauing no regarde to y^e
 time. Howbeit those thigs
 which farre disagree frō al
 huma

humantie, as if anye man
sing in the street, or if anye
other greate disorde there
bee: by and by they appere
and they greatly neede not
our adomonicion, or rules:
but frō these. whiche seeme
to bee small faulies, and of
many can nor be percciued
we must the moze diligent-
lye retrainē. As in instru-
ments sounding by strings
or blast, though neuer so lit-
tle they tar, yet that of a cō-
ning manne is wont to bee
founde: so must wee line in
this life & nothinge chaūse
to tar, pea and so muche the
moze, as the concozde of
beedes is greater, & better
than of tunes. Wherefoze
as in instruments, musici-
ans eares do feelee euen the
least disorde, so if we wyll
bee sharpe, and quicke iud-
ges and markers of faulies
we shall vnderstand oftē-
tymes greate thynges by
small.

we shal sone iudge by & set-
ting of & etc, by smooth loo-
king, or vēding of & browes
by sadnes, mirth, laughter
speaking, silēce, straining.
and

vt si quis in foro cātet, aut
si qua est alia magna puer-
litas, facile apparet, nec
magnoperē admonitiōē
& p̄cepta desiderant.

Quę autē parua videntur
esse delicta, neq; a multis
intelligi possunt, ab his est
diligentius declinandū:
vt in fidibus aut in tibijs,
quamuis paulū discrepēt,
tamen id a sciente animad-
uerti solet: Sic viuendum
est in vita, ne forte quid
discrepet, vel multo etiam
magis quō maior & meli-
or actiōnū, quā sonorū cō-
centus est. Itaq; vt in fidi-
bus musicorum, aures vel
minima sentiunt: sic nos
si acres ac diligentes iudi-
ces esse volumus animad-
uersoresq; vitiōrū, magna
intelligemus sēpe ex par-
uis, Ex oculorum obtutu,
ex supciliōrū aut remissio-
ne, aut contractiōē, ex mōe
stitia, ex hilaritate, ex risu,
ex locutiōe, ex reticētis

de Officiis.

ex cōtentionē vocis, ex sū
 missionē, ex cēteris similib⁹
 facile iudicābimus, quid e-
 orū apte fiat quid ab offi-
 cio naturaq; discrepet.
 Quo in genere nō est in-
 comodū quale quodq; eo
 rū sit ex alijs iudicare, vt si
 quid dedeceat in illis, vite
 mus & ipsi. Fit n. nescio
 quo modo, vt magis in a-
 lijs cernamus quā in nobis
 met ipsis si quid delinquitur,
 Itaq; facillimē corrigū-
 tur in discēdo, quorū vitia
 imitātur emēdandi causa
 magistri. Nec vero alienū
 est, ad ea eligēda, quę dubi-
 tationē afferunt, adhibere
 doctos homines, vel etiam
 vñs peritos, & quid his de
 vnoquoq; genere officij
 placet exquirere. Maior e-
 nim pars eo ferē deferri so-
 let, quō a natura ipsa dedu-
 citur, in quibus vidēdū est
 non modo quid quisq; lo-
 quatur, sed etiā quid quisq;
 sciat, atq; etiam qua de

and fallynge of the vōlee. &
 other such like, what is sit-
 tinglye done: and what fro-
 mtie, and nature swar-
 ueth. In which kinde of
 thinges, it is not vnconne-
 nient to iudge by other, of
 what sort eche of them is,
 & if ought misbecometh an
 other, we shonne it also in
 our selues. For it comes to
 passe, I wote not howe, &
 we see moze in other, than
 in oure selues, if ought bee
 done amisse. And therefore
 verpe soone those schollers
 bee corrected, whose faults
 theire masters doe coun-
 terfet, for to make them a-
 mended. For truelye ont
 of the waye it is, in choo-
 singe of thynges, whiche
 bringe a doubtfulnesse to
 take learned mens aduysle,
 or skilfull by experience: &
 so to searche what lyketh
 them, concernynge euerye
 kinde of dulty. For & grea-
 ter part is comonlye wont
 thither to bee caried why-
 ther of verpe nature theye
 be led. In which we muste
 see not only what ech man
 saythe, but also, what eche
 man thinkethe, & for what
 cause

cause. eche mā so thinketh. causa quisq; sentiat. Vt enī
 For as painters, and they pictores, & ij qui signa fa-
 that grane images, and the bricant, & veri etiā poetæ
 righte poets also, bee wyl- suum quisq; opus à vulgo
 lynge to haue theire swoor- considerari vult vt si quid
 kes scene of all sortys of mē reprehensum sit a pluribus
 that in case oughte bee re- id corrigatur, hiq; & secū
 proued of many, it may bee & cū alijs, quid in eo pec-
 corrected, and therin bothe catum sit, exquirunt: sic
 with them selues, & wyth aliorum iudicio permulta
 other they examine, what nobis & facienda, & non
 is done amisse: so after the facienda, & mutanda &
 iudgement of other, manye corrigenda sunt. Quæ ve-
 things of vs both must bee ro more aguntur, & insti-
 done, and left vndone, and tutis ciuilibus, de his ni-
 also changed. & amended. hil est præcipendum, illa

As for things, which are enim ipsa præcepta sunt.
 done after custome, and ci- Nec quenquam hoc erro-
 uill ordinances, there is no re duci oportet: vt si quid
 pcept to be geuen of thē. Socrates aut Aristippus
 For thei be pceptys of thē contra morem consuetu-
 selues, neyther it behoueth dinemq; ciuilem fecerint
 any man to bee ledde with locutiue sint, idem sibi ar-
 thys error, if Socrates, or bitretur licere, magnis e-
 Aristippus haue doone, or nim illi & diuinis bonis
 spoken anye thing against hac licentiā assequebātur.
 ciuill order, and custome: Cynicorū vero, ratio tota
 that he shoulde thinke the I. j. est
 same lawfull for him to do
 Thei obtained such a large
 libertie of fault finding, by
 their great, and heauenlye
 gifts. But y hole fashon
 of the

de Officijs.

est ei scienda: est enim iūni
ca verecundię: sine qua ni
hil rectū esse potest, nihil
honestum. Eos autem quo
rum vita perspecta in re
bus honestis, atq; magnis
est bene de Repub. sentiē
tes ac bene meritos, aut
merentes, aliquo honore,
aut imperio affectos obser
uare & collere debemus.
Tribuere etiam multum
senectuti, cedere ijs, qui
magistratum habebunt:
habere delectum ciuis &
peregrini: in ipso quoq;
peregrino, priuatimue an
publicē venerit. Ad sum
mam, ne agam de singulis,
communem toti⁹ generis
hominum consiliatorem
& cōsolationē colere, tu
42 eri, seruare debemus. Iam
de artificijs & questibus
qui liberales habendi, qui

of the Cinikes is vtterlye
to be refused. For it is ene
my to shamefastnes: wyth
out which, there can be no
thing vpright, nor nothing
honest. But those wee
ought to reuerence, & geue
attendace vpo the: whose
life hath bē tried in honest
& worthy matters: who do
meane wel to the common
weal, & haue wel deserued
or do deserue well thereof,
& to any honour, or rule be
aduanced, also wee muste
haue olde age in great esti
mation: & must geue place
to those, & beare office and
make difference betwene a
citizen & a strāger: & in the
very strāger also we ought
to cōsider, whether he cāe
of priuate busines or for
cōmō weales affaires. In
sume (& I treat not of ene
ry particular) we are bound
to loue, maintein, & pserue
the cōmon attonement & fel
lowship of al mankind.
Now, concerning occupa
ciōs, & gainful sciēs which
are to bee compted honest
and

& whiche are of base repu-
 tacion, thus cōmonlye wee
 haue learned. Firſte thoſe
 gaynings be dilatoed, &
 runne in hatred wyth all
 men, as the gayne of tol-
 farmers, & vsurers. Wute
 of eſtimaciō alſo, & baſe bee
 the gaynes & men in wa-
 ges do take, whoſe labour
 is bought, & not their cun-
 ning. For in the & very hi-
 er is as it were the obliga-
 tion of their bondage.
 They more ouer are to be
 compted of the baſer ſozte,
 who buy of marchāts, that
 out of hand they retayle a-
 gain. For nothing they pro-
 fit, onleſſe they lye apace, &
 truly diſhoneſter thing is
 there none, the a vain tōg.
 And al kind of hādye craſ-
 tes men ſerue in mean occu-
 pacions. Nether can the
 workeſhop truly haue in it
 any gentlemanly doing, &
 no deale to be playſed are
 theſe occupacions, whiche
 be ſeruers of pleaſures:
 as Drinkeomen, butchers
 cookes, puddingmakers,
 fiſhermen, whiche Ce-
 ſar ſpeleth of, put to theſe

yf

ſordidi ſint, hec ferè acce-
 pimus. Primum improbā-
 tur ij queſtus, qui in odio
 hominū incurrunt, vt por-
 titorū, et ſceneratorum. Il-
 liberales autem & ſordidi
 queſtus mercenariorū om-
 nium, quorū opere, nō quo-
 rum artes emuntur. Eſt e-
 nim in illis ipſa merces auc-
 thoramentum ſeruitutis.
 Sordidi etiam putādi, qui
 mercantur amercatoribus
 quod ſtatim vendant. Ni-
 hil enim proficiūt, niſi ad-
 modū menciuntur. Nec
 vōro quicquam eſt turpi-
 vanitate. Opificesq; omnes
 in ſordida arte verſantur.
 Nec enim quicquam in-
 genuum poteſt habere of-
 ficina: minimēque artes ex
 probādæ, quæ miniſtre ſūt
 voluptatū: cetarij, lanij co-
 qui, ſartores, piſcatores, vt
 ait Terentius: adde his
 Iij. ſi

de Officijs.

si placet, vnguētarios, saltatores, totūq; ludū talariū. if ye list, perfumers, dauncers, & all hazarders.
 Quibus autē artibus, aut But those sciences, where in is greater wisdom, and
 prudentia maior inest: aut no meane profit sought, as
 nō mediocris vtilitas queritur, vt medicina, vt architectura, vtdoctrina rerum physicke, castinge of buyldinges, & learning of worthy knowledge, bee honest
 honestarū, he sunt ijs, quo for thē, with whose estate they agree. And marchant
 rum ordini conueniūt, honeste. Mercatura autē si dise, if it bee small, is to bee
 nuis est, sordida putāda est compted of little estimaciō: but if it bee great, and well
 in magna & copiosa, multa vndiq; aportās, multisq; stored, conueying many commodities round about, and
 sine vanitate impartiens disparlinge those same into many mens handes, without vaine wordes, it is not
 non est admodum vituperanda. Atq; etiam si satiata muche to bee dispraised, and
 quēstu, vel contenta potius, vt sēpe ex alto in portum, sic ex ipso portu se in furthermore, if being satisfied with gaine, or contented
 agros possessionesq; cōtulerit, videtur iure optimo rather, as it hath often cōs
 posse laudari. Omnium autem rerum, ex quibus aliquid from the sea to the hauē so
 est agricultuta melius it chaunge from the haue into landes, & possessions,
 nil vberius, nil dulcius, nil thomine libero it seemeth, of verie good
 dignius. De qua quoniam right it may be commended
for of al things, wherout anye gayne is sought, nothing is better thā ground tilth & rriming, nothinge yeeldinger, nothinge sweeter, nothīg meter for a free bozne mā, whereof because

in Cato the elder we haue
spoken ynough, thence shal
you take, what so to thys
place shal appertaine. But
how duities do proceede
fro those parts, which bee-
lōg to honesty. I thinke it
sufficiētly declared. Now i
those same things whyche
be honest, there may befall
oftimes a question, & com-
parison of two honest thin-
ges, whether is the honest-
ter, which pointe is passed
ouer of Panætius:

For whereas all honestye
springeth out of fower brā-
ches wherof one is of kno-
weledge, an other of cōmō
fellowship, & third of great
courage, the fowerthe of
measure keepinge, it muste
needes be, & in choosing of
duty these be often compa-
red together. we thinke
therefore, those duities bee
more agreeable to nature
which be borrowed fro com-
mon fellowship, than those,
which be fetchted fro know-
ledge, & that may be proo-
ued by this argument: bee-
cause if a wise mā happen
on such a life, & hee bee en-

riched

i Catone maiore satis mul-
ta diximus, illinc assumes.
quæ ad hunc locum perti-
nebunt. Sed ob ijs partib
quæ sunt honestatis, quem
admodum officia ducere-
tur, satis expositum vide-
tur. Eorum autem ipsorū,
quæ honesta sunt, potest i
cidere sepe contētio & cō-
paratio de duobus honest-
tis, vtrum honestius, qui lo-
cus à Panætio est præter-
miss⁹. Nā cū ōnis honestas
manet a partibus quatuor-
quarum vna sit cognitio
nis, altera cōmunitatis, ter-
tia magnanimitatis, quar-
ta moderationis: hę in de-
ligendo officio sæpe inter
se comparētur necesse est.
Placet igitur aptiora esse
naturæ ea officia, q̄ ex cō-
munitate, quam ea quę ex
cognitione ducantur. Id-
que hoc argumēto confir-
mari potest. Quod si cons-
tigerit ea vita sapienti, vt

de officijs.

omnium rerum affluentibus copijs dicetur: quamuis ea, que cognitione digna sunt, summo otio secū ipse consideret & contempletur, tamen si solitudo tanta sit vt hominem videre non possit, excedat è vita. Princepsq; omniū virtutum est illa sapiētia, quā σοφίαν græci vocant. Prudentia enim, quam græci φρόνησιν dicunt aliā quandam intelligimus: quæ est rerum expetendarum, fugiendarumque, scientia. Illa autem sapientia, quam principem dixi, rerum est diuinarum, atque humanarum scientia: in qua continetur deorum et hominū cōmunitas & societas ipsorū iter ipsos. Ea si maxima est (vt est certe) necessesse est, qd' à cōmunitate ducatur officiū, id esse maximū

ryched with a flowing plēasie of all maner substances though with verpe greate leasure he consider, and all to beholde with the hymselfe those thinges whyche are worthye of knowledg yet if his solitarines be so gret & he can not haue the sight of a mā, he would wish to be out of the world. And & wisdom which the Greeces doo terme σοφίαν is & princeesse of al vertuez. For yndence whiche the Greeces doo cal φρόνησιν wee take to be of another nature: which is the knowledg of thinges to be desyred, & thinges mete to be eschewed. But that wisdom, whiche I named the princeesse, is the science of heuēly, & worldly thinges, wherein is contained the cōmonite of gods & men, & theire societie, togeather. whiche vertue in case yt bee the greatest as it is in deede, it muste needes folow, that the duitie whyche is bozowed of cōmonite also is & greatest
for

For the knowledg, and consideration of naturall causes should, after a certaine sorte, be mained, and vnperfite, if noe perfourmaunce of deedes shoulde followe. And deedes must appeare in defendynge of mens commodities. They belong therfore to the fellowshippe of men, and for that cause are to be preferred before knowledg.

And this euery best disposed man, whan it comes to the pointe, both shew, & declare. For who is so desirous of thowseleinge, & learning & nature of thigs but in case whils hee were treatinge, and beswinge of matters moste worthe of knowledege in the meane season hee should sodenly heare tidings of & hazarde and danger of hys country which he is able to succor & withstande: hee woulde leaue, and sette asyde all those studies: yea though he thought, he were able to nuber & sterz, or to measure & huge cōpasse of & world & the same man also wold do as much in his parētes and

Etenim cognitio, contemplatioq; nature manca quodāmodo, atq; inchoata sit si nulla actio rerum consequatur. Ea vero actio in hominū commodis tuendis maximè cernitur, Pertinet igitur ad societatem generis humani. Ergo hæc cognitioni anteponenda est. Atquæ id optimus quisq; re ipsa ostendit & indicat. Quis est enim tam cupidus in prespicienda, cognoscendaque rerū natura: vt si ei tractanti, contemplantiq; res cognitione dignissimas subito sit allatum periculum, discrimenq; patrię, cui subuenire, opitulariq; possit, non illa omnia relinquat, atque abijciat, etiā si dinumerare se stellas, aut metiri mundi magnitudinem posse arbitretur.

Atq; hoc idem in parētis,

L.iiiij.

in

de officijs.

in amici re aut periculo fe-
cerit. Quib⁹ rebus intelli-
gitur, studijs officijsq; sciē-
tiæ preponenda esse officia
iustitię quę pertinet ad ho-
minū vtilitatē: qua nihil
homini esse debet ātiqu⁹.
Atquē illi ipsi quorū studia
vitaq; ōnis in rerū cogniti-
one versata est, tamē ab au-
gēdis hominū vtilitatibus
& cōmodis nō recesserunt
Nam & erudiere multos,
quō meliores ciues, vtilio-
resq; in rebus suis publicis
essent: vt Thebanū Epami-
nūdā Lysias Pythagoræ⁹:
Syracusū Dionem, Plato,
multiq; multos. Nosque
ipsi quicquid ad Rempub.
attulimus (si modo aliquid
attulimus) ā doctōribus
atq; doct̄ina instructi ad
eam & ornati accessim⁹.
Neq; solum viui atq; p̄sens
studiosos discēdi erudiunt

and in his frendes cause, &
perel. By whiche thinges
it is gathered, & beefore &
studies, & duityes of know-
ledge, & studies of iustyce
are to be preferred: whiche
do belonge to the profite of
men thā the whiche a man
ought to hold nothig derer
Also they who haue spent
theire holt life, & studie in
knowledge of things, haue
not yet withdrawen them-
selues from helping to in-
crease mens profits, & com-
modities. For they also ha-
ue entrusted many, to ma-
ke thē the better citizens, &
& more profitable in theyre
cōmon weales, as Lysias
the Pythagoreā scholed &
Thebane Epaminondas:
Plato taught Dion & Si-
racusan, & many other. ma-
ny mo, & what soeuer wee
our selfe brought to & com-
mon weal (if any thing we
haue brought) we came to
it enfourmed by techers, &
furnished wpth learninge.
And they not onely whyle
they liue, and bee presente,
do schole, & teache the stu-
dents

dents of learning, but after
theire death also, by theire
monuments of learninge,
they do the same. For they
haue not ouerpasseed one po
inte, & cōcerneth, laſws, cul
tome, & the commō wealth
knowledge, so as they may
seme to haue ēploied theire
quiet studies to oure com
mon affaires.

Thus they being themsel
ues geuen to the studies of
learning, and wisdomē, do
chiefely bestow their wise
dome, prudence, & vnder
standing to mens cōmodi
ties. For the same cause all
so, it is better to viter plē
tifuſly, so it be dyscretelye
than without eloquence to cō
ceiue neuer so swittelye, be
cause ons conceite serueth
onely within it selfe. wher
as eloquence gettes swithe
in her reche those, wpythe
whō we are ioined in com
mon felowshippe. And as
swarms of bees do cluster
together, not to this end, to
make cōbs, but beig swar
ming by kinde, they worke
their cōbes, so men muche
more

atq; docent: sed hoc idē e
tiā post mortē monumētis
litterarū assequuntur. Nec
enim loc⁹ vllus pretermis
sus est ab ijs, qui ad leges
qui ad mores, qui ad disci
plinā Reip. ptineret: ita vt
otiū suū ad nostrū negoti
um cōtulisse videantur. Ita
illi ipsi doctrinæ studijs &
sapiētiae dediti ad hominū
vtilitatē suā sapiētiā pru
dētiā, intelligētiaq; potissi
mū conferūt. Ob eā etiam
causā eloqui copiose (mo
do prudenter) melius est
quā vel acutissimē sine elo
quētia cogitare: quod co
gitatio in se ipsa vertitur:
eloquentia vero cōplecti
tur eos, quibuscū cōmuni
tatē iūcti sumus. Atq; vt a
pū examina nō fingendo
rū fauorum causa congre
gantur: sed cum congre
gabilia natura sint fingunt
fauos: sic homines ac
multo etiam magis, na

de Officiis.

natura cōgregati, adhibēt
augendi congregandiꝑ so-
lertiā. Itaque nisi ea virtus
quæ cōstat ex hominibus
tuendis, id est ex societate
generis humani, attingat
rerū cognitionem, soliu-
ga cognitio, et ieiunia vi-
deatur. Itēque magnitudo
animi remota à cōmunita-
te cōiunctioneq; humana
feritas sit quedā & imma-
nitas. Ita sit vt vincat cog-
nitionis studiū, cōsociatio
hominum; atq; cōmunitas.
Nec verū est quod dicitur
à quibusdam, propter ne-
cessitatē vitę, quod ea, quæ
natura desideraret, & con-
sequi sine alijs, atque effice-
re non possemus, idcirco
istam esse cum hominibus
communitatem & socie-
tatem. Quod si omnia no-
bis, quæ ad victum, cul-
tumq; pertinent quasi vir-
gula diuina (vt aiunt)

more than they, by nature
swarming, do vse their cū-
ning of doing, & denyling.
Therefore onelesse & same
vertue, which consisteth in
defendinge men, that is to
say, the felowship of man-
kind, both meete with the
knowledge of thinges: yt
may seme a very bare and
alone wandring knowledg
and likewise greatnesse
of courage, seuered frō cō-
mon fellowshipp, and nei-
bourhooðe of men, muste
needes be a certaine sauage
ness, and beastly crueltie.
So it failes out, that the
accompayninge, & commō
felowship of men far sur-
mountes the studie of kno-
wledge.

Neither is it true, which
is said of somme: that thys
common knotte, and felow-
shipp is had amonge men
euen for necessitie of life be-
cause without other, wee
might not get, and bringe
to passe those thinges, that
nature doothe desire: and
that, if all thinges, were
found vs, euen by the grace
of Godde as (theye saye)
which

Which apertene to foode, & furniture of life, the wold euery one of a good wytte al busines laide asyde, sette hys selfe wholly in know ledge, & sciēce. But that ys not so. For he wold both fynde solitarinesse, & choose a companion of study, both teach, & learne: bothe heare and speake. Wherefore al dwytye whiche auayleth to mainteine neibourhod, and fellowship of men is to bee preferred aboue the dwytye whiche consisteth in know ledge, & science. This question parauneture maye bee wel moued, whether this comon fellowship whiche is most of all agreeable to nature, be also alwaies to be preferred before meane, & measure keeping. I thinke not so.

For there be some thinges partly so filthye, partly so haynous, that a wyse man wold not do them, no not to saue hys countri. As manye suche. Possidoni⁹ hath gathered together, but some of them so foule, and so filthye: that

suppeditaretur: tū optimo quisque ingenio negotijs onibus omisiss, totum se in cognitione & sciētia collo caret. Non est ita, nam & solitudinem fugeret, & socium studij quereretur: tum docere, tum discere vellet tum audire, tum dicere. Ergo omne officiū, quod ad coniunctionem hominū & ad societatem tuendam valet, antepōnendū est illi officio, quod cognitione & scientia cōtinetur. Illud forsitan querendū sit, nū hęc communitas, que maximē est apta naturæ, sit etiā moderationi, modestięque semper antepōnenda? non placet, sunt enim quædam partim ita fœda, partim ita flagitiosa, vt ea ne conseruādē. quidē patrię causa sapiēs factur⁹ sit. Ea Possidoni⁹ cōlegit multa, sed ita tetra quædā, ita, obscœna
vt

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de Officiis.

vt dictu quoque videatur
turpia. Hec igitur non sus-
cipiet quisquam Reip. causa
nec Resp. quidē pro se sus-
cipi volet. Sed hec cōmodi
us se res habet, quōd non
potest accidere tempus, vt
inter sit Reip. quicquam il-
lorum facere sapientem.

Quare hoc quidem effec-
tum sit in officijs deligen-
dis: hoc genus officiorum
excellere, quod teneatur
hominū societate. Etenim
cognitionem prudentiam
q̄ sequitur considerata ac-
tio. Ita fit, vt consideratē a-
gere pluris sit quam cogi-
tare prudenter, atq̄ue hæc
quidem hactenus. Pate-
factus est enim locus ipse,
vt non sit difficile in exqui-
rendo officio quid cuique
sit preponendum, videre.
In ipsa autem communi-
tate sunt gradus officio-
rum, ex quibus quid cuiq̄
præstet, intelligi possit:

that euen to be spoken they
seeme shamefull.

Those therefore oughte
no mā to take in hād, for
ȝ cōmon weales cause, no-
ther wold the cōmon weal
for her sake haue them en-
terprised. But this matter
standes in better case, for
that ther can befall no time
that ȝ cōmon weale should
neede to haue a wyse man
doe any of them.

wherefore let this be con-
cluded, in choyse of duities
that suche kinde of duities
most excell, as concerne the
fellowship of men. For ad-
uised doyng will followe
knowledge, & wisdom, &
So it comes to passe, that
too doe aduisedly is moze
worth, thā wilsely too de-
uise. And therof thus farre
For this place is plainely
enough set out, & it is not
harde, in serching out of du-
ty, to perceiue, among thē
all which afore other is to
be preferred.

yet euen in cōmō felowship
there be degrees of duities
whereby may be knownen,
what one is aboue ȝ other
so

so as y first duties be due
to the gods immortall, the
second to our countrey, the
third, to our parentes, and
so forth by degrees, y rest
to the rest.

Of the whiche matters
briefly debated may be ga-
thered, how men are swont
not only to doubt, whether
a thing be honest or disho-
nest: but also twoo honest
thinges layde before them,
whether is the honestest

This point (as I
saide before) is
ouer slipped
by Pane-
tius.

But now to the re-
sidue lette vs
proceede.

(..)

vt prima dijs immortalib⁹
secunda patrie, tertia parē-
tibus: deiceps gradatim re-
liqua reliquis debeantur.

Quibus ex rebus breuiter
disputatis, intelligi potest,
nō solū id homines solere
dubitare honestū ne an

turpe sit, sed etiam

duobus ppositis

honestis vtrū

honestius

Hic locus à Panetio est (vt

supra dixi) prætermis-

sus. Sed iam ad re-

liqua perga-

mus.

(.)

de Officiis

M. TVLLI CICE-
RONIS, DE OFFICI.

is. Liber secundus.

¶ MARCVS
TVLLIVS CICE.

raes second booke of
duties to Marcus
his sonne.

QUEMADMODUM officia ducuntur ab honestate Marce fili: atque ab omni genere virtutis, satis explicatum arbitror libro superiore. Sequitur ut hec officiorum genera prescribam, quę pertinent ad vitę cultum, & ad earum rerum quibus utuntur homines facultatem ad opes, ad copias in quo tum queri dixi quid utile, quid inutile, tum ex utilibus, quid utili⁹ aut quid maximę utile, de quibus dicere aggrediar, si pauca prius de instituto, ac de iudicio meo dixerō. Quanquam enim libri nostri complures:



After what sorte duties should be taken out of honesty, son Mark I from every kind of vertue: I suppose it sufficiently declared in my former booke. It folowes, & wee go forward to these kinds of duties: which belong to power, to riches, to & fortune of mans life, and to the plenty of those things, & men do occupie wherein I saide it is sought. bothe what is profitable, what vnprofitable: & also of profitable things: which is the more profitable, or whiche & most vnprofitable. Of which I wil eter to speake. I shall say a woorde or two before, of my purpose, and meaning.

For though our bookes haue stirred by many men to the

the studie not only of rea-
ding, but also of wytyng:
yet otherwys I feare, lest
the name of philosophie bee
hateful to some good men:
& y they maruayle, I bee=
slow in it so much traual,
& time. In dede as long as
the cōmon weale was go-
uerned by thē, to whō shee
had cōmitted her selfe, I
did employ al my care, and
studie vpon it. But when
one man kept all in thral-
dome, & there was no place
at al for counsel, & autho-
ritie: & I besides had forgo
my cōpaniōs: of preseruig
the state, who had ben sin-
guler men, neither I gaue
my selfe to greues, where-
with I shoulde haue been
wasted, on les I had resis-
ted thē, noz again, to plea-
sures vnseemely for a lear-
ned man. And would god,
& the common weale, had
stode in y state where it be-
gan: & had not light vppon
men, who were not so de-
sirous of altring, as ouer-
throwing of thinges. For
firste, as wee were wonte
to dooc, when the com-
mon weale was standinge:

nō modo ad legēdi, sed e-
tiā ad scribēdi studiū exci-
tauerint: tamē interdū ve-
reor, ne quibuscūq; bonis vi-
ris philosophiē nomē sit in-
uisū: mirenturq; in ea tan-
tū me operē & tēporis po-
nere. Ego autē quamdiu
Resp. per eos gerebatur,
quibus se ipsa cōmiserat, ō-
nes meas curas cogitatio-
nesq; in eā cōferebā. Cū
autē dominatu vnus ōnia
tenerētur, neq; esset vsquā
consilio aut authoritati lo-
cus: socios deniq; tuendæ
Reip. sommos viros amisif-
sem: nec me angoribus de-
di quibus essem confectus
nisi his restitissem: nec rur-
sum indignis homine do c-
to voluptatibus. Atquē v-
tinā Resp. stetitset quo
cæperat statu, nec in homi-
nes non tam communitan-
darum rerū quā euerteri
darum cupidos incidisset.
Primum enim, vt stante
Repub. facere solebamus,

wee

de Officiis

in agendo plus quàm in scribendo operę ponerim. Deinde ipsis scriptis non ea quę nunc, sed actiones nostras manderemus, vt sepe fecimus. Cũ autem Resp. in qua omnis mea cura, cogitatio, opera ponisolebat, nulla esset omnino: illę scilicet literę omnino conticuerunt forenses, & senatorię. Nihil autem agere cũ animus nõ posset, in ijs studiis ab initio versatus ætatis: existimaui honestissimẽ molestias deponi posse, si me ad philosophiam retulissẽ. Cui cum multum adolescens discendi causa temporis tribuissẽ postea quàm honoribus in seruire cœpi, meq; totum Reipublicę tradidi, tantum erat philosophię loci quantum super fuerat amicorum & Reipublicę temporis. Id autem omne cõsumebatur in legẽdo

we would take moze labor in pleadig. & in wꝛiting: afterward, in very wꝛitpꝛngs we would not put & thigs that we do nowe, but oure pleadings, as we haue done diuers times.

But when & cõmon weale in which al my care, studie and trauaile was wont to be bestowed, was none at al. verely those lawierly, & Senatehouse learnynges were husht. But seing my mind could not choose, but be doing: hauing ben occupied in those studies, from the beginning of my yonge age, I thoughte sozowes might be put awayne moste honestly if I returned my selfe to philosophie. wherunto when beinge yong I had geuen muche time, to learne it, after & I begā to attend honours, & betooke my selfe whole to the cõmō weale, so muche leasures was lefte for philosophie, as remayned of the tymes spent aboute mye frendes and the common weales causes. And that was all bestowed in readyng, for

for writing I had no time
In our most miseries ther
fore, we seme to haue got-
ten this so great a commo-
ditie, that wee myght put
those matters in writinge:
which were not sufficiētly
knowne to oure men, & yet
weare moste woorthye of
knowledge. For what is
ther in faith more wishful,
thā wisdomē: what more
excellent: what to a manne
more woorthy: what for a
mā more honorable: They
than, who doo desire this
benamed philosophers: nei-
ther is philosophy ought
els, if ye will tell the mea-
nings of the worde, but the
study of wisdomē. And wis-
dom (as it is defined of an-
cient Philosophers) is the
sciēce & heauiely & worl-
dly thinges, and of the causes
whereby these thinges bee
holden. And who-so dis-
praileth the study therof: I
wot not verely, what ther
may be & he would deeme
praise woorthy, for whether
& delight of & mīd be sou-
ght & quietīg of care: what
may bee compared & their
stu-

scribendi ocium nō erat.
Maximis igitur in malis
hoc tantum boni assecuti
videmur: vt ea literis man-
deremus, quæ nec satis e-
rant nota nostris, & erant
cognitione dignissima.
Quid est enim, per deos,
optabilius sapiētia? quid
prestati? quid homini me-
lius? quid homine digni?
Hanc igitur qui expetunt,
philosophi nomināt: nec
quicquā aliud est philoso-
phia (si interpretari velis)
quām studiū sapientie.
Sapientia autem est (vt a
veteribus philosophis de-
finitū est) rerū diuinarum
& humanarum, causarum
quæ quibus heres continē-
tur, scientia: cuius studiū
qui vituperat, haud sanē in-
telligo, quidnam sit, quod
laudandum puter. Nam si
ue oblectatio queritur a-
nimi, requiesq; curarum
quæ conferri cum eorum

de Officiis.

studijs potest, qui semp ali **studies.** who alwayes ga-
 quid inquirūt, qd' spectet, **ther** somwhat that tēdeth
 & valeat ad benè beatēq; **& aualeth** wel, & wealful-
 viuēdū: Siue ratio cōstā- **ly to lyue,** or if the waye of
 tiē, virtutisq; queritur, aut **stedfastnes,** and vertue bes
 hęc ars est, aut nulla omni **sought** either this is & arte
 no p quā eas assequamur, **or ther is none** at al. where
 Nullā vero dicere maxi- **by we maye** attayne them.
 marū rerū artē esse, cū mi- **To vphold** there is no art
 nimarum sū arte nulla sit **of & greatest** things, seeing
 hominum est parum cōsi- **none of & least** be about art
 deratē loquentium atq; in **it is a token** of men spea-
 maximis rebus errātium. **king** with small abusēmēt
 Si autē est aliqua dicipli- **and erringe** in the greatest
 na virtutis: vbi ea quere- **matters.** But if ther be a-
 tur, cū ab hoc discendi ge- **ny science** of vertue, wher
 nere discesseris? Sed hęc **shal it be** sought, whē you
 cū ad philosophiā cohort- **be gone** from this kinde of
 ramur, accuratius solēt dis- **lerning.**
 putari: qd' alio quidā libro **But these** thinges are
 fecimus. Hoc autē tēpore **wont to be** more exactlye
 rātum nobis declarandū **discoursed,** when we exhort
 fuit, cur orbatī Reipu. mu- **men to philosophie,** whiche
 neribus ad hoc nos studiū **in deede** wee haue done, in
 potissimum contulissimus **another boke.** But at this
 Occurritur autē nobis & **present,** only it was to be
 quidē a doctis et eruditis, **declared** of vs, why wee
 querentibus satis ne con- **got vs** chiefly to this study
 when wee were bereft of
 our cōmon welth offices.
 But it is gainsaid vs, &
 that of skilfull, and learned
 mē demāding whether we
 seme to do cōstātly inough
 who

who althoughe wee holde,
that nothing can bee surely
knownen: yet bothe were
wonte to dispute of other
matters, and at thys same
time we p^rosecute p^recepts
of duity. To whō I would
oure oppinions were well
knownen. For wee are not
they whose winde wanders
in errour, & hath not
at all, what to folow. For
what a mynd shoulde thys
be, or rather a life: where
the meane not onely of dis-
puting but also of living is
taken cleane awaye. But
as other, who do say some
things be certein, some un-
certaine: so wee dissentinge
from them, do saye agayne
some thinges bee p^rouable
some vn^prouable.

What is there then that
shoulde let mee to folowe
those thⁱngs which to me do
seeme p^rouable: which cō-
trarywise, to dis^proue, and
to boide the p^resump^tiō of
affirming: and to see rash-
nes, whiche disagreeth frō
wisdomes most of al.

But by our men ther is
disputing agais^t all thⁱngs,
because

stanter facere videamur:
qui cū p^ricipi nihil posse di-
cam⁹ tamē & alijs de reb⁹
differere soluamus, & hoc
ipso tēpore p^recepta offi^ci
p^rsequamur. Quibus vellē
satis cognita esset nostra
sentētia. Nō enim sum⁹ ij
quorū vagetur animus er-
rore, nec habeat vnquā
quid sequatur. Quae enim
esset ista mens, vel quae vi-
ta potius non solū dispu-
tandi, sed etiā viuendi, ra-
tione sublata? Nos autē vt
ceteri, qui alia certa, alia in-
certa esse dicunt, sic ab his
dissentientes, alia p^rbabilia
cōtra alia non probabilia
esse dicimus. Quid est er-
go quod me impediāt, ea
quae mihi p^rbabilia videāt^r
sequi? quae cōtra in p^rbare
atq; affirmādi arrogātiā vi-
tantē, fugere temeritatē,
quae a sapiētia dissidet plu-
rimū. Contrā autem om-
nia disputantur a nostris,

de Officiis.

quod hoc ipsum probabile
elucere non possit, nisi ex
utraque parte causarum esset
facta contentio. Sed hæc ex
planata sunt in Academi-
cis nostris satis (utarbi-
tror) diligenter.

Tibi autem mi Cicero, quā-
quam in antiquissima, no-
bilissimaque philosophia,
Cratippo authore versa-
ris, his simillimo qui ista
preclara pepererunt: ta-
men hæc nostra finitima
vestris ignota esse nolui.
Sed iam ad instituta per-
gamus.

Quinque igitur rationi-
bus propositis officij per-
sequendi, quarum duæ ad
decus, honestatemque per-
tinent, duæ ad commoda
vitæ copias, opes, faculta-
tes, quinta ad eligendi
iudicium, si quando ea,
quæ dixi, pugnare inter
se viderentur: honesta-
tis pars perfecta est:

because this same thinge &
is profitable cannot shine
forth, except there shoulde
be a conference of reasons
expressed vpon both sides.
But these matters, as I
suppose, bee diligentely &
nough made plaine in oure
Academikes.

But although my Cicero,
you bee exercised in y most
auncient & most noble phi-
losophy. Cratippus beinge
your authoz: a mā ful lyke
vnto those who haue made
these notable things: yet I
woulde not these of ours,
berre neere vnto yours, to
you should bee vknownen.
But now let vs goe on to
our purpose.

Seing then five waies be
set out of treating vpon du-
tie: wherof two do pertain
vnto comelynesse and ho-
nestye: other two belong to
the commodities of a mā
life, to aboundance, power
ryches: the fift dothe serue
to y iudgement of chosinge, if
euer those, whiche I spake
of shoulde seeme to striue to-
gether: the parte touchyng
honestye is made an end of
whiche

which truely I desire to be
very wel knowne to you.
But this, whereof we tret
now, is the very same, that
is called profitable.

In y^e which terme custome
saylinge hath swarued out
of the waye: and by litle &
little is brought too thys
poynte, that it would seuer
profitable from honest: and
would make some thing ho-
nest, which should not bee
profitable, and some thinge
profitable, whiche shoulde
not be honest: thā y^e which
no greater danger could be
brought to mans life.

Philosophers surelve of
very greate authozine doe,
grauelyno doubt, and ho-
nestly in imagination son-
der these thzee confused
kynds. For whatsoeuer is
iust, they also iudge y^e same
to be profitable: & like wise
what so is honest, they take
the same to be iust: wherof
is concluded, that whatso-
euer is honest, the same is
profitable: the which thing
whoe smallye forsee: theye
oftentimes hauinge in ad-
miracion luttile wited mē

It. iij.

and nes & callidos admirantes

quam quidem tibi cupio
esse notissimam. Hoc autē
de quo nunc agimus, id ip-
sum est, quod vtile appel-
latur,

In quo verbo lapsa cōsue-
tudo deflexit de via, sen-
simque eo deducta est, vt
ab honesto vtile secerne-
ret: & constitueret hone-
stum esse aliquid, quod v-
tile non esset: & vtile qd'
non honestum: qua nulla
perniciēs maior hominum
vitæ potuit asferri. Summa
quidem autoritate philo-
sophi seuerè sanè, atq; ho-
nestè hæc tria genera cōfu-
sa, cogitatione distingūt.

Quicquid enim iustum sit
id vtile etiam esse censent:
itemquē quod honestum.
idem esse iustum. Ex quo
efficitur vt quicquid ho-
nestum sit, idem sit vtile.

Quod qui parum perspi-
ciūt, hi sepe versutos homi-

de Officiis.

eorū maliciā sapientiā iudicant. Quorū error eripienda est: omnisq; opinio ad eā speciē traducēda, vt honestis consilijs, iustisque factis nō fraude & malitiosē intelligāt ea, quę velīt cōsequi posse. Que ergo ad vitā hominū tuēdā p̄tinent, partim sūt inanimata vt aurū, argentū, vt e quę gignuntur ē terra, & alia eiusdem generis partim animata, quę habēt suos impetu, & rerū appetitus. Eorū autē alia rationis expertia sunt, alia ratione vtentia. Expertes rationis sunt equi, boues et reliq; pecudes, & apes, quorū opera efficitur aliquid ad hominū vsū, atq; vitā. Ratione autē vtentū duo genera ponuntur, vnum deorum alterum hominum. Deos placatos pietas efficit et sanctitas. Proximē autē et se eūdū deos hōines homini bus maximē vtilēs esse pos-

and crafty do repute theier willines for wisedom. whose error must be taken away and their whole opinion is from that to be brought vn to this heap, that by honest counsel, and good dedes. not by guyle. & craftines, theie vnderstande themselves in possibilitie to attaine such things. as the would.

Some things thā which appertaine to y maintenance of mans life. be liuelesse: as golde, and siluer, as these whiche are gotten out of y earth. as other. of the same sort: some be liuing, and feeling which haue their motions & appetits to things. And some of them be void of reason, some haue y vse of reason. Void of reason be horses, oxen, and other cattle, and bees, by whose worke. somewhat is made for mans vse: & life. But of those that haue vse of reason, twoe kinds there be put: one of gods, an other of menne. Deuotion & holinesse will make the gods fauourable. But next of all & after the gods, mē to mē may be most profitable.

And

And again there is y^e same diuision of those thinges, which annoy, & hurte. And because men do not thinke the gods doe harme, these excepted they suppose men to men to do mozt hurt, or profit.

For the most part of those same, which bee called line lesse be the effectes of manz sworke, neither wee should haue them, except hande, & craft had bene put thereto neither without mans seruice, we shoulde vse them.

For neither preservation of health, nor sailinge, nor grounde tilth, & trimminge nor the tinning, and sauuing of cozne, and other fruytes without labour of manne, coulde haue bene any at all. Now mozeouer both cariage out of those thinges. Wherewith we were storied and conueyance in of those which we should neede, ther coulde bee doubtlesse none. excepte manne shoulde doo those offices. And in lyke manner, nother stones shold be hewed out of quarries, necessarye to our vse, nother ad vsum nostrū necessarij.

sūt. Earūq; iterū rerū quæ noceāt & obsint, eadē diuisio est. Sed quia deos nocere non putāt: his exceptis homines hominib⁹ plurimū obesse vel prodesse arbitrantur. Ea enim ipsa quæ inanimata diximus, pleraq; sunt hominū effecta opere, quæ nec habere-mus nisi manus & ars accessissēt, nec his sine hominū administratione vteremur. Neq; enim valitudinis curatio, neq; nauigatio neq; agricultura, neq; frugū fructuūq; reliquorū perceptio, & cōseruatio sūn opera hominū vlla esse potuisset. Iam vero & earum rerū quib⁹ abundaremus, exportatio, & earū, quibus egeremus inuectio certe nulla esset. nisi his muneribus homines fungerentur. Eademq; ratione, nec lapides exiderētur è terra

de Officiis,

nec ferrum, æs, aurū, argē-
tum effoderetur penit⁹ ab
ditū, sine hominum labore
& manu. Tecta vero qui-
bus & frigorū vis pellere-
tur, & calorū molestiæ se-
darentur, vnde aut initio
generi humano dari potu-
isset, aut postea subuenire
si aut vi tēpestatis, aut ter-
remotis aut vetustate ceci-
dissent: nisi cōmunis vita
ab hominibus harū rerum
auxilia petere didicisset.
Adde ductus aquarū, deri-
uationes fluminū, agrorū
irrigationes, moles apposi-
tas fluctibus, portus manu
factos: quæ nō sine homi-
nū opere habere possemus.
Ex quibus ōnibus multif-
quē alijs pspicuum est, qui
fructus, quēq; vtilitates ex
rebus ijs quę sūt inanimata
pcipiantur, eas nos nullo
modo sine hominū manu
atq; opera capere potuissē
qui deniq; ex bestijs fruct⁹

nother yron, golde, brasse,
siluer deepe hidden coulde
be digged by wout the la-
bour & hand of man.

Houses also whereby both
y sharpnesse of colde might
be defended & the noiaunce
of heat might be asswaged
from whence either at the
beginninge, mought theye
haue bene geueen to man-
kinde: or after do ease, if ei-
ther by violence of tēpeste
or by earthquakes, or old-
nesse they had gon to wra-
ke except comon life had lear-
ned of men to al be the ayd
for these things.

Wode hereunto conduites
of water, turning of ruerz
letting in water ouer grou-
des wharfes made agaist
streames. Hauens caste by
hand: which wout mennes
wozke, we might not haue
By al which, and many o-
ther things, it is euydente:
that by no meanes, woute
mans hande and trauayle,
we coulde haue receiued y
fruits, and profits, whiche
be gotten of those things,
that be liuelesse.

what fruits also of beastes,

or what commoditie could
there be taken? but if men
shoulde helpe thereto. For
euen they doubtlesse were
men. Who were the chiefe
in deuyling, what vse wee
might haue of eche beast
nor at this season, without
mennes seruice, might wee
either kepe ioyles, or break
them, or saue the, or of the
take reasonable commodi-
ties: and by men also bothe
those beasts bee kyled,
which doe hurte, and those
be taken, whiche maye doe
seruyce.

What should I number
bp a heape of artes? Wout
whiche, mans life coulde
haue beene none at al. For
who should ease the sick?
What delyte shoulde there
be amonge the healthfull?
What diet? What aparail?
onelesse so many artes sho
uld serue vs. With which
things mans lyfe be sur-
nished, is become so farre
different from the feeding
and cote of beasts.

Cities also, with out the
assemble of manne, coulde
nryther bee buylded, nor
peopled.

where=

aut. que commoditas, nisi
homines adiuuarent, per-
cipi posset? Nā et qui prin-
cipes inueniendi fuerunt
quā ex quaq; bellua vsu
habere possemus, homines
certē fuerūt. Nec hoc tem-
pore sine hominū opera,
aut pascere eas, aut doma-
re, aut tueri, aut tēpestiuos
fructus ex his capere pos-
semus. Ab eisdemq; & ea,
que nocent, interficiuntur
& quę vsus possunt esse ca-
piuntur. Quid enumerem
artiū multitudinē? sine q-
bus vita hominis omnino
nulla esse potuisset?

Quis n. egris subuenisset?
quę esset oblectatio valen-
tiū? qui victus, aut cultus
nisi tam multę nobis ar-
tes ministrarentur. Qui-
bus rebus exulta homi-
num vita tantum distat, a
victu & cultu bestiarum.
Vrbas vero sine hominum
cœtu nō potuissēt, nec ar-
tificari, nec frequentari.

de officiis.

Ex quo leges moresq; cōstitui, tum iuris equa descriptio, certa; viuendi disciplina, per quas bene beatē; viuitur, quas res & māsuetudo animorū cōsecuta, & verecūdia est: effectūq; est, vt esset vita munitor, atq; vt dādo, & accipiēdo, pmutandisq; facultatibus & commodis nullare egeremus. Lōgiōres hoc loco sumus, quam necesse est. Quis est enim cui non pspicua sunt illa, quē pluribus verbis a Panetio cōmemorantur? neminē neque ducē in bello, nec principē domi. magnas res & salutares sine hominū studijs gerere potuisse. Commemorantur ab eo Themistocles Pericles Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexāder, quos negat sine adiumentis hominum tantas res efficere potuisse.

Vtutur in re non dubia

whereupon ordynances and customes were made also an indifferent settinge out of law, and a sure rule too line after, by whiche, the life is ledde well and wealefully whiche thinges both the mildnes of minds & shamefastnesse hathe followed, and it is brought to passe, that our life shoulde bee the moze safeguarded, and that by geuing and takinge and enterchanging, of goodes, and pleasures, we should want nothinge, we be longer in this place than neede requires. For who is he, to whom these thinges are not manifeste, which in moze wordes bee recyted of Panetius: that neither any capteine in war nor pprince at home, could haue archiued greate feates and auaylable wythoute mens endeuour. Richer sed of him is Themistocles, Pericles, Cyrus, Agesilaus, Alexander, whom he denped to haue beene able to cōpas so great thigs about the ayd of men. In a matter noe whit doubtfull
bee

hee blethe witnessess nos testibus non necessarijs.
whit necessarye.

And as wee obtain great commodities, by the like mind, and consent of men: sother is none so lothsome a pestilence, which doth not growe to man by man.

There is a booke of Dicearchus, bpō f death of mē who was a great Peripatetike, and pleinteful: and after the other causes gathered together, as of waterbrakes, of pestilence, of destruction, yea and of the sodein flocking together of beastes, by whose violence hee sheweth how certeine kindes of men were consumed: afterward, hee makes cōparison, how manye more men haue bene destroyed by mens violence (that is) by warre or rebellion, than by al other miserie.

Secing then this place hath no maner of doubt but that men both profite, & hurt men very muche: I point this to be a property of vertue to wyne mens hartes to her, & bynd them to her vlc.

Atq; vt magnas vtilitates adipiscimur conspirationē hominū, atq; consensu: sic nulla tā detestabilis pestis est, que non homini ab homine nascatur, Est Dicēar chi liber de interitu hominū, peripatetici magni, & copiosi: qui collectis ceteris causis eluuiōis, pestilētiæ, vastitatis, beluarū etiā repentinæ multitudinis, quarū impetu, docet quædam hominū genera esse consumpta. Deinde cōparat quantō plures deleti sunt homines, hominū impetis, id est bellis, aut seditionibus, quā omni reliqua calamitate. Cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus & p̄sint & obsint: propriū hoc statuo esse virtutis, consilare sibi animos hominū & ad vsus suos adiungere.

Thert=

de officiis.

Itaq; quæ in rebus inanimis quæq; in vsu & tractatione, belluarū fiunt vtiliter ad hominū vitā artib⁹ ea tribuūtur operosis, Homīnū autē studia ad amplificationē nostrarū rerum prompta ac parata virorū præstantiū sapientia & virtute excitantur. Etenim virtus omnis tribus in rebus ferē vertitur quarum vna est in percipiēdo quid in quaq; re verū, sincerum q; sit, quid consentaneum cuiq; quid consequens: ex quo quæq; gignatur: quæ cuiusq; rei sit causa. Alterum, cohibere mot⁹ animi turbatos, quos græci πᾶθος nominant: appetitionesq; quas illi ὀρευαξ obedientes efficere rationi. Tercium ijs quibus cum congruemur vti moderatē & scīter: quorum studijs ea quæ natura desiderat, expleta,

Therefore what so in thingz liuelesse, & what so in the vse, & occupping of beastes is done profitably to mans like: it is al appointed to y^e laboursome trades.

But mens good wylkes, that be prest, and ready to the aduancement of oure estate, be stirred vp by the wisdom and vertue of excellent men,

For al vertue in a maner consisteth in thre popntes. whereof one is in thozow= seeing what in euery thing is true, & perfecte what agreeable to eche thing: what is the sequelo: whereof all things growe: what is the cause of euery thing.

The other to keepe in the troublesome moode of the minde, which the Greekes name πᾶθος and to make & appetites wht⁹ they cal ὀρευαξ obedyent vnto reason.

The thirde, to vse them soberly and skilfully. withe whom we be conuersat: by whose good wills, we may haue those thinges at fill and

and heaped, which nature desire, yea and by them, if any harm be brought vpon vs, we may it auoide, & maye be weaked of those which haue gone about to hurt vs, & maye paye them with so much punishment as equitie, and mans gentleness doth beare.

But by what meanes we may cōpas mens good willes, & receyue the same we shall saye, and that not long hereafter. But a few words are to be sayde before.

That a great power there is in fortune, on either side either for welfare, or euillfare who is ignorant: For bothe when we enjoy her prosperous blast, we are carried to our desired ends, & when her winde is turned, we are afflicted. This same fortune hath other changes. Whiche bee seldomer, first, & cōe frō things liuelles, as sea stormes, tēpests shipwaks, hoīfales, burninges, then from beastes, as stripes, bytings, ouerrunnings

cumulataq; habeam⁹, per eosdēq; si quid importet nobis incōmodi, pulsē⁹ vlciscamurq; eos, qui nocere nobis conati sūt, tātaq; pēna afficiamus quāta equitas humanitasq; patit⁹.

Quibus autem rationibus hanc facultatē assequi possimus vt hominum studia cōplectamur eaq; teneam⁹ dicemus, nequē ita multo post: sed pauca ante dicēda sūt. Magnā vim esse in fortuna in vtramq; partem vel ad secundas res vel aduersas quis ignorat? Nam & cūm prospero flatu ei⁹ vtimur, ad exitus peruehimur optatos: & cūm refluat, affligimur.

Hęc igitur ipsa fortuna ceteros casus rariores habet: primum ab inanimis, proceilas, tempestates, naufragia, ruinas, incendia: deinde a bestiis iētus, morsus, impetus.

de Officiis.

petus. Hęc igitur (vt dixi) rariora. At verò interitus exercituū: vt p̄ximē triū, sepe multorū clades imperatorum: vt nūq̄ summi ac singularis viri, inuidiē p̄te rea multitudinis, atq; ob eas bene meritorū sepe ciuium expulsiones, calamitates, fugę. Rursusq; secundę res, honores, imperia, victorię quanquā fortuita sunt tamen sine hominum operibus & studijs neutra in partē effici possūt. Hoc igitur cognito, dicendum est quoniā modo hominum studia ad vtilitates nostras allicere atque excitare possimus.

Quę si longior fuerit oratio, cū magnitudine vtilitatis, comparetur. Ita fortasse etiam breuior videbitur. Quęcunq; igitur homines homini tribuunt ad eū augēdū atq; honestādū

runnings. These therefore (as I sayde) be seldomer. But the destruction of armies, as alate of thzer, oftē of manne slaughter of capitains, as latelpe of a noble & singular man. & enuyngs moreouer of the multitude and by reason of the same, oftentimes y banishmētes, the miseries, the fleeinges away of the wel deseruing citizens: and agayne, prosperitie, honour, empire, victorie, although they be in fortunes hande: yet wout mens trauailes, & studies on neither side they cā not be brought to passe.

This then knowen: wee must declare, but by what meanes wee may allure, & stirre bp mens good wils to our profits. The which proesse if it bee somewhat longe let it bee compared with the greatnesse of the profite: so perhappes euen somewhat to shorpe it shal seeme.

whatsoever then menne geue to a manne, to enriche, and aduance him epther

ther they dooe it for good
will, when for some cause
they beare affection to any
or els for honours sake, if
they reuerence anye mans
vertue, & thinke him wor-
thy of moſte fortunate es-
tate: or in whōe theye haue
a trust, and do suppose thē
to prouide well for theire
matters or els whose po-
wer they feare, or cōtrari-
wise of whō they looke af-
ter some what, as when
vsurpers and people plea-
sing men lay large gifts
before them, or at last, they
be ledde by meede, and re-
warde. whiche in deede
is the vilest waye, and the
fowlest both to them, who
are caught with the same,
and to those, who do seeke
to haue refuge thereunto.
For the matter goethe not
well, when the same that
shoulde bee wrought by
vertue is attempted by
money. But because ma-
nye tymes this helpe is ne-
cessary, wee will tell howe
it ought to be vsed, if firste
wee shall haue spoken of
those things which be ne-
cessary to vertue.

aut beneuolētię gratia fa-
ciunt, cū aliqua de causa
quempiam diligūt: aut ho-
noris si cuius virtutē sus-
piciūt, & si quē dignū for-
tuna quā amplissima pu-
tant: aut cui fidē habēt, &
bene rebus suis consulere
arbitrātur: aut cuius opes
metuunt: aut cōtra a qui-
bus aliquid expectāt: aut
cū reges populare sue ho-
mines largitiones aliquas
proponant: aut postremō
pretio ac mercede ducun-
tur. Quę sordidissima qui-
dē est ratio et inquinatissi-
ma, et ijs, qui ea tenentur
et illis qui ad eam confu-
gere conātur. Malē enim
se res habet cū qd' virtute
effici debet id tentatur pe-
cunia. Sed quoniam non
nūquā subsidium hoc ne-
cessariū est, quemadmodū
sit vtendū eo dicemus, si
prius ijs de rebus, quę vir-
tuti propriores sunt dixerī

And mus

de Officiis.

Atque etiam subiiciunt se homines imperio alterius & potestati pluribus de causis. Ducuntur enim aut beneuolentia, aut beneficiorum magnitudine, aut dignitatis prestantia, aut spe sibi id utile futurum, aut metu, ne vi parere cogantur, aut spe largitionis, promissionisque capti, aut prostremo. ut sepe in nostra Republica. videmus mercede conducti. Rerum autem omnium nec aptius est quicquam ad opes tuendas ac tenendas quam diligi, nec alienius, quam timeri.

Preclare enim Ennius, Quem metuunt oderunt, Quem quisque odit perisse expetit.

Multorum autem odium nullas opes posse obistere: si antea fuit ignotum, nuper est cognitum. Nec vero huius tyranni solum, quem armis oppressa

And likewise men make themselves subiecte to the rule & auctority of another for diuers causes.

For theye bee led eyther with good wil or greatnes of benefites, or excellencye of honour, or hope, it shall bee profitable to them, feare lest by power they be driuen to yeld: or as taken with hope of large gifts, and promyses: or at least, as wee see often in our common weale, euen hyred for mercede.

And certes of all thyngs neither is there anye sitter to mayntaine a power the to bee loued, neyther more vsfitter then to bee feared. Notably saith Ennius: Whom they feare, him they hate alway the more; whom any man hateth, he wissheth him lost.

But if afore it was unknowne, since alate it is well knowne, that no power can withstand the hatred of manye: And truly not onely the deathe of thys tyrant, whom & citye being oppressed & force of armes

armes did suffer, dothe de-
 clare how muche & hatred
 of men preails to destruc-
 tion: but the like ends of o-
 ther tiraunts doe shewe as
 much, of whome scarce any
 hath escaped the like death.
 For feare is an euil keeper
 of continuance: & contrary
 to it, goodwill is faythful
 yea for euer. But let a rou-
 ghenes hardely be vsed of
 the: who by rule doe keepe
 straight such as be brought
 vnder, by force, as of ma-
 sters ouer seruantes, yf
 they cannot otherwys be
 ruled. But whoe in a free
 state so order them selues,
 & they be feared, there can
 nothing possible bee made
 better then they bee. For al-
 though the lawes be sonke
 by some mans might: al-
 though libertie be al to sha-
 ken, yet at lengthe theye
 swimme out againe, eyther
 by secret iudgemēt, or by
 priuie voices in auaucing
 to honour: & certesse & strin-
 ges of ceased lybertie bee
 sharper, than of liberty con-
 tinued. Let vs thenne
 cm=

pertulit ciuitas, interitus
 declarat, quātū odiū homi-
 nū valet ad pestē: sed reli-
 quorū similes exitus tiran-
 norū, quorū haud ferēquit
 quā talē interitum effugit
 malus enim custos diutur-
 nitatis metus: contraque
 beneuolētia fidelis est, vel
 ad ppetuitatē. Sed ijs, qui
 vi oppressos imperio coer-
 cent, sit sanē adhibēda fæ-
 uitia, vt heris in famulos, si
 aliter teneri nō possūt. Qui
 verō in libera ciuitate ita
 se instruunt, vt metuantur
 his nihil potest esse demen-
 tius. Quāuis enim demerſę
 sint leges alicuius opibus,
 quamuis tremefacta liber-
 tas: emergunt tamen hæc
 aliquando aut iudicijs ta-
 citis, aut occultis de hono-
 re suffragijs. Acriores au-
 tem morsus sunt inter-
 missæ libertatis, quā
 retentæ. Quod igitur
 L.j. latissime

de Officijs.

latissimè patet neq; ad icolumitatè solū, sed etiā ad opes & potetiā valet plurimū, id amplectamur, vt met⁹ absit, charitas retineatur Ita facillimè quę volumus et priuatis in reb⁹ & in Re pub. cōsequemur. Etenim qui se metui volēt a quib⁹ metuuntur, eodē metuāt ipsi necesse est. Quid enim cēsemus superiorē illū Dionisiū, quo cruciatu timoris āgi solitum, qui cultros metuēs tōsorios cādētē carbone sibi adurebat capillum? Quid Alexādrū Phereum, quo animo vixissēar bitremur? qui (vt scriptum legimus) cū vxorē Theben admodum diligeret: tamen ad eā ex epulis ī cubiculum veniēs, barbarum & eum quidem (vt scriptum est) compunctum notis Threicijs districto gladio iudebat anteire:

embrace that, whiche most largely sprezabeth, and most auaileth not only to lasty, but also to welth & power: & feare bee banished, & loue retained. So mooste easelye we shal obtaine what wee desire, both in priuate matters, & in the cōmō welth. For who so will theselues to be had in feare, it muste nedes bee, & they themselues feare those sāt, of whō they bee feared. For what think we of the first Dionisius? & what tormēte of feare was he wōt to bee troubled: who fearing the barbars razars. & a redde hote cole singed off his owne bearde. what of Alexander & Pheraia: wyth what an hert, do we suppose, hee lyued: who (as we reede wyritten) when excedingly hee loued his wife Thebe: yet cōming to her from baketting into the chamber, hee commaunded a kerne, & him also (as it is wyttē) being pynted & Threacia markes, to goe befoze wyth a drawne sworde, and

and he sent of his garde a-
 foze, to ransacke the wo-
 mens cofers, & seeke, that
 no weapon were hidden in
 their garments. O misera-
 ble mā, who thought both
 a kerne, & an yron branded
 slaue faithfuller, than his
 wife. And his opinion dyd
 not deceiue him for by her
 he was slaine for a ielou-
 sie of spoulebreache. And
 truelye ther is no strength
 of Empire so great, which
 with suppressing by feare,
 can be long continuinge.
 witnes is phalaris, whose
 crueltie is famed aboue
 others, who perished not
 by treason, as this Alexā-
 der did. Whom euen nowe
 I spake of, nor by a fewe,
 as this our mā, but agāst
 him the whole commons of
 the Agregentines rose
 with violence, what the
 Macedonians, dyd there
 nor forsake Demetrius,
 and all whole gotte them
 to Pyrrhus, what the La-
 cedemonians ruling vn-
 ryghtfullie: dyd not
 welnye all their leag-
 frinds sodenly forsake the
 and

premittebatq' de stipatori
 suis, qui pscrutarētur ar-
 culas muliebres, et ne'qd'
 in vestimētis occultaretur
 telū, exquirerēt. O miserū,
 q̄ fideliorē & barbarum et
 stigmaticū putaret quā cō-
 iugē, nec eū sefellit opinio
 ab ea est enī ipse, ppter pel-
 licatus suspicionem iterfec-
 t⁹. Nec vero vlla vis impe-
 rij tanta est q̄ pment metu
 possit esse diuturna. Testis
 est Phalaris, cui⁹ est præter
 ceteros nobilitata crudeli-
 tas: q̄ nō ex insidijs interijt
 vt is, quem modo dixi, A-
 lexander, nō à paucis, vt
 hic noster, sed in quem v-
 niuersa Agrigentinarum
 multitudo impetum fecit.
 Quid Macedones? nonne
 Demetrium reliquerunt,
 vniuersiq; se ad Pyrrhum
 contulerunt? Quid Lace-
 demonios iniuste ito-
 rantes? nonne, ceciderūt,
 nes ferē. ij. specta-

de Officijs.

spectatoresq; se otiosos p-
 buerūt, Leuctrice calamita-
 tis. Externa libentius in ta-
 li re quàm domesticarecor-
 dor. Veruntamē quādiu
 imperiū popul. Roma. be-
 neficijs tenebatur, nō inui-
 rijs, bella aut pro socijs, aut
 de imperio gerebātur, exi-
 tus, erāt bellorū aut mites,
 aut necessarij: Regū: popu-
 lorū, nationū, portus erat
 & refugiū Senatus: nostri
 autē magistratus, imperato-
 resq; ex vna hac re maximā
 laudē capere studebant, si
 prouincias, si socios equita-
 te, & fide defendissēt. Itaq;
 illud patrociniū orbis ter-
 re verius quàm imperium
 poterat nominari. Sensim
 hanc consuetudinē & dis-
 ciplinam iam ātea minue-
 bamus: post vero Syllæ
 victoriā penit⁹ amisimus.
 Quesitū est enī videri quic-
 extitit socios iniquum, cū
 in ciuestā-

& shewed themselues idle
 lookers on of y ouerthrowe
 at Leuctra: For eie exam-
 ples gladlier, than home
 dedes I reherse, in such a
 case. Neuertheles as longe
 as the empire of the people
 of Rome was vpholdē by
 worthy actes, not by word-
 ges doing, & warres were
 made, epyther for defence of
 leagfrendes, or for empire,
 then weare the endes of
 warres, epyther merciful or
 necessary. the Senate was
 the hauē and refuge of
 kinges, of peoples, of naci-
 ons. And our magistrates,
 and caprayng endeouored to
 get great praise. by this on-
 ly meane, if prouynces, &
 leagfrendes, in righte, and
 trueth, they had defended.
 Therfore it might haue bē
 named the protectiō more
 truly, thā the empire of the
 worlde. By little and little
 we abated this custome, &
 orde, somewhat afoze, but
 after Syllaes victorie, vt-
 terly wee losse it. For men
 ceased to accōpt any thing
 vnrasonable to ward leag
 frēds, whē so great cruelty
 was

was shewed euen against
citizens. Therefore ther fo
lowed in him of an honest
quarrel an vnhonest victoꝝy
foꝝ whē ſaleſtaffe was
pighte & in ſ market place
he ſold the goodes both of
good mē & riche, & thoſe e-
uen citiꝝes. he was ſo bolde
to ſay ſ he made ſale of his
lawful bootie. One ſucce-
ded, who in a wicked cauſe
& a moꝝe ſhameful victoꝝy
not onely put the goods of
euery one of the citiꝝes to
open ſale, but in one ſtate of
miſery enſwapped hole p-
uinces, & regions, & ſo fo-
rein nations beeing vexed,
& vndone, we ſaw Maſſi-
lia boꝝne about in triumph
foꝝ a ſheꝝs of our Empire
loſt, & triumphe made ouer
ſ citie, about whiche oure
capteines of warres neuer
got any triũph, beyond the
alpes. I could reherſe ma-
ny mo curred deedes beſide
done againſt our leag frē-
des, if the ſonne had ſcene
ought, moꝝe haynous, than
this one. Juſtlye therefore
ar we ſcoꝝged: foꝝ had we
not ſuffered ſ wickedneſſe

L. iij.

ta crudelitas. Ergo in illo
ſecuta eſt honeſtā cauſam
nō honeſta victoria. Eſt e-
nim auſus dicere haſta po-
ſita cū bona in foro vēde-
ret, & bonorū virorū & lo-
cupletū, & certē ciuiū pꝛe-
dā ſe ſuā vēdere. Secut' eſt
qui in cauſa impia. victoria
etiā ſœdiore, nō ſolū ſingu-
lorum ciuiū bona publica-
ret, ſed vniuerſas quoq; p-
uincias, regionesq; vno ca-
lamitatis genere cōpꝛehen-
deret. Itaque vexatis, ac p-
ditis exteris nationibus, ad
exēplū amiſſi imperij, por-
tare in triumpho Maſſiliā
vidimus & ex ea vrbe tri-
ũphari, ſine qua nūquā no-
ſtri imperatores extrāſalpi-
nis bellis triũpharūt. Mul-
ta pꝛeterea cōmemorarem
nefaria in ſocios: ſi hoc v-
no Sol quicquā vidiffet in
dignius. Iure igitur plecti-
mur. Niſi enim multorum
ipunita ſcelera tuliffimus

de officijs.

nunquam ad vnum tanta of many to be vnponished,
 puenisset licentia : a quo such a lawlesse libertie had
 quidem rei familiaris ad neuer come to the hands of
 paucos , cupiditatum ad one, from whom sothlye the
 multos improbos venit he inheritance of his goodes
 reditas . Nec verò vn came to seiw, but of his gre
 quam bellorum ciuiliu by desires, to many naugh
 semen & causa deerit, dum tye mence. For truely the
 homini perditu hastam il seede, and cause of cyuile
 lam cruentam & memine warres shal euer laste, as
 rint & sperabunt, quam P. longe as mischeuous men
 Sylla cum vibrasset dicta shal both remember , and
 tore propinquo suo, idem hope after that bloody sale
 sexto & tricesimo auno staffe, which when Publi
 post à sceleratiore hasta us Sylla hadde shaken,
 adem non recessit . Alter his nye kinselman beeing
 autem qui in illa dictatus Dictator, the same stepte
 ra scriba fuerat, in hec fu not once backe from the
 it questor vrbanus . Ex shaking of alphe more mis
 quo debet intelligi , tali cheuous staffe, the sixt and
 bus præmijs ppositis nun thirtieth yere after. But
 quam defutura bella ciui other, who in the Dictator
 lia . Itaque parietes vr had bene secretarpe, in this
 bis modo stant & manent, was Tresurer for the city
 ijq; ipsi iam extrema sce wherupon ought too bee
 ra metuètes. Ré vero pu vnderstanded, that whyle
 blicam penitus amisimus. such bootyes be layed afoze
 men, ciuill warres shal ne
 uer want. And so, only the
 walles of the citie do stand
 and remaine, yea and those
 same enē now dzedig their
 last mischiese, but the comō
 sweale we haue utterly lost

And

and into these destructions
we are false (for we muste
returne too oure purpose)
while we hadde rather too
be feared, than to be deare,
and welbeloued. If al this
coude befall too the people
of Rome, rulinge vnrighte
fullye: what oughte euerye
free man to thinke: whiche
thinge sith it is euident, that
the power of good will ys
greate, of feare slender, it
folowes, that we make dis-
course, by what meanes
we may sonest with hono-
r and vprightnes, attaine
loue, which we desire.

But al wee do not alwey
stand in neede of the same.
For to the tradinge of eche
mans life it must be appli-
ed whether it be needefull,
of many or sufficiēt, of few
to be loued. Lette thys
therefore be certayne, as
thing, which is both princi-
pal, and most necessarye to
haue faithfull familiarities
of frendes, louinge vs, and
hyghly esteeming oure ver-
tues. For this is the onely
meane in dede that ther be
not muche difference be-
tweene great, & meane men
and

Atq; in has clades incidi-
mus (redeūdū est enim ad
propositum) dum metui,
quā chari esse, & diligi
maluimus. Quē si populo
Romano iniuste imperati
accidere potuerūt, quid de
bēt putare singuli? Quod
cū pspicuum sit beneuo-
lētiē vim esse magnam, me-
tus imbecillē, sequitur vt
differamus, quibus reb⁹ fa-
cillimē possimus eam quā
volumus, adipisci cum ho-
nore et fide charitatē. Sed
ea nō pariter ōnes egemus
Nam ad cuiusq; vitā insti-
tuendā accōmodādum est
ā multis ne opus sit, an fa-
tis sit a paucis diligi. Cer-
tum igitur hoc sit, idq; &
primū et maximē necessa-
riū, familiaritates habere si-
das amātium nos amicorū
& nostra miratiū. Hæc enī
est vna res prorsus, vt non
differat multum inter sū-
mos & mediocres viros :

de officijs.

eaq; est vtriq; propemodū
 cōparanda. Honore & glo
 ria & beneuolētia ciuium
 fortasse nō æque omnes e
 gēt: sed tamē si cui hęc sup
 petūt, adiuuāt aliquātū cū
 ad cetera, tum ad amicitias
 cōparādas. Sed de amicitia
 alio libro dictum est, qui in
 scribitur Lælius. Nunc di
 camus de gloria, quanquā
 ea quoq; de re nostri libri
 duo sūt. Sed attingamus,
 quandoquidē ea in rebus
 maiorib; administrādis ad
 iuuat plurimū. Sūma igitur
 & pfecta gloria cōstat
 ex tribus his. Si diligit mul
 tudo, si fidē habet, si cum
 admiratione quadā hono
 re nos dignos putat. Hęc
 autē (si est simpliciter bre
 uiterq; dicēdū) quibus re
 bus pariuntur ā singulis,
 eisdem ferē a multitudine.
 Sed est alius quoq; quidam
 aditus ad multitudinē, vt

& it muste be procured, in a
 manner of thē both. Not al
 perchance do stande in like
 neede of honoure, & glory, &
 citizens good wils: but yet
 who so hath thē they fur
 der somewhat both to other
 things, and also to the pur
 chasing of frendships. But
 of frendship we haue spokē
 in the booke, which is enty
 led Lælius: now we let vs
 speak of glory though of
 matter also there bee two
 bookes of oures, yet let vs
 touche it, beecause the same
 auayleth much, in executig
 of greater matters.
 The hig best therfor, & pfit
 glory stādeth of these thre
 if the multitude fauour vs
 if they haue a trust in vs,
 if with a certaine admirati
 on they cōpt vs worthy of
 honour. And if wee muste
 speake it plainely, & briefly
 as these be gottē at y hāds
 of euery free mā, by y same
 means in a manner theye be
 obtained of the multitude.
 But there is also a cer
 taine other enteraince in
 to the multitude, that wee
 may

may (as ye shold say) flow
 into y^e hertes of the whole
 And first let vs se touchig
 those thre, whiche beefore
 I called the preceptes of
 good wil, & which no dout
 is caught most of al by be-
 nefites. And secundarylye,
 good wyll is alured by a
 wel willing mind, althou-
 gh perhaps abilitie suffy-
 seth not. But wonderously
 y^e loue of the multitude ys
 al to stirred wth the fame, &
 opinion of liberalitie, bon-
 teousnes, iustice, saytheful-
 nes, & of al those vertues,
 whiche appertaine too the
 mildnes of maners & gentle-
 nes. For y^e very same, whi-
 che wee name comely & ho-
 nest, because of it selfe it ly-
 keth vs, & wth his owne na-
 ture, & beauty mooueth all
 our minds, & principallye
 shineth (as it were) out of
 those vertues, whiche I
 haue reherfed, therefore by
 very nature wee are enfor-
 ced to fauoure them, in
 whom wee thynke those
 vertues too bee. And these
 be the causes of fauourynge,
 for other moe lygheter
 there=

in vniuersorū animos tan-
 quā influere possimus. At
 primū de illis tribus, quæ
 ante dixi, beneuolētię pcep-
 ta videamus. quę quidē be-
 neficiis capitur maximē. Se-
 cundo autē loco beneficia
 volūtatē, beneuolētia mo-
 uetur, etiā si res fortē non
 suppetit. Vehemēter autē
 amor multitudines cōmo-
 uetur ipsa fama & opiniōe
 liberalitatis, beneficētię, iu-
 stitię fidei omniūq; earū vir-
 tutū, quę ptinēt ad mansue-
 tudinē morū ac facilitatē.
 Etenī illud ipsū, quod de-
 corū honestūq; dicimus,
 quia p se nobis placet, ani-
 mosq; omniū natura et spe-
 cie sua cōmouet, maximēq;
 quasi plucet ex ijs, quas cō-
 memorauī, virtutibus: id-
 circo illis, in quibus eas vir-
 tutes esse remur, ā natura
 ipsa diligere cogimur. Atq;
 hę quidē causę sunt diligē-
 di grauissimę. Possiunt
 enim preterea nonnullę:

de Officiis.

esse leuiiores. Fides autē vt
habeatur, duabus reb⁹ effi
ci potest: si existimabimur
adepti coniunctā cum iu
stitia prudētiā. Nā & ijs fi
dem habemus, quos plus
intelligere quam nos arbi
tramur: quosq; & futura
p̄spicere credimus & cūm
res agatur, in discrimenq;
vētū sit, expedire rē, & cōsi
liū ex tēpore capere posse.
Hanc enim ōnes existimāt
vtilē veramq; prudentiam
Iustis autē & fidis homini
bus, id est. viris bonis ita fi
des habetur, vt nulla sit in
his fraudis iniurięq; suspi
cio. Itaq; his salutē nostrā,
his fortunas, his liberos rec
tissimē cōmitti arbitramur
Harū igitur duarū ad fidē
faciendā iustitia plus pol
let. Quippe cū ea sine pru
dentia satis habeat autho
ritatis: prudentia sine iusti
tia nihil valet ad faciendā fi
dē. Quo enī quis versatior

there may be beside. But
that a trust may bee had in
vs, by two thinges it may
be brought to passe: if wee
shal bee thought to haue at
tained prudence toynded w
Iustice. For both to them
we haue a trust, whom we
suppose to vnderstand more
than oure selues: & also too
them, who we beleue, bee
able both to foresee thinges
to come & also to dyspache
thy busines, & forthewyth
to take counsaill when the
matter is in hande. & stands
in hazarde. For all men do
iudge this the profitable,
and true prudence. But in
suche wise credite is geuen
to iust, & trustye men (that
is) to good men: & in them
there is no suspicion of de
ceit, & iniurie. Therefore to
these our life, to these oure
goods, to these our childre
we suppose very well to be
committed. Of these twoo
then iustice is of more po
wer to win a credit, because
it without prudence hath
sufficente authoritie, pru
dence without iustice is no
thinge woorthye to gette
credite. For the subtyler,
and

and the craftier that a man
 is: so much the more hee is
 hated, and suspected, when
 the opinion of his honestie
 is pulled aswape. wherefore
 iustice ioined wpyth vnder-
 stāding, shal haue as much
 power as it list, to purcha-
 se credite, iustice without
 prudence shal bee of muche
 power, prudence wout ius-
 tice shal be nothinge worty.
 But lest sōe mā haue mar-
 uelle: seeing amōgst al phi-
 losophers it is playne & by
 my selfe disputed oftē: him
 that shoulde haue one ver-
 tue, to haue al the vertues
 why I doe now sonder thē
 so, as though there may a-
 ny mā be iust, whiche same
 is not prudēt, of one sort is
 that subtilenesse, when very
 troth is leueled in disputa-
 tion, & of another sorte ys
 that talke, when it is al ap-
 plied to the cōmon opinion
 wherefore we speake so in
 this place, as the common
 sort doe. & we cal some one
 sort māly, some other good
 mē. sōe other prudent. For
 the peoples wordes, & v-
 sual termes, we must treat
 when

& callidior est, hoc inuisi-
 or & suspectior detracta
 opinione pbitatis. Quam-
 obrē intelligentiæ iustitia
 coniuncta quantum volet
 habebit ad faciendam fidē
 virium. Iustitia sine prudē
 tia multum poterit, sine iu-
 stitia nihil valebit pruden-
 tia. Sed ne quis sit admira-
 tus, cur cū inter omnes
 philosophos cōstet, ā meq;
 ipso sepe disputatū sit, quī
 vnā haberet, ōnes habere
 virtutes: nunc ita seiungā
 quasi possit quisquam qui
 non idem prudens sit iust⁹
 esse. Alia est illa, cū veritas
 ipsa limatur, in disputatiōe
 subtilitas, alia cū ad opini-
 onē cōmunem ōnis accom-
 modatur oratio. Quamo-
 brē vt vulgus, ita nos hoc
 loco loquimur, vt alios for-
 tes, alios bonos viros a-
 lios prudentes esse dicam⁹
 Popularibus enim verbis
 est agendum & vſitatis,

de Officiis.

cū loquamur de opinione populari: idq; eodē modo fecit Paneti^o. Sed ad ppo si tū reuertamur. Erat igitur ex trib⁹ quæ ad gloriā pptererēt hoc tertiū, vt cū admiratione hominū honore ab his digni iudicamur. Admiratur igitur cōmuniter illi quidē omnia, q̄ magna & preter opinionē suā anīaduertūt, separatim autē ī singulis, si pspiciunt nec opinata qdē bona. Ita q; eos viros suspiciāt, maximiq; efferunt laudibus in quibus existimāt se excellentes quasdā et singulares virtutes pspicere. Despiciūt autē eos & cōtēnūt, in quib⁹ nihil virtutis, nihil a nimi, nihil neruorū putāt. Nō enim ōnes eos cōtēnūt de quibus malē existimāt. Nam quos improbos, maleficos, fraudulentos, putant, & ad faciendam iniuriā instructos, eos haud cōtemnunt quidem

whē we speak of ꝑ cōmon peoplez opiniō. & ꝑ did Da netius after the same sorte But to the purpose let vs returne. Of the thzee therfore whiche shoulde appertaine to glozpe, this was the thirde ꝑ & admiration of men. wee might by them be thought woorthy of honour. Generally then theye haue in admiration doubtlesse al thinges, whiche they haue noted to bee greate, & beyond their swening, & seuerally in euerye free man, if they p̄sirely see good thinges vnloked for. Therefore they honour these men, & w highest praises set them aloft: in whō they think the selues to bee holde certayne passing & singular vertues But those theye despise, & set at nought: in whom no vertue, no courage, no strength. they iudge. For al men do not despise the. of whom they thinke euill. For whō theye deeme dishonest, misreportes, gilefull, & readye framed to do wrong, those theye despise not certesse, but

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but of the they thynk euill
 wherfore (as I said afoze)
 they be despised: who ney-
 ther to them selues, nor to
 other do good, as they say
 in whom ther is no payne
 fulnes no diligence, no ca-
 ryng but they bee reueren-
 ced & a certeyn admiraciō
 who are thought to go be-
 fore others in vertue, & to
 be about both al vnsemy-
 nes, and also those vyces
 which other cā not easelye
 stand for bothe pleasures,
 ful flattering daimes, do of-
 tentimes wrestle & greater
 part of the mind from ver-
 tue, & also when the brāds
 of paines be laide vnto the
 most men beyond measure
 bee all to frayd. Life, death
 riches, pouertie, most migh-
 tilie moue al manne. which
 thynges whoe so on eyther
 side, with a lofty, & greate
 courage do despise & when
 beefore them is offered
 anye goodlye, and honest
 thyng, it turnethe & halethe
 them whole to it selfe, then
 who doth not maruel at &
 brightnes, and beautye of
 vertu: Therfore both this
 despy-

sed de his male existiment
 Quāobré (vt ante dixi) cō-
 tēnūtur ij, qui nec sibi nec
 alteri p̄sunt (vt dicitur) in
 quibus nullus labor, nulla
 industria, nullacura est. Ad
 miratiōe quadā verō affici-
 untur ij, qui anteire cete-
 ris virtute putātur: Et cū
 ōni carere dedecore, tū ve-
 rō ijs vitijs quib⁹ alij nō fa-
 cile possūt obfistere. Nā &
 voluptates blādissimę ido-
 minę sepe maiores partes
 animi a virtute detorquēt
 & dolorū cū admoventur
 faces prēter modū pleriq;
 exterrētur. Vita, mors, diui-
 tię, paupertas ōnes homines
 vehemētissimē pmouent.
 Quę qui in vtrāq; partē ex-
 celso animo, magnosq; des-
 piciūt, cūq; aliqua his āpla
 & honesta res obiecta est,
 totos ad se cōuertit, & ra-
 pit: tū quis non admiretur
 splendorē, pulcritudinem
 quę virtutis? Ergo & hæc
 animi

de Officiis

animi despiciētia admirabilat' magnā facit: & maxime iustitia, ex qua vna virtute viri boni eppellantur mirifica quēdā res multitudini videtur nec iniuria. Nemo enim iustus esse potest, quā mortē, qui dolorē, qui exiliū qui egestatē timet, aut qui ea quę his sūt cōtrariā, equitati āteponit. Maximē q; admirantur eū, qui pecunia non mouetur: quod in quo viro p̄spectum sit, hūc dignū spectatu arbitratur. Itaq; illa tria, quę p̄posita sūt ad gloriā, omnia iustitia conficit, et beneuolentia, quōd prodesse vult plurimis: & ob eandem causā fidem, et admirationē habet, quōd eas res spernit et negligit, ad quas pleriq; in flammati auiditate rapiuntur. Ac mea quidem sententia, omnis ratio et institutio vitę adiumenta hominum desiderat. In primisq; vt habeas, quibus

dispying mynd causethe a great wōderīg & speciall ye iustice of whiche vertue alone good mē be named semeth to þ multitude a wōderful thing, & not without cause. For none can be iust who dzeadeth death, paine, banishmēt or pouertie, nor anye þ befoze equitie p̄ferreth the cōtraries. And most of al, they wonder at him, who is not tēpted w money, & in what man that is wel tried, him thik they woorth to be regarded. Therefore iustice dothe woork al these thze. which be pointed out for glozpe, & gettes good will also, because it meanes to p̄ofyte verpe many, & for the same cause, it woorkethe credite likewise, and admiration, because it despisseth, & nought regardeth those things wherunto moste men are kindled w greedines be haled. And surelpe after mye iudgement, euery trade, & order of life requireth the aides of menne: and chieflye that yee haue some, wpyth whom you maye debate in familiar talk: whiche

which is harde onlesse yee
 bere vpon you the shew of
 an honest man. Therefore
 opinion of iustice is neces-
 sarie euen to y alone yuer
 & one y leades his life in y
 fieldes, yea and so much y
 moze, because if theye haue
 it not, vniust they shall bee
 compted, & being garded w
 no defēce shall bee vexed w
 many iniuries. And to thes
 also, who do sell, buy, hyze,
 lette, and bee entangled in
 bargaining, busines, iustice
 to goe thozow with theire
 matters, is necessarye
 whose power is so greate:
 that euen they, who bee fed
 with euil doinge, and mys-
 chiefe, can not possible lyue
 without some parcel of ius-
 tice. For who stealeth, or
 pryauely picketh anye thyng
 from any of them, & who
 he goeth a theuving, he lea-
 ueth not himselfe a place,
 no not in robberie. And on
 lesse hee, whoe is named
 the archepirate, deuyde
 the pryse egallye, eyther
 hee shall bee slayne of hys
 mates, or els forsaaken.

yea

cū possis familiares cōferre
 sermones: quod est diffici-
 le, nisi speciē prę te boni vi-
 ri feras. Ergo etiā solitario
 homini, atq; in agro vitā a-
 gēti opinio iustitię necessa-
 ria est, eōq; etiā magis, qd
 si eā nō habebūt, iniusti ha-
 bebūtur: & nullis pręsidiis
 septi multis afficiētur iniu-
 riis. Atq; his etiā qui vēdūt
 emunt, cōducunt, locāt cō-
 trahendisq; negotiis impli-
 cantur, iusticia ad rē geren-
 dā necessaria est. Cuius tā-
 ta vis est, vt nec illi quidē
 qui maleficio & scelere pas-
 cūtur, possint sine vlla par-
 tícula iusticię viuere. Nam
 qui eorū cuipiā qui vnā la-
 trocinātur, furatur aliquid
 aut eripit, is sibi ne in latro-
 cinio quidē relinquit locū.
 Ille autē, qui archipirata di-
 citur: nisi equabiliter prę-
 dā dispartiat, aut occiditur
 à sociis, aut relinquitur.

Quin

de Officiis

Quā etiā leges latroñ esse dicūtur quib⁹ pareāt, quas obseruēt. Itaq; ppter equa bilē prædē partiitiōē et Bar gul⁹ Illiricus latro (de quo est apud Theopōpū) mag nas opes habuit: & multo maiores Viriatus Lucitan⁹ cui quidē etiā exercit⁹ no stri, imperatoresque cesse runt: quē C. Lēlius, is qui sapiēs vsurpatur, prætorfre git, & cōminuit, fœrocita tēq; eius ita repressit, vt fa cile bellum reliquis trade ret. Cū igitur tanta vis iustitię sit, vtea etiam latro num opes firmet, atq; auge at: quantam eius vim inter leges, & iuditia, & institu ta Reip. fore putamus? Mi hi quidem non apud Me dos solum (vt ait Herodo tus) sed etiam apud maio res nostros iustitię seruan dæ causā vidētur olim be ne morari reges cōstituti:

yea & it is sayd ther are la wes among theenes, wher to they obey, & doo obserue them. And so by reason of the euen portioning of the prise, both Bargulus, the Illirian robber, of whom mencion is made in Theo pōpus had greate rycheffe: & much greater had Viri atus the Lusitane, to whō of trouthe euē our armyes, and captaynes gaue place, whō Caius Lelius, hee & was commonly called the wise, being Pretor, did dis cōfite, & abate, & so alayde his fierlenes, & hee left an easly swarre to other. Seig then the strength of iustice is so great: & it also stabli sheth, & encreased robbers riches. how greate suppose we the power therof to be amonge lawes and indge ments, & ozdinaunces of a cōmon weale? Certesse we think, not only among the Medes (as telleth Hero do tus) but also amonge our aunceters, in old time, well condicioned kynges haue been ozderyed, for & ende of empyng iustice.

for at the beginning, whē the multitude was oppressed by thē, who had & greater power: for refuge they fledde to some one excellent in vertue, who when he saued the weaker from iniurie, by painting out an equitie, kept the highest & the lowest in difference of lawe.

And the like cause there was of making lawes as of kynges: for euermoze an egal right hath ben sought for otherwile it were not a right.

If they obtained & same at the handes of one iuste, and good man, wyth hym they were contented: when that chaunced not, lawes were deuised: which wyth al men alwaies in one, and a like voice shou'd speake. wherefoze this is doubtlesse a cleare case: that they were wont to be chosen to governe: of whose iustice & oppinion of the multytude was great. And this there to adioyned, that they also might bee compted wyse: there

Nam cū premeretur initio multitudo ab ijs q̄ maiores opes habetant, ad vñ aliquē cōfugiebant virtute prestantem, qui cū p̄hiberet iniuria tenuiores, equitate constituenda, sumos cum infimis pari iure retinebat. Eademq; constitutendarū legum fuit causa, quę regū. Ius enim semper est quęsitum equabile neq; enim aliter esset ius.

Id si ab vno bono & iusto viro consequebantur: eo erant cōtenti: Cū id minus contingeret: leges sūt inuentę, quę cum omnib; semp vna atq; eadem voce loquerentur. Ergo hoc quidem perspicuum est, eos ad imperandum deligi solitos, quorum de iustitia magna esset oppinio multitudinis. Adiuñcto vero hoc, vt iidem etiam prudentes haberētur:

de Officiis.

nihil erat qd' homines his
autoribus non posse cōse-
qui se arbitrarentur Omni
igitur ratiōe colenda & re-
tinenda iustitia est, tū ipsa
propter se (nam aliter iusti-
tia nō esset) tū ppter am-
plificationē honoris et glo-
riē. Sed vt pecuniē nō quæ-
rendæ solū ratio est, verū
etiā collocandę, quę perpe-
tuos sūpt' suppeditat, nec
solū necessarios, sed etiam
liberales: sic gloria & que-
renda & collocanda rati-
one est.

Quāquā præclarē Socra-
tes, hanc viā ad gloriā pxi-
mam & quasi compendia-
riam dicebat esse si quis id
ageret, vt qualis haberi vel-
let talis esset. Quod si quis
simulatione, & inani ostē-
tatione & ficto nō modō
sermone sed etiam vultu
stabilem se gloriam con-
sequi posse rentur, vehē-
menter errant.

there was nothing, & men
vnder those guydes should
seeke themselves vnable
to attayne. Justice there-
fore is by al maner means
to be regarded, & maintai-
ned: both it for it selfe sake
(for els it were not iustit)
& also for the enlargement of
honor & gloze. But as ther
is a way not onely of get-
ting money, but also of be-
stowing it, which may suf-
fice for continual charges,
not only such as be necessa-
rie, but also liberal, so glo-
rie must be bothe gotten, &
ordered by a meane.

Notwithstandinge nota-
blye Socrates dyd saye,
this to bee the nearest, and
(as it were) the gain way
to gloze, if a man would
endeuoure this, to bee in
deede suche as hee would
be compted.

And if anye doe deeme
themselves able to attayne
stedfast gloze, by false pre-
tence, and vaine outshew,
both with fayned speache
and countenance, they be
farre out of the way.

The

The true glorie taketh
deepe roote, & also shooteth
abroade, al counterfet things
do soone shedde, as do the
little flowers: neither can
there anye forged thing be
durable. witnesses verry
manye there bee on bothe
sydes: but for shortnesse
sake, wee wil be contented
with one family.

For Tyberius Gracchus
& Publius sonne so lōg shall
be praised, as remembraunce
of the Romaine state shall
stande.

But his sonnes neyther
liuinge were lyked of good
menne, and did goe in that
number of men rightfullpe
put to death. Let them thā
who so the true glorie wil
attaine, perfourme the dui-
ties of iustice. What those
were. it was tolde in the
former booke. But to the
ende that soone we maye
seeme suche manner menne
as wee bee: althoughe the
greatest effecte is euen in
this point, that we be suche
as wee woulde bee comp-
ted: yet certeine preceptes
are to be geuen.

For

Vera gloria radices agit
atq; etiā propagatur: ficta
omnia celeriter tanquā
flosculi decidunt: nec si-
mulatum potest quicquā
esse diuturnū. Testes sunt
permulti in vtrāq; par-
tem, sed breuitatis causa,
familia contenti erimus
vna. Tibi enim Gracchus
Publij filius, tam diu lauda-
bitur, dum memoria rerū
Romanarum manebit. At
eius filij nec uiui probabā-
tur a bonis & mortui nu-
merum obtinent iure cā-
forum. Qui igitur adipisci
veram iustitiæ gloriam vo-
let, iustitiæ fungatur offi-
cijs: ea quę essent, dictum
est in superiore libro. Sed
vt facilius quales simus,
tales esse videamur (& si
in eo ipso vis maxima est,
vt simus ij, qui haberi ve-
limus) tamen quedam præ-
cepta danda sunt.

M.ij.

de Officiis.

Ná si quis ab ineunte ætate
habet causã celebritatis &
nominis aut a patre accep-
tã (qd' tibi mi Cicero arbi-
tror cõtigisse) aut aliquo
casu atq; fortuna in hũc o-
culi omniũ cõijciũtur, atq;
in eũ quid agat, quẽadmo-
dũ viuatur inquiritur & tan-
quam i clarissima luce ver-
setur, ita vt nullũ obscurũ
potest nec dictũ eius esse,
nec factũ. Quorũ autẽ pri-
ma ætas ppter humilitatẽ
& obscuritatẽ in hominũ
ignoratione versatur, hi si
mul ac iuuenes esse cœpe-
runt, magna spectare, &
ad ea rectis studijs debent
cõtẽdere. Quod eõ firmio-
re animo facient quia non
modo non inuidetur illi æ-
tati, verũ etiã fauetur. Pri-
ma igitur est adolēscenti
commendatio ad gloriam
si qua ex bollicis rebus cõ-
parari potest, in qua multi
apud maiores nostros ex-
titerunt. Semp. n. ferẽ

For if any frõ his first en-
tered age hath cause of nãe,
and fame: eyther receiued
of his father, which to you
my Cicero, I suppose to
haue happened, or by any
chance & fortune: on him
all mennes eyes are cast: &
of him there is searchinge,
what he doth, & how he ly-
ueth: and so, as though he
should lead his life in most
open light, nother woord
nor deede of his can be vn-
known.

But whose first age is pas-
sed without mens knowe-
ledge by reason of basenes,
& vnknown name: these,
as sone as they begin to be
yongmen, ought to loke af-
ter great thigs: & to prease
vnto y same & directe stu-
dies. which they shal do so
much the better courage
because the age is not only
not enuied, but also fauou-
red. The chiefe sett ig forth
then for a yong manne to
gloze is, if any praise may
bee gotten by feates of ar-
mes, wherein manye haue
shewed them selues, &
monge our auncesters, for
warres were almost cõt-
nually

nually kept. But your age bella gerebantur. Tua au-
 chaunced vpon that warre tem ætas incidit in id bel-
 where the one side had too lū, cuius altera pars sceleris
 much mischiefe, the other nimium habuit, altera fe-
 little good fortune. In licitatis parum. Quo tamē
 which warre yet, whē Dō in bello cum te Pompei-
 peius had made you Cap- us aq̃ alteri præfecisset,
 taine of ʒ one winge, bothe magnam laudem & a sum-
 of a man most noble, & of ʒ mo viro & ab exercitu cō-
 army, you got great prayse sequebare equitando, ia-
 with riding, & throwinge culando, omniaq̃ue mili-
 the dart, and sustainyng tari labore tolerando-
 all thinges withe a souldy- Atq; ea quidem tua laus
 ourlyke painefulnes. And pariter cum Rep. cecidit.
 verely that your praise, & Mihi autem hæc oratio
 the common weale fell to- suscepta non de te est, sed
 gither. But of me this tre- de genere toto. Quamob-
 tise is not taken in hande rem ad ea, quæ restant,
 touching you but touching pergamus.
 the whole generalitie. Vt igitur in reliquis rebus
 wherefore let vs goe for- multa maiora sunt opera
 ward to such thinges as do animi quàm corporis, sic
 remaine. hæres quas persequimur
 As then in other matters, ingenio ac ratione, gratio-
 the workes of the mynde res sunt quàm ille, quas vi-
 be much moze, than of the ribus. prima igitur com-
 bodye, so those thinges, mendatio, proficiscitur
 which with witt, & reason duitye a modestia, tum pietate
 we go through, be of moze M.iiij.

The first commendation
 then proceedethe of sober
 moode, the next of natural
 duitye a modestia, tum pietate
 M.iiij.

de Officiis.

in parentes , tum in suos beneuolentia.

Facillimè autem & in optimam partem cognoscuntur adolescentes, qui se ad claros et sapientes viros bene cōsulententes Reipub. contulerunt : quibus cum si frequentes sunt opinionem afferunt populo eorum fore se similes quos si bi ipsi delegerūt ad imitandum. Publij Rutilij adolescentiam ad opinionem & innocentiae & iuris scientiae P. Mutij commendauit domus.

Nam L. quidem Crassus, cum esset admodū, adolescens, nō aliunde mutuatus est : sed sibi ipse peperit maximam laudem ex illa accusatione nobili et gloriosa.

Ex qua etate qui exercēt, laudib⁹ affici solēt vt Demosthenē accepim⁹. Ea ætate Lu. Crassus ostendit.

duitye toward parentes: & thirde of good wil towarde theirs.

But to the best commendation, yongmen bee knowne sonest of al: who haue bestowed them selues vnder noble and wise menne, wel counselling & cōmon weal: on whom if they be attendant, they bring the people in belief & theye wil proue lyke them, whom theye haue chosen themselves to folowe. Publius Mutius house did set oute Publius Rutilius youthstrate, for opinion both of harmelesse life, and of knowledge in lawe.

For as for Lutus Crass⁹ when he was a very yong man, he borrowed not from any other place, but from himself a very great praise by that noble, and glorious accusation.

And in which age theye who haue exercyses, are wonte too bee aduanced with the praise as wee haue heard by Demosthenes: in the same age Lucius Crassus, dyd shewe hym selfe
in

in opē court, to do that be- id se in foro optime iam
ry wel, hauing fore studied p̄meditatū facere qd' e-
which euen then at home, tīa tum poterat domi cum
with praise he might haue exercisē.

But whereas ther be two duplex ratio sit orationis,
foztes of speach, wherof in quarum in altera sit sermo
the one is familiar talke in in altera cōtentio: non: est
the other vehemence it p̄ id quidē dubiū, quin cōtē-
no doubt, but ȳ vehemēce tio orationis plurimū pos-
of speach may do most, and sit & maiorem vim habeat
hath the greater furdēce ad gloriā. Ea est enim, quā
to glōrye.

Foz that is ȳ thing whēch we do call eloquencei, but eloquētiā dicimus. Sed ta-
pet it is harde to tell, howe mē difficile dictū est, quā-
much a gentleness, and fa- toperē cōciliēt animos ho-
miliarsnes of speache wyn- minū comitas, affabilitas-
neth mens mindes.

There be letters abroad que sermonis. Extant epi-
of Philippus too Alexan- stolæ & Philippi ad Alex-
der, and of Antipater to andrū & Antipatri ad Caf-
Cassander, and of Anti- sandrum, & Antigoni ad
gonus to Philippus, three Philippum filium, trium
very wysemen (foz so wee prudentissimorum (sic e-
haue heard) in which they nim accepimus) quibus
giue rules, that withe gen- prācipiunt vt oratione be-
tle speache they allure the nigna multitudinis ani-
heartes of the multytude, mos ad beneuolentiam al-
too owe theyze good will liciāt: militesq; blando ap-
and that they please theyze pellādo sermone deliniāt.
souldpours by speakinge
too them wythe sayre wor-
des.

But

M.iiij.

de Officiis.

Quæ autē in multitudine
 cum contentione habetur
 oratio, ea sēpe vniuersam
 excitat gloriā. Magna est
 enim admiratio copiosē
 sapienterq; dicentis: quem
 qui audiūt, intelligere etiā
 & sapere plus quā ceteros
 arbitrantur. Si vero inest
 ī oratione mixta modestiē
 grauitas: nil admirabilius
 fieri potest. eoq; magis si
 ea sunt in adolefcēte. Sed
 cū sint plurima causarū
 genera, que eloquentiā de
 siderant: multiq; in nostra
 Repu. adolefcentes & a-
 pud iudices & apud Sena-
 tū dicendo laudē assecuti
 sūt: maxima est admiratio
 in iudicijs. Quorum ratio
 duplex est. Nam ex accusa-
 tione & defensione con-
 stat, quarū etsi laudabilior
 est defēsiō, tamē etiā accu-
 satio probata p̄sape est.
 Dixi paulō āte de Crasso.
 Idem fecit adolefcens

But that oration, whiche
 is made amonge the multi-
 tude with the vehemence oftē
 times raiseth an vniuersal
 glorie. For greate is y^e wō-
 dermēt at him, y^e plentiful-
 ly, and wisely speakethe:
 whom y^e hearers doe iudge
 also too vnderstand more,
 and to be wisser, than other
 And if in the oracion there
 be grauenes mingled with
 sober moode: nothing there
 can be done more wonder-
 full: & so muche the more if
 those be in a yong man.
 But wheras ther be very
 manye kindes of causes,
 which do require eloquēce
 and many yongmen in our
 comon weale, bothe before
 the iudges, and before the
 Senate, haue attayned
 praise by speaking in mat-
 ters: the greatest admirati-
 on is ī iudicial causes y^e na-
 ture wherof is in two ptz.
 For it standeth in accusati-
 on, and defence: of whiche
 albeit defence is the more
 commendable, yet also ac-
 cusation is oftentimes alo-
 wed. I spake of Crassus
 a little before: the lyke dyd
 Mar-

Marcus Antonius, being a poyng man: an accusacion also bzoughte Publius Sulpitius eloquence to li-
 ght: whē into iudgemēt he called the sedicious, and vnprofitable cittē Caius Iozbanus, but this fourth
 lye is not often to bee done noz at any time, onlesse ey-
 ther for the comon weales cause: as did the two Lu-
 cullioz for proteccion sake as we did for the Siciliae & for the Hardines: Iulius Cesar, for Marc^{us} Iulius Cæsar. In
 us fusius diligence was knowen in the acculing of Marc^{us} Aquili^{us}. Once thē
 it may bee doone, not often certesse. But in case a man
 must needes do it often, let him ascribe his offyce too &
 comon weale: whose ene- mies too reuenge often, is
 not to be reprooued: yet let there be a measure present
 for of a hard harted man or rather scarce a manne
 it semes, vpo many to bzig the danger of life: for that
 both is dangerous to hym selfe, and also a shameful
 blotte

Mar. Antonius P. Sulpitij eloquentiam accusacio il-
 lustraui: cūm seditiosum & inuilem ciuem C. Nor-
 banum in iudicium voca-
 uit. Sed hoc quidem non est sepe faciendū, nec vn-
 quam, nisi aut Reipub.
 causa, vt duo Luculli: aut patrocinio, vt nos pro Si-
 culis, pro Sardis pro M.
 Albutio Iulius Cæsar. In accusando etiam Aquilio
 L. Fusij cognita industria est.
 Semel igitur aut non sæ-
 pe certē, Sin erit cur faci-
 endū sit sæpius. Reipub.
 tribuat hoc muneris, cuius inimicos vlcisci sæpe, non
 est reprehendēdū: modus tamen adsit. Duri enim ho-
 minis, vel potius vix homi-
 nis videtur, periculum ca-
 pitis inferre multis.
 Id enim cūm periculosum ipsi est, tum etiā sordidum

de officiis.

ad famam committere, vt
accusator nominetur.

Quod contigit M. Bruto
summo genere nato, illius
filio, qui iuris ciuilis inpris
mis peritus fuit. Atq; etiam
hoc præceptum officij di
ligenter tenendum est, ne
quem vnquam innocentē
in iudiciū capitis accersas
id enim sine scelere fieri
nullo pacto potest.

Nam quid est tam inhumana
num, quam eloquētiā a
natura ad salutem homi
num & ad conseruationē
datam ad bonorum pestē
perniciemq; conuertere.

Nec tamen vt hoc fugi
endum est, ita habendum
est religioni, nocentem a
liquando, et nefarium, im
piumq; defendere.

Vult hoc multitudo, pa
titur consuetudo: fert e
tiam humanitas.

Iudicis est semper in cau
sis verum sequi: patroni

blotte in his name, to gyne
cause, that he bec named a
promotour.

Whiche chaunced to Mar
cus Brutus, borne of a no
ble stocke, his sonne, who
was verpe wel skilled in
the ciuill laswe. And therto
this rule of duitie must be
diligently kept, & ye bringe
no innocent, at any time, in
iudgement vpon life, for &
can in noe wyse bee doone
without haynous wycked
nesse.

For what is there so vnna
tural, as to turne eloquēce
being geuen of nature for
& sauegard, & preservation
of men, to the harme and
distruction of good menne
And yet, as this is to bee
eschewed, so it is not to be
counted contrary to godli
nesse, to defend the gilty o
therwhile, & myscheuous
and wicked.

This & multitude desireth
custome beareth, humani
tie also woꝝketh.

The iudges partis, ener
more in causes to folowe
troth, the counsellers parte
many

many times to defende the
trouthe lyke, though it bee
not so true: which to write
I would not be bolde, na-
me: seing I treat of phi-
losophie: but that the same
liked Panettus, the gra-
uest of the Stoikes.

But moſte of al by defen-
ding, bothe glozpe, and fa-
mour is gotten: & so much
the moze if euer it befall,
that he be defended, whoe
doth seme to be besette, and
pſeſſed with the richesse of
any man of power: as our
ſelfe did, both oftē at other
times, and also being yong
for Sextus Roscius & A-
merine, against y^e might of
Lucius Sylla, bearynge
ſwaye: which oration (as
ye wot) is abroad.

But now wee haue ſet
forth yonge mens dunties,
which auayle to the attay-
ning of glozpe: hereafter we
muſt ſpeake of bountifull-
nes, & liberalitie.
whereof two maner waies
there be.

For liberal dealing is ſhe-
wed to ſuch, as neede either
by trauaile, or with money.

This

nonnunquā verisimile, eti-
am si minus sit verum, de-
fendere. Quod scribere
(præsertim cū de philo-
sophia scriberē) non aude-
rem, nisi idē placeret gra-
uissimo Stoicorū Panætio
Maximē autem & gloria
paritur et gratia, defensio-
nibus: eoq; maior si quan-
do accidit, vt ei subuenia-
tur, qui potentis alicuius
opibus circūueniri vrge-
riq; videatur: vt nos, & ſe-
pe alias: & adoleſcētes cō-
tra L. Syllæ dominantis o-
pes pro Sexto Roscio A-
merino fecimus: quæ (vt
ſcis) extat oratio. Sed ex-
positis adoleſcentum offi-
cijs, quæ valeant ad glori-
am adipiſcendam, dein-
ceps de beneficentia, ac li-
beralitate dicendum eſt,
cuius eſt ratio duplex.

Nam aut opera benigne
ſit indigentibus, aut pe-
cunia.

de officiis.

Facilior est hæc posterior locupletis præsertim: sed illa lautior ac splendidior & viro forti, clarioq; dignior. Quanquã enim in vtroq; inest gratificãdi liberalis voluntas, tamẽ altera ex arca, altera ex virtute depromitur. Largitioq; q̃ fit ex re familiari, fontem ipsum benignitatis exhaurit. Ita benignitate benignitas tollit: qua quo in plures vsus sis, eõ minus in multos vti possis. At qui opera, id est virtute & industria benefici & liberales erunt: primum quõ pluribus profuerint, eõ plures ad benignẽ faciendum adiutores habebunt, deinde consuetudine beneficentiã paratiores erunt, & tanquam exercitatiores ad bene de multis promerendũ. Præclare in epistola quadam Alexandrum filium Philippus accusat

This latter is the easer, specially to the possessor but that other is the goodlier, and moze glozious, & meeter for a manlye, and a noble manne. For though there is a liberall wyll of pleasuring in bothe, yet the one out of the coefer the other out of vertue is takẽ & the lanishinge whyche is made of a mannes house goods draweth dry & fountaine of liberalitie, so liberalitie is by liberality wasted, and toward the moe you doe vse it, the lesse yee can bee able too vse it toward many. But who so shalbe bountifull, & liberall of trauaile (that is) of vertue & diligence, first & moe they haue profited, the moe furtherers they shal haue toward dealing liberalie, afterwarde by customable vsing of bounteousnesse, the redier they shalbe, and (as it were) & moze practised to deserue wel of manye.

Princely dothe Phillipus, in a certain epistle, accuse Alexander his sonne, that

that by lauishenesse, he hū-
terth after the good will of
the Macedonians.

what reason in a mischpyse
quod he, hath bzought you
into this hope? & ye should
think, those woulde bee to
you faithfull, who you had
corrupted with money.

why? goe ye about thys,
that y Macedonians may
think you not theire kinge
but theire seruant & bziber:
well he said, seruauant and
bziber, because it is vile for
a king. Better also he saide
in that he called large gee-
ting corruption. For hee
that receiueth is made the
worke thereby, and the re-
dier alwaies to looke for
the like. This sayde hee to
his sonne, but let vs thinke
it geue in precept to vs al.
Wherefoze this certeynelye
is no doubt, but the same
liberalitie, whiche standeth
in traualle, & diligēce, boih
is honeste, and also spred-
deth farther, and is able to
profite mo.

Oftentimes yet a manne
must geue largelye, & thys
kind of liberalitie is not to be
utter

quod largitione beneuo-
lentiā. Macedonū cōfector.

Quē te malū, inquit, ra-
tio in istam spem induxit:
vt eos tibi fideles putares
fore, quos pecunia corru-
pisses. An tu id agis vt Ma-
cedones nō te regē suum,
sed ministrum & p̄bito-
rem putēt: bene ministrū
& prebitorem, quia sor-
didum regi: melius etiam
quod largitionem corrup-
telam dixit esse. Fit enim
deterior qui accipit, atque
ad id idem semper expec-
tandum paratior. Hoc ille
filio: sed preceptum pute-
mus omnibus.

Quamobrem id quidem
nō est dubiū quin illa be-
nignitas, quē cōstat ex ope-
ra & industria, & hone-
stior sit, & latius pateat, &
possit prodesse pluribus.

Nonnunquam tamen est
largiendum: nec hoc be-
nignitatis genus omnino

de Officiis.

repudiādū est: & sepe id
neis hominibus indigētib⁹
de re familiari inptiendū:
sed diligēter, atq; modera-
tē. Multi. n. patrimonialia ef-
fuderūt incōsultē largien-
do. Quid autē est stultius,
quā qd' libēter facias, cura
re vt id diutius facere nō
possis? Atq; etiā sequūtur
largitionem rapinæ. Cū
enim dando egere cœpe-
rint, alienis bonis manus
afferre coguntur. Ita cū
beneuolentię cōparandæ
causa benefici esse velint:
non tanta studia assequū-
tur eorum, quibus dede-
runt, quanta odia eorum,
quibus ademerunt.

Quamobrem nec ita clau-
denda est res familiaris,
vt eam benignitas aperire
non possit: nec ita reserā-
da, vt pateat omnibus.
Modus adhibeatur, isq; ue
referatur ad facultates.
Omnino meminisse de-

utterly cast of: & wee must
many times geue parte of
our substāce to meete mē,
that haue neede: but wee
must do it heedefullye, and
measurablye.

Foz dyuers haue spoylde
out their liuelod, by lauy-
shing it vnadvisedly. But
what is foolisher, then to
cause, that you can no len-
ger do the thing, which pee
loue to do: And also spoile
folosweth of lauishnes.

Foz when by geuing they
begin to be needie, they bee
diuen to lay hand on other
mens goods: so when they
woulde bee beneficiall foz
cause of good will gettyng
they purchase not so great
loue of theires, to whome
they gaue: as of them they
gette hated, from whom
they tooke.

wherefoze neyther a mans
substance is so to be shutte
vp, that liberalitie cannot
open it, nor so to be vnloc-
ked, that it lye abroade foz
euery bodye. A measure is
to be kept, & let it be refer-
red to abilitie. In any wise
wee must remember that,
which

Which with our men is be-
ry oft in vsage, and now is
come into the custome of a
prouerbe, that lausshenelle
findes no bottome.

Foz what stay can ther be
when bothe they, who are
swont to it, and other doo
desire one thinge? In all
there be two sortz of large
geeuers of whiche the one
bee called foole large, the o-
ther liberall.

Foole large wee call them
who with open feastes, and
sich gifts, & senseshowes,
and furniture of sightes, &
huntingz, power out there
money on those thinges
whereof they shall leaue a
memozre eyther shozte, oz
none at all.

But liberal they be named
who with ther riches doth
rausoun men take by pray-
seckers, oz foz their frinds
sakes, doo becommen suer-
tie foz debte, oz do ayde
them in their daughters
preferment of mariage, oz
els do helpe them eyther in
getting oz encreasing their
goods.

And therefore I maruaile
what

bemus id, qd' a nostris ho-
minibus sepius v'surpa-
tum, iamq; in puerbij con-
suetudinem venit: LAR-

GITIONEM FVN-
DVM NOM HABE-

RE. Etenim quis potest
esse modus, cum idem &
qui consueuerunt, & idem
illud alij desiderent? Om-

nino duo sunt genera lar-
gorum, quorum alteri prodi-
gi qui epulis & visceratio-
nibus, et gladiatorum mu-
neribus, ludorum venatio-
numq; apparatu pecunias p-
fundunt in eas res, quarum

memoria, aut breuem, aut
nullam omnino sint relic-
turi. Liberales autem, qui su-
is facultatibus, aut captos
a predonibus redimunt aut
es alienum suscipiunt ami-
corum causa, aut in filiarum
collocatione adiuuant, aut
opitulantur, vel in re querenda
vel augenda. Itaque miror

de Officiis.

quid in mentem venerit Theophrasto in eo libro, quē de diuicijs scripsit : in quo multa præclare, illud absurdè. Est enim multus in laudāda magnificentia & apparatione populariū munerū: taliūq; sup̄tuum facultatē, fructum diuitiarum putat. Mihi autē ille fructus liberalitatis, cuius exempla pauca posui, multo et maior videtur, & certior. Quanto Aristoteles grauius & veri⁹ nos reprehendit: qui has effusiones pecuniarū nō admiremur, quę sūt ad multitudinem deliniēdā: aut ij qui ab hostibus obsidentur si emere aquę sectariū mina cogentur, hoc primo auditu incredibile nobis videri, omnesq; mirari, sed cū attēderim⁹, veniam necessitati dare: in his immanibus iacturis, infinitisq; sumptibus nihil nos magnope mirari

what came in Theophrastus mind, i þ booke, which he wrote of ritches, wher in he spake many thigs notably but this out of course For he is much in praising great sumptuousnesse, and furnishment of people pleasing shewes: & hee deemeth the ablenesse of suche charges to be the fruit of riches But me thinkethe þ fruite of liberalitie, whereof I haue put a fewe examples is bothe greater, and more certaine.

How much more grauelie and trewly doth Aristotle reprove vs: who are not in a wonderment at these last shynges oute of money, which be done to claſſe the multitude: but in case there whoe are besieged of enemies, should be driuen too buye a quartre of water for tenne crownes: that thys at firste hearing, seemeth to vs vncredible, and al make a maruaile at it: but when we haue geuen good heede therto we hold it necessity yet we make no great marvail at these exceedig losses and

and endlesse charges, whē
 specialltye neither necessitie
 is relined, nor worshippinge
 increased, & that selfe same
 clawinge of the multitude
 shal endure for a short, and
 a smal while yea and that,
 with euerye of the lightest
 minds, and yet in the very
 same, euen together with
 the fulnesse, the remem-
 brance also of the pleasure
 dieth. It is also well ga-
 thered, that these shewes
 bee well lyked of chyldren,
 and women, and slaues, &
 freemē most like vnto sla-
 ues, but that noe wayes
 theye can bee allowed of a
 sage man, and one, that is
 a grounded iudgementer weie-
 eth those thynges, that bee
 done.

Nevertheless I per-
 ceive in our citie, it hath
 growen into vse, nowe in
 this good world: that the
 gaye shewes of the Ediles
 office is looked for, euen of
 the best menne. Therefore
 Publi⁹ crass⁹ both by sur-
 name rich, & also in substāce,
 kept his Edile office mar-
 uelous, sumptuously, & sone
 after

cū presertim neq; necessi-
 tati subueniatur, neq; dig-
 nitas augeatur: ipsaque illa
 dilinitio multitudinis ad
 breue, exiguumq; duratu-
 ra sit tempus: eaq; a leuif-
 simo quoq; animo, in quo
 tamen ipso vnā cum satie-
 tate memoria quoq; mo-
 riatur voluptatis. Bene e-
 tiam colligitur, hæc pueris,
 & mulierculis, & seruis, &
 seruorum similinis liberis
 esse grata, graui vero ho-
 mini, & ea quæ fiūt, iudicio
 certo ponderanti probari
 posse nullo modo. Quan-
 quam intelligo in nostra
 ciuitate inueterasse iam
 bonis temporibus, vt
 spendor ædilitatum ab op-
 timis viris postuletur. Ita-
 quæ P. Crassus cū cognō
 mine diues, tum etiam co-
 pijs, functus est ædilitio
 maximo munere. Et paulō
 N. j. post

de Officijs.

post I. Crassus cū omnium
hominum moderatissimo
Quinto Mutio magnificē
tissima ēdilitate fūctus est.
Deinde C. Claudius Ap-
pij filius. Multi post vt: Lu-
cullis, Hortensius, Syllanus
Omes autem P. Lentulus
me consule vicit superio-
res. Hunc est Scaurus imi-
tatus. Magnificentissima
vero nostri Pompeij mu-
nera secundo cōsulatu: in
quibus omnibus, quid mi-
hi placeat, vides. Vitanda
tamē est suspicio auaritiæ.
Nā Mamercus homini di-
tissimo prætermisso ēdilita-
tis consulatus repulsam at-
tulit. Quare & si postula-
tur a populo, bonis viris si
non desiderātibus, attamē
approbātibus, faciēdū est
modō pro facultatibus,
nos ipsi vt fecimus. Et si
quando aliqua res ma-
ior, aut vtilior popula-
ri largitione acquiritur:

after Luci⁹ Crass⁹, wyth
Quint⁹ Mutius the grea-
test meankeper of all men,
kept y^e tyme of their Edile
office moste royallie. Then
came Caius, Claudi⁹, Ap-
pi⁹ sōne. Afterward succe-
ded many as Lucull⁹ Ho-
rēti⁹, Syllanu⁹. But Pu-
blius Lentulus. When I
was Cōsull, passed all his
predecessours, Scaur⁹ fo-
lowed him. But our Po-
peius shewes, in his secōde
Consulshippe, were y^e cost-
lier of all, in euerye deale
wherof you se what tyketh
me, we must yet auoyd sus-
picion of couetousnesse.
Foz the refusall of the E-
dileshippe brought to Ma-
mercus, a verye riche mā,
a fall foz the Consulshippe
wherfōze the thing is to be
done both if it be called foz
of the people, & good men,
though they do not require
it, do yet allowe it, so it be
acording to ones abilitie,
as we our selfe haue done:
and also, if anye greater &
more profitable thinge is
wonne at anye time, by
people pleasinge largēte
as

as of late, a greate honour
 to Drystes were y^e dinings
 in open waies, in name of
 his tenths. No noz it was
 not compted a reproche to
 Marcus Scius that in a
 berth of cozne, hee gaue to
 y^e people for fower pence a
 bushell. For from a great,
 & a long testred enuie he de
 liuered him selfe, neither by
 a dishonest losse, seinge hee
 was Edile noz yet verpe
 great. But alate, it was
 passinge hie honour to our
 Philo: because for y^e cōmon
 weales sake, which in our
 saferte consisteth, & hyed
 fencemē hee suppressed all
 Publi⁹ Clodius attēps &
 rages. There is therefore
 cause of largesse, if either it
 be necessarie, or profitable
 And yet in these same, the
 rule of meankeping is best
 Certesse Lucius philipp⁹
 Quint⁹ sonne, a manne of
 great witte, and moste fa-
 mous, was wont to glory
 that he, without anye gifte
 geuing, had attained al ma
 ny dignities, which were
 compted most honorable.
 The like said Cotta Curia
 wee

vt; Oresti nuper prādīa in
 semitis, decimæ nomine,
 magnō honorifuerūt. Nec
 Marco quidē Seio vitio da
 tū est, quōd in caritate an
 nonę assē modium populo
 dedit. Magna enim se et in
 ueterata inuidia, nec tūrpi
 iactura, quando erat ēdilis
 nec maxima liberauit. Sed
 honori summo nuper no
 stro Miloni fuit, quōd gla
 diatoribusemptis Reipub.
 causa, quę salute nōstra cō
 tinebatur, omnes P. Clodij
 conat⁹ furoresq; compres
 sit. Causa igitur largitionis
 est, si aut necesse est aut v
 tile. In his autem ipsis me
 diocritatis regula optima
 est L. quidem Phillippus
 Q. Fabij filius magno vir
 ingenio, imprimisq; clarus
 gloriari solebat: se sine
 villo munere adeptum
 esse omnia, quę haberen
 tur amplissima.

Dicebat idē Cotta Curia
 N.ij. N.2.

de Officijs.

Nobis quoq; licet in hoc quodāmodo gloriari. Nā p̄ āplitudine honorū, quos cūctis suffragijs adepti sumus, nostro quidem anno (quod cōtigit eorū nemini, quos modo nominaui) sanē exiguus sūptus ēdilitatis fuit. Atq; etiā illē impēse meliores sūt: muri, naualia, portus saquarū ductus, omniāq; quæ ad vsum Reipub. pertinent. Quamquam quod prēsēs tanquā in manu datur iucundius est: tamē hęc in posterum gratiora. Theatra, portic⁹ noua tēpla, verecundi⁹ reprehēdo propter Pompeiū: sed doctissimi nō probant, vt et hic ipse Paneti⁹ quē multū in his libris secutus sum, non interpretatus & Phalereus Demetrius, qui Periclem principē Grēcīe vituperat, quod tantam pecuniam in prēclara illa propilēa coniecerit.

we also in this may glorye after a certaine sorte. For doubtles smal was & coste of our Edileshp: in respect of such large honoures, as by al mens voices wee atteyned: euen in oure yeare: which hath befalln to none of them, whom I named ere while. And also these expences be better, which are bestowed vpon citie walles shipdockes, hauens, cumdutes, & al ſe appertene to the vse of the cōmō weale. Although ſe is moze pleasant, which prēsētly is geue (as it were) in hande, yet for time to come these be moze acceptable. Sights courts, galery walkes, and new churches, & moze reuerently, I finde faulte w, for Pompeius sake, but the best learned men do not allow thē: as both ſe Pannetius, whō I haue followed much in these booke, & yet not translated him, & also Phalerius Demetri⁹ who dispraised Pericles, & prince of Greece, because he laid so much money vpon those goodlie porches.

But

But of this kinde vniuer-
sally, it is diligently dispu-
ted, in those bookes, which
I wrote of a comō weale.
The whole maner then of
suche largesse generallpe is
faultpe, per for certaine ty-
mes it is necessary, & then
the same is both to be refer-
red to ones abilitie, & to be
tempered wth a mean keeping.
But in that other kinde of
large geftuing, which pro-
ceedes of liberalitie, not all
alike in causes vnlike, wee
ought to bee disposed. O-
therwise is his case who is
p^{re}sessed with miserie, and
otherwise his, who seeketh
more welth, hauing no ad-
uersitie. Toward the mi-
serable, liberality ought to
be forward, excepte p^{er} euē-
ture they shal bee worthe
of miserie, wee oughte yet
in no wise to be altogether
pinching towarde those
who woulde haue them-
selues to bee holpen, not
that theye maye feelee noe
affliction, but that they
may rise to hygher degree.
necuertheless in choosynge
out

Sed de hoc genere toto in
his libris quos de Reipub.
scripsi, diligēter est disputa-
tum. Tota igitur ratio tali-
um largitionum genere vi-
tiosa est, temporibus neces-
saria: et tamen ipsa & ad
facultates accommodāda,
& mediocritate moderan-
da est. In illo autē altero
genere largiendi quod a li-
beralitate pficiscitur, non
vno modo i disparib⁹ cau-
sis affecti esse debem⁹. Alia
causa est eius, qui calamita-
te p^{re}mitur, & eius qui res
meliores querit, nullis suis
rebus aduersis. Propēsiō
benignitas esse debet in
calamitosos: nisi forte erūt
digni calamitate. In ijs ta-
mē q̄ se adiuuari volēt, nō
solum vt ne affligantur,
sed etiam vt altiorē gra-
dum ascendant, restricti-
omnino nullo modo esse
debemus: sed in diligendis

de officijs.

idoneis iudicium, & diligē-
tiā adhibere. Nam præcla-
rè Ennius.

Benefacta malò locata.
malefacta arbitror. Quod
autem tributum est bono
viro & grato, in eo cūm ex
ipso fructus est, tum etiam
ex ceteris. Temeritate enī
remota, gratissima est libe-
ralitas, eoquē eam studio-
sius pleriq; laudant, quòd
summi cuiusq; bonitas cō-
mune profugium est om-
nium. Danda igitur opera
est, vt hos beneficijs quam
plurimis afficiamus, quo-
rum memoria liberis, po-
sterisque prodatur, vt his
ingratis esse non liceat.

Omnes enim immemo-
rem beneficij oderunt, e-
amq; iniuriā in deteren-
da liberalitate sibi etiam
fieri: eumquē qui faciat,

out meete men. we ought
to vse a discretion, & a dili-
gence. For notable sayeth
Ennius.

Good deedes, in case
they be euill placed,
Euill deedes I count,
and clene disgraced.

But what so is geuen to a
good mā, & a thāksful, ther
by both there comes fruite
frō hī & also frō other. For
so rashnes be auoided, libe-
ralitie is very pleasurefull,
& so much y more earnest-
ly most mē praise it, becau-
se euery greate mā's good-
nes is the cōmō refuge of
al. Our endeuour therfore
is to be done, & we reward
thē w very many benefitez
to whose childre, & offsprig
a memozy may be lefte, so
y of good right they cā not
be vnthankful. For al men
doe hate the forgetter of a
good turne, & do deme that
wrong euen to themselves
to be doone, in frayinge a-
waye ones liberalitie, and
they take him, whose cau-
sethe it too bee a common
exemp

enemie of the poore. And this liberalitie also is profitable to & common weale to haue prisoners redeemed out of captiuitie, and the poore enriched.

Whiche wee see wrytten at large in the oracio of Crassus, that it was wonte too be done abroade by vs of & Equestrial order, I place therefore this vsage of liberalitie before laushnesse in shewes. This is for graue menne, & great, that other, (as it were) for flatterers of & people, tickeling, as ye would say, the lightnes of the multitude & pleasur. But it is meett for a man both to be liberal in geuing & nothings eger in requyringe, & also in euery matter of bargaynage sellynge buyng, hyring, letting, nye dwellinges, and partye bouides, to be iust and gentle, & too remytte muche of his due to many, but from trauers in lawe to refraine as much, as hee maye, and I wot not, whether some what moze also: than hee may.

¶.iiii.

For

comune hostem tenuiorū putant. Atq; hæc benignitas etiā Reipub. vtilis est redimi è seruitute captos, locupletari tenuiores: quod quidē vulgo solitū fieri ab ordine nostro in oratione Crassi scriptum copiosè videmus. Hanc ergo cōsuetudinē benignitatis largitioni munerū lōgè atepono. Hæc est grauiū hominum atq; magnorum: illa quasi assentatorum populi, multitudinis leuitatem voluptate quasi titillatium. Conuenit autē tum in dando munificū esse, tū in exigendo non acerbū. In omniq; re contrahenda vèdendo, emendo, conducendo, locando in vicinitatibus & cōfinijs equū & facilē, multa multis de iure suo cedētē: à litibus vero quātū liceat (et nescio an paulo pl' etiam quàm liceat) ab horrentem.

de officijs.

Est enī nō modō liberale, For it is not only a liberal
 paulū nōnūquā de suo iure decedere: sed interdum point to forgoe somewhat
 etia fructuosū. Habēda au of his right other whil, but
 tem est ratio rei familiaris: sometime also profitable.
 quā quidē delabi sinere fla but regard of a māz welth
 gisiosū est: sed ita, vt illibe the muste be had, which be
 ralitatis, avaritiæq; absit sus rely to suffer to decay, is a
 picio. Posse enim liberalita soule fault, but so, as susp
 te vti, nō spoliātem se patri tion of nigardelynes, & co
 monio, nimirū est pecunię uctousnes, bee auoided.
 fruct⁹ maxim⁹. Recte etia For no donbt it is y gre
 ā Theophrasto est laudata test fruit of moneye: that a
 hospitalitas. Est enim (vt man be able to vse lybera
 mihi quidē videtur) valde tytie not makinge spoile of
 decorū, patere domosi ho his liuelhood. Wel also, is
 minū illustriū illustrib⁹ hos hospitalitie praised of The
 pitibus. Idq; etia Reip. est ophrast⁹. For it is (as me
 ornamēto homines exter thinketh) very seemely, no
 nos hoc liberalitatis gene ble mens houses to be open
 re in vrbe nostra nō egere for noble gestes. And that
 Est etia vehementer vtile also is an honoure too the
 ijs, qui honestē multū hos state: that outlandish men
 se volūt per hospites apud in our citye doo not want
 externos populos valere this kinde of liberality. It
 opibus & gratia. Theo is also exceding profitable
 phrast⁹ scribit quidem Ci to them who honestlye de
 monem Athenis etiam in sire to bee able to do much
 suos curiales Laciadas to preuaile in power, and
 fauour, by theyre geastes,
 amonge fortune natyons,
 Theoprastus in deede
 writeth, that Cimon at A
 thenes also was a good
 housekeeper for the Lacia
 dang of hys warde.

Because

Because hee toke order so, hospitalē fuisse. Ita enim in
 & cōmounded his baylies: stituisse, & villicis iſperauit-
 al things should be offered sic, vt omnia præherentur
 to what so euer Laciadan quicūq; Laciades in villam
 turned into his mannoire. suā diuertisset. Quę autem
 But these benefiſts, which opera nō largitione, benefi-
 hee bestowed by trauals, cia dātur: hec tū in vniuer-
 not by large gifts, are em- sa Rēpub. tū in singulos ci-
 ploied both vpon y whole ues cōferūtur. Nam in iure
 cōmon weale, and vpon e- cauere, cōsilio iuuare, atq;
 very citizen a part. & oz in hoc scientię genere pdesse
 law to geue aduise, with quām plurimis, vehemēter
 counsel to help, & to furder & ad opes augendas p̄tinet
 very many with this kinde & ad gratiā. Itaq; cū multa
 of science it sheweth very præclara maiorū, tū quam
 much, both to the encrease optimē cōstituti iuris ciui-
 of riches, and also to fauor. lis summo semp in honore
 & therefore as there weare fuit cognitio, atq; interpræ-
 many worthye thinges of tatio: quā quidē ante hanc
 our aunceters, so alwaies cōfusiōnē temporū in pos-
 in great prize was y know sessiōne sua principes reti-
 ledge, & the openinge of the nuerūt. Nūc vt honores vt
 right well ordeyned cyuill ōnes dignitatis gradus, sic
 lawes, which truelye before huius scientię splendor
 this turmoile of times, ru- delectus est. Idq; eo in-
 lers rectued in the due es- dignius quod eo tempo-
 & as euery degree of wor- re hoc contigit, cū is es-
 ship so the glozve of thys set, qui omnes superiores.
 science is blotted out. And quibus
 that is so much the shame
 fuller, because this happe-
 ned at that time: when hee
 reigned, who in knowledge

de Officiis.

quib' honore par esset, sci-
 etia facile vicisset. Hæc igitur
 opera grata multis, &
 ad beneficiis obstringēdos
 homines accōmodata. At-
 que huic arti finitima est
 dicēdi grauior facultas, et
 gratior, & ornatior. Quid
 enim eloquentia laudabili-
 us & prestabili' vel admi-
 ratioe audiētū, vel spe in-
 digentium, vel eorum, qui
 defensi sunt gratia? Huic
 quoq; ergo à maiorib' no-
 stris est in tota dignitate
 principatus datus, deserti
 igitur hominis et facile la-
 borantis quodq; in patrijs
 est moribus multorū cau-
 sas & nō grauatē, et gratu-
 itō defēdentis, beneficia &
 patrocinia latē patent. Ad
 monebat neres, vt hoc
 quoq; loco intermissionem
 eloquentiæ, ne dicam inte-
 ritum, deplorarem: nisi ve-
 rerer ne de meipso aliquid

clerely exceeded al his fore-
 goers, to whom he had be-
 pre in honour. This tra-
 uaille therfore is pleasure-
 ful to many, & verpe fit to
 bind men with benefices.

And the grauer, and grace
 fuller, and trimmer feate of
 oratorie is nere cost to this
 science.

For what is more prayse
 worthy, & better than elo-
 quēce: either for the admi-
 ration of the hearers, of the
 hope of the neders, or for
 their cause, who haue bene
 defended. Therfore to this
 likewise a preminence in
 all honoure was geuen of
 our elders. The benefices
 then & pleading of a fine
 spoken manne, & gladly ta-
 kinge paines, & (as it is in
 his countrey fashion) bothe
 not vnwillinglye, and also
 freely defēding many mē
 causes, be farre speedde a-
 bzode.

The matter hath put me i
 minde, & in this place also
 I should bewaile & discō-
 tinuance, I will not say
 destructiō of eloquēce: but
 that I feared, lestē tou-
 chinge

thing my selfe somewhat: *I viderer queri. Sed tamen*
 should seeme to complaine *videm⁹ quibus extinctis o*
 what withstanding wee see *ratoribus quàm in paucis*
 what notable oratorz haue *spes, quanto in pauciorib⁹*
 bene put out of the way: & *facultas, quàm in multis sit*
 how in a few a hope, unfe- *audacia. Cum autem om-*
 wer a skil, in many a bold *nes non possint, ne multi*
 nes there remaines. But *quidem, aut iuris periti esse*
 seeing neither al, nor yet ma- *aut disertis: licet tamen o-*
 ny can bee either conning i *pera prodesse multis, be-*
 the law, or wel spoken mē *neficia petentem, commen-*
 one yet is tranayl may fur- *dantem iudicibus, aut ma-*
 der manye, & shewethe for *gistratibus: vigilantē pro*
 their commodities, & spea- *re alterius, eosq; ipsos qui*
 keth in their fauour to the *aut consulunt, aut defēdūt*
 iudges, & magistrates: that *rogantem, quod qui faciūt*
 slepeth not oute an others *plurimū gratiē consequū-*
 cause: & treateth thos same *tur latissimeq; eorum ma-*
 who either bee counsellers, *nat industria. Iā ilud non*
 or defēders, which who so *sūt admonendi (est enim*
 do. they attē ver y much *in promptu) vt animad-*
 fauour, & their paynfulnes *uertant, cū iuuare alios*
 floweth al abrode. *velint, ne quos offendant*
 Now they are not to be ad- *Sepe enim, aut eos ledūt*
 monished of this (for it ys *quos non debent, aut eos*
 wel knowen) & they take *quos non expedit. Si im-*
 hede: when theye wil helpe *prudentes, negligētia est:*
 other, & they offende none. *fi*
 For oftentimes either they
 hurt thē, whō they shouide
 not: or thē, whom it is not
 behoouable, if vnswarlike
 they do it, of negligēs it is

de Officiis.

si scientes, temeritatis. Vtē
dū enim est excusatiōe ad
uersos eos, quos inuitus of
fēdas quacūq; possis, quare
id quod feceris necesse fue
rit, nec aliter facere potue
ris, certisq; operis & officiis
erit id quod violatum est,
compensandum. Sed cum
in hominibus iuuandis, aut
mores spectari, aut fortu
na soleat: dictu quidem est
pplie: Itaque vulgo lo
quuntur, sese in beneficijs
collocandis mores homi
num, non fortunam sequi
honestā oratio est. Sed
quis est tādē qui inopis &
optimi viri causę, non ante
ponat in opera danda gra
tiam fortunati & poten
tis: A quo enim expe
ditior & celerior remune
ratio ferē videtur, in eum
ferē est volūtas nostra pro
pensior. Sed animaduert
endum est diligentius,

if wittingly, of rashenes it
comes you must vse also to
them, whom you offend a
gainst your will, suche an
excuse, as ye maye: for
what cause y same. & you
haue done was necessarie,
and you could not do other
wise: and that whiche was
done offensively, shalbe re
compensed with other tra
uailes, & frendlye doinges.
But whereas in helpinge
men, either their condicions
are wont to bee considered
or their estate, in dede it ys
soone saide, and so theye do
commonly speake, that in
bestowing their benefites
they regarde mens manerz
and not their state. In ho
nest sayng it is, but who is
ther at al, which in bestow
inge his traualle, doth not
preferre the fauor of a rich
man, and one of power, be
fore the pooze, and a ryght
good mans cause. For frō
whom, we thinke, a speedi
er, & redier recompence shal
come, too him wherdes com
monlye our good will is y
more enclined. But we
must mark more diligently.
what

What is the nature of things
 For verely though a poore
 manne can not render due
 thanks: yet if he be a good
 man, owe the forsooth hee
 may: This suerlye was in
 place, whoesoever sayd it:
 money who haueth in haue
 hath not payd, & who hath
 payd, haueth in minde, but
 thanks bothe who hath e
 payd, haueth in minde, and
 who haueth in minde, hath
 rendered. But these, who
 compt themselves riche, ho
 norable, & wealefull, will
 not bee once bounde to a
 man for a pleasure, but they
 thinke rather that they haue
 done a pleasure, when, yea
 although theye haue taken
 some great thing, they sus-
 pect somwhat likewise of
 them either to be craved or
 toke for, but they recken it
 euen like a death, that they
 shoulde seeme to haue vsed
 ones furderance, or shoulde
 be called hāgers on. But a
 other poore man, thinking
 him selfe regarded, and not
 his state, whē any thing is
 doone vnto him, desires that
 he may be thought thankfull
 not

que natura rerum sit. Ni-
 mirū enim inops ille, si bo-
 n⁹ est vir. etiā si referre gra-
 tiā nō potest: habere certe
 potest. Cōmodè autē qui-
 cunq; dixit, pecuniam qui
 habeat, non reddidisse: &
 qui reddiderit, nō habere.
 Gratiam autem & qui re-
 tulerit habere & qui habe
 at retulisse. At qui se locu-
 pletes, honoratos, beatos
 putant, hi ne obligari qui-
 dem beneficio volunt: quā
 etiā beneficium se dedis-
 se arbitrantur, cū ipsi quā-
 uis aliquid magnum acce-
 perint, atq; etiā a se aut
 postulari, aut expectari a-
 liquid suspicantur. Patro-
 cinio vero se vsos, aut cli-
 entes appellari, mortis in-
 star putant. At vero ille
 tenuis cum quicquid fac-
 tum sit, sese spectatum, nō
 fortunam putat: nō modo
 illi

de Officiis

illi qui est meritis, sed etiā illis, a quibus spectat (eget enim multis) gratū se videri studet. Neq̄ verō verbis augeat suū munus, si quo forte fungitur: sed etiam extenuat, videndumq; illud idē, quod si opulentū, fortunatūq; defenderis: in vno illo aut forte in liberis eius manet gratia. Sin autē inopē, probū tamen et modestū, omnes non improbi humiles (quę magna in populo multitudo est) præiudiciū sibi paratū vidēt. Quā obrē melius apud bonos, quā apud fortunatos beneficium collocari puto. Dāda tamen omnino opera est, vt omni generi satisfacere possimus. Sed si res in contentione veniēt, nimirū Themistocles est author adhibendus: qui cūm confuleretur vtrū bono viro pauperi, aut min⁹ probato diuiti filiam collocaret

onely to him who haue deserued it, but also to them, (for he stāds in neede of manye) of whō hee looks for ought. Not yett wth wordes he sets out his seruice, yf phaps he do anye, but also abateth it. And this same point is to be considered, if you defend a riche, and a welthy man, the thank remaines in him alone, or p^{er} chaunce in his childre, but if you do it for him that is poore, & yett honeste, & discrete: all the meane degree, beīg not dishonest, (which is a great multitude amōg people) doe see succoure prepared for thē. wherfore I think a benefit better to be bestowed vpon good mē than vpon riche. yett alwaies we must geue oure endeuour & we maye content al maner of men, but if y^e matter shall come into cōparison, verely Themistocles is to be takē for an author, who, whē he was asked counsell, whether one should bestow his daughter vpon a good poore man, or a rich man not so honest:

I (quod he) do rather like
a man. who lacketh moncy
thā money which wāteth
a man.

But maners be corrupted
& marred, by ouer regar-
ding riches, what doth the
great sto:ie iherof perceyue
to euery one of vs: perauē-
ture it helpeth him, & hath
it: & he was not alwayes.
But grāt it helps, in deede
he may be the mightier but
which way may hee be the
honestest man? And if the
rich man be also a good mā-
ter nor his riches hynder
him, & cause him to finde
lesse helpe, so they furder
him nor: and let a mannes
whole iudgmēt be, not how
rich, but what manner man
eche one is. And in bestow-
ing benefits, & trauaile the
last lesson is that you laboꝝ
nothing against equitye, &
nothing with wrong.

For iustice is the ground of
a cōtinuall cōmendation, &
same, without whiche, no-
thing can be praisable.

But seing we haue spoken
of such kind of benefits, as
belong to eche seuerall man

here

ego verō inquit, malo virū
qui pecunia egeat, quā pe-
cuniā, q̄ viro. Sed corrupti
mores, deprauatiq; sūt ad
miratione diuitiarū: quarū
magnitudo quid ad vnum
quēq; nostrū pertinet: illū
fortasse adiuiat, qui habet
ne id quidē sēper. Sed fac
iuuare, potētiōr sanesit, ho-
nestior yero quomodo?
Quōd si etiam bonus erit
vir: ne impediāt diuitiæ
quo minus iuuetur, modō
ne adiuuent, sitq; omne iu-
diciū non quā locuples,
sed qualis quisq; sit. Extre-
mum autē preceptū in be-
nificijs operaq; danda est,
ne quid contra equitatem
cōtendas, ne quid pro iu-
ria. Fundamentū enim p-
petuę commendationis &
fame est iustitia, sine qua
nihil potest; esse lauda-
bile, sed quoniam de eo
genere beneficiorū dictū
est, qd' ad singulos spectāt,
deinceps

de Officiis

deinceps de ijs, que ad vni
uersos, quęq; ad Rēp. per
tinent disputandū est. Eo
rum autem ipsorum parti
eiusmodi sunt, vt ad vni
uersos ciues ptineant, par
tim singulos vt attingant,
quę sunt etiam gratiora.
Danda est opera omninō
si possit vtriusq; nec minus
vt etiam singulis consula
tur: sed ita vt ea res aut p
sit, aut certē ne obsit Reip.
pub. C. Helij, & T. Grac
chi frumentaria magna
largitio fuit, exhauriebat
igitur ærarium, modica M
Octauij, & Reip. tolerabi
lis, et plebi necessaria: ergo
& ciuibus & Reip. saluta
ris. Inprimis autem viden
dum erit ei, qui Remp. ad
ministrabit: vt suū quisq;
teneat: neq; de bonis
priuatorum publicē di
minutio fiat. Pernitiosē enī
Phillippus in tribunatu,
hereafter we must treat of
those which pertain to all
men, & to a cōmon weale.
And some of those sãc bre
of such sort, & they pertain
to the whole number of ci
tizens, soine that they con
cerne euery free mā, which
be also more fauourable. &
dr. igēs doubles ther must
be geuen, if it may, & it bes
pinded for both, & no leste
also, for euery one, but so,
as & thung either may fur
der or at lest not hinder the
cōmō weale. Cains Grac
chus corndole was great,
he wast so therfore & trea
surie. Marcus Octavius
made such a one, as was
measurable, & as & cōmon
weale might bere, & neces
sarie for the people, & ther
fore wealful both to the ci
tizens, & also to the state.
But specially it muste be
seene to of him, whoe shall
gouerne the cōmō weale, &
euery man kepe his owne:
& that there be no impay
ring of priuate mēs goods
for coumon charges. For
Phillippus did dangerous
lye in his Tribune shippe,
when

When he made the law concerning landes, which yet he soone suffered to bee repealed, and therein marvellously he shewed himselfe a sober man, but as he dyd euill, in setting forth many thinges people pleasinglye so this he spake euill, that there were not in the cytie two thousand men, whoe had any substance.

It is suerly a mischeuous saying, and sounding to the making of goods common and what greater pestilence can ther be, than that: For common wealthes. & countreis are ordeined to this end specially, that men may keepe their owne.

For althoughe men assemble together, nature being gupde, yet they sought the defences of cities, for hope of safe keepinge of their goods.

There muste also good heede be geuen, that (as often it happened among our aunceters) for the pozenes of the treasure, and continuance of the warres, a tribute be not needfull to be payde

cum legem agraria ferret quam tamen antiquari facile passus est, & in eo vehementer se moderatum prebuit, sed cum in agendo multa populariter, tum illud male dixit: non esse in ciuitate duo millia hominum, qui rem haberent.

Capitalis oratio est ad equationem bonorum pertinens.

Qua peste quæ potest esse maior? Hanc enim ob causam maximè vt sua tuerentur, Resp. ciuitatesq; constitutę sunt. Nam etsi duce natura congregabantur homines, tamen, spe custodię rerum suarum, vrbium presidia querebant.

Danda etiam opera est, ne (qd' apud maiores nostros sepe fiebat) propter e-rarij tenuitatē, assiduitatē-que bellorum tributū sit

de Officiis.

conferendum. Idquē ne
eueniat, multō antē erit p
uidendum. Sin quē neces-
sitas huius muneris alicui
Repub. iobuenerit (malo
enim alteri quā nostrā
ominari, nequē tantū de
nostra, sed de omni Re-
pub. disputo) danda erit
opera, vt omnes intelligāt
si salui esse velint, neces-
sitati esse parendum.

Atquē etiam omnes qui
rempub. gubernabunt, cō
sulere debebūt, vt earum
rerum copia sit, quæ sunt
necessarię. Quarum qua-
lis comparatio fieri soleat,
& debeat, non est necesse
disputare, est enī in prōp-
riū: tantum locus attingen-
dus fuit. Caput autem est

in omni procuratione ne-
gotij et muneris publici,
vt auariciæ pellatur eti-
am minima suspicio,

payde. And longe before it
must bee prouyded, that it
may not fail. But yf anye
necessitie of this duitie shal
happen vpon any common
weale (for I hadde rather
prophecie to some others,
then to ours, & yet I reaso
not of ours, but of euerye
common weale) ther must
be geuen a diligence, & all
men may vnderstande, that
if they wil be in safety they
must obey necessitie.

And mozeouer, all suche
as shall rule the common
weale, oughte to prouyde,
that there bee stoze of these
thinges whiche are neces-
sarye.

Of which it is not nede-
full to dispute, what a pro-
uision, is wonte & oughte
to bee made, for the matter
is manifeste, this place
was no moze but to bee
touched.

But the chiefe point is,
in all administration of
matters, and common
weale offices, that euen
the leaste suspicio of co-
uetousnesse bee auoyded,
would

would God, quoth Caius Pontius the Samnite, fortune had reserved mee to those daies, and I had then been bozne, when the Romaines begoon once to take byrbes, I would not suffer them anye longer to rule. Hee needed not p'wis to haue tarped for many woordes.

For of late this mischief entered into this common weale. Therefore I am wel content, that Pontius rather liued then, if there was in him so much manhode in dede.

Not yet a hundzed and tenne yeres be past, since y^e lawe of pillage was made by Lucius Piso, whereas none befoze had been.

But afterwarde folowed so manye lawes, and euey of the latter the harder, so many accusid, so many cōdēpned, so great an Italiō swarre, rayled for feare of iudgements: when lawes & iudgemēts were taken away, so great pouling, and robbing of large friends, that

vtinam inquit Caius Pontius Samnis, ad illa tempora fortuna me seruasset & tunc essem natus quando Romani dona accipere cœpissent, non esse passus eos diutius imperare.

Ne illi quidē multa secula expectanda fuerūt, modò enim hoc malum in hanc Rempubicam inuasit.

Itaque facile patior, tūc potius Pontium fuisse siquidem in illo tantum fuit roboris. Nondum centum & decem anni sunt, cūm de pecunijs reputundis a Lu. Pisone lata est lex, nulla antea cūm fuisset.

At vero postea tot leges & proximę quęque duriores, tot rei, tot damnati, tantū Italicū bellū propter iudiciorū metum excitatum, tanta sublati legibus & iudicijs, expilatio, direptioque sociorum,

O. ij.

de Officiis.

vt imbecillitate aliorū nō
nostra virtute valeamus.

Laudat Affricanum Panē
tius, qd' fuerit abstinens,
quid nī laudet? sed in illo
alia maiora. Laus enim ab
stinentiē non hominis est
solum, sed etiam tempo-
rum illorum.

Omni Macedonū gaza
quē fuit maxima, potit⁹ est
Paulus: tantū in ærarium
pecuniæ inuexit, vt vnus
imperatoris preda finē at-
tulerit tributorū.

At hic nihil in domum su-
am intulit, præter memori-
am nominis sempiternam
Imitatus patrem Affrica-
nus nihilo locupletior
Chartagine euerfa. Quid?
(qui eius collega in censu-
ra fuit) L. Mummius, nū-
quid copiosior cūm copi-
osissimā vrbem fundi-
tus sustulisset? Italiam or-
nare, quā domum suam
maluit. Quanquam Italia

that by the weakenes of o-
ther, not by oure prowess,
wee do preuaile. Panctius
praiseth African⁹, because
he was no taker.

Why shoulde hee not bee
praised? But other grea-
ter thinges there weare in
him. For the praise of re-
straining frō taking is not
only f^r mans, but also that
tūces Paul⁹ got al f^r Ma-
cedonians treasure, which
was exceedinge greate, hee
brought so much ryches in
to the treasury, that one
captaines boote made an
end of tributes: but he bore
nothinge into his house,
saue an euerlasting memo-
ry of his name.

Africanus folowed his fa-
ther, no whit the moze enri-
ched by Carthage razed.
what of Lucius Mummi-
us whoe was his office se-
lowe in the Censozshippe?
was hee anye deale the ry-
cher when by the grounde
he had onerthrowen f^r most
riche citie.

He was willing rather to
bewtifie Italse, than his
own house, although Ita-
ly being

being beautified. hys verpe
house seemeth to mee the
beautifuller. No vyce then
is there fowler (that thy-
ther mye talk may returne
from whēce it is strayed)
then couetousnesse, special-
lye, in pynces and common
weale rulers.

For it is not oly dishonest
but wicked also. & shame-
ful to make a gaine of the
commen wealthe.

Therefore wher as Apollo
Pythius gaue oute by ora-
cle, that Sparta noe other
way, but by couetousnesse
shoulde come to destruction
& same he seemeth to haue
prophecied not onely to the
Lacedemonians but also
to al wealthy peoples.

For theye who rule ouer
common weale, may by no
meanes sooner wyne the
good wyl of the multitude
then by a refrayning hand
and staydnesse.

But who so wyl be people
pleasers, and for that cause
do either attempt the mat-
ter of landes, that the ow-
ners may be, driuē frō their
holdes, or els do think mete
that

ornata, dom⁹ ipsa videtur
mihi ornatior. Nullum
igitur vitiū est tetrius (vt
eo, vnde egressa est referat
se oratio) quā auaricia, præ-
sertim in principib⁹ & Rēp.
gubernantibus.

Habere enim questui rēp.
non modo turpe est, sed
sceleratum etiam & nefa-
rium. Itaq; quod Appollo
Pythius oraculo edidit,
Spartam nulla re alia nisi
auaritia esse perituram, id
videtur non solū Lacedæ-
moniis, sed etiam omnibus
opulentis populis prædix-
isse. Nulla autem re conci-
liare facilius beneuolentiā
multitudinis possūt ij, qui
Reip. præsūt quā absti-
nētia & continentia.

Qui verō se popula-
res volunt esse ob eamque
causam aut agrariam rem-
tentant vt possessores suis
sedibus pellantur, aut pæ-
cunias creditas debitorib⁹

de Officiis.

condonandas putant, ij that loued money be remitted to y^e debtors: they shake labefactant fundamenta y^e foundations of y^e comon Reipublicæ. concordiam weale, first they take away primum quæ esse non potest, quam alijs adimuntur concord, which cannot bee when money is pulled from alijs condonantur pecuniæ, & forgeruen to other some, nexte they banyshe equitatem, which is wholy tollitur omnis si habere su rooted out, if it be not law um, cuique non licet. ful for euery man to haue his owne.

Id enim est proprium, For that is the prop end vt supra dixi, ciuitatis at as I saide before of a city que vrbs, vt sit libera, & and borough, that there be non sollicita sue rei cuius a free, and no troublesome que custodia. Atq; in hac keeping of euerye mannes perniciæ Reipub. ne illam own good. quidem cōsequuntur, quā And in this mischief of y^e putant gratiam. comon wealth, they do not attain such fauour as they suppose they doe.

Nam cui res erepta est, For he from whom goods est inimicus, cui data est e- be taken is become an ene- tiam dissimulat se accipe- my, he also to whom they re voluisse, et maxime in are geue makes as though pecunijs creditis occultat hee is not willinge to take suum gaudium, ne videatur non fuisse soluendo. them, and moſte of all hee hydes his toy in loued money forgeruen. least he maye seeme to haue beene vnable to pay it.

But

But surely hee that recei-
ueth the wrong, both bea-
reth hys grieve in remem-
brance, and sheweth it in
sight neither if they be moe
to whom wickedly it hath
bene geuen, than they from
whō vniustly it hath bene
take, it foloweth that there
fore they bee also moze in
power.

For these thynges be iud-
ged not by number, but by
weight. And what equite
is in this: if he should haue
land who hath had none, &
he should forgo land, who
hath had it many yeares,
yea or hundredes of yeres
before continued in posses-
sion.

But for this kinde of in-
iurie, the Lacedemonians
draue oute Lysander the
Ephozian, and they slewe
Agis the king, whiche had
neuer happened amōg the
before, whereof followed,
at that time so great discē-
sions, that there arose tri-
bunes, & their noble men
were exiled & a verie well
ordered comon weale wēt
to ruine.

At vero ille qui accipit in-
iuriam & meminit & præ-
se fert dolorem suum nec
si plures sūt ij quibus im-
probè datum est, quàm illi
quibus iniustè ademptum
est, id circo plus etiam
valent.

Non enim numero hæc iu-
dicantur, sed pondere.

Quam autè habet equita-
tè, vt agrum multis annis,
aut etiam sæculis antè pos-
sessū, qui nullū habuit habe-
at, qui autem habuit, amit-
tat? At ppter hoc iniuriæ
genus Lacedemonij Lisā-
drum Ephorum expule-
runt: Agin regem (quod
nunquam antea apud eos
acciderat) necauerūt.

Ex quo tempore tantę dis-
cordiæ secutę sunt, vt tirā-
ni existerent, et optimates,
exterminarentur, & præ-
clarissimè constituta Res-
publi. dilaberetur,

O.iiij.

de Officiis.

Nec verò solum ipsa cecidit: sed etiam reliquâ Græciam euertit contagionibus malorum, quæ a Lacedæmonijs profectæ manarunt latius. Quid nostros Gracchos Tib. Gracchi summi viri filios, Africanos nepotes, nonne agrariæ contentiones pdiderunt?

At vero Aratus Sicyonius iure laudatur: qui cum eius ciuitas L. annos a tyrannis teneretur, pfectus Argis Sicyonem clandestino introitu vrbe est positus, cumquæ tyrannum Nicoclem, improuiso oppressisset, sexcentos exules, qui fuerant eius ciuitatis locupletissimi restituit, Remq; pub. aduentu suo liberauit.

Sed cum magnam animaduerneret in bonis & possessionibus difficultatē quod & eos, quos & ipse

had a fall but also it ouerthrew the rest of Greece with the infectious of much chiefes whiche sprynginge from the Lacedæmonians did flowe farther abroade: what of our Gracch? Tib. Gracchus & noble mannes sonnes, Africanus childrens children: byd not landstrues bring them to destruction?

But in deede Aratus the Sicyonia is rightfully commended: who, when his citie was sitte peres wythe holden by tyrantes: being departed fro Argos to Sicion, & a priuie stolne entrie, gotte possession of the citie: & when, vppon a sodaine, he had ouerthrowen the tyrant Nicocles: he re-took hōe againe six hundred banisht men, who had bene the greatest possessors of the citie, and by his comminge, set the common weale at libertie.

But when he percepued the great inconuenience in the goodes and possessions because both he thought it very

berpe vnrasonable , that
they should lacke whom he
hiscife had restozed, whose
goods other had possesed,
and againe to remoue fifty
yeres possession.he iudged
it not very indifferēt: bee-
cause that in so lōg a space
much by enheritāce, much
by sale, much by dower,
was holdē without wrong
he thought it was necessa-
ry: neither the goodes too
be takē from thē, nor those
to bee vnsatisfied, whose
had bene befoze, when hee
had then determined, that
he shoulde neede mony, for
the ordering of the matter:
he saide hee would make a
page to Alexandria: and
commanded the matter to
remayne vntouched, vntill
his returne.

And hee with speede went
to Ptolomeus, who had
ben his entertainer: which
then reigned the seconde af-
ter the buyldings of Alex-
andria: to whom when he
had declared, that he was
minded to set his countrey
at libertie: and had enfor-
med him of y^e case: y^e noble

Man

restituerat, quorum bona
alij possiderant, egere ini-
quissimū arbitrabatur: &
L.ānorū possessiones mo-
uere non nimis equum pu-
tabat, propterea quod tam
longo spacio multa here-
ditatibus, multa emptioni-
bus, multa dotibus tenebā-
tur, sine iniuria iudicauit,
nequē illis adimi, nequē
his non satisfieri, quorum
illa fuerant, oportere.

Cū igitur statuisset
opus esse ad eam rem con-
stituendam pecunia Alex-
andriam se proficisci velle
dixit, remquē integram ad
reditum suum iussit esse.

Isq; celeriter ad Ptolome-
um suum hospitem venit,
qui tum regnabat alter
post Alexandriam condi-
tam: cui cū exposuisset,
patriam se liberare velle,
causamquē docuisset: a
rege opulento vir summ⁹

de officiis.

facile impetrauit: vt grandi pecunia adiuuaretur.

Quam cum Sicyonem attulisset, adhibuit sibi in consilium quindecim principes: cum quibus causas cognouit, et eorum qui aliena tenebant, & eorum, qui sua amiserant, perfecit que estimandis possessionibus, vt persuaderet alijs vt pecuniā accipere mallet, & possessionibus cederent: alijs, vt commodius putarent numerari sibi quod tanti esset, quā suū recuperare.

Ita perfectum est, vt omnes constituta cōcordia sine querela discederent.

O virum magnū, dignum quē, qui in nostra Republica natus esset.

Sic par est agere cum ciuib' non (vt bistam vidimus)

manne soone obtained of a rich king, to be aided with a masse of money.

Whiche when hee hadde brought into Sicyon, he tooke to him in counsel fifteen of his nobles wythe whom hee examined the cases both of them who dyd witholde other mens, and of theirs, who had lost ther own. & did put these fifteen in commission for the dealing of possessions and to perswade some, that they would be willing to take monye, and to release their possession, and other some to thinke, that too haue as much payde them in balowe, it were more profite, than to recouer ther owne. So it came too passe, that they all departed withoute complainte, by a well ordered concord.

A manne of much honour, and worthy to haue bene borne in our commonweale.

Thus it is meete to deale with citizens, and not (as twise already we haue sene

to pitch salestasse in ſ mar-
ket place, and to putte the
goodes of the citizens in ſ
cryers mouth. But that
Greeke thought meete too
proude for all, which was
the part of a wyſe, and a
worthy man. And that ys
the greateſt diſcretion, and
wiſedome of an honozable
cityzen to defende, not to
pull awaye the cytizens cō
modities, and to conteyne
them al within one maner
of equitie.

But ſome will ſay, menne
may dwel rentfree in ano-
thers houſe, why ſo?
That whe I haue bought
it, haue buyded it, doo re-
paire it, do laye charges vpon
it, thou ſhouldeſt haue
the ble of mine againſt my
wil: what is this els, but
from ſome too take their
own, & to ſome to geue o-
ther menneſ.

And as for the new tables
what reaſon haue theye:
but that you may buy land
with my money, & poſſeſſe
it your ſelfe, & yet I maye
not haue my money.

where

hastam in foro ponere, &
bona ciuium voci ſubijce-
re preconis. At ille Græ-
cus, illud quod fuit ſapien-
tis & preſtantis viri, om-
nibus conſulendum puta-
uit.

Ea quæ eſt ſumma ratio, &
ſapientia boni ciuis, com-
moda ciuium defendere,
non diuellere: atquæ om-
nes æquitate eadem conti-
nere.

Habitant gratis in alie-
no. Quid ita? vt cum ego
emerim, edificauerim, tue-
ar, impendam, tu me inui-
to fruare meo, quid eſt
aliud aliis ſua eripere, alijs
dare aliena?

Tabulæ verò nouæ quid
habent argumenti, niſi vt
amas mea pæcunia fun-
dum, & eum tu habeas, e-
go non habeam pecuni-
am.

de officiis.

Quamobrem ne sit es alie
num, quod Reipub. noce-
at prouidendū est, quod
multis rationibus cauēri
potest hoc si nō fuerit, vt
locupletes suū pdant, de-
bitores lucrentur alienum
Nec enim vlla res vehemē-
tius Rēpub. continet quā
fides: quē esse nulla potest
nisi. erit necessaria solutio
rerum creditarum.

Nunquam vehemētius ac-
tum est quā me consule
ne solueretur. Armis &
castris tentata res est ab
omni genere hominum &
ordine, quibus sic restiti,
vt totum hoc malum de
Repub. tolleretur. Nun-
quam nec maius es alienū
fuit, nec melius nec facili-
us dissolutum est. Fraus-
dandi enim spe sublata,
soluēdi necessitas consecu-
ta est. At vero hic noster
victor, nunc quidē victus

wherefoze it must be prou-
ded, that there be noe debte
which may hynder the co-
mon weale, whiche thynge
may be looked to manye
waies. if this be not suffe-
red, that possessioners lose
theire owne, noz detters
gaine other mens.

Foz nothing moze strōgly
preserueth a commō welthe
then faithfulness. whych
can bee none all al, excepte
there be of necessitie a pay-
ment of thinges lōned.

Foz neuer moze earnestlye
it was gone aboute. then
when I was Consull, &
ther should be no paymēt.
The matter was attēpted
withe speare and shilde, by
euery sorte and degree of
men, whom in suche wyse
I withstoode, that this so
great a mischiefe was roa-
ted out of & comon wealth.
Neuer was there moze
dette, neither better noz ea-
sier payde. Foz when hope
of defrauding was taken
away, necessitie of payment
folowed.

But this our conquerour
nowe verelye conquered,
hath

hath compassed those things, whiche hee purposed, whereas now hee is neuer a whit & better. So great was hys desire to doe noughtely, that euen & being doing of naughtines delighted him, although hee had no occasion. They the who shal vpholde the common weale, must kepe the away from this manner of large giustes, that to some they be geuen, and from other they bee taken, & specially must geue their diligence, that by equitie, lawe and iudgement euery man may holde his owne, and neyther the poozer sorte, for their small abilitie, bee deceiued by couine, nor enye maye hinder the riche eyther to keepe, or recouer their owne. Moreover, by what meanes so euer theye canne, eyther in warre or peace, lette them enlarge the common weale, wpythe dominion, lande, and custome.

These bee the deedes of noble men, these were practised among our anceters, these

que cogitarat, cum ipsius intererat, ea p̄ficit cū eius iam nihil interesset.

Tanta in eo peccandi libido fuit, vt hoc ipsum eum delectaret, peccare, etiam si causa non esset. Ab hoc igitur genere largitionis, vt alijs detur, alijs auferatur, aberunt ij, qui Remp. tuebuntur. Inprimisque operam dabunt, vt iuris & iudiciorum equitate suum quisque teneat: & neque tenuiores propter imbecilitatem circumueniantur: neque locupletibus ad sua vel tenenda, vel recuperanda obsit inuidia. Preterea quibuscumque rebus, vel bello vel domi poterunt, Rempub. augeant, imperio, agris, vectigalibus.

Hec magnorum hominum sunt, hec apud maiores nostros factitata.

de Officiis.

Hec genera officiorū qui these kindes of dutties who
persequuntur, cum sūma so folowe, shall with verpe
vtilitate Reipublicę, mag- greate profit to the cōmon
num ipsi adipiscentur & weal, get themselves bothe
& gratiā et gloriam. great fauour and glory.

In his autem vtilitatum But in these preceptes of
pręceptis Antipater of Tīre profite. Antipater of Tīre
Tyrius Stoicus, who alate dy- the Stoike, who alate dy-
ed at Athens. thinks, that
nup est mortuus duo prę- two preceptes be ouer lea-
terita cęset esset a Panętio ped of Panętius, tēdering
of health, and prouision of
valetudinis curationem, money,
& pecunię: Quas res a sū- which thinges I suppose
mo philosopho pręteritas to haue been ouerpassid by
arbitror, quod essent faci- the noble philosopher, bee-
les, sunt tamen certē vti- cause they were light mat-
ters yet without doubt, they
les. Sed valetudo susten- be profitable.
tatur notitia sui corporis, But health is preserued by
& obseruatione, quę res knoweledge of ones owne
aut prodesse soleant aut body, and markinge those
obesse: & continentia in thinges, whiche are swont
victu omni atque cultu, either to do good. oz harme
corporis tuendi causa, & and by a staiednes both in
pretermittendis volupta- all a mannes dyet, and ap-
tibus: postremo arte eorū, parell, for cherishing of the
quorum ad scientiam hæc body, and also for bearinge
peritinent. pleasures, and lastelye, by
their conuige, to whose
science these thinges per-
tine.

Res autem familiaris quę But a mans substance
must

muste bee gotten, by those things which be far from dishonesty, and must be saved by diligence, & honest, sparing, and by those same meanes also, it must be encreased.

Xenophon the Socratician hath gonned through these things verie handsomly, in that booke whiche is intituled Economicus, the whiche wee turned out of Greeke into latine, when we were at y same age in a maner as you are now.

But comparing of profits (because this forwerth place was ouer passed by Panetius,) is oftentimes necessarie. For bothe the gifts of the bodie, are wot to bee compared wyth fortunes gifts, and also fortunes gifts with the bodie gifts, and those of y bodie one with an other, & those that fortune geetes, likewise one with an other.

The bodie gifts be compared w fortunes, after this sort, y he had rather bee in helth, thā be rich, fortunes gift be compared w y bodie

ri debet ijs rebus a quibus abest turpitudine, conseruari autem diligentia & parsimonia, eisdem etiam rebus augeri.

Has res comodissimè Xenophon Socraticus perfectus est in eo libro, qui Economicus inscribitur: quem nos ista ferè etate cum essemus, quæ es tu nunc, e grecis in latinum conuertimus.

Sed vtilitatum cõparatio (quoniam hic locus erat quartus a Panetio pretermisus) sæpe est necessaria. Nam et corporis comoda cum externis & externa cum corporis: & ipsæ inter se corporis: & externa cum externis comparari solent.

Cum externis corporis, hoc modo cõparatur, valere vt malis, quā diues esse. Cū corporis externa,

de Officiis.

hoc modo, diue, esse poti-
us quàm maximis corpo-
ris viribus.

Ipsa inter se corporis, sic:
vt bona valetudo volup-
tati anteponatur, vires ce-
leritati Externorum au-
tem, vt gloria diuitijs, ve-
tigalia vrbana rusticis.

Ex quo genere compara-
tionis illud est Catonis se-
nis a quo cùm quæreretur
quid maximè in re famili-
ari expediret: respondit,
bene pascere. Quid secun-
dum? satis bene pascere:
Quid tertium? bene ve-
stire.

Quid quartum? arare.

Et cùm ille qui quæsie-
rat dixisset: quid scenera-
ri? Tum Cato, quid homi-
nem, inquit, occidere?

Ex quo, & multis alijs
intelligi debet, vtilitatum
comparationes soleri fieri:

in this wise, that you had
rather be riche, than of ve-
ry great strength.

Those of the body be com-
pared one with an other,
thus that good helth be pre-
ferred befoze pleasure, and
strength befoze swiftnesse.

But fortunes guiftes be
cōpared together, this way
that glozy bee esteemed be-
foze ryches, & citie tribute
befoze the countreis.

Of the whiche kinde of cō-
parisson is that sayinge of

Cato & old man, of whom
when it was demaunded,
what was most profitable
for a mans substaunce, he
made answer, to feede well,
what & seconde. To feede
sufficiently well, what the
third. To clothe well, what
& fowerth, to plowe. And
whē he, who had moued &
question had laide, what to
lende vpon vsurie? then
what is it, quoth Cato to
kill a man?

wherupon, and of many
other things it ought to be
gathered, that compariss
of profytes are wont to be
made, and that this is very
well

wel adioined for þ̄ fowerth
point of searchinge oute of
duties.

But of this whole matter
of getting money, of besto-
wing the same, and also of
vsinge it, farre better it is
disputed by certaine honest

men, sitting at þ̄ middle

Plane, thā of any philo-
sophers in any schole,

yet are they to bee

knowne, and of

them in this

booke we

haue trea-

ted.

The rest will we

prosecute her-

after.

& rectè hoc adiunctum
esse quartū exquirèdorum

officiorum gen⁹. Sed toto

hoc de genere, de querèda

de collocàda pecunia, etiā

de vtèda, cōmodius à qui-

busdā optimis viris ad Ia-

nū mediū sedētib⁹, quā ab

vllis philosophis vlla ischo-

la disputatur. Sūt tamē ea

cognoscèda. Pertinēt

enim ad vtili-

tatem,

de qua hoc libro dispu-

tatū est. Reliqua

deinceps per-

sequemur.

P. i.

de Officijs.

M. TVLLII CICE-
RONIS, DE OFFI-

cijs Liber ter-
tius.

¶ MARCVS
TVLLIVS CICE-

roes third booke of
duties to Mar-
cus his sonne.

PVBLIVM SCIPI-

onem, Marce fili, cum
qui primus Africanus
appellatus est, dicere
solitum scripsit Cato, qui
fuit fere eius equalis, nun-
quam se minus otiosum ef-
se, quàm cum otiosus: nec
minus solum, quàm cum
solus esset. Magnifica ve-
rò vox & magno viro ac
sapiente digna quæ decla-
rat illum, & in otio de ne-
gotijs cogitare, & in solitu-
dine secum loqui solitum,
vt neq; cessaret vnquam,
& interdum colloquio al-
terius non egeret. Itaq;
duæ res, quæ languorem
afferunt cæteris, illum



The same Publi-
Scipio, sonne
Marke, who the
firste Africanus
was named wold cōmōlye
say, as Cato hath written,
who was in a maner hys
like in yeres: That he was
neuer more lesureles than
when hee was leasurefull:
and neuer lesse alone, than
when he was all alone. A
noble sayig surely, & meete
for a worthy, & wise man:
whiche declareth, that hee
both in his lesure was wōt
to muse of matters too bee
done, & also in his solitari-
nesse, to debate them withe
him selfe, so as he was no-
thing idle at anye time, and
sometime needed not the cō-
municatiō of other. And so
these two thinges, leasure,
and solitarinesse, whiche
bzing a dulnes vpon other
made

made him the quicker. **I** acuebāt, otium & solitudo.
would wish, & we likewise Vellē & nobis hoc idem
might truely say the verpe verē dicere liceret. Sed si
same. But although by im- minus imitatione tāta inge-
itacion wee are not able to nij præstatiā cōsequi possu-
atteine so great excellēce of mus: volūtate certē proxi-
wit, yet, doubtlesse in desire mē accedim⁹. Nā et a Rep
we come verpe neere. forensibusq; negotijs ar-
For both by wicked war, mis impijs, viq; prohibiti,
& power, being put of from otium persequimur, & ob
common weale matters & eam causam vrbe relicta
iudiciall causes, wee take rura peragrantes sepe soli
oure quiet leasure, & for & sumus. Sed nec otium hoc
cause leauing the citie, and cū Africani otio, nec soli-
walking abroad in & coun- tudo hęc cū illa comparan-
trep, oftentimes we be alōe. da est. Ille enim requiescēs
But neither this leasure is à Reip, pulcherimis mune-
to be cōpared with Africa ribus, otium sibi sumebat
nus leasure: nor this soly- aliquando, & a cētū ho-
tarinesse, with that of his. minum, frequentiaq; inter
For hee ceasinge from the dum tanquam in portum
goodly ministracion of the se in solitudinem recipie-
common weale, tooke hym bat. N ostrum autem oti-
selfe leasure otherwhyle, & um negotij inopia, non re-
from the pzease, and resozt quietiscendi studio consti-
of men, nowe and thā into tutum est. Extincto enim
a solitarie place, as into a senatu deletisq; iudicijs
hauen, withdrew hym selfe, P. ij. quid
but our leasure comes not
of desire of rest but for lack
of busines. For scynge the
Senate is deposed, and
iudgementes abolished:
what

de Officijs.

quid est quod dignū nobis aut in curia, aut in foro agere possimus? Itaque in maxima celebritate atq; in oculis ciuiū quōdā vixim⁹, nūc fugiētes cōspectū sceleratorū, quibus ōnia redū dant, abdimus nos quantū licet, & sepe soli sum⁹. Sed quia sic ab hominibus doc tis accepimus, non solūm ex malis eligere minima oportere: sed etiā excerptere ex his ipsis, si quid inesset boni: ppter ea & otio fruor, non illo quidē, quo debeat vtiis. q̄ quōdā peperisset otiiū ciuitati. Nec eā solitudinē lāguere patior, quā mihi affert necessitas nō voluntas. Quanquam Africanus maiorē laudem meo iudicio assequebatur nulla tamen ei⁹ igenij monumenta mandata literis, nullum opus otij, nullum solitudinis munus extat,

what is there, that eyther in court, or in place of pleameets for vs we may do. Therfore wee, who in the greatest assemble, & in the eyes of y citizens sometime haue liued, now fleeinge y sight of the wycked, wyth whom all places swarme: doe withdawe our selues as much as we may, & are oftentimes alone. But because th⁹ wee haue herd of learned men, y not only we ought of euyls to choose the least, but also if there were any goodnes in thē, to pike it out, therfore both I enioye quietnes not such twis, as hee ought to haue, who once procured quietnes to the whole city, and also do not suffer that solitarinesse too wax ydle: which necessitie byzings bypon me, & not mine owne desire. Although African⁹ did get greater praise, euen in my iudgemēt, yet no monuments of his witte put in wyting, no woꝝk of hys quiet life, no fruit of his solitarines remaines abyode. Whcreof

wherof it muste needes be gathered. & hee, by earnest occupieng of hys mynde, and by beating out those thinges, which by musing hee attained: was neither idle, nor at any time alone but wee who haue not so great depenes of witt, that by secret musing wee be drawn from solitarinesse: do turne al our studie, and endeavour to thys trauaile of witting. And therefore we haue written more in a shorte space, since the state was ouerthrowne, than in many yeres, when it stode. But where as all philosophie, my Cicero, is verie good, and fruitfull, nor any parte therof is barrenne, and waste, yet not place therein is more yelding, nor more plaintfull, than the place touching duties, fro which be borrowed the preceptes of liuing constantly, and honestly. wherfore although I trust you dayly heare, and receiue thys same of our Cratippus, prince of Philosophers in these daies, neuertheles I

Ex quo intelligi debet, illū mentis agitatione, inuestigationeque earū rerum, quas cogitando consequebatur nec otiosū, nec solū vnquā fuisse. Nos autē, qui nō tantū roboris habemus, vt cogitatione tacita à solitudine abstrahamur, ad hanc scribendi operā ōne studiū curamque conuertim⁹. Itaque plura breui tēpore euerſa, quā multis ānis ſtāte Rep, ſcripſimus. Sed cū tota philoſophia mi Cicero, frugifera, & fructuoſa, nec vlla pars eius inculta ac deſerta ſit: tamē nullus feracior in ea locus eſt, nec vberior, quā de officijs, à quibus cōſtanter, honeſteque viuenti pręcepta ducūtur. Quare quanquā à Cratippo noſtro principe huius memorię philoſophorū hæc te aſſiduē audire, atque accipere conſido: tamen

de officijs.

conducere arbitror talib' aures tuas vocibus vndique circūsonare, nec eas, si fieri possit, quicquam aliud audire. Quod cūm omnibus est faciendum, qui vitam honestam ingredi cogitant: tamē haud scio an nemini potius quā tibi. Sustines enim nō paruam expectationem imitandæ industriæ nostræ magnam honorum, nōnullam fortasse nominis. Suscepisti o- nus preterea graue & Athenarum, & Cratippi ad quos cūm tāquam: ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem redire turpissimum est, dedecorantem & vrbis auctoritatem & magistri. Quare quantum conniti animo potes quantum labore cōtendere (si discendi labor est potius quam voluptas) tantum fac

holde it profitable, that I ring about your ears with suche soundes, on euery syde: & that they, if possible it maye bee done, heare none other thinge. Which both is to be don of al those that minde to enter the honest life, and I wotte not whether of anye man more than of your selfe, for you carye an expectation, not final of folowing our trade great of comming too oure honour, some paraduēture of attaininge too our fame You haue taken vpon you moreouer a greate charge, both by reason of Athens, and also of Cratippus, to the which seeing, as too the mart of good sciēces, you haue trauailed: too retorne cūptie, a greate reproch it is, staininge the worshoppe bothe of the citie, and also of your maister. wherfore as muche as by wytte you ar able to compass, as much as by paine you can endeavour (if to studie be rather a paine, than pleasure) so muche see, that you doe in heede.

dede, and gyue noe occasi-
on that seing all things are
sufficed by vs, you shoulde
seeme to haue disapointed
your selfe. But of these ma-
ters hitherto. For we haue
oftentimes wrytten muche
vnto you, in way of exor-
tatio. Now to the part re-
maininge of the foresayde
diuision let vs retourne.

Panætius therfore, who
without doubt of duple
hathe moste diligently dis-
puted, and whom wee,
vsing a certayne correcty-
on, haue chieselye folowed
when hee hadde set forth
thre kinde, in whiche
menne sweare wont to con-
sell, and aduise them sel-
ues of duple, the one. whē
theye shoulde doubt. whe-
ther it, wherewyth theye
were in hande, were ho-
nest, or dishonest. the other
whether it were profitable
or vnprofitable, the thyrde,
if that, which shoulde haue
the shewe of honesty, shoulde
strype wth it, that
seemed profitable: howe
it shoulde bee necessarie,
those

vt efficias, nēue commit-
tas, vt cūm omnia suppedi-
tata sint à nobis, tute tibi
desuisse videre. Sed hæc
hactenus. Multa enim se-
pè ad te cohortandi gratia
scripsimus. Nunc ad reli-
quam partem propositę di-
uisionis reuertamur,

Panætius igitur, qui si-
ne controuersia de offici-
is acuratissimè disputauit,
quemquē nos, correctiōe
quadam adhibita, potissi-
mum secuti sumus: tribus
generibus propositis, in
quibus deliberare homi-
nes & consultare de offi-
cio solerent: vno cum du-
bitarent honestumnē id
esset de quo ageretur, an
turpe: altero vtilenē, an in-
utile: tertio si id, quod spe-
ciē haberet honesti pugna-
ret cū eo, qd' vtile videre-
tur: quomodo ea discerni

P.iiij.

oporte-

de officijs.

oportere: de duobus generibus primis tribus libris explicauit: de tertio autē genere deinceps se, scripsit dicturū, nec exoluit id qd' promiserat. Quod eò magis miror quia scriptum a discipulo eius Possidonio est, triginta ānos vixisse Panetiū postquā illos libros edidisset. Quē locū miror à Possidonio breuiter esse tactū in quibusdā cōmentarijs: præsertim cū scribat nullū esse locū in tota philosophia tā necessariū. Minimē verō assentior ijs, qui negant eū locū a Panetio prætermissum: sed consulto relictū: nec omnino scribendum fuisse, quia nunquam posset vtilitas cū honestate pugnare. De quo alterū potest habere dubitationē, adhibendū sive fuerit hoc genus, quod in diuisione Panetij tertium est, an plane omittendum, those same to be discerned: of the first two kindes, in thzee bokes he opened hys mynde: & of the third kinde he wrote he woulde speake afterwarde: & that did hee not perform, which hee had promised, wherat I maruaile the more: because yt is witten bye hys scholer Possidonius: that Panetius liued thirtie yeres after he had set forth the those bokes, which place I wonder, it whs so briefely touched of Possidonius in certaine abridgements: specially seing he writes, there is no place in all Philosophie so necessarie. But in no wise I agree w them, which denye thys place did onerskape Panetius: but that of purpose it was left out: and that it was not to be witten at al, because profit might not striue w the honestye. Touchinge the whiche, the one maye haue in it a doubte: whether this part, which in Panetius deuphsion is the thyrde was too bee added, or whether too bee left oute, the

the other can not bee doubted of, but of Panætius yt was taken in hande, and yet lesse vntreated. For who so of a threeparted diuision two partes hath finished, too hym the thyrde must nedes remaine. Whoe ouer, in hys thyrde booke toward the ende, hee promised, that afterwarde hee wil speake of this part, Hereto commeth a substa-
ciall witnesse, Possidonius who also writeth in a certeine letter, that Publius Rutilius Rufus, whych hadde hearde Panætius, was wont to saye, lyke as no painter might bee found who could finishe by that part of Menus, whiche Appelles hadde lesse vnfynished: (for the beautye of her face tooke awaye the hope of counterfeitinge the reste of her bodye) so those thynges, that Panætius hadde ouer passed, and had not finished, their was no mā to prosecute, because of the excellence of those matters, which he had gone thorow withall, wherefore of
Pa

Alterum dubitari non potest, quin à Panætio susceptū sit, sed relictū. Nā qui è diuisione tripartita duas partes absoluerit: huic necesse est restare tertiā. Præterea in extremo libro tertio, de hac parte pollicetur sed deinceps esse dicturum
Accedit eodem testis locus ples Possidonius, qui etiam scribit in quadā epistola P. Rutiliū Rufum dicere solere, qui Panætiū audierat: vt nemo pictor esse inuentus, qui Veneris ear partem, quam appelles inchoatam reliquisset, obsolueret (oris enim pulchritudo, reliqui corporis imitandi spem auferebat) sic ea, quæ Panætius prætermisisset & nō perfecisset, præter eorū, quæ fecisset præstatiā, neminem esse perfecturum. Quamobrem de iudicio

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iudicio Panætij dubitari: non potest, recte autem hanc tertiā partē ad exquirendū officiū adiūxerit, an scilicet: de eo fortassē dubitari potest. Nā siue honestū solū bonū est, vt Stoicis placet: siue qd' honestū est, id ita sūmū bonū est (quēadmodū Peripateticis nostris videt') vt ōnia ex altera parte collocata, vix miūmi mōmētī instar habeāt: dubitā dū nō est, quin nūquā possit vtilitas cū honestate cōtēdere. Itaq; accepimus Socratē solitū execrari eos, q' primū hęc natura coherentia opinione distraxissent. Cui quidem ita sunt Stoci assēsi, vt et quicquid honestum esset, id vtile esse censerent: nec vtile quicquam quod non honestū. Quod si is esset Panætius, qui virtutem propterea colēdam diceret, quod ea efficiens vtilitatis esset: vt ij, qui res expetendas,

Paneti⁹ iudgement it can not be doubted, but whether hes to the serching out of dutie. this third part adioyned wel or no, therof peraduenture it may be doubted for whether honesty be only good as liketh the Stoikes, or els honesty in such sort be the soueraine good (as seemeth to our Peripatetikes) they count al things, set on y other side of very smal weight in comparison, it is not to be doubted, but that profit can neuer be at strife w honestye Therefore we haue heard say, Socrates was wonte to curse the, who first parted a sonder in opiniō these that by nature were coupled together, to whō doubtles the Stoikes so asserted that what so were honest the same also they iudged to be profitable. nor anye thing to be profitable whiche were not honeste. If Panetius were y mā who woulde saye, that vertue therfore shoulde be honored, because it ys y cause of profite, as thepe, who measure thinges meete

to be desired either by pleasure, or by ingratification: hee might maintein that, honestie sometime striues with profit. But seeing he is y^e man who iudgeth y^e onely good which is honest. & that mans life is made neuer the better, by encrease of suche things, as be repugnant to honestie vnder a certayne shewe of profit, nor by decrease of them the worse, it seemes he should not haue brought in such manner talking of aduancement, where in that, which should seeme profitable, should be compared with that, whiche ys honest. For that, which of the Stoikes ys called the soueraigne good, as to liue agreeable to nature, it hath (as I suppose) this meaning, with vertues alway to agree, & other things which shoulde be accordig to nature. so to those: if to vertue they were not repugnant- whiche seeinge it ys so, some suppose, this comparison was not well brought in: nor anye thinge at all, touching the branche should

vel voluptate, vel indolentia metiuntur, liceret ei dicere honestatē aliquando cū vtilitate pugnare. Sed cū sit is, quid id solum bonum iudicet quod honestū sit: quę autē huic repugnent specie quadā vtilitatis, eorū neq; accessione meliorē vitā fieri, nec decessione peiorē, non videtur huiusmodi debuissē deliberationē introducere: in quę qd' vtile videretur, cū eo, qd' honestū est, cōparetur. Etenim quod summum bonū à Stoicis dicitur, conueniēter naturæ viuere, id habet hāc (vt opinor) sētētiā naturā cū virtute congruere sēper, cētera autē q̄ secundum naturam essēt, ita legere, si ea virtuti non repugnarent. Quod cū ita sit, putant quodē hanc cōparationem non esse rectē introductam, nec omnino de eo genere quicquā

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percipiendū fuisse. Atq; il-
lud quidē honestum, quod
pprie verēq; dicitur, id in
sapiētibus est solis, neque a
virtute diuelli vnquā po-
test. In ijs autē in quibus sa-
piētia pfecta nō est ipsū il-
lud quidē pfectū honestū
nullo modo, sed similitudi-
nes honesti esse possūt. Hęc
enim ōnia officia, de quib⁹
his libris disputamus, medi-
a Stoici appellant: & ea
cōmunia sūt, & latē patent
q̄ & ingenij bonitate mul-
ti assequūtur, & progressio-
ne discēdi. Illud autē quod
rectū ijdē appellāt, pfectū
atq; absolutū est: et vt ijdē
dicūt ōnes numeros habet
nec pręter sapientē cadere
in quēquā potest. Cū autē
aliquid actū est, in quo me-
dia officia cōparātur, id cu-
mulatē videtur esse pfectū
propterea quod vulgus
quid absit ā perfectō, fe-
rē non ex toto intelli-
git: quatenus autem in

should haue bene taughte.
And suretye that honestye
which is properly, & truly
so called, is in the wise on-
ly, and from vertue can ne-
uer be seuered, but in those
in whom is not perfect wise-
dome, doubtles & sãe pfecte
honesty cā in noe wise bee.
seblaunces of honesty ther
may bee. Al these duptyes
therefore, whereuppon in
these booke we dispute, &
Stoikes cal the meane du-
ties: & those be cōmon duti-
ties, & do spred farre. Why-
che many atteine bothe by
goodnes of wit, and by go-
ing forēward in learninge.
But that whiche they call
Rectum, is the perfecte and
absolute duptye. & as theye
also say, it hath al his par-
tes, neither can happen too
any, but a wise man. And
when any thing is doone,
wherein the meane duties
may appere, it semeth to be
fully persitt because the cō-
mon people almoste vnder-
standeth not at all. What it
wanteth of perfyete, but as
farre as they vnderstande,
they

they think nothing is leste
vndoone. And whereas it
comonly chaſiceth in mee-
ters, & paintings, & in other
things mo. that the vnſkil-
full bee delighted & praiſe
thoſe thinges, that are not
to be praiſed, for that cauſe
I helceue they doe ſo, that
in thoſe there is ſome good
grace, that catcheth the ig-
norant, who in dede be not
able to diſcern, what faulte
is in euery thing. And ther-
fore whē they be taught of
the ſkilful, they ſone fal fro
theire opinion. The Sto-
ikes then ſay, that theſe du-
ties, whereuppon in theſe
bookes wee treat, bee (as
who ſayth) certain ſecond
ſortes of honeſtie, not pro-
per only to the wiſe but co-
mō alſo to all maner of mē
therfore all be allured &
theſe, in whō ther is a for-
wardneſſe of vertue. And
when the two Decij, or
two Scipioes be vouched
for māly men, or els when
Fabriti⁹, or Ariſtides bee
alleged as iuſt, neither of
them for manlines, nor of
theſe for iuſtice & exāple is
brought ab his iuſtitiē tāquā à ſapiē-
tibus

telligit, nihil putat præter-
miſſū. Quod autē in Poe-
matibus & in picturis vſu
venit, in alijsq; cōpluribus,
vt delectētur imperiti lau-
dentq; ea quæ laudanda
non ſint, ob eā credo cau-
ſam, quod inſit in his ali-
quid probi, quod capiat ig-
naros, qui ijdem quid in
vna quaq;re vitijs ſit, neque
āt iudicare. Itaq; cū ſint
docti a peritis, facile deſiſ-
tūt à ſententia. Hæc igitur
officia de quib⁹ his libris
diſſerimus, quaſi ſecunda
quedā honeſta, dicunt eſſe
nō ſapiētiū modō propria,
ſed cū ōni hominū genere
cōmunia. Itaq; his ōnes, in
quibus eſt virtutis indoles,
cōmouētur. Nec vero cū
duo Decij, aut duo Scipio
nes, fortes viri cōmemorā-
tur, aut cū Fabritius, aut A-
riſtides iuſtus nominatur,
aut ab illis fortitudinis, aut

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tib⁹ petitur exēplū. Nemo enī horū sic sapiēs est, vt sapiētem volum⁹ hic intelligi. Nec ij, q̄ sapientes habitū sunt et nominati M. Cato, & C. Leli⁹ sapientes fuerunt, nec illi quidē septem, sed ex mediōrū officiōrū frequentia, similitudinē quādam gerebāt, specieq; sapientū Quocircā nec id, quod vere honestū est, fas est, cū utilis repugnātia cōparari: nec id, qd̄ comuniter appellam⁹ honestum, quodq; colitur ab ijs, qui bonos se viros haberi volunt cum emolumentis vnquam est comparandum. Tanq; id honestum, quod in nostrā intelligentiam cadit, tuendū, conseruandumq; nobis est, quam illud, quod ppriē dicitur, verēq; est honestum sapientibus. Aliter enim teneri non potest, si qua ad virtutem est facta progressio.

brought, as of perfit wyse men. For none of these in such sort is wise, as in this place wee will haue a wyse man taken: nor Marcus Cato, and Caius Lelius whoe were cōpted & called wise, were perfit wise mē: no nor these seuen sages of Greece: but by the often vsing of the means, & cōmon duties, they boze a certaine semblaunce, & thew of wise men. wherefore neyther is it lawfull & the thig whiche in dede is honest, be compared wth the contrarietie of & profitable: neither & whiche commonly we call honest, & which is exercised of them who will haue them selues good men to bee cōpted wth cōmodities at any tyme is to bee cōpared, and as well & honestye, whiche fallerthe into our vnderstanding, is of vs to be mainteined, and kept as y^e is, of the wyse, which pperly is called, & in dede is honestye. For other wise it can not bee holden on, if there bee atteyned anye proceedinge to vertue.

But

But thus we say by them
 who by keepng of duties
 are esteemed for good men.
 But who doe measure all
 things by profits, & com-
 modities, & wil not y same
 to be ouerweyed with ho-
 nestie, these are wont in ad-
 uisement taking to cōpare
 honestye wpyth it, whyche
 they reke profitable, good
 mē vñe not so to do. Ther-
 fore I thinke, Panetius,
 when he said, men are wōt
 in this cōparison to doubt,
 ment the verpe same & hee
 spake, that men onelye are
 wōt, but not y they must
 needes. For not onelye to
 iudge the thinge, & seemeth
 profitable moze woꝛth thā
 that whiche is honest, but
 also to compare these toge-
 ther, & in them to cast doub-
 tes, a verpe foule shame it
 is. What is it then, & many
 tymes is wont to bzynge a
 doubtfulnesse: and seemeth
 meete to be considered? I
 suppose it is, if at any time
 ther befall a doubtfulnes:
 what maner of thing it is
 wherof cōsideratiō is take
 For

Sed hæc quidem de ijs, qui
 cōseruatione officiorū ex-
 istimantur boni. Qui autē
 ōnia meriūtur, emolumen-
 tis & cōmodis, neq; ea vo-
 lunt prēpōderari honesta-
 te, hi solent in deliberādo,
 honestum cū eo, quod v-
 tile putant, comparare: bo-
 ni viri nō solēt. Itaq; existi-
 mo Panetium cūm dixerit
 homines solere in hac cō-
 paratione dubitare, hoc ip-
 sū sensisse, quod dixerit, so-
 lere modo, non etiā oport-
 ere. Etenim nō modo plu-
 ris putare quod vtile vide-
 atur, quā illud quod ho-
 nestū, sed hæc etiam inter
 se cōparare, & in his dubi-
 tare turpissimū est. Quid
 est ergo quod nōnūquam
 ad dubitationē afferre so-
 leat, considerandumquē
 videatur? Credo si quādo
 dubitatio accidit, quale sit
 id de quo consideretur.

Sæpe

de Officiis

Sepe enī tēpore fit, vt qd' plerūq; turpe habere soleat, iueniatur nō esse turpe. Exēpli causa, ponatur aliquid quod pateat latius. Quod potest esse mai⁹ scelus quā nō modo hominē, sed etiā familiarē occidere. Nū igitur se obstrinxit scelere, si quis tirānū occidit, quāuis familiarē? Populo quidē Romano non videtur qui ex ōnibus prēclaris factis illud pulcherimū existimat. Vicit igitur vtilitas honestatē, immō vero honestas vtilitatē secuta est. Itaq; vt sine vllō errore, di iudicare possimus, si quando cum illo, quod honestum intelligimus, pugnare id videbitur, quod appellamus vtile, formula quēdam constituenda est, quam si sequemur in comparatione rerum, ab officio nunquām recedemus.

For often by the time, it comes to passe, & it whiche for & most part is wont too be counted dishonest is found not to be dishonest. For examples sake let ther be put some case, & moze largely extendeth, what greater mischief can there bee than one to kill not onely a man but also his familiar: hath he than guiltied himselfe of murder who hath slaine a Tirant, although he were his familiar: To & people of Rome doubtles it seemeth not so, who of all worthy deedes esteemeth & the noblest, with them therefore profit passed honestye: yet rather honestie folowed after profit.

Therefore that withoute any error wec may be able to iudge, if euer & whiche wec call profitable, shall seeme too strine wpyth it, whiche is knowen for honest: a certaine rule is to be appointed, whiche if wec wil folowe in the comparison of thynges, from due-tye wec shall neuer swarne,

And

And this rule shal be most agreeable with y^e trade, and doctrine of the Stoikes: which verily in these booke we therfore folow, because althoughe of the auncient Academikes, and our Peripatetikes (who wer once al one with y^e Academikz) those thinges, which be honest bec preferred befoze such, as seeme pfitable: yet these more goodly be disputed of y^e Stoikz. to whō what so is honest: the same semeth pfitable: & nothing seemz pfitable which is not honest than it is of those who reckon some what too be honest and not profitable, or somewhat profitable, and not honest. But to vs our Academia geuees great libertie: that whatsoeuer most prouable comes in place, y^e same by our prerogatiue wee may lawfully defend. But I return to the rule. To pul away the any thing frō an other, & a man to encrease his commodities with an other mans discommoditie, it is more againste nature: thā death, than pouertie, than payne,

Q. 1.

and paupertas, quam dolor

Erit autē hęc formula Stoicorū rationi disciplinęq; maximē cōsentanea: quā quidē in his libris ppter ea sequimur qd' quanquam a veteribus Academicis & Peripateticis nostris qui quōdā ijdē erāt, qui Academicique honesta sūt āte ponuntur ijs, quę vidētur vtilia: tamē splendi⁹ hęc ab eis differuntur, quibus quicquid honestū est, idē vtile videtur, nec vtile quāquam, qd' non honestum quā ab ijs, quibus aut honestū aliquid nō vtile, aut vtile nō honestū est. Nobis autē nostra Academia magnā licētiā dat: vt qd' cūq; maximā pabile occurrat id nostro iure liceat defendere. Sed redeo ad formulā. De trahere igit aliqd aliteri, & hominē hominis in cōmodo suū augere commodum. magis est contra naturam quam mors, quā

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quàm cetera quę possunt and other thinges whiche
aut corpori accidere, aut maye happen eicher to the
rebus externis. Nā princi- bodie, or to the outwarde
pio tollit cōiūctū humanū state for first of all it takes
& societatē. Si enim sic e- awaye the conuersation, &
rimus affecti, vt ppter suū felowship of mē. for if we
quisq; emolumentū spoli- shalbe so disposed: that eue
et aut violet alterū, diſrū- rie man, for his owne com
pi necesse est eā, quę maxi- moditie, spolie, & wrong an
mē est secūdū naturā hu- other: & felowship of man=
mani generis societatē. Vt kinde whiche is moſte ac
si vnū quodq; mēbrū sen- cordinge too nature muste
sū hūc haberet, vt posse pu nedes be broken. As if eue
taret se valere, si proximi ry part of the bodie should
mēbri valetudinem ad se haue this ymagination: to
traduxisset, debilitari & in think, it might be strong, if
terire totū corpus necesse it had conueied to it self the
esset, sic si vnusquisq; no strength of y next lummes:
strum rapiat ad se commo of force it should folowe &
da aliorū detrahatq; quod the whole body shoulde be
cuique possit, emolumenti weakened, & perishe, euen
sui grātia, societas hominū so if euery one of vs catche
& cōmunitas euertatur ne too hymselfe the commo
cesse est. Nam vt sibi quis dires of other, and pulleth
quē malit qd' ad vsam vi- from eche may what he ca
tę pertinere quàm alteri for his owne profits sake, &
acquirere, concessum est felowship, & comon com
non repugnante natura. panie of mē must nedes be
ouerthorwen. for it is suf
ferable, & nature not agāst
it: & euery mā be more wil
ling for himself, than for an
other mā to get what so p
teineth to y vse of hys life,

¶ This

This doubtlesse nature
doth not suffer & wyth the
spople of other, we increase
our riches, substance, and
welch. And not onelye it is
ordayned by nature, that
is to witte, by the vniuer-
sal law of naciōs, but also
in like maner, by the lawes
of people, wherby in euery
Cittie & common wealth is
vpholden, & it shoulde not
be lawfull, for a mans own
profite sake, to hurt ano-
ther. For the lawes tende
to this. & this they meane
that the felowship of cyti-
zens bee in safetie, whiche
who so riuē a sunder, those
wyth death, banishment
pysonment, and penalties,
they punish. And thys
much moze doth the verye
course of nature require,
whiche is & law of God &
mā, & whiche who so is wil-
lig to obey (all truly wyll
obey it, & haue a myd to liue
accordeinge to nature) shall
neuer so offend, & an other
mans goods he would co-
net, & take to hymselfe, that
he hath pulled fro an other
For much moze according

Illud quidē natura nō pa-
titur, vt aliorū spolijs no-
stras facultates, copias, o-
pes augeamus, Neque verō
hoc solum natura, id est,
iure gentiū sed et legibus
populorum, quibus in sin-
gulis ciuitatibus Resp. cō-
tinetur, eodē modo cōsti-
tutū est, vt nō liceat sui cō-
modi causa, nocere alteri.
Hoc enim spectant leges,
hoc volunt: in columen
esse ciuium cōiunctionē,
quā qui dirimunt, eos mor-
te, exilio, vinculis, damno
coercent. Atq; hoc multo
magis exigit ipsa nature
ratio, quę est lex diuina &
humana: cui parere qui
velit (omnes autem pare-
bunt qui secundum natu-
ram volunt viuere) nun-
quam committet, vt ali-
enum appetat, & id, quod
alteri detraxerit, sibi as-
umat, Etenim multo
magis est, secundum

tu

Q.ij.

de Officiis.

naturam celsitas & animi
magnitudo, itēq; cōmuni-
tas, iustitia, liberalitas, quā
volūptas, quā vita, quā di-
uitiē. Quę quidē cōtēnere
& pro nihilo ducere cōpa-
rantem cū vtilitate cōmu-
ni, magni animi & excelsi
est. De trahere autē alteri
sui cōmodi causa magis est
cōtra naturam quā mors,
quā dolor, quā cetera ge-
neris eiūsdē. Itemq; magis
est secundum naturam p
omnibus gentibus (si fieri
possit) cōseruandis, aut iu-
tiandis maximos labores
molestiasq; suscipere, imi-
tantes Herculem illū, quē
hominum fama beneficio-
rum memor in concilio cō-
lestium collocauit, quā vi-
uere in solitudine nō mo-
do sine vllis molestis, sed
etiā in maximis voluptati-
bus abūdantem ōnib⁹ co-
pijs, vt excellas etiam pul-
chritudine & viribus.

to nature is the highest, &
greatnesse of courage: and
likewise comon fellowship,
iustice and liberalitie: then
pleasure, then life, then ry-
chesse.

Which things doubtles for
a man to despise and sett at
naught, in comparison of
common profit: is a signe
of a greate, and haughte co-
rage.

But to pull from another,
for ones owne profit sake,
is moze against nature: thā
death, then, for owe, than y
rest of the same kinde.

And in like maner, moze
acordinge to nature, is,
for the sauinge and aidinge
of nations (if it may possi-
ble be done) too vnder take
great traualles, and paines
folowinge. That notable
Hercules whom mens re-
port (y recorder of desertz)
hath placed in the compa-
nye of them aboue: than to
liue in solitarinesse, not on-
ly without any paines, but
also in great pleasures, so
swing ful of all riches: yea
though moze ouer you mai
excell all other, in beautys
and strength.

Where-

wherefoze euerpe man of best, and most noble disposition, p̄ferreth & life far befoze this. wherof it cōs to passe, that a man obedient to nature cannot hurte a man.

Furdermoze, who so wōgeth an other, that himself may get some commoditie either beleues, that he doth nothing against nature, or weenes & he should shonne death, pouertie, sorowe, the losse also of chilozen, knyfs, friends, rather than & doing of iniury to any man. If he thinketh nothings to be done against nature, in wronging of menne: what shoulde you reason with hī which cleane takes awaye man frō man? But if hee plainely thinketh & mete to be auoided: & yet these hee demeth much worse, death pouerty sorow, he is i thys point out of the waye: that he taketh anye discommoditie either of the bodye, or of fortune to be sozer, than the vices of the minde.

Therefore ther must be in all menne one entente:

Quocircō optimo quisq; splēdidissimoq; ingenio lōgē illā vitā huic anteponit Ex quo efficitur, hominē naturę obedientē, homini nocere non posse, Deinde qui alterū violat, vt ip̄se a liquid cōmodi cōsequatur aut nihil se existimat contra naturā facere: aut magis fugienda censet mortem, paupertatē, dolorē, amissionē etiā liberorū, ppin quorum amicorū, quā facere cuipiam iniuriā. Si nihil existimat contra naturā fieri hominibus violandis, quid cū eo differas, qui omnino hominē ex homine tollat? Sin fugiendū id quidem censet, sed multo illa peiora, mortem, paupertatem, dolorem, errat in eo quod vllum aut corporis aut fortunę vitium, a-nimi vitijs grauius existimat. Ergo vnum debet that esse omibz propositum,

de Officiis.

vt eadem sit vtilitas vnus cuiusq; & vniuersorū: quā si ad se q̄sq; rapiat, dissoluetur omnis humana consociatio. Atq; si etiā hoc natura p̄scribit, vt homo homini quicūq; sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit, cōsultum velit: necesse est secundū eandem naturam, omnium vtilitatem esse cōmunē. Quod si ita est, vna cōtinemur omnes, & eadem lege natura. Idq; ipsum, si ita est, certe violare alterum naturę lege prohibemur, verū autem primum, verū igitur & extremum. Nam illud quidem absurdum est, qd' quidam dicunt, parenti se aut fratri nichil detractus ros commodi sui causa.

Sed aliam rationem esse ciuium reliquorum. Hi si bi nihil iuris & nullam societatem communis vtilitatis causa statuunt esse cū

that alike may be the p̄fite of euery free man, & of al vniuersally. which p̄fite if eche man pluck vnto himselfe, al mā's felowship shal be dissolued. And if nature doth also appoint this, that man would haue men, p̄ouided for, whatsoeuer he bee, yet euen for this same respect, because he is a mā it must needes folow that accoꝛdinge to the same nature the p̄fite of al bee in common. which if it bee so, we al bee contained in one, & the like lawe of nature. And if y^e same be so, doubtlesse, by the lawe of nature, wee are forbydden one to wrong another.

Now, the antecedent is true, therefore true also is the consequent. If or that verely is reasonlesse, that some say, frō their parent or brother, they will take nothing away, for cause of their owne p̄fite, but of or their citizens, that there ys an other respect to bee had. These be in opinion, that they haue no lawe, nor felowshippe to keepe wthth

citizens

citizens, for a comon pro-
fits sake, whiche opinion
doth ripp a sunder all the
societie of a citie.

And thepe that saye, ther
must regarde be had of citi-
zens, & none of foreigners
do ryue a sunder the com-
mon felowshippe of manne-
kynde, whiche being desiro-
yed, al bountifulnesse, libe-
ralitie, goodnesse, & iustice,
is utterly rooted vp, which
who so take awaye, euen
toward the gods immor-
tal are to bee compted irre-
ligious. For suche doe o-
uerthrowe the felowshipe
by them among men ordey-
ned. Of the whiche felow-
shipp the surest bond, is to
thinke it to be moze against
nature, for one man to vse
extortion to another, for
his owne profittes sake,
then to suffer all dyscom-
modities, either outward
or of the bodye, yea or of
mynde: whiche happen w-
out iust deserting.

For this vertue Iustyce,
of al vertues is the lady, &
Queene.

ciuibus: quę sententia om-
nē societatem distrahit ci-
uitatis. Qui autem ciuium
rationē dicunt esse haben-
dam, externorum negant,
hij dirimunt communem
humani generis societate:
qua sublata, beneficentia,
liberalitas, bonitas, iustitia
funditus tollitur. Quę qui
tollunt, etiam aduersus
deos immortales impij iu-
dicandi sunt, ab his enim
constitutam inter homi-
nes societatem euertunt:
cuius societatis arētissimū
vinculum est, magis arbi-
trari esse contra naturam
hominem homini detra-
here sui commodi causa,
quā omnia incommoda
subire vel externa, vel cor-
poris, vel etiam ipsius ani-
mi, quę vacent iustitia.

Hęc enim vna virtus om-
nium est domina & regina
virtutum.

Per-

Q. iij.

de Officiis.

Forſitan quiſpiam dixerit, ¶ *Parauēture.* ſome wil ſay: nonne igitur ſapiens, ſi ſame ſhal not then the wyſeman
me ipſe cōficiatur, abſtule- if he be diuened by ſamynē,
rit cibū alteri homini ad take awaye meate from an
nullā rē vtili? minimē ve- other man good for nothig
ro, nō enī mihi eſt vitamea no doubtleſſe.
vtilior, quam animi talis af- For my life is no more p-
fectio, neminē vt violē cō- ſitable to mee, then ſuch a
modi mei gratia . Quidſi diſpoſition of mind, that I
Phalarim crudelē tyrannū wrong no body for my pro-
& immanem vir bonus, ne fits ſake.
ipſe frigore cōficiatur, ve- What if a good man coulde
ſtitu ſpoliare poſſit, nonne ſpoile the cruell, & beaſtlye
faciat? Hęc ad iudicandū tyrant ¶ Phalaris of his clo-
ſūt facilima. Nā ſi quid ab thinge, that hee ſhould not
homine ad nullā partē vti, dye for cold himſelf: might
litatis tuę cauſa detraxeris he not do it? Theſe be full
inhumanē feceris, cōtraq; eaſie to iudge.
naturę legem. Sin autem For if you take ought frō
is tu ſis, qui multā vtilita- a man on no behalf proſita-
tatem Reip. atq; hominū ble, for loue of youre owne
ſocietati, ſi in vita remaneas cōmoditye: ye ſhal doe vn-
afferre poſſis, ſi quid ob eā kindly, and againſte ſi lawe
cauſam alteri detraxeris, of nature: but if you be the
non ſit reprehendum. Sin man, who may bring much
autem id non ſit eiufmo- profit vnto ſi cōmon weal,
di, ſuum cuiq; incommo- and ſi ſellowſhip of men, if
dum ferēdum eſt potius you remaine aliue: in caſe
ye take away ought frō a-
nother, bpō ſi cōſideratiō: if is not to be repproued, but
if ſi matter ſtādeth not euē
ſo ebery man muſt rather
bear his own diſcōmodity,
than

then pul a way of anotherz commodities. Suchenes thā oz pouerty, ez any such like is not moze against nature: thā extorcion, & greedy nesse of an other mannes goods. But to leaue alone y cōmon profit, is against nature: for it is vniust.

Therefore the very law of nature, which preferueth, & maintaineth mens pfit: appoynteth about doubte: y fro the ydle, and vnprofitable manne, necessary things to liue with be conuerted to the wise, the good & the manly man: who if hee should dye for want, should draw a waye wythe hym much of the common profit: and yet so hee must doe it: that neither by ouerweening in hymselfe, noz louing of hymselfe to wel, he make this a pretended coloure to doe wrong. Therefore alwaies let him doe his duty prouidinge for the profit of men, and that selowshyp among men, which I oftē times repeat. For as touching Phalaris case, the iudgement is very easie.

For

quàm de alterius cōmodis detrahendū. Nō igitur magis est cōtra naturam moribus aut egestas, aut quid eiusmodi, quā detractio atque appetitio alieni. Sed cōmunis vtilitatis derelictio cōtra naturā est: est enim iniusta. Itaque lex ipsa naturę quę vtilit' hominū cōseruat, & cōtinet, decernit pfecto, vt ab homine inertī atq; inutīlī ad sapiētē, bonum, fortemq; virum transserantur res ad viuēdum necessarię qui si occiderit, multum de cōmuni vtilitate detraxerit: modō hoc ita faciat, vt ne ipsa de se bene existimans, seseq; diligens, hāc causā habeat ad iniuriā. Itaque sēp officio fungatur, vtilitati cōsulēs hominū, & ei, quam sēpe cōmemoro, humanę societati. Nā qd' ad Plalerī attinet, pfacile iudiciū est.

de officiis.

Nulla n. nobis cū tyrannis
societas est, sed potius sū-
ma distractio, neq; est con-
tra naturā spoliare eum si
possis, quē honestū est me-
care. Atq; hoc omne gen-
pestiferū atq; impiū ex ho-
minū cōmunitate extermi-
nandū est. Etenim vt mē-
bra quēdam amputantur,
si et ipsa sanguine & tan-
quā spiritu carere ceperūt
et nocent reliquis partib⁹
corporis: sic ista in figura
hominis feritas & imma-
nitas beluæ a cōmuni tan-
quā humanitate corporis
segreganda est. Huius ge-
neris questiones sunt ōnes
de, in quibus ex tēpore of-
ficiū exquiritur. Eiusmodi
igitur credo res Panætium
psecuturū fuisse, nisi ali-
quis casus aut occupatio
cōsiliū eius peremisset. Ad
quas ipsas consultationes
ex superioribus libris satis
multa præcepta sunt,

For with the tyrāts we haue
no society, but rather be at
extreme diuision & them
neither is it against nature
to spoile him, if ye can whō
it is honest to kyll, and all
such pestilent and wycked
rables are to be diuened out
of the companies of men,
For euen as certein limms
be cut of if they once begyn
both to lacke bloode, & life
(as you would saye) & also
do hurt the other partes of
the bodye, so thys sauage-
nesse, and cruelnesse of a
beaste, vnder the shape of a
manne, must be parted (as
it were) from the common
naturalnesse of a mannes
bodye.

Of this sorte be all those
questions, wherein duty is
sought out by circumstance
of time.

Such matters therfore I
beelieve Panætius woulde
haue treted of, had not sōe
chaunce or businesse pre-
uented his purpose. Con-
cerning which maner of ta-
king of aduysment, in my
books afoze, many thinges
bee sufficiently taughte, by
which

which, it may be perceived, what is to be avoyded, for dishon: I ye, & wha. is not to be shonned, because it is not dishonest.

But forasmuch as of oure worke begonne, yet almoste ended, now (as who sayth) we sett on the rooffe, as the Geometers are wonte not to proue al, but to requyre, that certeyne thynges bee granted them, to the intent they may more easely sette out their purpose, so doe I require of you my Cicero. that ye graunt mee, if yee may, that nothing but that whiche is honest, is for ye selfe to bee desired.

But if it may not be granted, because of Cratippus, yet this no doubt you will graunt me, that the thinge which is honest, is chiefly for it selfe to be desired. whether ye wil, is ynough for mee, and bothe the one, and the other seemes the more proueable, neyther any thing els appeareth probable.

And first, in this poynte. Panæti-
us is to be desired
because

quibus perspicui possit qd' sit propter turpitudinem fugiendum, quid sit id, qd' idcirco fugiendum nō sit quia omnino turpe nō sit Sed quoniam operi inchoato prope tamen absoluto tanquam fastigium imponim⁹, vt geometre solent nō ōnia docere, sed postulare vt quedam sibi concedantur, quō faciliusque velint explicent: sic ego a te postulo mi Cicero, vt mihi concedas, si potes, nihil præter id, quod honestum sit, esse propter se expectandum.

Si in hoc nō licet propter Cratippum: at illud certē dabis, quod honestū sit id esse maxime propter se expectandū, Mihi utrū vis satis est: & tū hoc, tum illud probabilius videtur: nec præterea quicquam probable. Ac primum Panæti-
us in hoc defendendus est,

de officiis.

quod non vtilia cū honestis pugnare aliquādō posse dixerit (neque enim ei fas erat) sed ea quę viderētur vtilia. Nihil verō vtile, quod non idem honestū: Nihil honestum quod nō idē vtile sit sæpe testatur: negatq; vllā pestem maiorem in vitam hominum inuasisse, quam eorum opinionem, qui ista distraxerint.

Itaq; non vt aliquādō anteponerimus vtilia honestis: sed vt ea sine errore diiudicemus, si quādo inciderent, induxit eam, quę videret' esse, non quę esset repugnantiam.

Hanc igitur partem relictam explebimus, nullius adminiculis, sed (vt dicitur) Marte nostro.

Neque enim quicquam de hac parte post Patetium explicatum est,

because he saide not, & profitable thinges at any tyme striue with honest (for yt was not lawfull for him so to saie) but those whych seme profitable might strue with honesty. But he often witnesseth, that nothing is profitable: whiche same ys not honest, nor honeste whiche same is not profitable: & he denieth any greater pestilence to haue crept into mans life: then ther opinion, who haue deuided these two a sunder.

Therefore he brought in & repugnāce: whiche did seme to bee & was not in deede: not that, at anye time, wee shoulde preferre profitable thinges before honest: but that without erreure, wee might discerne thē, if euer they sel in place:

This parte therefore leste vntouched: we wil supply withe no others aide, but (as they say in warre) euē with our owne force. For touching this parcel, there hath bene, since Danerius wrote, nothings sette out that

that liked me: of al, that e-
uer came to our handes.

Therefore, when anye
shewe of profite is offered
vs we must nedes be sty-
red: but if, when wee geue
good heede, ye see dysho-
nesty ioyned wth that thyng
which bringeth a shewe of
profytte, then the profyt is
not to be desired, but wee
must thinke, where disho-
nesty is, there profyt canne
not be.

Now, if nothing there bee
so much against nature, as
dishonesty (for nature doth
desire good, & conuenient
& steadfast thinges, & despi-
seth the contrarie) & again
ther is nothig so according
to nature, as profit, doubt-
lesse in the same profitable
thing dishonesty can not be.
And also, if we be bozne to
honestie: and it is eyther
onely to bee desired, as to
Zeno it seemed, or in all es-
timation, is to bee compred
of moze value, thā all other
thinges, as pleaseth Aris-
totle, it muste nedes bee,
that the thyng, whiche is
honest, is eyther the onely,
or the

quod mihi quidē pbaret,
de ijs, quę in mantis meas
venerūt. Cū igitur aliqua
species vtilitatis obiecta
est: nos cōmoueri necesse
est. Sed sicūm animū attē-
deris, turpitudinem videas
adiunctam ei rei, quę spe-
ciē vtilitatis attulerit: tūe
nō vtilitas requirenda est:
sed intelligendum, vbi tur-
pitude sit, ibi vtilitatē esse
nō posse. Quod si nihil est
tam cōtra naturam quam
turpitude (recta. n. & con-
ueniētia & constantia na-
tura desiderat aspernatur
quę cōtraria) nihilq; tam
secūdū naturam, quam v-
tilitas, certē in eadē re vti-
li turpitudō esse, nō potest
Itēq; si ad honestatē nati
sumus, eaq; aut sola expe-
tēda est, vt Zenoni est vi-
sū: aut certē omni pōdere
grauior habēda, quā reli-
quaoīa, qd' Aristoteli pla-
cet: necesse est quod ho-
nestū sit, id esse aut solū,

de Officiis.

aut summum bonum: quod autem bonum id certè utile. Itaque quicquid honestum, id utile. Quare error hominum non proborum cum aliquid, quod utile visum est arripuit: id continuo secernit ab honesto.

Hinc sic, hinc venena; hinc falsa testamenta nascuntur: hinc furta, peculatus, expilationes, direptionesque sociorum & civium: hinc opum nimiarum potentie non ferende: postremo etiam in liberis civitatibus existunt regnandi cupiditates: quibus nihil nec tetricius, nec foedius excoGITARI potest. Emolumenta enim rerum; fallacibus iudiciis vident, præniam, non dico legum, quas sepe perumpunt, sed ipsius turpitudinis, quæ acerbissima est non vident.

or the soueraigne good, & what so is good, the same doubtlesse is profitable. And so al that is honest, is profitable. Wherefore when the error of menne not honest hath caughte holde of somewhat that seemeth profitable, by & by it deuydes the same from honesty.

Hereof murders, hereof poisonings, hereof counterfeiter swils do spring, hereof felony, hereof robbing & treasure, pillage, and extorcion from leasfrendes and citizens, hereof groweth the power of two exceeding richesse, not to be suffered, & finally in free cities there be the desires of ruling whereas nothing either more cruell. Then they or more detestable can be imagined.

For with deceitfull cities they see the game of things but the punishment I will not say, of laws which they often breake through but of dishonestie it selfe, which is worst of all, they see not.

where

wherefoze let fuche takers
of aduifemēt be diuē frō
among vs (foz they are al-
together wicked, & vngod-
lye (who vse aduifement
whether y may folowe y,
which seemes to be honest,
or wittynge stame them
selues with dishonesty.

foz in y verpe doubting a
great faulte there is, al-
though they neuer come to
the doing of it.

Therfoze those things are
not to be abused on at all,
in which the very taking of
aduifement is dishonest.

And also in al deliberatiō,
the hope, & opinion of con-
cealinge, & hidinge of mat-
ters is to be put away.

foz fully (in case we haue
any whit profited in philo-
sophie) we ought to be per-
swaded, though we could
hide it from al goddes, and
men, that nothing yet come
tously, nothig vniustly, no-
thing wātōly, nothing vn-
staiedly is meete to be don.

Here vpon that Gyges ys
brought in by Plato, who
when the earth had opened
in certaine greafe stornes

went

Quamobrem hoc quidē
deliberantiū genus pella-
tur e medio (est enim to-
tum sceleratū et impium)
qui deliberant vtrū id se-
quātur qd' honestū esse vi-
deant, an se sciētes scelere

cōtaminent. In ipsa enim
dubitatione facinus inest,
etiam si ad id nō peruene-
rint. Ergo ea deliberanda

omnino non sūt, in quib⁹
est turpis ipsa deliberatio.

Atq; etiam ex omni deli-
beratione celandi, & oc-
cultandi spes opinioq; re-
mouēda est. Satis enim nō

bis (si modo ī philosophia
aliquid psecimus) persua-
sum esse debet, si ōnes de-

os hominesq; cēlare possi-
m⁹ nihil tamē auarē, nihil
iniustē, nihil libidinosē, ni-

hil incontinenter esse faci-
endum. Hinc ille Gyges
inducitur a Platone, qui

cū terra discessisset ma-
gnis quibusdam imbris,

de Officiis.

in illum hiatum descēdit,
 enecumq; equum (vt ferūt
 fabulē) animaduertit, cu
 ius in laterib⁹ fores essent,
 quibus aptis, hominis mor
 tui vidit corpus magni
 tudine inusitata, annulūq;
 aureū in digito, quē vt de
 traxit, atq; ipse induit (erat
 autē regius pastor) tum
 in consiliū pastōrū se rece
 pit: ibi cū palam eius an
 nuli ad palmam conuerte
 rat, a nullo videbatur, ipse
 autem ōnia videbat: idem
 rursus videbatur, cū in
 locum anulum inuerte
 rat. Itaq; hac oportuni
 tate anuli vsus, reginē stu
 prum intulit: eaq; adiutri
 ce regem dominum inte
 remit, sustulitq; quos ob
 stare arbitrabatur, nec in
 his quisquam eum facino
 ribus videre potuit: sic re
 pentē anuli beneficio rex
 exortus est Lidye.

went downe into & gaping
 hole: and spied a brazen
 horse (as the fables tell) in
 whose sydes were doores:
 which being opened he saw
 the corse of a dead manne,
 of an vnwonted hugeness
 and a gold ring vpon hys
 finger: which as sone as he
 pulled of, hee put it on hys
 own finger (This Gyges
 was the kinges shepard)
 Then he got himself again
 to & cōpany of sheppardes,
 There whē he had turned
 the hed of & rinze towarde
 the palme of his hand: hee
 was scene of no boope, yet
 he saw euery thing and hee
 was scene again, when hee
 had turned & ring in sight.
 And so vsing this vantage
 of the ring, he lay with the
 queene: and by her ayd, hee
 slew the kinge hys may
 ster: and made dispatch of
 them, to whom hee thought
 to stand in his way. Ne
 ther could any man see him
 beinge about these mischie
 uous deedes.

So by the commodity of
 his ring, he became sodely
 king of Lydia.

Thys

This same ringe then if a parfit wise mā shold haue he woulde think it no more lawfull for him to offende thā if he had it not. For he nest thigs, not secret thigs by good men be sought. And in this place certaine philosopherz, and those not of the worst, but yet not al of y finest say: that Plato tolde a fained, and deuised fable, as though he defendeth, that either the thinge was done, or was possible to be done.

This is the effecte of this ringe, and of this ex-
 eple: if no mā shold knowe
 or no mā shold once suspect
 when you shoulde doo anye
 thing, for regard of riches,
 power, rule or lust yea if it
 shoulde bee vnknowne for
 euer both of god, and man:
 whether you woulde do it,
 or no. They denye it possi-
 ble to befall: and althoughe
 it cannot so befall indeede:
 yet I demaunde, in case y
 might befall, which they de-
 nye too bee possible what
 wold y do? They force on,
 grossely in good sothe.

For rent? Vrgēt sanē rustice:
 R. i.

de Officijs.

negāt enim posse, & in eo
perstant. Hoc verbum, si,
quid valeat, non vident,

Cū enim querimus, si
possint celare, quid facturi
sint, non querimus, possint
ne celare: sed tanquam
tormenta quædam adhi-
bemus: vt si responderint
se impunitate proposita
facturos quod expediat,
facinorosos se esse fatean-
tur: si negent, omnia tur-
pia per se ipsa fugienda
esse concedant.

Sed iam ad propositum re-
uertamur. Incidunt sepe
multę causę, quę contur-
bant animos vtilitatis spe-
cie, non cū hoc delibe-
retur relinquendane sit
honestas propter vtilita-
tis magnitudinem (nam
id quidē improbum est)
sed illud, possit nē id, qd'
vtile videatur, fieri non
turpiter.

For they holde, it is vn-
possible, and therein they
stay still.

what this word, if, impos-
sible, they see not. For whē
we demaund, if they be a-
ble to conceale, what theye
will doe? wee do not de-
maund whether they be a-
ble to conceale it or no, but
wee laye befoze them as yt
were the rack, and certeine
manyles, that if they aun-
swer, they woulde do what
them liked. beyng sure to
scape scottfree, they cōfesse
them selues to bee wycked
if they say, they woulde not
they graunt all dishonest
things for theselues meete
to bee eschewed. But now
let vs returne to oure pur-
pose. There do oftentimes
befal diuers matters, whi-
che trouble mens mindes,
vnder a shew of profit, not
when this is aduised vpon
whether honestye is to bee
left for y greatnes of pro-
fit (for y plainelye is wy-
cked) but whether y thinge
which semeth profitabl may
be done wout dishonesty.

When

When Brutus toke away
the rule from Collatinus
Tarquinius, his office se-
lowe, hee might haue been
thought to do it vniustlye,
for in dymning out y^e kings,
he had been Brutus assis-
tant, and ayder also of hys
counseils.

But when the rulers had
agreed thus in counsell, that
the kyndred of Superbus,
& the name of the Tarqui-
nians, & the memo^{ry} of the
kingdom should be utterly
dymned out, because it was
profitable to prouyde for
theire countray, & same was
in such wise honest, y^e euen
very Collatinus ought to
haue lyked it. And so pro-
fite preuayled, because of
honesty, without whiche,
profite could not haue ben
at all.

But with the king, whome
dubdred this citie, it fared
not so. For a shewe of pro-
fit strake in his mynde, to
whō when it appeared moze
profitable for him to rule
alone, then with an other,
he slew his brother. This
mā for got both godlikenesse,
and

Cūm Collatino Tarqui-
nio Collegē Brutus impe-
rium abrogabat: poterat
videri facere id iniustē, fu-
erat enim in regibus ex-
pellendis socius Bruti cō-
siliiorum, & adiutor.

Cūm autem cōsiliū hoc
principes cepissent: cogna-
tionem superbi, nomenq;
Tarquiniorum, & memo-
riam regni esse tollendā:
quod erat vtile patrię con-
sulere, id erat ita honestū,
vt etiā ipsi Collatino pla-
cere deberet. Itaq; vti-
litas valuit propter hone-
statem, sine qua nec vtili-
tas quidem esse potuisset,

At in eo rege qui vrbē
condidit, non ita. Species
n. utilitatis animum impu-
lit eius cui cū visum esset
vtilius solū se, quā cum
altero regnare, fratrem in-
teremit.

Omisit hic & pietatem
R. ij.

de Officijs.

& humanitatem, vt id, and naturalnesse: that hee
quod vtile videbatur, ne- might obtaine the thinge,
quē erat, assequi posset: & that seemed profitable, and
tamen muri causam oppo- was not so indecde, and yet
suit speciē honestatis, nec his brothers leapinge ouer
probabilem, nec satis ido- the wall hee alleaged, for a
neam. Pecauit igitur, colour of honestie, neither
pace vel Quirini vel Ro- allowable, nor sufficient
muli dixerim. enough.

Nec tamen nostrę nobis
vtilitates omittendę sūt a-
lijsquē tradendę, cūm his
ipsi egeamus: sed sua cui-
que vtilitati, quod sine al-
terius iniuria fiat, seruien-
dum est.

Scitē Chrisippus, vt mul-
ta. Qui stadium (inquit)
currit, eniti & contendere
debet quāmaximē
possit, vt vincat: supplan-
tare eum, quicum certet,
aut manu depellere nullo
modo debet.

He offended therefore, that
by Quirinus, Romulus
fauour I may lay it.

Notwithstandinge we ought
not to leaue our owne com-
modities, and geue the to
other, when our selues do
neede the same, but euery
man must serue his owne
profit so farre, as without
another's iniurie it maye be
doone.

Featly said Chrisippus
in this, as he did in many
thinges, who so, quoth
hee, runneth in the race,
ought to endeuour, and la-
bour, as muche as he may,
that himselfe may winne
game, but in no wyse he
ought to trip him, & whō
he runnes, or to keepe him
of with his hand.

So in this life it is not vn
lawful for enerye man too
get him selfe, & maye serue
hys vse, but to pul from all
other, it is no right.

But most of al duityes be
put out of order in frende-
shippes. in the which it is a
gainst duitie, both not to do
that rightfulltye you maye,
and to do, that is not law-
ful. But of al this matter
a shorthe, and no harde rule
there is.

For these, which seeme
profitable, honours, ryches
pleasures, and other of the
same kind, are neuer to bee
preferred asoze frendship.
And a good man. for hys
frends sake, nother wil do
against the comunon weale
nother againste his othe, &
promes, no not though hee
shal be iudge bpō his own
frende. For he puts of the
personage of a frend, when
he takes vpon him the per-
son of a iudge. Thus much
he shal leane too frendshipe
& he had rather, his friends
cause were true, & that hee
wil graunt him time tho-
roughly to plead his cause

Sic in vita sibi quengꝝ pete-
re, quod pertineat ad vsū
non iniquum est: alteri di-
ripere, ius non est.

Maximè autem perturbā-
tur officia in amicis, quibꝯ
& non tribuere qd' rectè
possis, & tribuere qd' non
sit æquum, contra officiū
est.

Sed huius generis totius
breue & non difficile præ-
ceptum est. Quæ enim vi-
dentur vilia, honores, di-
uitiæ, voluptates, cæteraqꝯ
generis eiusdem, hæc ami-
citæ nunquàm antepone-
da sunt. Ac nequè contra
Remp. neqꝯ contra iustu-
randum, ac fidem amici
sui causa vir bonus faciet:
nec si iudex quidem erit
de ipso amico. Ponit e-
nim personam amici, cū
induit iudicis. Tantum da-
bit amicitæ, vt veram a-
mici causam esse malit, &
vt perorandæ liti tempus,

as

de officijs.

quod per leges liceat, accō as much as by the lawe he
modet. Cū verò iurato maye. But when by hy
dicenda sententia sit, me othe he is to geue sentence
minerit. Deum se adhibe he must remēber he taketh
re testem, id est (vt ego ar God to witnesse, that is to
bitror) mentem suam, qua meane (as I suppose) hy
nihil homini dedit deu ip consciēce, for nothing more
se diuinius. Itaq; p̄clarū godlike than it is, hath god
a maioribus accepim⁹ mo himselfe geuen to man.
rem rogandi iudicis (si eū Therfore of our auntetry
teneremus) quæ salua fide we haue receiued a goodly
facere possit. Hæc rogatio maner of desiring & fauour
ad ea petrinet, quæ paulo of a iudg if we would kepe
ante dixi, honestè amico it: To do what he may sa
iudice posse concedi. Nam uing his oth. This request
si omnia facienda sint quæ is referred to those things
amici velint, non amicitie which a litle befoze is said,
tales, sed cōiurationes pu might honestly be granted
tandæ sunt. Loquor autē by a iudge to his frend,
de communibus amicitijs. For if al things should be
Nam in sapientibus viris done which frends woulde
atq; p̄fectis nichil po desire, such were to be cōi
test esse tale. Damonem & ted not amities, but cōsp
Pythiam Pythagoras fe racies.
runt hoc animo inter se I speake now of common
fuisse, vt cū eorum frede shippes. For in men
teri Dionysius tyrannus, wise and per site, there can
diem necis destinauisset, be no such thing. When say
and that Damon & Pythias,
the Pythagoreās, were so
affectioned, one toward an
other, that when Dionisi⁹
the tiraunt had appointed,
one of them hy dyng day
and

and he, who was condemned too dye: had required certain daies of respite, for disposing of his thinges: the other became bound to dye for body, for his forthcomminge, vpon condicion that if he retourned not at his day, he would himselfe dye for him, who when at his day he was cōe again: the tiraunt wonderinge at their faithfulness, required that they woulde take him in for the thirde in theyre frendshyppe when therfore that which in frendshyppe seemeth profitable, is compared with that, whych is honest: let the showe of profit yelde, and honestye preuaile.

But when in frendshyppe those things shal be required, which be not honeste, let religio, & vprightnes be preferred befoze frendship: & so shal y choyse of duty be had, which we seeke after. But vnder the showe of profit, in y cōmon weale ther is oftentimes dooinge amisse, as our mē did in the razing of Cozynth.

Sozer

& is, qui morti addictus esset, paucos sibi dies commendandorum suorum causa postulauisset: vas factus est alter eius sistendi: vt si ille non reuertisset ad diē: moriendū esset ipsi. Qui cum ad diem se recepisset, admiratus eorum fidē tirānus petiuit vt se in amicitiam tertium ascriberent.

Cū igitur id quod utile videtur in amicitia, cum eo quod honestū est, comparatur, iaceat vtilitatis species, valeat honestas.

Cū autem in amicitia, quæ honesta non sunt potestabuntur: religio & fides anteponantur amicitia. Sic habebitur is, quem exquirimus, delectus officij. Sed vtilitatis specie in Republi. sapissime peccatur, vt in Corinthi disturbance nostrā.

R.iiij.

de officijs.

durius etiam Athenienses, qui statuerunt, vt Æginetis, qui classe valebant, pollices præciderentur. Hoc visum est vtile, nimis n. iminebat propter propinquitatem Ægina Pireo. Sed nihil, qd' crudele, vtile. Est n. hominū nature, quā se qui debemus, maximè inimica crudelitas. Male etiā qui peregrinos vrbibus vti prohibent, eosquē extermināt: vt Petronius apud partes nostros, Papius nuper. Nam esse pro ciue qui ciuis non sit rectum est nō licere: quam tulerunt legē sapientissimi cōsules Crassus & Scæuola, vsu vero vrbis prohibere peregrinos: sane inhumanum est. Illa præclara in quibus publicæ vtilitatis species præ honestate cōtemnitur. Ple na exemplorum est nostra Respubli. cū sæpe alias,

Sozer also delt the Athenians, who made a decree that the Æginets thumbs, who were skilled in nauigation, should be cut of.

This was thought profitable: for Ægina dyd too much ouerlook Pircum, by reason of the neere bordering. But nothinge, that is cruell is profitable. For to mannes nature, whiche we ought to folowe, crueltie is most enemy.

They also doe euil, who barr straungers frō vsynge their citie, and doe banishe them: as did Petronius in our fathers daies, and Papius of late yeres.

For one to goe for a citizen who is no citizen, it is reason, it shou'd not be lawfull the which law þ very wise Consuls, Crassus, & Scæuola did make: but too forbiddinge strangers the vse of the citie, it is doubtles an vnciuil part. Those doinge be notable. wher i shewe of comen profit is despised: in respect of honesty. Our cōmō weal is full of exēples, both often at other tymes, and

& chiefly in the second Punike warre: which after ouerthrowe take at Canai had greater courages, then euer in prosperitie, no tokē there was of feare, no mention of peace. So greates the force of honestie, that it dimmethe the show of pfit.

When the Athenians no way were able to withstand the assault of the Persians and were determined that leauing the citie, and settig their wiues and childzen in Troezen, they would take their ships, & defende liberty of Greece, with their nauie, one Cypsius thepe stoned to death, who pswaded with them to kepe still the citie, & receiue Xerxes. And hee seemed to folowe profite: but that was none wher honestie gainstode it Themistocles, after victory of that battle, which was holden with Persians, sayde in the open asseemble, that hee had wealfull counsel for the state, but it was not expedient, it shoulde be openly known, he re-

tum maximè bello punico secundo, quę Cannēsi calamitate accepta maiores animos habuit, quā vnquā rebus secundis. Nulla fuit timoris significatio, nulla mētio pacis. Tanta vis est honesti, vt speciē vtilitatis obscuret. Atheniēsis cūm Persarū impetū nullo modo possent sustinere, statuerentq; vt vrbe relicta coniugibus & liberis Trozene depositis, naues cōscenderent, libertatemq; Græcie classe defenderent, Cirsilū quendā suadentē, vt in vrbe manerent, Xerxemq; reciperent, lapidibus obruerunt. Atq; ille sequi vtilitātē videbatur: sed ea nulla erat repugnante honestate. Themistocles post victoriā eius belli, qd' cum Persis fuit, dixit in concio: ne se habere consilium Reipub. salutare, sed id sci ri opus non esset.

de Officiis.

postulauit vt aliquem populus daret, qui cum communicaret. Datus est Aristides. Huic ille, classem Lacedemoniorum, quæ subducta esset ad Gytheum, clam incendi posse, quo facto frangi Lacedemoniorum opes necesse esset.

Quod aristides cum audiuiſſet, in concionem magna expectatione venit: dixitque perutile esse consilium, quod Themistocles afferret, sed minimè honestum. Itaque Athenienses quod honestum non esset, id ne vtile quidem putauerunt: totamque eam rem, quam ne audiuerat quidem, auctore Aristide repudiauerunt.

Melius hi quam nos, qui paritas immunes, socios vectigales habemus.

Maneat ergo, quod turpe sit

he required that the people should assigne some man, to whom he should tel it, Aristides was appointed.

He tolde him the nauye of the Lacedemonians, which was conueied to Gytheum might priuily be set a fire: by which arte, the Lacedemonians strength should of necessity be abated.

which thing when Aristides heard, hee came to the open assemble, with there great expectation, & saide. it was very profitable counsell, whiche Themistocles dyd geue. but nothing honest.

Therefore the Athenyans the thing, that was not honest, did not compt profitable at all: and being aduertised by Aristides. they reiected the whole matter, whiche theye had not once hearde.

Better did they then wee do, who haue Mitrates unpunished, and leage frindes tributarie.

Let this therefore stande for a conclusion. that the thing which is not honest,

is neuer profitable: noe not
euen then, when ye attaine
the thing, which you reckē
to be profitable. For the
same to thinke profitable,
which is dishonest, a misex-
table case it is.

But often times (as I
said before) there so befall
cases, when profit seemeth
to striue againste honestye,
that is to bee considered,
whether altogether it doth
gaunst and it, or maye bee
made agree with honestye.

Of that kinde bee these
questions: if for examples
sake, a good manne depar-
ting from Alexandria, shal
bring to Rhodes a greate
quantitie of coine, in the
time of scarcitie, & famyne
& extremitie dearth of coine a-
mong the Rhodians, in case
the same man know, that
many marchants be already
sette forth from Alex-
andrie: and sawe theyre
shippes, freyghted with
coine, in theire course ma-
kinge towarde Rhodes:
whether hee oughte to de-
clare it to the Rhodians,

id nunquam esse utile: ne-
tum quidem, cum id, quod
esse utile putes, adipiscere.
Hoc enim ipsum utile pu-
tare, quod turpe sit, cala-
mitosum est.

Sed incidunt (vt supra di-
xi) sepe causæ, cum repug-
nare utilitas honestati vi-
deatur: vt animaduerten-
dum sit, repugnet nè pla-
ne, an possit cum honesta-
te coniungi. Eius generis
hæ sunt questiones. Si ex-
empli gratia, vir bonus ab
Alexandria pfectus Rho-
dum magnum frumenti
numerum aduexerit in
Rhodiorum inopia, & fa-
me summaque annonæ ca-
ritate, si idem sciat cōplu-
res mercatores Alexandri-
asoluisse, nauesque in cursu
frumēto onustas peten-
tes Rhodum viderit: dic-
turus ne sit Rhodijs id,

de Officiis.

an silentia suum · quā plurimo venditurus?

Sapientem & bonum virum fingimus: de eius deliberatione & consultatione quærimus: qui celaturus Rhodios non sit, si id turpe iudicet: sed dubitet an turpe non sit.

Inhuiusmodi causis aliud Diogeni Babilonio videri solet magno & graui Stoico, aliud Antipatro discipulo eius homini acutissimo.

Antipatro omnia patefacienda, vt ne quid omnino, quod venditor norit, emptor ignoret. Diogeni venditorem, quatenus iuris ciuili constitutum sit, dicere vitia oportere, cætera sine insidijs agere: & quoniam vendat, vel le quā optime vendere. Aduexi, exposui,

or with silence shoulde sell his owne for as much as he might.

Wee put the case here, of a wise and good man: touching his deliberation and taking of aduise ment, we question. Who woulde not hide it from the Rhodians if he thought it dishonest: but he doubteth whether it be dishonest or no.

In suche maner cases, one thing Diogenes the Babylonian, a greate and graue Stoike, is wont to thinke, an other thing Antipater, his scholer, a very sharpe witted man.

Antipater holdeth that all must bee opened, that the buyer be ignorant of no manner thing, which the seller knoweth. Diogenes sayth, & seller ought to tel & faultes, that as farre as is appointed by & ciuill lawe and the rest to do without deceits: & seeing he selleth, to desire with the best auantage to sell.

Hither haue I brought it, I haue sett it forth to sale, I sell

I sel mine for no more than
 other do, perchance also for
 lesse. seeing I haue greater
 store, to who is the wronge
 done: There groweth a dis
 putation by Antipater, of
 the contrary side, what go
 ye aboute? Sithens ye are
 bounde to profit men, & to
 serue the felowship of man
 & ye are bozne vnder suche
 a lawe, that ye should keepe
 those principles of nature,
 which ye ought to obey, &
 alwaies to folowe, & your
 profit shoulde bee common
 profit, againe, and as well,
 common profit shoulde bee
 yours: will you hyde from
 men both what commodi
 tie and what store also is
 at hand for them?

Diogenes peradventure
 will aunswer thus: It is
 not all one thinge to hyde
 from menne, and too holde
 ones peas, neither doo I
 nowe hyde it from yee,
 though I tell ye not, what
 is the nature of Goddes,
 what is the ende of good,
 which things wel knowne
 woulde profite you more,
 then

vendo meum non pluris
 quā ceteri, fortasse etiam
 minoris, cum maior est co
 pia, cui fit iniuria? Exori
 tur Antipatri ratio ex al
 tera parte.

Quid agis? tute cum ho
 minibus consulere debeas
 & seruire humanę societa
 ti: eaquē lege natus sis, &
 ea habeas principia natu
 rę, quibus parere, & quę
 semper sequi debeas, vt v
 tilitas tua communis sit v
 tilitas, vicissim & eque cō
 munis vtilitas tua sit cæ
 labis homines, quid his ad
 sit cōmoditatis, & copie?

Respondebit Diogenes
 fortasse sic aliud est cæ
 lare, aliud tacere, nequē
 ego nunc te celo, si ti
 bi non dico, quę natura
 Deorum sit, quis sit fi
 nis bonorum: quę tibi
 plus prodesent cognita,

de Officiis

quā tritici vtilitas. Sed nō quicquid tibi audire vtile est, id michi dicere necesse est, immo vero, inquit ille, necesse est: Si quidē memini tibi esse inter homines natura cōiunctam societate. Memini inquit ille. Sed num ista societas talis est, vt nihil suum cuiusq; sit? Quod si ita est ne vëdēdū quidē quicquā est, sed donandum.

Vides ī hac tota disceptatione non illud dici, quāuis hoc turpe sit, tamē quoniā expedit, faciā: sed ita expedit, vt turpe nō sit. Ex altera autem parte, ea re, quia turpe sit, non esse faciendum. Vendat ædes vir bonus propter aliqua vitia, quæ ipse norit, ceteri ignorent: pestilentes sint, & habeantur salubres: ignoretur in omnibus cubiculis apparere serpentes: malè materiata,

then & cheapnes of wheate, But it is not necessary for mee to tell, whatsoeuer is profitable for you to hear. yes verely sayth hee, it is necessarie if so bee, you remember & fellowship knytt among men by nature.

I remember it, saith the other, but is thys fellowship such & eche man may haue nothing of his owne? In case it be so nothing doubtlesse is to be sold, but to bee geuen.

You see, in all this controuerlie, this is not sayde: though it bee vnholiest, yet because it is profitable, I wil do it. but & in such wise it is profitable, as it is not dishonest, & of the contrary side, & therefore it is not to be done, because it is dishonest. But the case, a good mā sell a house, for certeine discommodities, which hee knoweth, and other know not, let case it be cōtagious & is taken for holson: be it so, it be vnknowne, that in all the chambers do appere venomous crepinge beastes & that it is cuill timbered, and

and ready to fall, but thys none knoweth but the owner. I demaund, if the seller opē not this to the buyers, & sels y house for much more then he thought. hee should haue done. whether he dorh iustly or vnihonestly: hee verely doth dishonestly sayth Antipater.

For what other thing is it, than not to shewe the wanderer his way (which at Athens was forbidden vpon paine of cōmon curse) if this be not it: to suffer y buyer to rush sodenly and runne headlong by error into a great decepte: yea it is more, then not to shoue a manne the waye. For it is wittingly to lead one out of the waye into a false belief.

Diogenes replyeth again, did hee compelle ye to buy, who nor once moued ye to it: hee sett to sale that lyked him not. you bought. that lyked ye.

If they who offer to sell a good farme, & wel buylded as they set it oute, bee not thought to haue deceyued, al-

ruinosę: sed hec preter do-
minum nemo sciat: quero
si hec emptoribus veditor
non dixerit, & desę vendi-
derit pluris multo, quā
se venditurū putarit: num
id iustē aut improbē fece-
rit? Ille verō improbē, in-
quit Antipater. Quid.n.
est aliud erranti viam non
monstrare (quod Athenis
execrationibus publicis
sancitū est) si hoc non est,
emptorem pati ruere, & p
errorem in maximā frau-
dem incurrere? plus etiam
est quā viam non mon-
strare: nam est scientem in
errorem alterū inducere.

Diogenes contra: num
te emere cogit, qui ne hor-
tatus quidem est? ille
quod non placebat pro-
scripsit, tu quod placebat
emisti. Quod si qui pro-
scribunt villam bonam
benequē edificatam, non
existimantur fecellisse,

de Officiis

etiam si illa nec bona est,
nec edificata ratione, mul-
tò minus, qui domum nō
laudarunt. Vbi. n. iudiciū
emptoris est, ibi fraus ven-
ditoris quę potest esse?
Sī autem dictū non om-
ne prestandū est, quod di-
ctum non est id prestādū
putas? Quid verò est stul-
tius, quā venditorē eius
rei, quam vendat, vitia nar-
rare? Quid autem tam ab-
surdū, quā si domini iussu
ita pręco prędicet: domū
pestilentem vendo. Sic er-
gō in quibuscūq; causis du-
bijs ex altera parte defen-
ditur honestas: ex altera
ita de vtilitate dicitur vt
id, quod vtile videatur,
non modò facere honestū
sit, sed etiam non facere,
turpe. Hęc est illa, quę vi-
detur vtilium fieri cum
honestis sepe dissensio.
Quę dijudicanda sunt,

although it be neither good
nor well buylded, muche
lesse then they, who haue
not praised their house.

For where I buyers eye
is his chapman, ther what
deceit can there be of I sel-
ler: and if euerye saying is
not to be pfourmed, thinke
ye that meete to be pfour-
med, that was not sayde?
But what is moze foolish
then the seller to tel I faul-
tes of the thing, whiche he
puts to sale? And what so
fonde a hearing is there, as
if at the owners commaū-
demēt, I cryer thus should
make a noyes? I haue a
contagious house to sell.

Thus therefore in some
doubtfull cases, of the one
part is honestye defended,
of the other parte there is
speakinge of profite, that is
is not onely honest to do,
but also dishonest not to do
it, that seemeth profitable.

This is that dissention,
whiche seemeth often to be
fall betweene profitable
things, and honest. whiche
pointes are to be discussed.

For

For we haue not set them
forth to make questiōs, but
to open them.

Wheer thinke then. neither
that same Rhodian coine
marchaunt, nor his house-
seller ought to haue hidden
the fozelsaide thinges from
his buiers. For whatsoeuer
you kepe in scilence, you do
not fully so muche, as it is
to hide, but whē, for poure
profittes sake, yee woulde
haue those ignorant of that
you know, whom it standz
vppon to knowe it. Howe
this kind of hidig of what
nature it is, and what ma-
ner of mannes, who seeth
not? Doubtlesse it is a
parte not of a plaine, nor of
a simple, nor of a gentle,
nor of a iuste, nor of a good
man: but rather of a subile
witted, close, wylie, deceit-
full, gileful, craftie, forlike,
& a verie dubler. These so
manie, & other moe names
of byces to enter into, is it
not vnprofitable? If they
bee dispraise worthe, who
haue heid ther peace: what
is to bee thought of those,
who haue vsed a vaineesse
of

Non enim vt quereremus
exposuimus, sed vt explica-
remus. Non igitur videtur
nec frumentarius ille Rho-
dius, nec hic æ dium ven-
ditor celare emptores de-
buisse. Neq; enim id est ce-
lare, cum quid reticeas, sed
cum quod tu scias, id igno-
rari emolumenti tui cau-
sa velis eos, quorum inter
sit id scire. Hoc autem
celandi genus quale sit, &
cuius hominis quis non
videt? Certè non aperti,
non simplicis est, non inge-
nui, non iusti, non viri bo-
ni: versuti potius, obscuri,
astuti, fallacis, malitiosi, ca-
lidi, veteratoris, vafri,
Hec tot & alia plura, non
nè inutile est vitiorum su-
bire nomina?

Quod si vituperandi sunt
qui retieuerūt: quid de ijs
existimandum est: qui ora-
tionis vanitatem adhibue-
runt
S.i.

de Officiis.

runt? C. Cannius æques of talke.
 Romanus, homo nec in- Capus Cānus, of the E-
 facetus, & satis literatus, questrial order in Rome a
 cūm se Siracusas otiādi (vt man not vnpleasaunt, and
 ipse dicere solebat) nō ne- welynough learned, when
 gotiandi causa contulisset, he had gott him to Sir-
 dictabat se hortulos ali- cusa, euen for pleasure, and
 quos velle emere, quō iui- not for busines (as he was
 tare amicos, & vbi se ob- wōt to tel) he byated, & hce
 lectare sine interpellatori- would buy some place of
 bus posset. Quod cūm per plesure. whether he myght
 crebuisset, Pythius ei qui- bid his frends, & where he
 dam, qui argentariam face might delight himselfe w-
 ret Siraculis, dixit venales out troubles. whiche when
 quidem se hortos non ha- it was spyed abzoad, one
 bere, sed licere vti Cannio Pythius who kept a bank
 si vellet, vt suis, & simulad of exchaunge at Siracusa
 cœnam hominem in hor- saide, that hce had in deede
 tos inuitauit in posterū di- a plesaut plot, howbeit
 em. Cū ille promississet, not to sel, yet Cannius if it
 tum Pythius vt argentari- pleed him might vse it as
 us qui esset apud omnes or his owne, & therewith bad
 dines gratiofus, piscatores him to supper, agaynst the
 ad se cōuocauit: et ab is pe next day, when he had pro-
 tiuia, vt āte suos hortulos- mised. then Pythius lyke
 postera die piscarētur: dix a banker who was well in
 it q̄ quid eos facere vellet. fauour w^{all} degrees, cal-
 led vnto hym certayne fy-
 shermen, & required them,
 that the nexte daye theye
 woulde fysh beefore hys
 ground & tolde them what
 he woulde haue them doo.

Cannius

Cān^{us} came at his time to supper . Sumptuouslye there was prepared a number of fisherbotes were before their eyes. Eche man for his parte, brought that he had takē. The fish was powdered down at Pythius feet. Then quoth Cān^{us} I pray ye Pythius, what is this. & there is so greate store of fish, so goodly a sort of botes: what maruayle: quod he again: for what so euer fish ther is about Syracusa, it is in this place: here is the watering place this ground these citizens can not wel spare. Cān^{us} kindled with a desire to it, was earnest wth Pythius, & he would sell it him . Hee made it strange at the firste what neede many words: he obtaineth it: the mā being in loue wth it, and riche, bought it for so muche, as Pythius would aske: and bought it furnished: he put teth in sueries: & makes by the bargaine, Cān^{us} the next day, desired his acquaintance thyther, and came hym selfe beetymes: he

Ad cenam tempore venit Cannius, erat opiparē a Pythio apparatus conuiuū. Cymbarum ante hortulos multitudo, p se quisq; qd ceperat, afferebat: ante pedes Pythij pisces abijciebatur. Tum Cannius: quæso inquit, quid est o Pythi, tantumne piscium? tantumne Cymbarum? Et ille. Quid mirum, inquit hoc loco est, Syracusis quicquid est piscium, hec aquatio, hac villa isti care re non possunt. Incensus Cannius cupiditate, contendit a Pythio, vt venderet: grauātē ille primō. Quid multa? Impetrat: emit homo cupidus & locuples, tanti, quanti Pythius voluit et emit instructos, nomina facit, negotium conficit: Inuitat Cān^{us} posttridiē fami lares suos: venit ipse matu- S.ij. re scal-

de Officiis.

scalmū nullū videt, querit
ex proximo vicino, nū fe-
ria quēdā piscatorū essent
quōd eos nullos videret.
Nullē (quod scia) inquit il-
le, sed hic piscari nulli solēt
itaq; heri mirabar, quid ac-
cidisset. Stomachari Canni-
us, sed quid faceret? nōdū
enim Aquilius collega &
familiaris meus pertulerat
de dolo malo formulas: in
quibus ipsis cūm ex eo que-
reretur quid esset dol⁹ ma-
lus respōdebat, cū esset ali-
ud simulatū, aliud actum.
Hoc quidē sanē luculēter
vt ab homine perito defi-
niendi. Ergo & Pythius:
& ōnes aliud agētes, aliud
simulantes, perfidi, impro-
bi, malitiosi sunt. Nullum
igitur factum eōrum po-
test vtile esse, cū sit tot
vitijs inquinatum. Quōd si
Aquiliana definitio vera
est, ex omni vita simulatio

he saw neuer a bote: he en-
quired of his next neighbor
whether it were not some
holy day & the fishermen,
because he saw none of the
None that I know quoth
hee: but here none of them
are wont to fische: & there-
fore yesterday I marue-
led what chāce was befallen
Canius began to chafe,
but what could he do: For
as yet Aquilius, my office
fellow, & familiar, had not
set forth y cases, y shoulde
bee compted couine, In y
which same, when I de-
maūded of him, what was
Couine: he answered, whē
one thing was pretended,
and another done. Thys
doubtlesse was very plainly
answered, as of a man
skilfull in defining. There
fore bothe Pythius, and al,
that do one thing, and pre-
tend an other, bee false,
swicked, and gilefull. Doe
decde then of theirs can be
profitable, when it is with
so manye faultes bespot-
ted. If Aquilius defini-
tion bee true, oue of all
māns life must false preten-
dinge and

ding, & dissembling be ban-
nished. So euery good mā
shal neither falsely ppretend
noz dissemble, that he may
buy oz sell the better. And
this couine also was pon-
nishable by the lawes: as
deceitfull gardenship, in §
twelue table: and craftye
beguiling pōgmen of their
goods, by the lawe Lec-
torian, and without lawe
by iudgements, where the
bil is put in, vpon good cō-
science. But of all other
iudgements these woordes
bee most notable, that be of
course in a case of arbytre-
ment of mariage: the bet-
ter, the iuster: and in a case
of truste oz cōfidence: That
among honest men ther be
honest dealing. What then:
either in §, which is § bet-
ter, § iuster: cā ther be any
point of couyne: oz when it
is saide, among honest mē,
let ther be honest dealing:
can any thing discretely
oz guiltfully be done? But
couin (as iayeth Aquili⁹)
is contained in fayned pre-
tence, and dissimulatyōn.
Utyng therefoze in ma-
kinge of bargaynes is vt-
terlye to bee excluded. Let

dissimulatioq; tollenda est
Ita nec vt emat meli⁹, nec
vt vēdat, quicq; simulabit
aut dissimulabit vir bonus
Atq; iste dolus malus etiā
legibus erat vindicatus, vt
tutela. XII. tabulis & cir-
cumscrip̃tio adolescentiū
lege Lectoria, & sine le-
ge iudicijs, in quib⁹ ex fide
bona agitur. Reliquorum
autē iudiciorū hęc verba
maximē excellunt, in arbi-
trio rei vxoriq; melius, equi-
us. In fiducia, vt inter bo-
nos bene agier. Quid ergo
aut in eo quod melius æ-
quius est, potest vlla pars
in esse fraudis? aut cū di-
citur inter bonos benē a-
gier, quicquam agi dolosē
aut maliosē potest? Do-
lus autem malus simula-
tione & dissimulatione,
(vt ait Aquilius) con-
tinetur. Tollendum est
igitur in rebus contra
hendis omnem mendacium
S. iij. nō

de Officiis.

non licitatore[m] venditor
nec qui contra se liceatur,
emptor opponit, vterq[ue] si
ad eloquendū venerit, nō
plus quā semel eloquetur.
Quintus quidem Sceuola
P. fili⁹, cū postulasset, vt
sibi fundus, cuius emptor
erat, semel indicaretur, idq[ue]
vendedor ita fecisset, dixit
setq[ue] se pluris estimare, ad-
didit centū milia: Nemo
est qui hoc viri boni fuisse
neget, sapientis negant: vt
si minoris quā potuisset vē-
didisset. Hæc igitur est il-
la perniciēs, qd alios bo-
nos, alios sapientes existi-
mant. Ex quo Ennius.
Nequicquam sapere sapi-
entem, qui sibi ipsi prodes-
se nequeat.
Verē id quidem, si quid es-
set prodesse, mihi cum En-
nio conueniret. Hecato-
nem quidem Rhodiū dis-
cipulum Panætij video,

not the seller sett a rayser
of the pryse against y buyer,
let not the buyer set one y
may lowe the pryce againe
for him. If they both come
to communication, theye
shal talke but once of y mat-
ter. whan Quint⁹ Sceuo-
la. Publius sonne, had req-
red y the pryce of y grounde
wherof he was a cheaper,
shoud oce be shewed hym,
& the seller had so done, he
said, he valued it moze wor-
the, and gaue hym moze by
xxv. hundzed crowns. Ther
is no man y can denye, but
this was y parte of a good
mā, a wise mā's parte they
deny it to be, euen as if the
other shold hane sold it for
lesse, than hec mighte haue
gottē. This therfore is the
mischiefe because they rec-
kē good to be one sort, and
wise of an other. wherupō
quoth Ennius.
The wise man his wit
very vaine he maye cal,
If profit he can not
himselſe therwithal.
It were true in dede, if I
agreed with Enni⁹, wher
it

it is to profit. I se Decato
 & Rhodia Paneti^r scholer
 saietij in those books, whi-
 che of dupties hee wrot to
 Quintus Tubero, that it tra
 is a wise mans part doing
 nothing against customes,
 laws, & ordinaunces to ha-
 ue a respect to his substāce.
 For we couet not only for
 our selues to bee riche, but
 for our children, our kyn-
 folk, our friends, & specially
 for y^e cōmō weale. For the
 substāce, & welth of euerye
 free mā is the richenes of a
 citie. Sceuolaes dooynge,
 wherof I spake a litle be-
 fore, cā in no wise lyke De-
 cato, for Sceuola utterlye
 denieth, y^e he will do ought
 for his o^{wn} gain sake, that
 is not lawfull To this mā
 neither gret praise oz thā-
 is to be geuen. But whe-
 ther both false p^rtendinge, &
 also dissēbling be couine oz
 no, few matters there bee,
 wherē this couin hath not
 ado, & whether hee bee a
 good mā, who p^rites whō
 he may, & hurtz no body, sul-
 wel a iust mā, but not ly-
 ghly a good man we shall
 finde. It

in ijs libris, quos de officijs
 scripsit, Quinto Tuberoni
 dicere, sapiētis esse nihil cō-
 tra mores, leges, instituta
 facientē habere rationē rei
 familiaris. Neq; enim solū
 nobis diuites esse volumus
 sed liberis, propinquis, ami-
 cis, maximēq; Reipub. Sin-
 gularū enim facultates &
 copiē diuitiæ sunt ciuitatis
 Huic Sceuolæ factum (de
 quo paulō āte dixi) place-
 re nullo modo potest. E-
 tenim ōninō se negat fac-
 turum cōpendij sui causa,
 quod non liceat. Huic nec
 laus magna tribuenda est,
 nec gratia. Sed siue simula-
 tio & dissimulatio dolⁱ ma-
 lus est: perpaucę res sūt in
 quibus dolus iste malus
 non versetur. Siue vir
 bonus est is, qui prodest
 quibus potest, nocet nemi-
 ni: rectē iustū virum, bo-
 num nō facile reperiemus
 S.iiij. Num

de Officiis.

Nunquam igitur est vtile peccare quia sepe est turpe: & quia sepe est honestum virum bonum esse, semper est vtile. Ac de iure qui de prædiorum sacitum est apud nos iure civili, ut in his vendendis vitia etiam dicerentur, quæ nota essent venditori. Nam cum ex XII. tabulis satis esset cautum ea præstari, quæ essent lingua nuncupata, quæ qui inficiatus esset duplicem penam subiret: a iure consultis etiam reticentiæ poena est constituta. Quicquid enim est in prædio vitij, id statuerunt, si venditor sciret, nisi nominatim dictum esset, præstari oportere. Ut cum in arce augurum Augures acturi essent, iussissentque Titum Claudium Centimalum, qui ædes in Caelio monte habebat, demoliri

It is neuer profitable the to do euil, beccause it is euermore dishonest: & beccause it is alwaies honeste to be a good man. it is alwaies profitable.

And suretpe touching the title of land, it is ordeyned wiche vs by ciuile lawe: y in selling of it, the faultes also should be tolde, which were knowen to the seller. For wheras by the twelue tables it was sufficiente provided: that those things should be pformed whiche were declared in woorde: which who so woulde deny, should forfeite double damages: ther was also by the Iudges of the lawe, a paine set for concealement. For what soener fault were in the lande: if the seller knew it. except expresselye he had declared it: they decreed, y it ought to be made good. As when in y towne the Augures were about their prophcinge by foules flight: & had comanded Titus Claudius Centimalus, who hadde houses in mount Celie, to pull those

downe

doſon, whoſe height ſhould
let they propheeping: Clau-
dius did ſet them to ſale, &
ſold the Iland: Publius
Calphurnius Lanarius
bought it. He was coman-
ded the very ſame by the
Augurs and ſo, whē Cal-
phurnius had pulled them
downe, & underſtoode, that
Claudius had ſet the hou-
ſes to ſale, after he had ben
comanded of the Augurs
to pulle them downe: hee
braue him to arbirment:
For al y he oughte in that
caſe to recompence him, of
good conſcience. Marcus
Cato. this our Caroes fa-
ther, made the award. For
as other are named fro their
fathers: ſo this who bargat
ſuch a ſtar is to bee named
fro his ſonne. He therefore
as iudge, gaue ſentence thus
y ſeing he knew the thinge
at the putting of it to ſale,
and did not declare it: hee
ought to render y bier the
damages. He therefore iud-
ged, it ſhould be good conſci-
ence: that the ſauke whiche
the ſeller knew ſhould bee
knowne to the bier. That
and

cas, quorū altitudo officie-
ret auspicijs: Claudius pro-
ſcripſit inſulam: vendidit
emit Publius Calphurnius
Lanarius. Huic ab Auguri-
bus in illud idē denuncia-
tum eſt, Itaq; Calphurnius
cū demolitus eſſet, cog-
nouiffetq; Claudium eſſe
poſtea proſcripſiſſe, quā-
m eſſet ab Auguribus demo-
liri iuſſus: arbitrū illud ad-
egit: quid ſibi de ea re face-
re oporteret ex fide bona.
M. Cato ſententiam dixit
(hui⁹ noſtri Catoñ pater)
Vt enim ceteri ex partibus
ſic hic, qui illud lumen pro-
genuit, ex filio eſt nominā-
tus. Is igitur iudex ita pro-
nunciavit: cū in venun-
dando rem eam ſciſſet, &
non pronunciauiſſet, epto-
ri damnum præſtari o-
portere. Igitur ad fidem
bonam ſtatuit pertinere, no-
tum eſſe emptori vitium,
qd' noſſet vëditor. Quod

de officiis.

si rectè dijudicauit, non rectè frumentarius ille, nō rectè ædium pestilencium venditor tacuit. Sed huius modi reticentiæ iuræ ciuili ones comprehendī nō possunt: quæ autē possunt, diligenter tenenter. M Marius Gratidianus propinquus noster C. Sergio Oratæ vendiderat ædes eas quas ab eodem ipse paucis ante annis emerat. Hæ Sergio seruiebant, sed hoc in mancipio Marius non dixerat, adducta res in iudicium est. Oratam Crassus, Cratidianum defendebat Antonius. Ius Crassus urgebat, quod vitium venditor non dixisset, sciens id oportere prestari, equitatem Antonius: quoniam id vitium ignotum Sergio non fuisset, qui illas ædes vèdidisset, nihil fuisset

and if he gaue a true iudgement, neither wel did the corn marchant afoze, neither wel did this contagio^s house seller in holdinge his peace. But suche maner of concealementes cannot all be comprehended in \S ciuill lawe, but such as may, be persitiue contained. Marius Grati^{us} Grati^{us} our kinsman, had solde to Caius Sergius Orata^s house, which he had bought of him a few yeres befoze. This house did a certayne seruice to Sergi^{us}, but Mari^{us} had not declared \S lãe in \S liuerpe of senlin. The matter was brought to \S law, Crass^{us} pleaded for Orata, Antoni^{us} for Grati^{us} dian^{us}. Crass^{us} stode vpon the letter of the lawe, beecause \S seller, knowing the discommoditie, had not tolde it, that it ought to be made good, Antonius enforced the equitie of the lawe, beecause that discommoditie was not vnknowē to Sergi^{us}, who had solde the lãe house, that it was nothing needefull too bee declared,

and

and that he was not decei-
ned, who vnderstoode of
what title it was that hee
hadde boughte. To what
purpose tendes al this?
That ye may perceiue, y
couin lyked not our auntes
tours. But one waye the
lawes condempne couin, an
other way y philosophers,
the lawes, as farre as by
open dede they can gather
vppon matters, the philo-
sophers, as far as by rea-
sonne, and vnderstanding
they can comprehend. Rea-
son therfore requirerh this
that nothinge subtely no-
thing fauourably, nothing de-
ceitfully be done. Is it the
any deceite, to pythe the
toyle although you go not
about to roule, nor chase
y game: for y very game
lyghts vpon it oftentimes,
when no body folowes the
So when you offer your
house to sale, you sett y
your bill, as a nette, you
sell the house, because of y
faulces, some body happes
vppon it vnware of them,
thoughe I see, this tho-
rough corruption of vse,
neither

necesse dici: nec eū esse de
ceptū qui id quod emerat,
quo iure esset, teneret quo-
rsum hęc vt illud intelli-
gas, non placuisse maiori-
bus nostris astutos. Sed ali-
ter leges, aliter Philosophi
tollūt astutias. Leges, qua-
tenus manu tenereres pos-
sunt: philosophi quatenus
ratione & intelligētia. Ratio
igitur hoc postulat, ne qd
insidiosē, ne quid simulatē
nequid fallaciter. Sunt nē
igitur insidię, tendere pla-
gas, etiā si excitaturus non
sis bestiam, nec agitaturus
Ipse feræ nullo insequen-
te sepe incidunt. Sic tu
cū ædes proscribas, tabu-
lam tanquam plagam po-
nas, domum propter vitia
vendas, in eam aliquis in-
currat imprudens: hoc
quāquam video, ppter de-
prauationem cōsuetudinis
neque

de officiis.

neque more turpe haberi
neque aut lege sanciri, aut
iure civili: naturę tamē le-
ge sancitum est, Societas
enim est (quod etsi sæpe
dictum est, dicendum tamē
est sepius) latissimē quidem
que pateat hominū inter
homines, interior eorū qui
eiusdem gentis sunt: propi-
or eorum, qui eiusdem ci-
uitatis. Itaque maiore res al-
liud ius gentium aliud
ius civile esse voluerunt.
Quod enim civile non idē
continuō gentium quod
autem gentium, idem ciui-
le esse debet. Sed nos ve-
ri iuris, germanęque iusti-
tię solidam & expressam
effigiem nullam tenemus,
vmbra & imaginibus uti-
mur: eas ipsas utinam
sequeremur. Feruntur e-
nim ex optimis naturę &
veritatis exemplis.

Nam quāti sunt verba illa

neither by custome is con-
firmed dishonest, neither by or-
dinance, or ciuill lawe of de-
crees: yet by the law of na-
ture it is forbidden. For
ther is a fellowship of mā
amongst men (which thing
although it hath ben often
times spoken of, yet often-
ner it must be spoken) whi-
che in deede very largelpe
extendeth: & a nerer ther is
of those, who be of one na-
tiō: & a nerer of thē, who be
of one city. Therefore our
nunceters woulde needes,
haue the law of nations to
be one thing, and the ciuill
lawe another. For what so
is the ciuill lawe, the same
is not consequēty the law
of nations: but what so ys
the law of nations, the sām
must needes be & ciuill law
But we kepe no sound, &
expresse forme of very law
& iustice: we vse the
shadowe and images ther-
of: yea and euen those same.
I would, we did folloowe.
For they be taken out of y
best principles of nature, &
paternes of troth, for how
precious be those wordes.

That

That not by you, or youre
ymes. I be snared or de-
ceiued how golden words
be those: that among good
men good dealing ought to
bee without deceiuinge.

But who be good men, &
what is good dealing, it is
a great question. Quintus
Sceuola the chiefe bishop
saide. there was great sub-
stance of matter in al those
arbitrementes, in whyche
they should be treating ac-
cording to good conscience
and the name of good con-
science he iudged to reache
very farre: and that it had
aduo in gardinships, com-
panies, matters of trusts,
comaundermentes, thinges
bought, solde, hired, and let
out: by which & felowshyp
of mans life is vpholden:
in these thinges he sayde, it
was the office of a greate
iudge to determine, what
eche man should do to ano-
ther, specially seig & iudge-
ments in most men be con-
trary one to another, wher-
fore couin must be vtterly
auoided: & & wiliness which

will

Vt ne propter te, fidemue
tuam, captus fraudatusue
sim: quàm illa aurea. Vt in
ter bonos benè agier oportet
& sine fraudatiōe. Sed
qui sint boni, & quid sit
benè agere, magna questio
est. Quintus quidem
Sceuola Pout. Max, sum-
mam vim esse dicebat in
omnibus ijs arbitrijs, in qui-
bus adderetur ex fide bo-
na. Fideique bonę nomen
existimabat manare latissi-
mè: idquē versari in tu-
telis, societatibus: fiducijs
mandatis, rebus emptis, vē-
ditis, conductis, locatis, qui-
bus vitę societas contine-
tur. In his magni esse iu-
dicis, statuere (præsertim
cū in plerisque essent iu-
dicia contraria) quid quę-
q; cuiq; præstare oportere.
Quocirca astutię tol-
lende sunt, eaque malitia,
quæ vult quidem videri

de Officiis.

se esse prudētiā, sed abiect
ab ea, distatq; plurimum.
Prudentia est enim locata
in delectu bonorū, et ma-
lorum. Malicia si ōnia, quę
turpia sunt, mala sunt, ma-
la bonis, antepōnit. Nec ve-
rō in prędijs solum ius ciui-
le ductū à natura malitiā,
fraudemq; vindicat, sed et-
iam in mancipiorū vendi-
tione venditorum fraus ō-
nis excluditur. Qui enim
scire debuit de sanitates de
fuga, de furtis, pręstat edic-
to ediliū. Hæredū alia cau-
sa est. Ex quo intelligitur,
quoniam iuris natura fōs sit.
hoc secūdū naturā esse, ne
minem id agere, vt ex alte-
rius prędetur inscitia. Nec
vlla perniciēs vitę maior
inueniri potest, quā in
malitia simulatio intelli-
gentiæ.

Ex quo illa innumerabilia
nascuntur: vt vtilia cum

will needes hane it selfe
seeme to bee prudence, but
it is farre from it, & differs
very muche. For prudence
is placed in the choyse of
good, and euill, wylines, if
al things be euill, which be
dishonest, preferreth euill be-
foze good. And not only in
matters of land, the ciuile
law, & hath his originall of
nature, doth punish wylly-
nes, & couine, but also in
sale of slaues & nteis, al co-
uine of the sellers is forbid-
den. For he & shoulde haue
known of their helthful-
nes, of their fugitiuenes of
their theuifhnes, dothe
make satisfactiō by & Edi-
les decree. Otherwise is
case of inheritois. wherof
is dō to vnderstād because
nature is the fountaine of
law, & this is according to
nature & no man go aboute
by anothers ignorance, to
make his owne gain. For
any greater destruction of
mans life can be found thā
of a wylines, falsely to dys-
semble ones vnderstāding
whereof those innume-
rable inconueniēces do
growe, that profitable
things

things seeme to fight with
honest. For how many wil
be fowd, who being sure to
be free fro punishment, and
knowledge of al mē, cā re-
frain fro doing wrog? Let
vs make a pofe (if it plese
ye) in those exāples, wher-
in the cōmō sort of men p-
haps do not thinke they do
amisse. For it falleth not in
this place to speak of mur-
derers, poploners, wilfoz-
gers, thecues, & robbers of
cōmūō trefure, who not
w wordes, & reasonings of
philosophers, but w chai-
nes & prisonment are to be
punished. But these thigs
let vs consider which they
do, who be compted good.
Certaine men brought out
of Grece to Rome, a cōū-
terfet will of Lucius An-
tonij Basilus, a very rich
man, & to the intente they
might the easeliter proue it
they did put in as heirs w
them Marcus Crassus, &
Quintus Hortensij, men
of moſte power in the
same citie. who when they
suspected it to be forged, &
were not gilty of any fault
in theire owne consyence

honestis pugnare videatur.
Quot enim quisq; reperi-
etur, qui impunitate & ig-
noratione omniū pposita ab-
stinere possit iniuria; Peri-
clitemur (si placet) et inijs
quidem exēplis, in quibus
peccari vulg⁹ hominū for-
tasse nō putat. Neq; enī de
sicarijs, venificis, testamē-
tarijs, furibus, peculatorib⁹
hoc loco differēdū est, qui
nō verbis sūt & disputatio-
ne philosophorū, sed vīcu-
lis et carcere castigādi. Sed
hec cōsideremus quē faci-
ūt ij, q̄ habētur boni. L. Mi-
nutij Basilij locupletis ho-
minis falsū testamētū qdā
ē Grēcias Romā attulerūt,
Quod quō facilius obtine-
rent, scripserūt heredes se-
cū M. Crassū & Quintum
Hortensium, homines ei⁹
de ciuitatis potentissimos,
qui cū illud falsum esse
suspicaretur, sibi autem
nullius esset conscij culpę,
they
alieni

de Officiis.

alieni facinoris munusculū
non repudiauerunt. Quid
ergo? sat in hoc est, vt non
deliquisse videantur? Mihi
quidē non videtur: quan-
quā alterū amaui viuū, al-
terū non odi mortuū. Sed
cūm Basilus. M. Satyrium
sororis filium nomen suū
ferre voluisset, eumq; fecis-
set heredem, hūc autē dico
patronum agri Piceni &
Sabini (ō turpē notā tem-
porū illorum) non erat &
quū principes ciuitatis rem
habere, ad Satyrium nihil
preter nomen puenire. E-
tenim si is, qui non defēdit
iniuriam neq; propulsat ā
suis cū potest, iniuste facit
vt in primo libro disserui:
qualis habendus estis, qui
non modo nō repellit, sed
etiam adiuuat iniuriam?
Mihi quidem etiam veræ
hereditates non honeste
videntur, si sint malitio-
sis blanditijs officiorum,

they refused not & prey re-
ward of another falsehood
what say wee then? Is
this enough that they seeme
not to haue done any fault
To me truely it seemes not
so: although the one I lo-
ued being aliue, & other I
hate not being dead: But
why Basilus would haue
hadde Marcus Satyrus
his sisters sōne to bere hys
name: and had made him
his heir: I mean him who
was protectour of y^e coun-
trei of Picene & Sabine.
(A shameful stain, in those
daies) it was not reason, &
the ruelers of the citie had
the goods, and nothig but
the name descended to Sa-
tyrius. For if hee, & dothe
nor fence of iniurie, & kepe
it away from his, when he
may, doth vniustlye: as in
my first booke I haue dis-
puted: what manner a man
is he to bee compted: who
not only doth nor fence of,
but also furdererth an iniu-
rie? And true inheritaunce
also seemes to mee not
honest if it be purchased by
wylfe flatteringe ducties:
and

and not by trueth, but by
false sayung. But in suche
cases, one thyng is wont
sometime to seeme profita-
ble: an other honest, yet
vntuouse it so seemeth: for
alike is y rule of profit, as
of honestie, who seeth
not this: no guyle, no mys-
chief shall faile in him. For
th^e imaginig, this in dede
is honest, but this is profi-
table: he wil take vpon him
by error to sonder thinges
coupled together by nature
which is y swelling of al
deceiptes, wyched dedes,
and mischiefs. Therfore if
a good mā haue such pow-
er y if he do but becke wth
his synger, his name maye
creep into the testamēt of
y riche let him not vse this
power: no not though he
know for certentie, that no
man at al w^{ill} once mys-
trust it. But if ye shoulde
giue this power to Marc^{us}
Crass^{us}, that wth a becke of
his synger, he might be put
in as heire, beinge no heire
as dede he wold (beleeue me)
leape for ioy in y op^e strete
But a iuste man, and hee,
whom

no veritate, sed simulationē
quæsitæ. Atqui in talibus
rebus aliud vtile interdū,
aliud honestū videri solet
falso. Nā eadē vtilitatis, q̄
honestatis est regula, qui
hoc nō prouiderit: ab hoc
nulla fraus aberit, nullum
facinus: Sic enim cogitas:
Est istud quidē honestū,
verū hoc expedit: res a na-
tura copulatas audebit er-
rorē diuellere, qui sons est
fraudū, maleficiorū, scele-
rum omniū. Itaq; si vir bo-
nus habeat hanc vim vt si
digitis concrepuerit, possit
in locupletū testamēta no-
men eius irrepere, hac vi
nō vtatur: nec si exploratū
quidē habeat, id omnino
neminē vnquā suspicatu-
rū. At si dares hāc vim M.
Crasso, vt digitorū pcussio
eū heres posset script^{us} esse
qui re vera nō esset heres: i
foro, mihi crede, saltaret.
Homo autem iustus, isq;

de Officijs.

quē sentimus virū bonū,
nihil cuiquam, quod in se
transferat, detrahet. Hoc
qui admiratur, is se, qui sit
vir bonus, nescire fatetur.
At verō si quis voluerit a-
nimi sui complicatam no-
tionē euoluere: iam se ip-
se doceat, eum virū bonū
esse, qui profit quibus pos-
sit, noceat nemini, nisi la-
cessitus iniuria. Quid er-
go hic nō noceat, qui quo-
dam quasi veneno pficiat
vt veros heredes moueat,
in eorum locum ipse suc-
cedat? Non igitur faciat
(dixerit quis) quod vtile
sit, quodq; expediat? im-
mō intelligat, nihil nec ex-
pedire, nec vtile esse quod
sit iniustum, hoc qui non
dedicerit, bonus vir esse
non poterit. Fimbriam cō-
sularem audiebam de pa-
tre nostro puer, iudicem
M. Luctatio Pythiae
fuisse equiti Romano,

who wee cōpt a good mā,
will catch nothing from a-
ny man, to cast it vpon him
selfe. who so hath wonder
at this: hee confelleth hym
self not to know, who is a
good man. But if a manne
will vnfold the secret know-
ledge of his minde: by and
by hee maye enforme hym
selfe, that he is a good man
who doth good to who hee
may: and hurteth no body,
but prouoked by iniury.
Howe then: dothe not hee
hurte another. who works
(as it were) with a certein
poyson: that the true heirs
he may displace. and make
himselfe succede in theirs
roume? May hee not then
doe that will some saye,
whiche is profitable, and
whiche is auailable? Maye
let him knowe that nothing
neither auailleth, nor is pro-
fitable, whiche is iniuste.
This who so hath not le-
ned, cannot be a good man
I heard of my father, whē
I was a boy: if iulia lōe
time Consul was iudge to
Mare? Luctat? Pythias
one of the Equestriall order
of Rome,

of Rome, in derde honest. whē he had put in suerites
to answer the action, if hee
were not found a good mā
therefore Fimbria sayde
vnto him, he would neuer
giue iudgemēt of the case:
lest he shoulde either rob a
tried mā of his good name
if he had iudged agāst him
or els shoulde sceme to haue
determined; & ther is some
good man: wheras & thing
consisteth in duities, & com-
mendations innumerable.
To this good man then,
whom also Fimbria, & not
onely Socrates had cōcei-
ued: can no way ought ap-
peare to be profitable, that
is not honeste. Therefore
suche a man will not bee so
bold to do, no noz purpose
any thinge, whiche he dare
not auer: It is not a shame
for philosophers to doubt
in these things, wherof the
cloyenes of the countrie do
make no doubt at al: Fro
whom is sprong that pro-
uerbe, which now is wel
woyne by cōtinuance. For
when they praise any mā
conscience, and goodnesse:
they

sanē honesto cū is sponti-
onē fecisset, ni bonus vir
esset. Itaq; ei dixisse. Fim-
briam, se illā rem nunquā
iudicaturum: ne aut spo-
liaret fama probatum ho-
minē, si contra iudicasset:
aut statuisse, videretur vi-
rum bonum aliquē esse, cū
ea res innubribilib⁹ of-
ficijs & laudibus contine-
retur. Huius igitur viro
bono, quē Fimbria, etiam,
nō modo Socrates nque-
rat, nullo modo videri po-
test, quicquā esse vtile, qd
nō honestū sit. Itaq; talis
vir non modo facere: sed
nec cogitare, quidē quic-
quā audebit, quod nō au-
deat predicare. Hoc nō ne-
est turpe dubitare philoso-
phos, quē ne rustici quidā
dubitent: a quibus natum
est id, quod iam tritum
est. vetustate. prouerbi-
um. Cum enim fidem ali-
cuius, bonitatēq; laudant;

de Officijs.

dignū esse dicūt, quicū in
tenebris mices: Hoc quam
habet vim, nisi illā, nihil ex
pedire quod nō deceat, et
tiam si id possis nullo re-
fellente obtinere? Vides
nē igitur hoc prouerbio
neq; Gygi illi posse veniā
dari, neq; huic quē paulō
ante fingebam, digitorum
peussione hēditates om-
niū posse conuētere? Ut
enim quod turpe est, id
quāuis occultetur, tamen
honestā fieri nullo modo
potest: sic qd honestum
non est, id vtile vt sit effi-
ci non potest, aduersante
& repugnante natura. At
enim cum permagna pre-
mia sunt, est causā peccan-
di. C. Marius cum a spe cō-
sulatus longe abesset, & iā
septimum annum post
prēturam iaceret, neque
petiturus vnquam consu-
latum videretur Q. Me-
tellum cuius legatus erat,

they say, he is such a man,
as ye may play w him blid
fold, what other meanyng
hathe that, but this, & no-
thing is expediet, which is
not comelye, although you
may obtain it without any
mans resistāce. Do yee not
se thā by this prouerb, that
neither y saue Gyges, can
be borne w: nor this other
whom ere wille. I sayed
w the wagging of his sin-
ger to bee able to turne to
him self al mennes inheri-
taunce: for as the things
whiche is dyshoneste, al-
though it be closelye kept,
can no way yet be made ho-
nest, so y thig which is not
honest, cannot bee brought
to passe to be profitable, es-
uen nature being agaynst
it, & standing it. But yet
where verie great bydes
be, ther is occasion of euill
doing. when Caius Ma-
rius was farre of frō hope
of y Cōsulship, a by. yeras
after his pētōrship, laye
still woz seemed as one y
ner woulde labour for the
Cōsulshippe, to the peo-
ple of Rome hee accused

Quin-

Quintus Metellus, a noble man, & citizen, whose ambassadour he was, when he was sent too. Rome from him, being his captain how he prolonged the warres, & saide, if they had made him Consul, he would in a short space haue brought Jugurtha, either quicke or dead, into the subjection of the people of Rome. And so in deede hee was made Consul, but he swarued from all trust, & iustice, who by false accusation brought in an enemy a very good, & graue citizen whose ambassadour hee was, and from whom hee was sent. So nor our Gratidianus, truelye did the dute of a good man, when hee was Pretor, & the Tribunes of the people had called vnto the company of the Pretors, that there might be set a standard of conscience by a common consent. For in those daies money was made so to fall, & rise, & no man cold know what he had. They penned a decreet by a common agreement by a paper

summum virū, & ciuē, cū ab eo imperatore suo Romanus missus esset, apud Populum. Roma criminatus est, bellum illū pducere: si se COS. fecissent breui tempore aut viuū, aut mortuum Jugurtham se in potestate Populi Romani redacturum. Itaque factus est ille quidem COS. sed a fide, iusticiaq; discessit: qui optimum & grauissimum ciuē, cuius legatus, & a quo missus esset in inuidiā falso crimine adduxerit. Nec noster quidem Gratidianus officio boni viri functus est, tunc cū prætor esset collegiumque prætorum tribuni plebis adhibuisset, vt res nummaria de comuni sententia constitueretur. Iactabatur enim temporibus illis nummus, sic vt nemo posset scire quid haberet. Conscripserunt, communiter edictum cū pœna,

de officijs.

atque iudicio: constitue- and condemnation: and ap-
runtq; vt omnes simul in pointed, that they altogether
rostra post meridiem des- ther at after noone, would
cenderent, & ceteri quide go down in Rostra. And
alias alio. Marius a subsel then at the rest wente ech
lijs in rostra recta, idque man his way: Marius fro
quod communiter com- the Senatours benche got
positum fuerat, solus edi him straight to Rostra, &
xit, & ea res (si quæris) ei alone proclaimed þ, which
magno honori fuit: omni by a common consent was
bus vicis statuæ facta: ad made, and that thing, if yee
eas thus & cærei. desire to knowe, was to h
a greate honour, in all the
streets, imagez were made
him, and too the same offer

red was incense & lightes
of waxe. what nebe manye
of woxe. what nebe manye
wordes? No manne was
there euer moze beloued of
þ multitude. These bee the
things which trouble men
offentimes, in takinge of
aduisement, when þ thinge
wherin equitie is broke, is
not counted so greate, but
that, whiche is gotten by
such dealing, seemeth mar-
ueylous great as to Ma-
rius it seemed not so disho-
nour, to get away the peo-
ples fauour fro his felows
and the Tribunes, but too
bee made Consull for that
doing, which the he had set
before

before his eye, it seemed ver-
ry profitable. But one rule
there is of all, whiche I
would faine haue you tho-
roughly to know, either
thing which seemeth profi-
table, let it not be dishonest,
or if it be dishonest, lette it
not seeme profitable. What
shal we the say? May we
either take this Marius,
or y other, for a good mā?
Wende & straine pour un-
derstandinge, to see what
shape, forme, and ymage
of a good mā is in it. Woth
it then commonly befall in
a good man to lye for hys
profit, to accuse, to present
or deceiue? Of a suertye
nothing lesse. Is their then
any thing so precious, or a-
ny gaine so muche to be de-
sired, y yet shoulde there
foze lesse the glozy, & name
of a good manne? What is
there so much, that this p-
fit (as they cal it) is able to
bring vs, as it may pul frō
vs, in case it take away the
name of a good mā, & spoile
vs of trouthe, and iustice?
for what differēce is ther)
whether one shape turn hi
selfe

valde vtile videbatur. Sed
omniū vna regula est, quā
cupio tibi esse notissimā
aut illud, quod vtile vide-
tur, turpe ne sit: aut si tur-
pe est, ne esse vtile videā-
tur. Quid igitur possumus
ne, aut illū Mariū virū
bonum iudicare, aut hūc:
Explica, atque excute in-
telligentiam tuam, vt vi-
deas que sit in ea species,
forma, & notio viri boni.
Cedit ergo in virum bo-
num mentiri emolumenti
sui causa, criminari, preri-
pere, fallere? Nihil profec-
to minus. Est ergo vlla
res tanti, aut commodum
vllum tam expetendum.
vt viri boni et splendorem
& nomen amittas. Quid
est qd' asferre tantū vili-
tas ista, quæ dicitur, possit,
quantū auferre. si boni viri
nomen eripuerit, fidē iusti-
ciāq; detraxerit. Quid enī
interest vtrum ex homine

de officijs.

se cōuertat quis in belluam
an in hominis, figura imani
tatem gerat belue? Quid
qui omnia fecta & honesta
negligunt dummodo po-
tentia cōsequantur? Nōne
idē faciunt quod is, qui e-
tiam socerum habere vo-
luit eum, cuius ipse auda-
cia potens esset? vtile e-
nim videbatur plurimum
posse alterius inuidia. Id
quā iniustū in patriam, &
quā turpe esset, non vide-
bat. Ipse autē socer in ore
sēp grēcos versus Euripi-
dis de Phēnissis habebat,
quos dicā, vt potero, incō-
dite fortasse, sed tamen vt
res possit intelligi.

NAM SI VIOLAN-
DVM EST IVS, REG-
NANDI GRATIA VI-
OLANDVM EST, A-
LIIS REBVS PIETA-
TEM COLAS.

selfe from a man to a beast
or vnder the forme of mā,
beares in him the brutish
cruelnesse of beast: what of
them, who set at nought all
good and honest things, so
they may attaine to power
doo theye not, euen as hee
did: who would needes
haue him too his father in
lawe, by whose bolde en-
terprises he might beare a
swey: for to him yt seem-
ed, pfitable to be of much
power, by anothers enuye,
but he saw not how vnjust
how vnprofitable, how vn-
honest it was for his con-
trepy. But as for his father
in law, he had alwayes in
hys mouth Eurippides,
greke verses of Phēnissi-
ans, which I will expresse
as wel as I can: Per-
chance wout theire grace,
but yet so as the meanings
may be conceiued.

If breach of lawes, a mā
shal vndertake:
Hee must them boldlye
break for kingdōs sake:
In eche thing els: looke
you regard the right.

Baynours

Haynonis was *Etioeles*
 or rather *Euripides*: who
 excepted not onely thyſe,
 which was moſte detesta-
 ble. why do we theſe gather
 theſe triſting caſes, as con-
 cerninge inheritance, mer-
 chaundise & deceitfull ſale?
 Nay beholde hym, that
 ſought to be kinge ouer the
 people of Rome, & al nati-
 ons, & brought it to paſſe.
 This kinde of deſire who
 ſo counteth honeſt, hee ys
 not well in his witt: for he
 alloweth the ſurthzoſo of
 lawe and libertie; and the
 cruel, & detestable oppreſſi-
 on of them he reckens a glo-
 rious matter.
 With what kinde of chidiſh
 the, or ratinge rather maye
 I accept to tourne him fro
 ſo great an errour, who co-
 ſenteth, it is not honeſte to
 raigne as king in that citie
 whiche both hath ben, and
 ought to bee free. & yet ac-
 cōptes it profitable for him
 that can bring it to paſſe.
 For, O ye goddes immor-
 tall, can the moſte ſhamefull
 & cruell murder of a mans
 own couſtre be profitable,

Capitalis Etioeles vel po-
 tius Euripides, qui id vnū
 qd' omnium ſcleratiſſimum
 fuerat, exceperit. Quid igi-
 tur minuta colligimus hæ-
 reditates, mercaturas, ven-
 ditiones fraudulentas?
 Ecce tibi qui rex po. Ro.
 dominuſq; omnium gētium
 eſſe cōcupierit, ſidq; pſece-
 rit. Hanc cupiditatē ſi quis
 honeſtā eſſe dicit, amens
 eſt, probat enim legū & li-
 bertatis interitum, earūq;
 oppreſſionē terram & de-
 teſtabilem, glorioſam pu-
 tat. Qui autē fateatur ho-
 neſtum nō eſſe i ea ciuita-
 te, quæ libera fuit, quæq;
 eſſe debeat, regnare: ſed ei
 qui id facere poſſit, eſſe v-
 tile: qua hunc obiurgatio-
 ne, aut quo poſius conui-
 cio a tanto errore coner-
 auertere? poteſt enim (dij
 immortales) cuiquam eſſe
 vtile fœdiſſimum & ter-
 rea terimū paracidiū patriceſ

de Officiis.

quauis is qui se eo obstri-
xerit, ab oppressis ciuibus
parens nominetur? Hone-
state igitur dirigenda uti-
litas est & quidem sic, vt
hæc duo verba inter se di-
screpare, sed tamen vnum
sonare videantur. Nūc ha-
beo ad vulgi opinionem, q̄
maior utilitas quā regnādi
esse possit? Nihil contra in-
utilius ei, qui id iniuste cō-
secutus sit inuenio, cum ad
veritatē cepi reuocare ra-
tionem. Possunt enim cui
quā esse vtilis angores, so-
licitudines, diurni & no-
cturni metus, via insidia-
rum periculorumq; ple-
nissima? **MULTI IN I-**
QVI ATQVE INFI-
DELES REGNO :
PAUCI BONI SVNT
inquit Accius. At cui reg-
no? quod a Tantalo & Pe-
lope proditum iure obti-
nebatur : Nam quanto
plures ei regni putas, quicu

yea though he that hath be-
haved himself in such bloud
be cleaped of the oppressed
subjects parent of the com-
mon weale? **Posit** there-
fore is to be directed by ho-
nestie, and that so, as these
two wordes may seeme to
differ in them selves in ter-
mes and yet too sounde all
one in meaninge? **Posit** to
the opinion of the common
people. What greater pro-
fitt can there bee, than too
raigne and too rule? Con-
trarie wise I find nothing
more vnprofitable for him,
who vniustly hath attained
it when I apply reason to
y^e trowth. For can greues,
cares, daylye, and nightlye
feares, & a life full of snares
and daungers bee profita-
ble to any man? **About** y^e seeking of y^e crown
many euil & faithlesse be.
But few good mē in such
a mā shal lightlye see (scare
quod **Acti**). **But** to whiche
crown? The same, y^e from
Tantalus, and **Pelops**
descēding, was by iust title
possessed For howe manye
mo, think ye were vntru, &
vntruſtpe

intrustye to the king: who
 with an arme of Rome
 people oppressed: & people
 of Rome: and forced that
 citie to bee subiecte to hym:
 which was not only fre of
 it selfe, but also a ruler of
 other nations: what blot
 of conscience, suppose you,
 had hee in his heart: what
 woundes of remorse: But
 whose life cannot be ought
 worth to himselfe: when
 state of his life is such, that
 who so takes it from hym,
 shalbe in most fauour and
 fame: In case these things
 be not profitable, which spe-
 cially seme so to be: because
 they be full of shame & re-
 proch, we ought now to be
 fully perswaded, & nothing
 is profitable, which is not
 honest. notwithstandinge
 the same, both at diuers o-
 ther times, & namely in the
 warres of Pyrrhus, was
 so adiudged by Catius: & a
 Britius in his second Con-
 sulship, & also by our Se-
 nate. For when king Pyr-
 rhus vnprovoked had mo-
 ued warre against & people
 of Rome, & fight was all
 about & empire & noble,
 and

exercitu Populi Romani
 populū ipsū Romanū op-
 pressisset, ciuitatemq; non
 modo liberam, sed etiam
 gentibus imperantem, ser-
 uire coegisset? Hunc tu
 quas conscientiae labe in
 animo sese habuisse? quae
 vulnera? Cuius autem vi-
 ta ipsi potest utilis esse cū
 eius vitae ea conditio sit, vt
 qui illam eripuerit, in max-
 ima & gratia futurus sit &
 gloriae? Quod si hec utilia
 non sunt, quae maximè vi-
 dentur, quia plena sūt de
 decoris ac turpitudinis, sa-
 tis persuasum esse debet,
 nihil esse utile, quod nō ho-
 nestum sit. Quanquam id
 quidem cū sepe alias tū
 Pyrrhi bello a C. Fabritio
 COS. iterum & a Senatu
 nostro iudicatum est. Cū
 enim rex Pyrrhus Popu-
 Romano bellū ultro intu-
 lisset, cūq; de imperio certa-
 mē esset cū rege generoso

de Officiis.

ac potente, perfuga ab eo venit in castra Fabritij, ei-
q; est pollicitus, si præmiū ei proposuisset, se, vt clam venisset, sic clam in Pirrhi castra rediturum, & eum veneno necaturum. Hunc Fabricius reducendū cura uit ad Pyrrhum: idq; eius factum a senatu laudatum est. Atqui si speciem utilitatis, opinionemq; querimus, magnum illud bellū perfuga vnus et grauem aduersarium imperij sustulisset, sed magnum dedecus & flagitium: quicum laudis certamen fuisset, eum non virtute, sed scelere superatum. Vtrum igitur vtilius vel Fabritio, qui talis in hac vrbe, qualis Aristides Athenis fuit: vel senatui nostro, qui nūquam utilitatem a dignitate seiunxit, armis cum hoste certare, an venenis?

e puissant prince, a runnaway traytour wēt frō him to Fabritius campe and promised, that if Fabritius would offer him a good reward, as he came priuily so he would return priuily to Pyrrhus paction, and dispatch him with popson. Fabritius caused him to be carried back again to Pyrrhus, and that dede of his was wel commended of the Senate. But if we seke the show, and respect of profit, true it is, thys one runnaway might haue made an ende of the great warre, & that greuous enemy of the Empire, but it had bene a great shame, & foule dede, to haue had him subdued not by prowesse, but by trechery, w^{ch} whom the sight was al for glory. Whether thē was it more profitable either for Fabritius, who was such a one in our city as Aristides was at Athenes, or for our Senate, who neuer feared profite from honour, to warre againste their enemy wth the armes, or with popson?

If empire be to be sought
for cause of glory, let tre-
chery be eschewed, wherein
can be no glozpe, again, if
riches be sought any maner
way, they cannot be profit-
table, if they come by infam-
y. Therfore that aduise
of Lucius Philippus,
Quintus Seneca. was not
profitable, that those cities
whiche Lucius Sylla, for
a certain summe of money,
had discharged of trybutes
by decrees of the Senate,
should again be tributary,
and yet wee should not re-
store them money, which
for their beinge free, they
had disbursed. The Se-
natehouse agreed all wyth
him. To sclander it was to
the gouernement. For of
Pirates better is the pro-
mise, then of the Senate.
yea but the tributes (they
will say) were thereby aug-
mented: therfore it was
profitable. How long will
they be bold to call any
thing profitable, if it is not ho-
nest: Can hatred, & infamy
bee profitable to any state
& should be withholden with
glory,

Si glorię causa imperium
expetendum est, scelus ab-
sit, in quo non potest esse
gloria. Sin ipsę opes expe-
tantur, quoquo modo nō
poterunt esse vtilēs cum
infamia. Non igitur utilis
illa L. Philippi Q. filij
sententia, quas ciuitates
L. Sylla pecunia accepta
ex sena. cons. liberaui-
set, vt eę rursus vectigales
essent: nequē his pecuni-
am, quam pro libertate de-
derant redderemus, et se-
natus est assensus. Turpe
imperio. Pyratum enim
melior fides, quā sena-
tus. At aucta vectigalia.
Vtile igitur, quousquē
audebunt dicere, quic-
quam vtile quod non
honestum? potest au-
tem vili imperio, quod
gloria debet fultum esse,

de Officiis

& beneuolentia sociorum, glorie, & good will of their
 vtile esse odiū & infamia. leagfrendes. I my self oftē
 Ego etiam cum Catone time haue disagreed euē &
 meo sepe dissensi. Nimis my Cato: for yor stidpne
 enim mihi videbatur præ thought he defēded & trea-
 factē erarium, vectigaliāq; surie gain, & tributes: a de-
 defendere: omnia publi- nied al manner of allowāces
 canis negare, multa socijs, to & farmers of our custōe
 cū in hos benefici esse & many, to our leagfrendes:
 deberemus, cum illis sic a- whereas toward these wee
 gere, v̄t cū colonis nostris should be beneficiall: & so
 toleremus. Eoq; magis, qd̄ deale & those: as we were
 illa ordinum coniunctio wont to do & our citizens
 ad salutem Reip̄. pertine- set to inhabit new towne
 bat. Malē etiam Curio, cū & so muche & more, because
 causam Transpadanorum & knittig together of those
 equam esse dicebat, sem degrees of mē did pertaine
 per autem addebat, vint to the safetie of the commō
 eat vtilitas, potius diceret welth. Curio also, did euil,
 non esse equam, quia non in & he said the Transpa-
 esset vtilis Reipub. quam dānes matter was iust but
 cū vtilem esse diceret, yet euermore he cried. Let
 non esse equam fateretur. profit p̄nail. We should
 Plenus est sextus liber de rather haue saide the mat-
 officijs Hecatonis talium ter was not iust, because it
 questionū sit ne boni viri was not p̄fitable. for & cō-
 in maxima caritate an- mō welth thā whē he saide
 none familiam non alere, it was iust, he should grant
 it was v̄mpositable.
 Specator s̄m booke of du-
 ties is ful of such questōs:
 whether it be fit for a good
 mā. in a very great derth of
 corn. to giue ouer houseke-
 ping?

pinge. The disputes & mat-
ter on both sides: but yet at
last he thinketh, duty is dy-
rected rather after profite,
then after humanitie.

He putteth the case, if one
must needs take losse by
sea: whether should he ra-
ther beare & losse of a horse
muche worthie, then of a
shewe little worth. In this
case, private profit leades
a man one way, & humani-
tie another. If a foole in a
shipwreck catch hold of
a boord: shal a wise manne
take it fro him, if hee can?
He saith no, because it were
iniurious. What maye the
owner of a ship do: shall he
take his owne? No, no
more then hee maye caste a
passenger out of a ship into
the sea, because it is hye.
For vntill they arrive at a
place, whether a ship was
hired: a ship is not the ow-
ners, but theirs: & fall in it.
What if two in a shipwreck
fight vpon one boorde: & they
both be wise men: should ei-
ther of the pul it to himself
or one giue ouer his hold to
the other? yea, he should giue
ouer: but

in vtrancq parte disputate
sed tamen ad extremū vtr-
litate non putat officium
dirigi, magis quā humani-
tate. Querit si in mari ia-
ctura facienda sit, equi ne
preciosi potius iacturā fa-
ciat, an seruii vilis? Hic
aliō res familiaris, aliō ducit
humanitas. Si tabulam
de naufragio stultus arri-
puerit, extorquebit ne e-
am sapiens, si potuerit?
Negat, quia sit iniurium.
Quid dominus nauis? E-
ripiet ne suum? Minimē
Non plus quā si nauig-
antem in aliō eijcere de
nani velit, quia sua sit.
Quoad enim peruentum
sit eō, quō sumpta nauis
est, non dominū nauis, sed
nauigantium.
Quid si in vna tabula
sint duo naufragi, hi quē
sint sapientes: sibi vter-
quē rapiat? an alter ce-
dat alteri: cedat vero:

de Officiis

sed ei, cuius magis interfit
vel sua vel Reipub. causa
vivere. Quid si hæc paria in
vtrorū? Nullum erit cer-
tamē, sed quasi i sorte, aut
in dimicando vict⁹, alteri
cedat alter. Quid si pa-
ter fana expilet, cuniculos
agat ad erarium, indicernē
id magistratibus filius?
Nefas id quidem est, quin
etiam defendet patrem, si
arguatur. Non igitur pa-
tria præstat omnibus offi-
cijs: immo verō, sed ipsi
patriæ conducit: pios ha-
bere ciues in parentes.
Quid si tyrannidem oc-
cupare, si patriam prodere
conabitur pater, filebitne
filius? immo verō obse-
crabit patrem ne id faciat:
si nihil proficiet, aecu-
sabit: minabitur etiam:
ad extremum: si ad perni-
ciem patriæ res spectabit:

but to him, whom it were
more expedient to lyue, epe-
ther for his owne or for co-
mon weales sake. what if
these be alike in both. The
there shalbe no struing be-
twene thē: but y one muste
yeld to the other, as the la-
ser doth in lots, or at y. Ita-
lian plays & the fingers
called Topco.
what if y father rob chir-
ches: or vndermine y wal-
les of the treasury: shoulde
the sonne open it to the ma-
gistrates: That were sure-
ly a cursed deede, yea rather
he should defend his father
if he were accused thereof.
Is not our countrey then
about al duties: yea trulpy
but it is profitable for ones
countrey, to haue y inhaby-
ters reuerence their parēts.
what if ones father wil go
about to vsurp, as a girat,
or to betray his countrey,
shall the sonne conceale it?
Nay he shal desire his fa-
ther not to do it, if hee no-
thig meane, he shal blame
him, & threaten him also.
And last of all, if the mat-
ter tende to the destruction
of

off his coustrie: he shall pre-
ferre the safetie of his cou-
trie before the safety of his
father.

patrię salutę ante ponit sa-
luti patris,

He putteth a question also:
if a wise man vnwares re-
ceiued counterfeit mony in
steede of good: after he per-
ceiues it, whether he shold
paye it out againe for good
money, if he were indebted
to anye bodye? Diogenes
sayth, he maye. Antipater
denyeth it, to whome Tra-
ther agree.

Querit etiam si sapiens
adulterinos nummos acce-
perit imprudēs pro bonis
cū id rescierit soluturus nē
sit eos, si cui debeat pro bo-
nis. Diogenes ait. An-
tipater negat: cui potius
assentior.

Qui vinum fugiens ven-
dat sciens debeat ne dice-
re: non necesse putat Di-
ogenes: Antipater viri bo-
ni existimat. Hęc sunt qua-
si controuersa iura Stoico-
rum, in mancipio venden-
do dicenda ne vitia? Non
nisi ea quę si non dixeris,
redhibeatur mācipium iu-
re civilj.

Sed hęc mendacem esse
aleatorem, furacem, ebri-
osum alteri dicenda, vi-
dentur

V.i.

to

He, that wyttingly sellethe
wine, & will not last: whe-
ther ought he to declare it,
or no? Diogenes thinks, it
is not nedefull: Antipater
reckēs it & dūty of a good
manne. These bee (as ye
would say) & cases, in con-
trouersie, in the Stoikes
matters of lawe. Whe-
ther, in selling a bondman,
his faultes are to bee tolde
or no? I meane not those,
whiche vnies you declare,
the bondman may be tour-
ned home againe by the ci-
uil lawe: but these, that hee
is a lyer, a dyer, a picker, a
dyokard: some think meete

de Officiis.

dētur, alteri nō videntur. Si quis aurū vendens, orichalcū se putat vendere, in dicetne ei vir bonus aurū illud esse an emat denario qd' sit mille denariorum? Perspicū iā est, & qd mihi videatur, & quē sit iter eos philosophos, quos nomi nauī, cōtrouersia. Pacta, & promissa sēper ne seruāda sint, quē nec vi, nec dolo malo, vt prētores solent dicere facta sint. Si quis medicamentū cuipiā dederit ad apuā intercutē, pepigeritq, si eo medicamento sanus factus esset, ne illo medicamēto vnq; postea vteretur: si eo medicamēto sanus factus sit, & annis aliquot post incideret in eundē morbum, nec ab eo qui cū pepigerat impetret, vt itē coliceat vti, quid faciendum sit, cū sit is inhumanus, qui nō cōcedat vti nec ei quicquā fiat iuriae?

to be tolde some other, not so. If one sellinge golde, supposeth he selles but copper, shoulde a good man of duitie tel him, y it is gold: or he may buy for a peny y is worth a thousand? It is already very plaine, bothe what I thinke, & what controuersie is among the Philosophers, whō I named. whether are couenantes, & promises alwaies to be kept, which bee (as the Doctoz vse to speake) made neyther by cōpulsio, nor by couē. If de minister to another a medicine for the droptie, and binds the patient by couenauant, that he shal neuer after vsethe same medicine, in case he bee made whole by y medicine, and within a few yeares after, do fall into y same dyscase, and can not obteine of him, & whome he made y couenaunt, that he may vie yt lyke wise againe, what is to be done, seing he is so vngentle, and will not graunt him to vse it, and yet hee shoulde take no harme thereby.

The

the mā must haue regard Vite & saluti consulendū
his owne life and health. est.

that if a wise man bee re-
quired of one, who makes
in his heire, where two
thousands, and fūc hundred
thousand crownes be leste
by testament, that, be-
cause he haue the possession
of it, he daunce openye on
any time, in any market, and
promiseth, so to doe, be-
cause otherwise the man
shoulde not put him in, as
his heire, shoulde hee doe
it, that hee promised:
no? I woulde wishe, he
had made no suche promise
at that, I think, had ben
pointhe of grauitie, butte
because he promised it, if hee
doe it dishonest to daunce
in any market, hee shal with
more honestie go from
the woorde, if he take no-
thing of any inherytaunce, ex-
cept peraduentur e hee will
to see if same monie be-
come the common wealth in
any time of great necessitie
it maye bee no shame for
him to daunce when
he shal procure the wealth
of his countrie.

Proz

Quid? si quis sapiens
rogatus sit ab eo qui cum
hæredem faciat. cum ei te-
stamento tertium milies
relinquatur, vt antequam
hæreditatem adeat, luce
palam in foro saltet, id-
quæ se facturum promise-
rit, quod aliter eum here-
dem scripturus ille non ef-
set: faciat quod promiserit
nec ne: promississe nollem
& id arbitror fuisse graui-
tatis. Sed quoniam promi-
sit, si saltare in foro turpe
ducat, honestius metietur
si ex hereditate nihil cœ-
perit, quàm si cœperit: nisi
fortè eam pecuniâ in Rei-
publice magnum aliquod
tempus contulerit: vt vel
saltare eum, cum patrie
consulturus sit, turpe non
sit.

V.ij.

Ac

de Officiis.

Ac ne illa quidem pmissa seruanda sūt, quę non sunt his ipsis vtilia, quibus illa promiseris.

Sol Phaetonti filio (vt redeamus ad fabulas) facturum se esse dixit, quicquid optasset: optauit vt in curum patris tolleretur sub latus est insanus, atq; qua constitit ictu fulminis de flagrauit, quātō melius fuerat in hoc promissum patris non esse seruatum, Quid, quōd Theseus exigit promissum à Neptuno? cui cum tres optationes Neptunus dedisset: optauit interitum Hypolyti filij sui, cum is patri suspectus esset de nouerca: quo optato impetrato These⁹ in maximis fuit luctibus.

Quid? Agamēnō cum deuouisset Dianę quōd ī suo regno pulcherimum natū

For those promises are be kept: which be not profitable euen for thē to whom you made them.

Titan (& we may return to fables) said to Phæon his sonne: hee would do whatsoeuer he would desire. He desired to be taken vp into his fathers chariot: the mad foole was hoisted vp: and on the side where hee stood, with a flash of lyghtning hee fell all on fire. How much better had it ben, his fathers promise had not ben in this performed?

What shall we say to promises, that Theseus required of Neptunus? Whom when Neptun⁹ granted three boones: Theseus asked for death of Hypolytus, his sonne: whom his father had him in a lousie for his stepmother. Which boone being obtained, These⁹ fell into very great lamentation.

What of Agamēnon: who he had vowed to Diana the fairest creature, & should

born
agdo
trafi
gentia:
nature
he p
hau
hapn
romi
wher
any ti
four
Not
to k
d. As
ate: A
th pe
again
wear
a duit
that if
oney
ould n
our cou
ge than
ape: I
ye she
mō we
be mo
o man
natur
st by ch
me di

bozne that yeaere in hys
kingdome: he offered vp in
sacrifice his daughter Iph
genia: who was y fairest
nature bozne that yeaere.
He pmise rather shoulde
haue bene kepte, than
happous a deede shoulde
comitted.

wherefoze promises also
any times, are not to be
fourmed.

Not at al times, things
to keepe are to be resto
red. As if one, wel in hys
duty: shal leaue a sworde
thye to keepe, and aske
agaïne, when he is made
to weare a sinne to restore
his duty to keepe it.

that if one who hath leste
money with you to keepe,
shoulde make war againste
our countrey: shal ye re-
fuse that was layde ye to
keepe? Noe as I suppose
ye shal doe againste the
most welth, which oughte
to be most deere vnto you.
So many thinges whiche
of nature seeme to bee ho-
nest by change of tymes be
come dishonest.

esset illo anno immolauit
Iphigeniam, qua nihil erat
eo quidem anno natū pul
chrius. Promissum potius
non faciendum, quā tam
tetrum facinus admitten-
dum fuit. Ergo et pmissa
nō facienda nonnunquā
neque sēper deposita red-
denda sunt.

Si gladium quis apud te sa-
na mente deposuerit, repe-
tat insaniens, reddere pecc-
atum sit, non reddere of-
ficiū.

Quid? si is qui apud te
pecuniam deposuerat, bel-
lum inferat patriæ: reddes
nē depositum? Nō credo:
Facies enim contra Rem
publi, quæ debet esse cha-
rissima. Sic multa, quæ na-
tura honesta videtur esse,
temporibus fiunt non ho-
nesta.

V.iiij. Facere

To

de Officiis.

Facere promissa, stare conuentis, reddere de posita, commutata vtilitate fiunt non honesta.

Ac de his quidem quę videntur esse vtilitatis cōtra iustitiam simulatione prudentiæ satis arbitror dictū.

Sed quoniam à quatuor fontibus honestatis primo libro officia duximus: in eisdem versabimur cū docebimus ea, quę videntur esse vtilia, nequę sint, quę sint virtutis inimica.

Ac de prudentia quidem quam vult imitari malitia, itemquę de iustitia, quę semper est vtilis, disputatū est. Reliqua sunt duę partes honestatis: quarum altera in animi excellentis magnitudine, & prestantia cernitur: altera in confirmatione & moderatione continentię & temperantię.

To perfourme promise to stand to covenantes, & restore that is layd vpon kepe, when it otherwyse houeth, it becommeth dishonest. And of these which seeme to be cases of profit contrarye to iustice, vnder pretence of wiselome, I thinke it sufficiently declared.

But for as much as in the first booke, we haue declared al duties, out of four fountaines of honestye, we shall continue still in the same. When we teache, what enemies of vertue those chynies be, which seeme to be profitable, & are not so in deed. And thus of wiselome, whom wiliness would seeme, and likewise of iustice which is alwaies profitable we haue discoursed.

The other two partes of honesty remaine. whereof the one is sene in & greatness, and worthynesse of excellent courage. & other in the framing, and measuring of staiednes, and temperance.

It seemed profitable to Ulysses (as some tragicall poets haue it set out. for in Homer, the best authour, ther is no such suspicion of Ulysses) but the tragedys doo laye it as a reproche to him, that by counterfeyting madnesse, hee woulde haue scaped going a warfare. It was no honeste deuyse.

yet profitable it was (as some peradventure wyl say) to rule, & to liue quietly at Ithaca. wyl the hys parents, wyl the his wife, & wyl the his sonne.

Thinke you any honour, got in dayly daungers, and trauailes, is to be cōpared wyl this quietnes of life? I verely iudge it meete to be despised, & reiected, because what so is not honest, I cōpte it in no wise to be profitable.

For what think you Ulysses shoulde haue hard, if hee hadde continued still in his counterfeyting? who hauinge done great feats in warre, yet heard these wordes of Ajax.

Vtile videbatur Ulyssi, vt quidam poetæ tragici prodiderunt nā apud Homerū optimū authorē talis de Ulysse nulla suspitio est: sed insimulant eum tragædię, simulatiōe infantię nūliātī subterfugere voluisse nō honestum consiliū: ac vtile (vt aliquis fortasse dixerit) regnare, & Ithacæ viuere otiosē cum parentibꝫ cū vxore, cū filio. Vllū tu decus in quotidianis periculis & laboribus cum tranquillitate hac conferendū putas? Ergo vero istam cōtēpnendam & abijciendam quoniam quæ honesta nō sit, ne vtilem quidem esse arbitror. Quid enim auditurum putas fuisse Ulyssē si in illa simulatione perseverasset? qui cum maximas res gesserit in bello, tamen hæc audiuit ab Aiace,

For

deOfficiis.

Cuius ipse princeps iussu For al the conscience of
randi fuit, that othe, he passed not

Quod omnes scitis, solus a fly,
neglexit fidem. which he himselfe pro-

Furere assimulauit, ne co- cured firste, ye wote, as
iret: institit: wel as I.

Quod ni Palamidis per- He coulde put on afai-
spicax prudentia, ned face, & fare at hee

Istius percepisset malitiosa were mad.
audaciam, And not to goe wythe

Fide sacratū ius perpetuō them, he wrought wyth
falleret. al the wiles he had,

His fly boldnes but Pa-
lamede by depe pollicy
did spye:

The sacred lawe of so-
lempne othe, the freke

Illi vero non modō cum would stil denye.

hostibus, verum etiā cum For him no doubt it was
fluctib⁹, id quod fecit, di- better to fight not onely wth

micare melius fuit, quā his enemyes, but also with
diserere consētiētem Græ the waues of the sea, as he

ciam ad bellum barbaris did: than to shrink frō them
inferendum. of Grece, who had conclu-

Sed omittam⁹ et fabulas et ded together too make war
byō the Troiaōs. But let
be leaue of both fables, &
fozeine

fozein examples, and come
we to trouth, and dedes.
When Marcus Attilius
Regulus, beyng seconde
time Consul, was taken
by a trayne in Afrik: Xan-
tippus the Lacedemonian
being the guide, & Amilcar
Annibals father, the gene-
ral, he was sent to the Se-
nate vpo his othe, that ex-
cepte certaine gentlemenne
take prisoners were resto-
red to the Penes, he shold
himselſe retourne to Car-
thage.

When he was come too
Rome he ſawe wel & ſhow
of profit, but as the matter
proueth, he iudged it very
vaine, which was but one
this ſort, to tary ſtil in hys
countreie, too bee at home
withe hys wyfe, and chil-
dern, to kepe his degree of
Conſular eſtate, & to take
the miſery which hee had
felt in warre, to be comon
to warfaring fortune.
who can deny theſe thingz
to be pſitable, what think
you. Greatnes of courage
& manlines ſaith nay to it.

Locke

externa, ad rem factam
noſtramque veniamus M.
Attilius Regulus, cum
COS. iterum in Africa
ex inſidijs captus eſſet, du-
ce Xantippo Lacedemo-
nio. Imperatore autem pa-
tre Annibalis Hamilcar e,
iuratus miſſus eſt ad ſena-
tum: ut niſi redditi eſſent
Pænis captiui nobiles qui-
dam, rediret ipſe Cartha-
ginem.

Is cum Romam veniſſet,
vtilitatis ſpeciem videbat
ſed eam (vt res declarat)
falſum iudicauit: quæ erat
talis, manere in patria, eſſe
domi ſuæ cum vxore, cum
liberis, quàm calamitatem
accepſſet in bello, commu-
nem fortunæ bellicę indi-
cantem, tenere conſularis
dignitatis gradum. Quis
hæc negat eſſe vtilia? quid
cenſes? Magnitudo animi
& fortitudo negat.

Num

de officiis.

Num locupletiores quæris
 autores; Harum enim est
 virtutum proprium, nil ex
 timefcere: omnia humana
 despiciere, nihil quod homi
 ni accidere possit intollerā
 dum putare. Itaque quid
 fecit: In senatum venit, mā
 data exposuit: sententiam
 ne diceret: recusauit: quā
 diu iureiurando hostiū te
 neretur, non esse se senato
 rem. Atque illud etiam (O
 stultum hominem, dixerit
 quispiam, & repugnantem
 vtilitati suæ) reddi capti
 uos negauit esse vtile. Illos
 enim adolescentes, & bo
 nos duces, se iam confectū
 senectute. Cuius cū va
 luisset auctoritas, capti
 ui retenti sunt, ipse Cartha
 ginem redijt. Neque eum
 charitas patrię retinuit, nec
 suorum.

Neque vero tū ignorabat

Loke ye for more substāce
 al auctorities: foz of the
 se vertues is it þe proprietie
 to be asfearde of nothyng,
 to despise al worldly vāni
 ties, to thinke nothing vn
 sufferable that no mā may
 befall.

Therfore what did he: He
 came into þe Senate: decla
 red that he had in cōmāū
 demēt, refused to geue his
 sentence, & saide he was no
 Senatour as longe as hee
 was bound by othe mini
 stred by his enemyes. Yea
 & this more ouer hee saide
 (O foolish man. wil some
 say, & against his owne p
 fit) þe it was not expedient
 to haue the captiues resto
 red. foz hee alledged they
 were yong, & good captay
 nes: wheras he was wo
 ne, & spent with age. whose
 auctoritie when it had pre
 uailed: the captiues were
 kepte sti: he himselfe retur
 ned to Carthage, and ney
 ther loue of his countrey,
 nor of his kinfolke stayed
 him.

yet was it not vnknown
 to hym

him, that hee returned to a se ad crudelissimum hostē,
 verpe cruel enemy, and to & ad exquisita supplicia p
 extreme tozments: but hee ficisci: sed iusiurandum cō
 thought his othe meete to seruādū putabat. Itaque tū
 be perfourmed. wherefore cum vigilando necabatur
 guen at the time, when hee erat in meliore causa, quā
 was put to death with cō si domi senex, captiu⁹ per
 tinual waking: hee was in iuris, consularis remāsisset.
 better state: than if hee had At stultē: quī nō modo nō
 remained an aged captiue, censuerit captiuos remittē
 & a perured Scnatoure at dos, verum etiam dissu
 home. aserit.

But fondly wil some say hee did: who not onely iudged it vnmetc, that the cap

times shoulde bee restored, but also dissuaded it.

How, I pray pee, did hee fondly, did ye so, seeing hee test autē quod inutile Re

auailed the cōmon wealth: ip. sit, id cuiquam ciui vti

May that bee pfitable for le esse? puertunt homines

any citizen, which is vn p ea, quę sunt fundamēta na

fitable to the state: We do ruræ cū vtilitatem ab ho

swrest those solidaciōz whi nestate seiungunt. Omnes

che nature layethe: when enim expetimus vtilitatē,

they seuer profite from ho ad eamque rapimur, nec

nelly. For we al couet p facere aliter vllō modo

fit, & to it be caried, noz by possumus. Nam quis est,

any meanes otherwisc can qui vtilia fugit? aut

we do. For who is he that quis potius, qui ea non

fleeth profit, or who rather studiosissimē persequatur?

is there? foloweth not the Sed

same most diligently. But

de officiis.

Sed quia nusquam possumus, nisi in laude, decore honestate utilia reperire: propter ea illa prima & summa habemus utilitatis nomen non tam splendide, quam necessarium ducimus. Quid est igitur (dixerit quis) in iureiurando: non iratum tenemus Iouem?

At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modum, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotij dicunt, & nihil exhibere alteri: sed eorum etiam, quae deum semper agere aliquid, et moliri volunt. Nunquam nec irasci Deum, nec nocere.

Quid autem iratus Iupiter plus nocere potuisset, quam nocuit sibi ipse Regulus. Nulla igitur vis fuit religionis, quae tantam utilitatem praeberet. Anne turpiter faceret: primum minima de malis. Num igitur tantum malitudo ista habebit

But because nowhere we can find things profitable but in praise, singleness, & honesty: therefore we esteem those as chief, and best: & the commendation of profit we count not so honorable as necessarie. What is then in othe: wil some say are we aserd, Iupiter wil be angry? May this is common among all philosophers not onely those, who hold, & God himselfe hathe nothing to doo, and nothinge appoints to an other body: but them also, who wil needs haue God alwaye doing and meddling with som what: & God is neuer angry, nor euer hurteth any creature.

What greater harme could Iupiter haue done, being offended, then Regulus dyd to himselfe? Ther was then no respect of religion, that might ouerturne so greata a profite. What should hee haue doone dishonestly? First of evils the lest were to bee chosen. Shall then this dishonesty haue in it so much discommodity, as

the, as had that torment.

Moreouer this saying, & is in Accius.

Hast thou thy saythed promise broke?

My faith I neither gaue nor geeue,

To any faithlesse while I liue.

Though of a wicked kyng it be said yet it is excellent Iye sayde.

Hereunto they adde, & as we say, some thinges seeme profitable, whiche are not so in dede: & they in like manner say, some things seeme honest, which are not so in deed: as for example, this same seemeth honest & hee did returne to torment, for the sauing of his othe: but it becometh dishonest: because & which had been wrought by the violence of his enemies should not haue been by him confirmed. They laye also to this, & who so is verie profitable & same groweth likewise to be honest, although it seemed not so at firste.

These

quantum ille cruciatus?

Deinde illud etiam apud Accium.

Fregistine fidem? Neque dedi, neque do infideli cuiquam.

Quanquā ab impio rege dicitur, luculentē tamē dicitur.

Addunt etiam, quemadmodum nos dicamus, videri quēdam vtilia, quæ non sint, sic se dicere videri quædam honesta, quæ, non sint, vt hoc ipsum videtur honestum conseruādi iusiurandi causa ad cruciatum reuertisse. Sed fit non honestum, quia quod per vim hostium esset actum, ratum esse nō debuit. Addunt etiam quicquid valde vtile sit, id fieri honestum, etiam si ātea nō videretur.

Hac

de Officiis.

Hee ferè contra Regulum
Sed prima videamus. Nō
fuit Iupiter metuendus, ne
iratus noceret: qui neq̃ i-
rasci solet, neq̃ nocere.
Hec quidem ratio nō ma-
gis contra Reguli, quā
contra omne iusiuran-
dum valet. Sed in iureiu-
rando, non qui metus, sed
quę vis sit, debet intelligi.
Est enim iusiurandum af-
firmatio religiosa. Quod
autē affirmatē, quasi Deo
teste promiseris, id tenen-
dum est. Iam enim non ad
iram deorū, quę nulla est:
sed ad iustitiam & ad fidē
pertinet. Nā preclarē En-
ni⁹: O fides alma, apta pē-
nis & iusiurandū Iouis.

Qui igitur iusiuran-
dum violat, is fidem vi-
olat: quam in Capitolio
vicinam Iouis. Opt. Max.
vt in Catonis oratiōe est,

These things cōmonly bee
alleged against Regulus.
But lette vs consider the
firste.

Iupiter was not to bee
feared, least he should hurt
him in his anger, because
neither to be angrie, nor to
do harme he is accustomed
This reasō surely maketh
nomoze against Regulus,
than againste all kinde of
othes. But in the othe ma-
kinge. not what the feare,
but what the vertue of it
is, ought to be considered.
For an othe is a religious
assuring of any thing. And
what so assuredly you haue
promised, as takinge God
to witnes, it oughte to bee
observed. For y^e othe nowe
respects not the wrathe of
y^e gods, which is none at al
but iustice, & faithfulness.
For notably said Cælius.

O heauēly Faith, tye to
thye wings, the othe of
loue also.

whoe so then stayneth
his othe, hee stayneth La-
dye Faith, whom, as it
appeares in Catoes oratiō
our

sure aunccestours woulde
needes haue to stand in our
Capitole, nexte vnto the
great, & mightie Ioue.

yea but Iupiter beinge
displeased, coulde not haue
dōe moze harme to Regul^o
thā Regul^o did to himselfe
That is true if there were
nothinge euill, but so feels
payne. But the Philoso-
phers, that bee of the grea-
test aucthoritie, do affirme
that it not onely is not the
bittermoost euill, but also no
euill at al. For whome, I
pray ye, doe not refuse to
take Regulus as no mean
witnes but (I beleue) the
grauest of all. For what
moze substanciall witnesse
do we looke for, thā a pere
of the common weale who
for the continaunge of hys
duitie did willingly enter
into tormētis. For wheras
I say, of euils the leaste, are
to be chosen, meaning it is
better dishonestly, then mi-
serably to liue, is there any
greater euill. than disho-
nestye? which if in the de-
formitye of the bodye it
breedethe somme offence,
howe

maiores nostri esse volue-
rūt. At enim ne iratus qui-
dē Iupiter pl^o Regulo no-
cuisset, quā sibi nocuit ip-
se Regulus. Certē si nihil
malum esset, nisi dolore: id
autem non modo non sū-
mum malum, sed nec ma-
lum quidem esse maxima
auctoritate philosophi af-
firmant.

Quorum quidem testē nō
mediocrē, sed haud scio an
grauissimū Regulū, nolite
quēso vituperare.

Quem enim locupletio-
rem quērimus quā princi-
pem. Po. Ro. qui retinendī
officij causa crutiatū sub-
ierit voluntarium.

Nam quod aiunt minima
de malis, id est vt turpiter,
poti^o quā calamitosē an-
est vllum maius malū tur-
pitudine. Que si in deformi-
tate corporis habeat a-
liquid offensionis:

quanta

de Officiis.

quanta illa deprauatio & feditas turpificati animi debet videri: Itaque neruosi
us qui ista dixerunt, solū
audent malum dicere, id
quod turpe sit: qui autem
remissius, hi tamen non
dubitāt summum malum
dicere. Nam illud qui-
dem.
Neq; dedi, neq; do infideli
cuiquam.

Idcirco recte à poeta dici-
tur, quia cū tractaretur
Atreus, personę seruiendū
fuit. Sed si hoc sibi sumant
nullam esse fidem, quę in-
fideli data sit, videant ne
queratur latebra periurio.
Est autem ius etiam bel-
licum fidesq; iusiurandi sæ-
pe hosti seruanda. Quod
enim ita iuratū est, vt mēs
cōciperet fieri oportere

How much must needes & corruptiō, and filth of a de-
filed mind appeare:

Therefore they who more
pithily debate these mat-
ters are bold to call & on-
ly euill, which is dishonest;
& who dispute them not
so earnestly, do not stick to
call & same & utterest euill.
As for & saying.

My faith I nether gaue
nor giue.

To any faithlesse, while
I liue.

It is therfore wel brought
in of & Doer, because whē
Atreus part should go in
hand, it was meete & spea-
che should serue for his per-
son. But if hereof theye
take theseluez a rule, & it is
no promes & is made to a
promes breaker: let them
take hede, ther be not sou-
ght a startig hole for piury
The lawe of armes, & the
pmes of an othe is manye
times to be kept with oure
enemy. For what so i such
sozt is sworne, & the minde
of & swearer concepueth,
it is

it is necessarie to be done: & id seruadum est, quod ali-
 sâr is to be obserued: what ter, id si nō feceris, nullum
 so fallerth otherwile: & same periu-
 if one do not, it is no periur-
 ry. As if you bring not the nibus pactū p capite pre-
 sūme of money that ye pro-
 mised rōuers for your life: tium non attuleris, nulla
 there is no deceiuing in yt, fraus est, ne si iurat⁹ quidē
 no, thoughte being sworne id non feceris. Nam pirata
 thereto ye do it not. For a nō est ex perduellum nu-
 pirate is not cōpted in the mero definitus, sed cōmu-
 number of enemies to ones nis hostis omnium, cū hoc
 countrey, but a cōmon ene- nec fides debet, nec iū-
 my to al men, with suche a randum esse commune.
 one neither pmes, neyther Non enim falsum iurare
 onth ought a like, as & vs peierare est, sed quod ex
 to be kept. For to swere an animi tui sententia iuraue
 vntruth, is not to forswere ris, sicut verbis concipitur
 but not to perfourne that, more nostro, id non face-
 which accordyng to the mea- re, periuriū est. Scitē enim
 ning of your hert yee haue Euripides.
 sworne, as by our custome Iurauī lingua mentem
 is exprest in a certain for- iniuratam gero.
 of wordes: surely it is per- Regulus verò non debuit
 iury. For fealty laide Eu- cōditiones, pactionesq; bel-
 ripides: licas et hostiles perturbare
 In worde I sware, but periurio. Cum iusto enim
 hart vnsworne I bare. X. j. et
 But it was not fit for Re-
 gulus with periurie to dy-
 stourbe & condicions, & co-
 uenāts with his enemies,
 & of warre. For with a iust
 and

de Officiis.

& legitimo hoste res gere
bater: aduersus quem &
totum ius feciale & multa
sūt iura communia. Quod
ni ita esset, nunquam cla-
ros viros senatus vinctos
hostibus dedidisset. At ve-
ro T. Veturius & Sp. Post-
humus cū iterum Coss.
essent, quia cū male pug-
natum apud Caudium es-
set, legionibus nostris sub
iugum missis. pacem cum
Samnitibus fecerant. dedi-
ti sunt his, iniussu enim Po-
senatusq; fecerant. Eodē-
quē tempore T. Numitius
Q. Aemilius. qui tum
tribuni plebis erant, quōd
eorū autoritate pax erat
facta dediti sunt, vt pax
Samnitium repudiaretur.
Atq; huius deditiois ipse
Posthumus, q̄ dedebatur su-
asor & author fuit. Quod
idē multis ānis post C. Mā-
dus, & lawful enemy the thing
was done: towarde whom
both al the fecial law, & di-
uers other laws be in com-
mon, whiche if it were not
so: the Senate woulde ne-
uer haue deliuered to their
enemies, noble men beinge
prisoners. But yet Titus
Veturius, & Spurius Pos-
thumius, the second tyme,
they were Cōsuls, because
when they had not fought
it, wel at Caudium, & oure
legiōs being subdued they
had made a peas wth the Sa-
nites: they were deliuered
vnto the, for wthout cōmissi-
on of the people, & the Senate
they had done it. And at the
same tyme, Titus Numiti-
us, & Quintus Aemilius, whoe
were the Tribunes of the
people, because the peas was
made by their auctoritie,
were deliuered also, & the
peas wth the Samnites might
be refused. And Posthumus
selse whoe was deliuered,
was the perswader, & causer
of the same deliuerie whiche
likewise Caius Marius
did, manye yeares after:
who

who, that he might be deli-
uered to the Numantines
with who without autho-
ritie of the Senate hee had
concluded a league, perswa-
ded y^e p^rticuler law, whiche
Lucius Furi⁹, & Sextus
Attilius made by y^e decree
of y^e Senate, & whē it was
receiued, he was deliuered
to the enemies. This man
delt more honestly, thē qui-
tus Pompeius, by whose
intercessio, whē he was in
y^e s^ame case it was brought
to pas, y^e the lawe was not
receiued. With him y^e thinge
which semed profit, p^rcuat-
led more thā honestie. & y^e
other aforesaide, the false
show of p^rfit was suppres-
sed by the authoritie of ho-
nesty. But y^e whiche was
done by violēce, needed not
to haue ben confirmed. As
who shoulde saye, violence
coude bee done to a manly
man, why then dyd hee go
to the Senate, namely see-
ing he was purposed to dis-
swade them from the deli-
uerie of the captiues: that
in him was most commen-
dable, y^e same ye disallowe
f^o2

cinus, qui vt Numantinis,
quibus cum sine senat⁹ au-
thoritate cōdus fecerat, de-
deretur, rogationem sua
sit eam, quam Lucius Furi-
us & Sext⁹ Attili⁹ ex sen-
con. ferebant: qua accepta
est hostibus deditus. Hone-
stius hic, quā Q. Pompei-
us, quo, cum in eadem cau-
sa esset, deprecante accep-
ta lex non est. Hic ea quæ
videbatur vtilitas, plus va-
luit, quā honestas. Apud
superiores vtilitatis speci-
es falsa, ab honestatis au-
thoritate superata est. At
non debuit ratum esse,
quod erat actum per vim,
quasi verò forti viro vis
possit adhiberi. Cur igitur
ad senatum proficis-
cebatur, cum presertim de
captiuis dissuasurus esset.
Quod maximum in eo
est, id reprehenditis.

X.ij. Non

de Officijs.

Non enim suo iudicio stetit: sed suscepit causam, vt esset iudicium senatus: cui nisi ipse author fuisset, captiuū profecto Pœnis rediti essent. Ita incolumis in patria Regulis restitisset. Quod quia patriæ non vtile putauit: idcirco honestum sibi, & sentire illa & pati credidit. Nā quod aiunt, quod valdē vtile sit, id fieri honestū, immō verō esse, non fieri. Est enim nihil vtile, quod idem non honestum, nec quia vtile honestum est, sed quia honestum, vtile. Quare ex multis mirabilibus exemplis, haud faciliē quis dixerit hoc exemplo aut laudabilius, aut prestantius. Sed ex tota hac laude Reguli, vnum illud est admiratione dignum: quod captiuos retinendos

for he stode not to his own iudgement, but toke y mat-
ter in hande y it might bee
y iudgemēt of the Senate,
whereunto if he had not bē
a counseler, the captiue noe
doubt had bē restozed to y
Cartaginens. So had Re-
gulus remayned safe i his
cōntrey, which because hee
toke it not to be profitable
for his cōntrey, therfore he
thought it honesty for hym
to bee of the minde, & so to
suffer. For where they say,
yut which is very profitable,
dothe become honest,
nay they should say it is in-
dede, & not become honest.
For ther is nothing profit-
table, which sãe is not ho-
nest, & not because it is p-
fitable, it is honest, but be-
cause it is honest, therfore
it is pfitable. wherfore of
many marueilous exāples
a mā shall not lightlye tell
eether a more cōmendable
or a more goodlye example
than this. But in all thys
praise of Regulus this one
thing is worthe of admy-
ration, that hee thoughte it
best, the prisoners shoulde
bee

bee kept still. For in that
hee returned I think it no
wonder at all, because in
those daies, he could not do
otherwise. Therefore, y^e co-
mendation is not the mans
but the times. For our au-
ceters were of this minde,
y^e there is no strayer bond
to bynd a mannes promes
than an othe. The lawes
in y^e twelue tables declare,
y^e our holy orders declare
y^e same, & oure leagues de-
clare no lesse, wherby befid
is y^e promes made euen to
the enemye, the enteries, &
punishementes of the Cen-
sors declare asmuch, who
about no matter moze hede
fully gaue iudgement, than
about keeping of othes.

Marc^{us} Pomponius, Tri-
bune of y^e people, dyd sum-
moⁿ Lucius Manius, Consul
son. whē he was Dictator
to appere at a day, because
he had takē vpon him y^e oc-
cupping of his dictato^rshipp
a fewe daies lēger than hee
shold, & accused him also. y^e
he had dēiue his son Tit^{us}
who afterward was called
Torquatus

consuit. Nam quōd redijt,
nobis nunc mirabile Vide
tur: illis quidem tempori-
bus aliter facere nō potuit
Itaq^{ue} ista laus nō est homi-
nis, sed temporum. Nullū
enim vinculum ad astrin-
gendam fidem iureiuran-
do maiores arctius esse vo-
luerunt, Id indicant leges
in XII. Tabulis, indicant
sacra, indicant fœdera, qui
bus etiam cū hoste deuin-
citur fides, indicant nota-
tiones, animaduersionesq^{ue}
Cens. qui nulla de re dili-
gentius quā de iureiurā-
do iudicabunt. L. Manlio
Auli filio, cū Dictat. fu-
isset, M. Pomponius trib.
pl. diem dixit, quōd is pau-
cos sibi dies ad dictatu-
ram gerendam addidisset,
criminabatur etiam, quōd
Titum filium qui Torqua-
tus postea est appellatus

de Officiis,

ab hominibus relegasset, et ruri habitari iussisset, quod cum audiuisset adolescens filius, negotiū adhiberi patri, accurrisse Romanū, & cum prima luce Pōponij domum venisse dicitur. Cui cum esset nuntiatum quod illum iratum allatum ad se aliquid cōtra patrem arbitraretur, surrexit ē lectulo, remotisq; arbitris ad se adolescentem iussit venire. At ille vt ingressus est, confestim gladium distinxit, iurauitq; se illum statim interfecturum, nisi iusiurandum sibi dedisset se patrem missum esse facturum. Iurauit hoc terrore coactus Pomponius, rē ad populum detulit, docuit cur sibi à causa desistere necesse esset. Manlium missum fecit. Tantum temporibus illis iusiurandum valebat. Atq; hic

Torquatus, from cōpanye of men: & had cōmaunded him to dwell in the cōstrey which when the pongman, his sōne, once heard of, that his father was brought in trouble, it is said, he ranne to Rome. & by brek of daye came to Pōponius house. To whō whē it was tolde because hee thought, & hee being offended wold bzing some matter vnto him, against his father, hee arose out of his bedde, & all hearers being voided out of place, he commaunded, the pongman shoulde come to him. But he, as sone as he entred, by & by drew hys sword, & sware hee woulde kil him out of hand. except he made an othe vnto him, & he woulde discharge hys father. Pōponius constrained with this terror, made an othe so, he opened & matter to the people, hee esourmed thē, why it was necessarie for him to let fall the accion. Hee discharged Manlius. So gretly was an othe had in regarde, at those daies. And this T^h?

Manly-

Mali⁹ is he, who got hys
surname, at the riuer of A-
nien, of a chaine, & he put-
led fro a frenchmā, whom
he slewe, beeing dogged by
him. in whose third Consul
ship, the latines at Mescys
weare discomfited and put
to flight. A very noble mā
doubtles, & one, whor not
long afore being louing to-
ward hys father, became
sower, & seuerer against hys
sonne. But as Regulus is
to be cōmended, in heping
his othe, so those ten, whom
Annibal after the Cānensi
an fight sent to the Senat
hpon their othe, that theye
should retourne into y^e cāp
wherof the Carthaginers
were then in possession: ex-
cept they obtained hys re-
quest, for the rānsommeinge
of certaine prisoners: are to
be dyspraised: if theye dyd
not retozne. Touching Iohō
al men wyte not after one
sort. For Polibius, a specy
el good authour, writeth:
that of the tenne chosen
gentlemenne. whor then
were sent, nyne returned
when

T. Manlius is est qui ad A-
nienim Galli quem ab eo
prouocatus occiderat, tor-
que detracto, cognomen
inuenit: cuius tertio consu-
latu Latini ad Vesperim fu-
si & fugati sunt. Magnus
vir in primis, & qui perin-
dulgens in patrem, idem a-
cerbe seuer⁹ in filium, Sed
vt laudandus Regulus in
conseruando iureiurādo
sic decem illi. quos post
Cannensem pugnam iura-
tos ad senatum misit Anni-
bal, se i castra redituros ea-
quorum potit ierant Peni-
nisi de redimēdis captiuis
impetrauissēt, si nō redie-
runt vituperandi de qui-
bus non omnes vno mō-
do. Nā Polibius bonos au-
thor in primis scribit. ex de-
cem nobilissimis qui tunc
erant missi, nouē reuertisse
senatu

de officijs.

à senatūre non impetrata
vnum ex decem, qui paulo
post quā egressus erat è ca-
stris redisset, quasi aliquid
esset oblitus, Romæ res
mansisse. Reditu enim in
castra liberatum se esse iu-
reiurando interpretabatur
Non rectè, Fraus enim dis-
tringit, non dissoluit per-
iurium. Fuit igitur stulta
calliditas peruersè imitata
prudentiam. Itaq; decre-
uit senatus, vt ille vetera-
tor & callidus vincus ad
Annibalē duceretur. Sed
illud maximum: octo ho-
minū milia tenebat. Annis-
bal: non quos in acie cepis-
set, aut qui periculo mortis
diffugissent: sed qui relictī
in castris fuissent à Paulo
& varone Cos. Eos sena-
tus non censuit redimen-
dos: cū id parua pecu-
nia fieri posset: vt esset
insitum militibus nostris

When the matter could not
be obtained of the Senate:
and that one of the tenne,
who a little after, hee was
gone out of the campe, re-
turned back, as though he
had forgotten somewhat: re-
mained stil at Rome. For
by his retourne to y campe
hee toke himselfe to be dis-
charged of his oth, but that
was not true. For gile cō-
firmeth, & not dischargethe
periurie. It was then a fo-
lishe craftines, that did pe-
uisshly cōūterfeit wisdoine.
Therfore y Senate made
a decree: y the same subtle,
& wilie fox should be caried
pinnioned vnto Anniball.
But this is a maruaylous
matter: Annibal had i hold
eight thousande of our men
whō he toke not in battlie,
nor as fliēg away for feare
of death: but y were leste
behinde in y cāpe, by Pau-
lus, & Varro, the Consuls
The Senate did not think
it good to raunsome them:
whereas they mighte haue
doone yt for a lyttle mo-
ney. y it mighte sinke into
our souldiourz heartes, ey-
ther

ther to winne the victorie aut vincere, aut emori.
 or manfully to dye. whiche Qua quidem re audita,
 thing whe it was knowne fractum animum Anniba-
 the saide Polibius wrytes, lis scribit idem: quod S.P.
 that Anniballes hart was dis- R. rebus afflictis tam ex-
 daunted therwith because q̄ celo animo fuisset. Sic ho-
 Senate, & people of Rome nestatis cōparatiōe, ea quæ
 euen in chaunces of aduer- videntur vtilia vincuntur.
 sitie. were of so losty a cour- Acilius autem, qui græce
 rage. Thus the thinges scripsit historiam, plures
 which seeme profitable, bee ait fuisse, qui in castra re-
 ouerweied by cōparison of uertissent, eadem fraude,
 honestie. But that same A vt iureiurando liberaren-
 cilius who wrote the sto- tur: eosq̄ a Cens. omni-
 rie in Greeke, saithe: there bus ignominijs notatos.
 were moe. which returned Sit iam huius loci finis. Per
 to ȳ cape. vnder ȳ same gile spicuum est enim ea quæ
 that they might be dischar- timido animo humili, de-
 ged: of their othe, and that misso, factoquē fiant (qua-
 they were noted by ȳ Cē- le fuisset Reguli factum,
 lors & al maner of infamy si aut de captiuis, quod
 here an ende of this pcell. ipsi opus esse videretur,
 for it is euident. that suche non quod Reipubli. cen-
 thinges as be done with a suisset, aut domi rema-
 feareful, seruile, dastardly neri voluisset) non esse v-
 & weake hart, as ȳ dooing tilia, quia sint flagitiosa,
 of Reguli had beene, if cy- forela
 ther he had thought, cōcer-
 ning the prisoners, that he
 sawe expedient for himself,
 not for the cōmon weale,
 & els woulde haue taried
 at home be not profita-
 ble, because ȳ bee reproche-
 ful

de officiis.

feda, & turpia. Restat quar-
 ta pars, quę decore, mode-
 ratione, modestia, continen-
 tia, tēperantia continetur.
 Potest igitur quicquā esse
 vtile quod sit huic talium
 virtutū choro cōtrariū. At
 qui ab Aristippo Cyrrē-
 naici atquē Annicerij phi-
 losophi nominati, ōne bonū
 in voluptate posuerūt:
 virtutemq; cēsuerūt ob eā
 rē esse laudādā, quod effi-
 ciens esset voluptatis, qui-
 bus obsoletis floret Epicu-
 rus, eiusdē ferē adiutor, au-
 thorq; sententię. Cū his, ve-
 lis, quisq; (vt dicitur) si ho-
 nestatē tueri, ac retinere sē-
 tentia est, decertādum est.
 Nā si nō modo vtilitas, sed
 vita ōnis beata, corporis fir-
 ma constitutione, eiusq; cō-
 stitutionis spe explorata
 (vt a Metrodoro scriptū
 est) continetur: certē
 hęc vtilitas & quidem
 summa sic enī censent)

ful, vile, and dishonest.

The fourth part is now
 behind, which consisteth in
 semelines, measurekeeping
 sober moode, staidnes, and
 temperance. May then a-
 ny thing be profitable, that
 is contrary to such an asse-
 ble of vertues: But § Cy-
 renaiques, & Annicerians,
 who had their name of phi-
 losophers from Aristippus,
 placed all felicitie in plea-
 sure: and therefore thepe
 iudged vertue to bee com-
 mēdable, because it was
 a causer of pleasure, & whē
 these were woyn out of esti-
 macion: the florished Epi-
 curus, a surdener, and an
 authoꝝ wel nye of the same
 opiniō. Against them must
 we strue with toothe, and
 naile (as they sape) if wee
 meane to defende, and pre-
 serue honestye. For if not
 only profit, but also al hap-
 py life cōsisteth in the good
 complexiō of the body, & in
 a sure trust to s̄ same com-
 plexiō, as by Metrodorus
 it is written, doubtles this
 maner profit, yea & s̄ verye
 chief (for so do they holde)

Will

Will strine with honesty.
 For first of all, wher shall
 there be a place appointed
 for wisdom? what meane
 they, y on euerye side thet
 should seeke after delicatēz
 How miserable a scrupce
 were it for vertue, to bee a
 waiter vpon pleasure. But
 what shoulde bee the office
 of wisdom? Skillfully to
 chose our pleasures: Admit
 there be nothing pleasant-
 er, thā so to doe, what can
 there be imagined moze di-
 honest? How with hym,
 who saith, y paine is y vt-
 terest euil, what place shall
 manlynesse haue, which ca-
 res not for any paines, or
 trauals, y be offered? For
 although Epicurus spekes
 in manye places touchinge
 paine (as he doth in this)
 stoutly enough: neuerthe-
 lesse it is not to bee regar-
 ded what hee saith, but
 what is meete for him too
 say, who hath posited out y
 limits of good thingz to be
 in pleasure, & of euil thingez
 in paine: as if I shoulde
 here him speake of shaped-
 nesse, and temperaunce.

He

cum honestate pugnabit.
 Nam vbi primum pruden-
 tię locus dabitur? an vt
 conquirat vndique suauit-
 ates? quā miser virtutis fa-
 mulatus seruientis volup-
 tati? Quod autē mun' pru-
 dentię? An legere intelli-
 getur voluptates? Fac ni-
 hil isto esse iucundius, qđ
 cogitari potest turpius?
 Iam qui dolorem summū
 malum dicat, apud eum
 quem habet locum fortitu-
 do, quę est dolorum labo-
 rumq; contemptio? Quan-
 uis enim multis locis di-
 cat Epicurus (sicut hic di-
 cit) satis fortiter de dolo-
 re tamen non id spectādū
 est quid dicat, sed quid cō-
 sentaneum sit ei dicere:
 qui bona voluptate termi-
 nauerit, mala dolore:
 vt si illum audiam de con-
 tinentia & temperantia.
 dixit

de Officiis.

dixit ille quidē multa mul-
tis locis, sed aqua heret, vt
aiūt. Nā q̄ potest tēperatiā
laudare is, qui ponat sumū
bonū in voluptate? Est e-
nī tēperatiā libidinū inimi-
ca, libidines autē cōsectatri-
ces voluptatis. Atq; i his ta-
mē trib' generib' quoquo
modo possūt, nō incallidē
tergiuersantur. Prudētiā in-
troducūt, sciētiā suppeditā-
tē voluptates, depellētē do-
lores. Fortitudinē quoque
aliquo modo expediūt: cū
tradūt rationē negligendē
mortis, ppetiēdiq; doloris.
Etiā tēperatiā inducūt nō
facillimē illi quidē, sed ta-
mē quomodo possunt. Di-
cunt enim voluptatis mag-
nitudinē doloris detractio-
ne fieri. Iustitia vacillat, vel
iacet potius : omnesq; hāc
virtutes, quæ communita-
te cernuntur, & in socie-
tate generis humani. Neq;
enim bonitas, nec liberali-
tas, nec comitas esse potest

He talks in dede in many
places many things, but he
is myered by the waye. as
they saye. For how can he
praise tēperance, that settēs
the soueraine good in plea-
sure? For tēperance is ene-
my to lust, & lust is a way-
tinge seruauunt to pleasure.
And yet in these thze kinds
not without subletye, they
fall to their shifts. Theye
bzing in wisdomē, as a sci-
ence ministring pleasure, a
boyding paines. Theye set
vs out also manlynesse, af-
ter a certaine sort, whē they
teche a way to despise deeth
& endure paine. Theye also
fetche in temperance, with
much a do doubtlez, but yet
as wel as they maye. For
they hold, that the gretnes
of pleasure ariseth by put-
ting of all payne. Justice
staggereth with them or ra-
ther lieth vnder foote, & all
those vertues, that showe
thē selues in y cōmō knot,
& feloship of mē. For there
can bee neyther goodnesse,
neither liberalitie, nor ciuili-
tye, no moze then frendship
may, if they be not soughte
after

after, for themselves, but
 be referred to pleasure, or to
 profit. Let vs the diuine our
 matter into few words. For
 as we haue taught there is
 no profit, which is contrary
 to honesty. so we say, al vo-
 luptuousnesse is contrary to
 honesty. And so much the
 more I take Callipho, &
 Dinomach⁹ worthy to bee
 reuied who thought, they
 should end the controuersie,
 if they made a ioyninge of
 voluptuousnes & honesty,
 as of beast & man, honesty
 admits not this knot, but
 bothe abhorre, & reiecte yt.
 For truly the end of good
 & euil, whiche ought to bee
 after one sort, may be min-
 gled, & tempered & things
 disagreeable. But hereof
 hitherto for it is answergh-
 tie matter, and in an other
 place discoursed more, at
 large. Now to the purpose
 After what sorte then the
 matter is to bee resolved,
 yf at anye tyme profite
 in appaunce doth strue
 & honesty, it is before suffi-
 ciently debated, but if volup-
 tuousnes

nō plus quā amicitia si hęc
 non p se expetatur: sed ad
 voluptatē, vtilitatēūē refe-
 ratur. Cōferamus igitur in
 pauca. Nā vt vtilitatē nul-
 lā esse docuimus, quę hone-
 stati esset cōtraria: sic onē
 voluptatē dicim⁹ honesta-
 ti esse cōtrariā. Quō magis
 reprehēdēdos Calliphonē
 & Dinomachū iudico, qui
 se direpturos controuersiā
 putauerūt si cū honestate
 voluptatē, tāquā cū homi-
 ne pecudē copulauiſſēt, nō
 recipit istā cōiūctionē ho-
 nestas: aspernatur, repellit.
 Nec vero finis honorū &
 malorū, qui simplex esse de-
 bet, ex dissimilibus reb⁹ mi-
 sceri, et temperari potest.
 Sed de hoc (magna enī res
 est) alio loco plurib⁹. Nūc
 ad ppositū. Quēadmodū
 igitur, si quando ea, quę vi-
 deretur vtilitas, honestati
 repugnat: dijudicanda res
 sit satis est supra disputatū

de Officiis.

Sin autē speciem vtilitatis etiā voluptas habere dicatur: nulla potest esse ei cū honestate cōiūctio. Nā vt tribuam⁹ aliquid voluptati. condimenti fortasse nō nihil, vtilitatis certē nihil habebit.

PERORATIO OPERIS.

Habes à patre mun⁹ Marce fili, mea quidē sētentia, magnū, sed perinde erit vt acceperis. Quāquam & hi tibi tres libri inter Cratippi Cōmentarios tanquam hospites erunt recipiendi. Sed vt si ipse venissem Athenas (quod quidem esset factū nisi me ē medio cursu clara voce patria reuocasset) aliquādo me quoq; audires: sic quoniā his voluminibus ad te profecta vox mea est. tribues histēporis, quātū poteris: poteris autem quantum voles, Cū vero itellexero, te hoc

tuoules also be cōpted to haue a shew of profit it can haue no felowship & honestie. For be it so, wee some what esteeme pleasure some sallowe perhaps it shal haue in it, but surely no profite at all.

The conclusion and dedication of his woorks.

An exhortation to his sonne,

you haue frō poure father a present sonne Marke, in my opinion verclie muche worth, but it shal bee euen so as ye take it. Notwithstanding these three bookes are, as straungers. to be entercyued of you, amonge Cratippus notes. But as ye shold ōce haue herd mee also, yf I had come to Athenes, which had bē done in dede, but y my countrey called mee back with open mouthe, in the midst of my iourney, so seemge in these volumes my voice is conueied vnto you, ye shal be stow as muche tie vpo thē as you may, & so much you may, as you wil. But whē I shal vnderstande y you take

take pleasure in this kinde of knowledge.thē I bothe present there shortly,as I trust,and in your absence, absent will speake w you. fare you well therefore, my Cicero,& assure youre self & you are to me doubt- lesse right dere,& yet farre dearer shalbe if in such bookes,and lessons, you will sette your de- light.	sciēcię genere gaudere:tū & presens tecum ppediē (vt spero) & dum aberis absens loquar.Vale igitur mi Cicero,tibiq; persuade, te mihi quidem esse charis- simum, sed multò fore chariōrem, si talibus monuemētis, pꝛe- ceptisq; læ- tabere.
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